57 California opinions name it 3 courts 1880–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Seely v. White Motor Co.green2 sentences2024The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.” (Seely, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 15 .) “Final recognition that ‘The remedies of injured consumers ought not be made to depend on the intricacies of the law of sales’ [citations] caused this court to abandon the fiction of warranty in favor of strict liability in tort.” (Ibid., quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1912) 200 F. 322, 323 .) But the S 2024The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.” (Seely, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 15 .) “Final recognition that ‘The remedies of injured consumers ought not be made to depend on the intricacies of the law of sales’ [citations] caused this court to abandon the fiction of warranty in favor of strict liability in tort.” (Ibid., quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1912) 200 F. 322, 323 .) But the S | 4 | 6 |
Stovall v. Dennogreen2 sentences2022While “a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review,” the “effect of the subsequent ruling of invalidity on prior final judgments when collaterally attacked is subject to no set ‘principle of absolute retroactive invalidity’ but depends upon a consideration of” multiple factors, including “ ‘public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application.’ ” (Id. at p. 627, italics added.) Two years after Linkletter, in Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 , the high court refined its analysis into a three-part test based in part on th 2018To accomplish these goals, the court introduced a now familiar three-factor analysis for deciding whether the courts should give a new rule retroactive application. "[W]e must look to the purpose of the [new] rule; the reliance placed upon the [old] doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of [the new rule]." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 636 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 ; see also Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 , 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 ( Stovall ) [courts must consider "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the ex | 2 | 3 |
Wood v. Riverside General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo 2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo | 2 | 2 |
Del Real v. City of Riversidegreen2 sentences2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo 2004(See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ]; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 ].) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement *1241 subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 8 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held the same prior to its ruling in this case. 9 *1242 This consistency in the holdings of our courts follo | 2 | 2 |
People v. Behrmanngreen2 sentences1989(See People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Cal.2d 459, 460-461 [ 211 P.2d 575 ].) These applications of rule 31 are in accord with the general rule that, “An order or decree of court takes eifect from the time it is pronounced, and the failure of the clerk to file the papers or enter the judgment does not delay or defeat the operation of the court’s pronouncement. [Citations.]” (Fr esno Estate Co. v. Fiske (1916) 172 Cal. 583, 597-598 [ 157 P. 1127 ].) These applications are also consistent with the history of rule 31. 1989(See People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Cal.2d 459, 460-461 [ 211 P.2d 575 ].) These applications of rule 31 are in accord with the general rule that, “An order or decree of court takes eifect from the time it is pronounced, and the failure of the clerk to file the papers or enter the judgment does not delay or defeat the operation of the court’s pronouncement. [Citations.]” (Fr esno Estate Co. v. Fiske (1916) 172 Cal. 583, 597-598 [ 157 P. 1127 ].) These applications are also consistent with the history of rule 31. | 2 | 2 |
Fresno Estate Co. v. Fiskegreen2 sentences1989(See People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Cal.2d 459, 460-461 [ 211 P.2d 575 ].) These applications of rule 31 are in accord with the general rule that, “An order or decree of court takes eifect from the time it is pronounced, and the failure of the clerk to file the papers or enter the judgment does not delay or defeat the operation of the court’s pronouncement. [Citations.]” (Fr esno Estate Co. v. Fiske (1916) 172 Cal. 583, 597-598 [ 157 P. 1127 ].) These applications are also consistent with the history of rule 31. 1989(See People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Cal.2d 459, 460-461 [ 211 P.2d 575 ].) These applications of rule 31 are in accord with the general rule that, “An order or decree of court takes eifect from the time it is pronounced, and the failure of the clerk to file the papers or enter the judgment does not delay or defeat the operation of the court’s pronouncement. [Citations.]” (Fr esno Estate Co. v. Fiske (1916) 172 Cal. 583, 597-598 [ 157 P. 1127 ].) These applications are also consistent with the history of rule 31. | 2 | 2 |
Hinojosa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2017Suffice it to say that the history of this rule is "tortuous," that Dean Pound thought in 1954 that the rule was " 'moribund,' " and that some think that the exceptions have swallowed the rule. ( Id. at p. 156, 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 .) Given this unprepossessing background, and the requirements of the case before us, the best course is to inquire to what facts the rule is intended to apply. 2017Suffice it to say that the history of this rule is "tortuous," that Dean Pound thought in 1954 that the rule was " 'moribund,' " and that some think that the exceptions have swallowed the rule. ( Id. at p. 156, 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 .) Given this unprepossessing background, and the requirements of the case before us, the best course is to inquire to what facts the rule is intended to apply. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Philpotgreen1 sentence2026(See People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [defendant’s extensive criminal history and parole and probation violations were “strong indication[s] of unwillingness or inability to comply with the law”].) Even though Celaya proffered evidence of efforts at rehabilitation, the trial court could find the weight of the evidence suggested a lack of reform, well after the age Celaya could be considered a youthful offender. | 1 | 1 |
Tanner v. Public Employees' Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2022(DiCarlo, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 486 ; accord, Tanner v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 743, 756 [predecessor to § 20636 enacted as part of bill to address local contracting agencies’ recently uncovered practice of intentionally inflating employees’ final compensation].) The DiCarlo court explained that the history of rule 571 “demonstrates that it was implemented” to “ ‘allow local agency and school district employers to report only those items of special compensation that are delineated in regulations adopted by the Board [of Administration]. [¶] Proposed Sec | 1 | 1 |
EAST BAY ASIAN LOCAL DEVEOPMENT v. Stategreen2 sentences2015There is nothing in the history of the clause to suggest that the drafters or the electorate intended that the clause be any more protective of the doctrine of separation of church and state than the First Amendment establishment clause.” (East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 718-719.) Thus, in determining whether a government practice violates the establishment clause of the state Constitution, California courts are guided by First Amendment establishment clause jurisprudence. 2015(See, e.g., East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“Our construction of the establishment clause of article I, section 4 is . .. guided by decisions of the Supreme Court.”]; Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ] (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) (Sands) [“federal cases . . . supply guidance for interpreting [the establishment clause of state Constitution]”].) 2. | 1 | 1 |
Sands v. Morongo Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“Our construction of the establishment clause of article I, section 4 is . .. guided by decisions of the Supreme Court.”]; Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ] (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) (Sands) [“federal cases . . . supply guidance for interpreting [the establishment clause of state Constitution]”].) 2. 2015(See, e.g., East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“Our construction of the establishment clause of article I, section 4 is . .. guided by decisions of the Supreme Court.”]; Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ] (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) (Sands) [“federal cases . . . supply guidance for interpreting [the establishment clause of state Constitution]”].) 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Sanabria v. Embreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Askew v. Askewgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silberg v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ballardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lorenson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.red | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Johnsonred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Doughertygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guerrerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Court (Greer)green | 1 | 1 |
| Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. And Cosmair, Inc. v. Edd Pruitt and Marjorie Ann Pruittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Krompholdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacPherson v. . Buick Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fross v. Wottongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mattesongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Albertsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kekogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wademangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences2022In Linkletter, the high court set forth several factors relevant to the retroactivity analysis, including “the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” (Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 629 .) The court noted that “in each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial — the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” (Id. at p. 639, fn. omitted.) And the court suggested that this basic-fairness-and- reliability 2020(Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 619 .) Linkletter directed courts to “weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” (Id. at p. 629.) The Linkletter court weighed these factors and concluded Mapp did not apply retroactively on habeas corpus review, observing the purpose of Mapp’s application of the exclusionary rule to the states to deter illegal police action would not be served by retroactive application. | 5 | 1965–2022 |
Estate of Hart
green
2 sentences1957(See Estate of Hart, 92 Cal.App.2d 691 [ 208 P.2d 59 ], where the history of this rule is traced and the cases assembled.) ” The order in the present proceeding for a writ of error coram nobis is not appealable. 1957(See Estate of Hart, 92 Cal.App.2d 691 [ 208 P.2d 59 ], where the history of this rule is traced and the cases assembled.) ” The order in the present proceeding for a writ of error coram nobis is not appealable. | 3 | 1952–1957 |
McNerlin v. Denno
green
2 sentences2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether 2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re the Probate of the Will Shattuck
green
2 sentences1958Our Supreme Court in Estate of Sutro, supra, 155 Cal. 727 , cited and followed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York (In re Shattuck’s Will, 193 N.Y. 446 [ 86 N.E. 455 ]) holding that a bequest in trust for “religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions” to be chosen by the executor was invalid, because the bequest might go to a private educational institution conducted for profit. 1958Our Supreme Court in Estate of Sutro, supra, 155 Cal. 727 , cited and followed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York (In re Shattuck’s Will, 193 N.Y. 446 [ 86 N.E. 455 ]) holding that a bequest in trust for “religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions” to be chosen by the executor was invalid, because the bequest might go to a private educational institution conducted for profit. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
Estate of Sutro
green
2 sentences1958Our Supreme Court in Estate of Sutro, supra, 155 Cal. 727 , cited and followed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York ( In re Shattuck's Will, 193 N.Y. 446 [ 86 N.E. 455 ]) holding that a bequest in trust for "religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions" to be chosen by the executor was invalid, because the bequest might go to a private educational institution conducted for profit. 1958Our Supreme Court in Estate of Sutro, supra, 155 Cal. 727 , cited and followed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York (In re Shattuck’s Will, 193 N.Y. 446 [ 86 N.E. 455 ]) holding that a bequest in trust for “religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions” to be chosen by the executor was invalid, because the bequest might go to a private educational institution conducted for profit. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
Wood v. Peterson Farms Co.
green
2 sentences1952(See Estate of Hart, 92 Cal.App.2d 691 [ 208 P.2d 59 ], where the history of this rule is traced and the cases assembled.) In Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 P.2d 922 ], the court held that in civil actions an appeal will lie from an order terminating proceedings for a record on appeal under subdivision 2 of section 963, Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes an appeal from “any special order made after final judgment.” But while special orders made after final judgment are appealable in civil actions under section 963, subdivision 2, Code of Civil Procedure they have uniformly 1952(See Estate of Hart, 92 Cal.App.2d 691 [ 208 P.2d 59 ], where the history of this rule is traced and the cases assembled.) In Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 P.2d 922 ], the court held that in civil actions an appeal will lie from an order terminating proceedings for a record on appeal under subdivision 2 of section 963, Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes an appeal from “any special order made after final judgment.” But while special orders made after final judgment are appealable in civil actions under section 963, subdivision 2, Code of Civil Procedure they have uniformly | 2 | 1952–1952 |
In Re Estate of Allen
green
2 sentences1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. 1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. | 2 | 1952–1952 |
Dunham v. Weisenberger
green
2 sentences1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. 1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. | 2 | 1952–1952 |
Spafford v. Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank
neutral
2 sentences1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. 1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. | 2 | 1952–1952 |
Estate of Cahill
neutral
2 sentences1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. 1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. | 2 | 1952–1952 |
Estate of O'Dea
green
2 sentences1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. 1952(Estate of O’Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [ 104 P.2d 368 ]; Estate of Allen, 175 Cal. 356 [ 165 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Spafford, 175 Cal. 52 [ 165 P. 1 ]; Estate of Cahill, 142 Cal. 628 [ 76 P. 383 ]; Estate of Hart, supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at p. 695 ; Estate of Ryker, 92 Cal.App.2d 162 [ 206 P.2d 406 ].) In Estate of Allen, supra, the court held that an order denying a motion under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for relief from default in the preparation of a transcript to be used on appeal from a probate order is not appealable. | 2 | 1952–1952 |
Ketterer v. Armour & Co.
green
1 sentence2024The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.” (Seely, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 15 .) “Final recognition that ‘The remedies of injured consumers ought not be made to depend on the intricacies of the law of sales’ [citations] caused this court to abandon the fiction of warranty in favor of strict liability in tort.” (Ibid., quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1912) 200 F. 322, 323 .) But the S | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Carpenter v. JACK IN THE BOX CORP.
green
1 sentence2022“The history of rule 3.1702 indicates that the ‘outside’ time limit for claiming prejudgment statutory attorney fees was intended to be entry of a final judgment—not entry of a prejudgment appealable order” (Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 468 , italics added), as confirmed by the fact that rule 3.1702(c) addresses claims for recovery of attorney fees on appeal following remittitur. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Dicarlo v. Cnty. of Monterey
green
1 sentence2022(DiCarlo, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 486 ; accord, Tanner v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 743, 756 [predecessor to § 20636 enacted as part of bill to address local contracting agencies’ recently uncovered practice of intentionally inflating employees’ final compensation].) The DiCarlo court explained that the history of rule 571 “demonstrates that it was implemented” to “ ‘allow local agency and school district employers to report only those items of special compensation that are delineated in regulations adopted by the Board [of Administration]. [¶] Proposed Sec | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Etchieson v. Texas
green
1 sentence2018(See also McNerlin v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 1933 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 [directing appeals court to apply Jackson v. Denno retroactively].) In Linkletter , however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its past approach was not required. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." ( Linkletter , supra , 381 U.S. at p. 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 .) As a result, the court reasoned, "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case [of applying a new rule retroactively] by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Dent
green
2 sentences2018In Dent , the defendant's appointed counsel failed to show up on time for the first day of trial. ( Dent , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 216 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 527 , 65 P.3d 1286 .) After "delineat[ing] the history of defense counsel's requests for continuances and failure to appear on the record," the trial judge indicated that he would continue the trial once again and relieved the defendant's attorneys as counsel of record. ( Ibid. ) He then advised the defendant that he " 'must be represented by attorneys that are senior trial attorneys. 2018In Dent , the defendant's appointed counsel failed to show up on time for the first day of trial. ( Dent , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 216 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 527 , 65 P.3d 1286 .) After "delineat[ing] the history of defense counsel's requests for continuances and failure to appear on the record," the trial judge indicated that he would continue the trial once again and relieved the defendant's attorneys as counsel of record. ( Ibid. ) He then advised the defendant that he " 'must be represented by attorneys that are senior trial attorneys. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kahn v. LASORDA'S DUGOUT, INC.
green
1 sentence2017“Words used in a statute . . . should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” ’ ” (Kahn v. Lasorda’s Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1122-1123 .) We agree with the return that rule 8.851 “is expressed in plain, simple language.” There is therefore no need to look to sources extrinsic to the rule itself to determine that the rule’s drafters intended to provide appointed counsel only to misdemeanor defendants | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Drope v. Missouri
green
1 sentence2014When discussing the rule in federal court, however, the Supreme Court did not use the word “capacity.” “Accordingly, as to federal cases, we have approved a test of incompetence which seeks to ascertain whether a criminal defendant ‘“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”’ Dusky[, supra,] 362 U.S. at [p.] 402.”’ (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 172 .)” Carisalas’s reliance on Drope is misplaced. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hardy
green
2 sentences2012The genesis of the instruction is People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52 [ 198 P.2d 865 ] (Hardy). 2012The genesis of the instruction is People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52 [ 198 P.2d 865 ] (Hardy). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Sims v. Charness green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Barela v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Schweiger v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Nieto Benitez green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Monge green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Raven v. Deukmejian green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Gory green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Skinner green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Drew green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Rodriguez green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Pacific Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Ivan Melchor Moreno and Rigoberto Melchor Moreno green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Doyle v. Ohio green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Corfield v. Coryell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sopp v. Smith green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Kollert v. Cundiff green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| People v. Hutchinson green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.