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Call Now: 904-383-7448Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
- Freedom of religion, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. III; Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. IV.
Freedom of speech and press, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V.
Freedom of assembly and petition, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. IX.
Forbidding direct or indirect aid to any church institution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII.
Tax exemptions for religious groups, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV.
Exercise of rights of freedom of speech and right to petition government for redress of grievances; legislative findings; verification of claims; definitions; procedure on motions; exception; attorney's fees and expenses, § 9-11-11.1.
Common day of rest, § 10-1-570 et seq.
Adult's reliance on prayer or religious nonmedical means of treatment of dependent, § 15-11-107.
Invasion of privacy through electronic mediums, T. 16, C. 11, Pt. 3.
Harassing communication, § 16-11-39.1.
Free Speech and Expression at State Institutions of Higher Education, P. 1D, A. 2, Ch. 3, T. 20.
Prohibition against mass gatherings without a permit, § 31-27-2.
Statement of rights under federal law, § 34-6-20.1.
Discrimination in public employment on basis of religion, §§ 45-19-29,45-19-34.
Access of news media to public meetings of departments, agencies, etc., of states, counties, etc., § 50-14-1.
Immunity of broadcasters from liability for Levi's Call: Georgia's Amber Alert Program, § 51-1-50.
- The Supreme Court has declared that the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, protects the personal rights specified in this amendment from state, as well as Congressional acts. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) (freedom of religion); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108 (1927) (freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) (freedom of the press); and Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937) (freedom of assembly).
- For article, "Religious Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment," see 9 Ga. B.J. 141 (1946). For article criticizing operation of this amendment in relation to right of privacy, see 10 Ga. B.J. 53 (1947). For article discussing conflict between free speech guarantees and municipal ordinances protecting public tranquility, see 14 Ga. B.J. 191 (1951). For article "Free Speech and the Interest in Local Law and Order," see 1 J. of Pub. L. 41 (1952). For article, "Freedoms of the First Amendment in Georgia," see 15 Ga. B.J. 405 (1953). For article, "Crime Comic Books: Government Control and Their Impact on Juvenile Conduct," see 7 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (1956). For article, "State Precedents for the Bill of Rights," see 7 J. of Pub. L. 323 (1958). For article, "Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction," see 8 J. of Pub. L. 66 (1959). For article, "Interpreting the Georgia Constitution Today," see 10 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1959). For article, "Government Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemption from Military Service," see 13 J. of Pub. L. 16 (1964). For article on this amendment's separation of church and state and state aid to parochial schools under the child benefit theory, see 13 J. of Pub. L. 76 (1964). For article "Religion and the Constitution - A Symposium on the Supreme Court Decisions on Prayer and Bible Reading in the Public Schools," see 13 J. of Pub. L. 247 et seq. (1964). For article, "The Supreme Court and Religion in Public Higher Education," see 13 J. of Pub. L. 343 (1964). For article, "Public Law, Politics, and the Local Courts: Obscene Literature in Portland," see 14 J. of Pub. L. 105 (1965). For article characterizing nonviolent demonstrations on the property of another as illegitimate exercises of the freedom of speech and espousing the "right not to listen," see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (1965). For article, "The Legal Status of the American Communist Party: 1965," see 15 J. of Pub. L. 94 (1966). For article, "Free Speech: The 'Missing Link' in the Law of Obscenity," see 16 J. of Pub. L. 81 (1967). For article, "Civil Disobedience: A New Credo?" see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 16 (1967). For article, "The Right to Denounce Public Officials in England and the United States," see 17 J. of Pub. L. 78 (1968). For article discussing this amendment's restrictions on judicial power to punish for contempt outside the courtroom, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 341 (1968). For article discussing treatment by Georgia appellate courts of controversies arising from the use of streets and public parks as forums for expression of views, see 3 Ga. L. Rev. 80 (1968). For article, "Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of School Officials," see 19 J. of Pub. L. 209 (1970). For article analyzing relationship of religion and government in United States from a sociological and theological perspective, see 19 J. of Pub. L. 283 (1970). For article, "Obscenity Law: A Public Policy Analysis," see 20 J. of Pub. L. 503 (1971). For article, "The Principle of Nondivisiveness and the Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools," see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1971). For article discussing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 396 U.S. 1041, 90 S. Ct. 680, 24 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1970), and the status of the theory of the implied trust on local church properties in favor of parent organization, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 515 (1971). For article on the judicial development of U.S. Const., Amend. 14 due process clause and the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 533 (1971). For article advocating absolutist interpretation of this amendment and rejecting clear and present danger, and balancing tests, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1972). For article, "Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of Dwindling Significance," see 22 J. of Pub. L. 3 (1973). For article discussing the validity of contempt of court sanctions based upon a party's disobedience of an injunction constituting a void prior restraint of constitutionally-protected activity, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 246 (1973). For article, "The Response of Georgia's Public School Systems to the School Prayer Decisions: 'Whipping a Dead Horse,' " see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 425 (1973). For article, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties: 1973-1974," see 23 Emory L.J. 905 (1974). For article discussing obscenity laws and their conflict with this amendment, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 291 (1974). For article, "Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for Standards," see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 837 (1974). For article, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties: 1974-1975," see 24 Emory L.J. 937 (1975). For article discussing uncertainty in the law of obscenity and suggesting proposals for avoiding resultant chilling effect, see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 533 (1975). For article, "Personal Liability of State Officials Under State and Federal Law," see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 821 (1975). For article, "Permissible Entanglement Under the Establishment Clause," see 25 Emory L.J. 17 (1976). For article discussing commercial speech and this amendment's protection, see 25 Emory L.J. 815 (1976). For article, "Sexual Privacy - Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions," see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 93 (1976). For article discussing constitutional rights of students to form religious clubs in the public school setting, and possible establishment problems, see 27 Emory L.J. 3 (1978). For article, "Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems With Enforcement Procedures," see 27 Emory L.J. 609 (1978). For article, "The Supreme Court on Privacy and the Press," see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 215 (1978). For article discussing private actions for invasion of privacy, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 513 (1978). For article surveying cases dealing with criminal law and criminal procedure from June 1, 1977, through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1978). For article analyzing the relationship between the military and the right of individuals under this amendment to engage in political activities, see 28 Emory L.J. 3 (1979). For article, "Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protection of the Laws," see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 505 (1979). For article, "Watchdogs and Leash Laws: Restraints on the Press," see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 615 (1979). For article discussing federal civil litigation, with respect to U.S. Const., Art. III, U.S. Const., Amends. 1, 14, and 15 issues, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 821 (1979). For article surveying judicial and legislative developments in Georgia's tort laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 229 (1979). For article, "Speech and Campaign Reform: Congress, The Courts and Community," see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 195 (1980). For article surveying 1979 fifth circuit decisions concerning rights of both public employees and prisoners, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 885 (1980). For article discussing the concept of a mandatory public service obligation for lawyers, see 29 Emory L.J. 997 (1980). For article, "The Constitutionality of Labor Unions' Collection and Use of Forced Dues for Non-Bargaining Purposes," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 561 (1981). For article, "Constitutional Criminal Litigation," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 993 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 51 (1981). For article, "Regulation of Advertising by Lawyers in Georgia," see 18 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1981). For article discussing eleventh circuit court cases in the year 1981 dealing with constitutional civil law, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1061 (1982). For survey article on constitutional law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For survey article on local government law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1982). For article discussing and proposing a plan for regulation of corporate spending in ballot issue campaigns, see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 675 (1983). For article surveying 1982 Eleventh Circuit cases involving constitutional civil law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1221 (1983). For annual survey of constitutional law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (1983). For annual survey on constitutional law, see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 137 (1984). For article, "Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930," see 35 Emory L.J. 59 (1986). For article, "The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface," see 35 Emory L.J. 139 (1986). For article, Introduction to Symposium on Cable TV Regulation, see 35 Emory L.J. 555 (1986). For article, "Cable Leased Access and the Conflict Among First Amendment Rights and First Amendment Values," see 35 Emory L.J. 563 (1986). For article, "Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective," see 35 Emory L.J. 777 (1986). For article, "Constitutional Judgment on Non-public School Aid: Fresh Guidelines or New Roadblocks?," see 35 Emory L.J. 795 (1986). For article, "Employer and Consultant Reporting Under the LMRDA," see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 533 (1986). For survey of 1985 Eleventh Circuit cases on civil constitutional law, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1253 (1986). For survey of 1985 Eleventh Circuit cases on employment discrimination, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1315 (1986). For essay, "Standing and Rights," see 36 Emory L.J. 1195 (1987). For article, "Judicial Privilege," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 89 (1987). For article, "Religious Liberty Law and the States," see 3 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 19 (1987). For article, "A Case for Press Responsibility," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 771 (1987). For article, "Libel in the Media: A Reporter's Perspective," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 779 (1987). For article, "Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps: New Hope for Preserving Freedom of the Press," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 785 (1987). For article, "Taking Libel Reform Seriously," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 793 (1987). For article, "A Suggestion to End the Struggle over Libel," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 809 (1987). For article, "There's Got to Be a Better Way: Alternatives to the High Cost of Libel," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 819 (1987). For article, "Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Law Reform," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 835 (1987). For article, "Media Defendants Rediscover Common Law's 'Fair Report' Privilege As Supreme Court Expands Access to Judicial Proceedings While Limiting First Amendment Protection," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 859 (1987). For article, "Awards of Damages for Mental Anguish Without Proof of Harm to Reputation: Is There Parasitic or Independent Life After Gertz?," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 881 (1987). For article, "Contempt of Court in Georgia", see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 66 (1987). For article, "State Bar Strengthens Legislative Efforts," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 116 (1987). For article, "Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, "Is Disparity a Problem," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1988). For article, "Juvenileness: A Single-Edged Constitutional Sword," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 949 (1988). For article, "Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National 'Religion,' " see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 495 (1988). For survey of 1987 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional law - civil, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1169 (1988). For survey of 1987 Eleventh Circuit cases on employment discrimination, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1215 (1988). For survey of Eleventh Circuit cases on evidence, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1259 (1988). For annual survey of constitutional law, see 40 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (1988). For article, "Public Employees and the First Amendment," see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 24 (1988). For article, "Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation," see 38 Emory L.J. 67 (1989). For article, "The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC," see 38 Emory L.J. 714 (1989). For article, "A Senate of Five: An Essay on Sexuality and Law," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 859 (1989). For article, "Metaphor and Paradox," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1053 (1989).
For article, "On a Medical Moraine: Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism," see 39 Emory L.J. 9 (1990). For article, "Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860," see 39 Emory L.J. 65 (1990). For article, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State," see 39 Emory L.J. 149 (1990). For article, "Religion and the Constitution of the American Political System," see 39 Emory L.J. 165 (1990). For article, "Republic and Liberal State: The Place of Religion in an Ambiguous Polity," see 39 Emory L.J. 191 (1990). For article, "Securities Regulation and the First Amendment," see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 223 (1990). For article, "Federal and State 'State Action': The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine," see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 327 (1990). For essay, "The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence," see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 629 (1990). For article, "Lemon or Marsh? An Establishment Clause Conundrum," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1131 (1990). For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law during 1989, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1261 (1990). For article, "Religious Exemptions As Affirmative Action," see 40 Emory L.J. 77 (1991). For annual eleventh circuit survey of constitutional law - civil, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1313 (1991). For article, "The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay," see 40 Emory L.J. 489 (1991). For article, "Introduction: The United States Bill of Rights, International Bill of Human Rights, and Other 'Bills' ", see 40 Emory L.J. 731 (1991). For article on free speech and school governance, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 253 (1992). For annual eleventh circuit survey of constitutional law - civil, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1075 (1992). For annual eleventh circuit survey of constitutional criminal law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1113 (1992). For article, "Secrecy Orders and Government Litigants: A Northwest Passage Around the Freedom of Information Act?", see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 121 (1992). For article, "Individual Rights and the Powers of Government," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343 (1993). For article, "Conceptual Interdependence and Comparative Competence," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 391 (1993). For article, "The Structure of Rights," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415 (1993). For article, "Rights as Trumps," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 463 (1993). For article, "Comment On: Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 567 (1993). For article, "On Legal Autonomy," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 737 (1993). For article, "Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 881 (1993). For article, "Constitutional Civil Law," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1107 (1993). For article, "Distinguishing Speech from Conduct," see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 621 (1994). For article, "The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising," see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 705 (1994). For article, "Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communication Torts, and the Borderline of the Brandenburg Test," see 29 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1994). For article, "The First Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Contemporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence," see 29 Ga. L. Rev. 81 (1994). For article, "Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 - December 31, 1993: Constitutional Civil Law," see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 1217 (1994). For article, "The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values," see 43 Emory L.J. 1189 (1994). For article, "Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause," see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 495 (1995). For article, "Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grument," see 44 Emory L.J. 433 (1995). For article, "1994 Eleventh Circuit Survey: Constitutional Civil Law," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1275 (1995). For article, "Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1017 (1995). For article, "Graduation Prayer After Lee v. Weisman: A Cautionary Tale," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1097 (1995). For article, "The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1123 (1995). For article, "The Ironic State of Religious Liberty in America," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1157 (1995). For article, "The First Amendment: Has the Supreme Court Overlooked its Role as Guardian of our Freedom by Failing to Distinguish Between Real Threat and Mere Shadow?" see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1167 (1995). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional civil law, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 745 (1996). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on employment discrimination, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 797 (1996). For article, "Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment," see 47 Emory L.J. 859 (1998). For article, "Speaking Out Outside the Courtroom," see 47 Emory L.J. 889 (1998). For article, "Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press," see 47 Emory L.J. 895 (1998). For article, "To Say 'I Do': Shahar v. Bowers, Same-Sex Marriage, and Public Employee Free Speech Rights," see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 381 (1998). For article, "Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The Consequences of Falling into the Theoretical Abyss," see 33 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1998). For article, "Core Societal Values Deserve Federal Aid: Schools, Tax Credits, and the Establishment Clause," see 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1999). For article, "Employment Law Responsibilities of Public Employers in Georgia," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 10 (1999). For article, "Expressive Commerce in Cypberspace: Public Goods, Network Effects, and Free Speech," see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 789 (2000). For article, "Three Arguments Against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory, Constitutional Torts, and Freedom of Speech," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 583 (2000). For article, "Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still Doesn't Get It!" see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 603 (2000). For article, "An Essay on Texas v. Lesage," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 621 (2000). For article, "Mt. Healthy, Causation, and Affirmative Defenses," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 637 (2000). For article, "Purveyors of Hate on the Internet: Are We Ready for Hate Spam?" see 17 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 379 (2000). For article, "Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause," see 17 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 691 (2001). Section 1983, the First Amendment, and public employee speech: shaping the right to fit the remedy (and vice versa), see 35 Ga. L. Rev. 939 (2001). The mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., see 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1087 (2001). Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: creating a complete definition of prior restraint, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1087 (2001). Constitutional civil rights, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1279 (2001). For article, "Free Speech and the Right to Offend: Old Wars, New Battles, Different Media," see 18 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 671 (2002). For article, "Statutory Civil Rights," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1499 (2002). For article, "Constitutional Civil Rights," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1315 (2002). For article, "Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet Governance," see 52 Emory L.J. 187 (2003). For article, "Constitutional Civil Rights," see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1379 (2003). For article, "Qualified Immunity in the Eleventh Circuit After Hope v. Pelzer," see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 22 (2003). For article, "Hanging the Ten Commandments on the Wall Separating Church and State: Toward a New Establishment Clause Jurisprudence," see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1329 (2004). For Eleventh Circuit survey article on constitutional civil rights decisions in 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1131 (2004). For article, "Video Games as a Protected Form of Expression," see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 153 (2005). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). "Government Regulation or Other 'Abridgements' of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Review under the First Amendment," see 54 Emory L.J. 979 (2005). For article, "Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States Adopt European 'Mobbing' Laws?," see 35 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 53 (2006). For article, "The Foundations and Frontiers of Religious Liberty: A Symposium Convened by The Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University Sponsored by The Henry R. Luce Foundation," see 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 43 (2007). For article, "Freedom of the Press 2.0," see 42 Ga. L. Rev. 309 (2008). For article, "The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause: A Refutation of the Argument that the Clause Serves to Protect Religious or Nonreligious Minorities," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 595 (2008). For article, "Advancing the Consensus: 60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?," see 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 69 (2009). For article, "Constitutional Narratives: Constitutional Adjudication on the Religion Clauses in Australia and Malaysia," see 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 437 (2009). For article, "Religious Freedom, Democracy, and International Human Rights," see 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 583 (2009). For article, "Sex In and Out of Intimacy," see 59 Emory L.J. 809 (2010). For article, "The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions and Justices," see 60 Emory L.J. 408 (2010). For article, "A New Conception of Israeli Grundnorm: The Jewish Immigration 'Trump Card' as the Solution to the Falasha Mura Exception," see 24 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 357 (2010). For article, "Terrorism, Historical Analogies, and Modern Choices," see 24 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 589 (2010). For article, "'I'm Not Gay, M'Kay?': Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?," see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 739 (2010). For article, "Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts," see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 107 (2010). For article, "Contrasting Concurrences of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism and Paternalism in Commercial and Student Speech Cases," see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 321 (2010). For article, "The Future of Music: Reconfiguring Public Performance Rights," see 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 207 (2010). For article, "Practice Point: Right of Publicity: A Practitioner's Enigma," see 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 351 (2010). For article, "Religious Symbols on Government Property: Lift High the Cross? Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property," see 25 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 5 (2011). For article, "Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Believe, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms," see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 657 (2011). For article, "Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?," see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 489 (2011). For article, "Bullying in Public Schools: The Intersection Between the Student's Free Speech Rights and the School's Duty to Protect," see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 407 (2011). For article, "The Constitutional Right not to Kill," see 62 Emory L.J. 121 (2012). For article, "State Government: Open and Public Meetings," see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2012). For article, "Public Officers and Employees: Division of Archives and History," see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 214 (2012). For annual survey on criminal law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2012). For annual survey on local government law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 213 (2012). For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012). For article, "Practice Point: You Look Complicated Today: Representing an Illegal Graffiti Artist in a Copyright Infringement Case Against a Major International Retailer," see 20 J. Intell. Prop. L. 75 (2012). For article, "Having it Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools," see 63 Emory L. J. 303 (2013). For article, "Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants," see 41 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 637 (2013). For article, "(Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation," see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 731 (2013). For article, "Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherance in Hosanna-Tabor," see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 405 (2013). For article, "Employment Discrimination," see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 891 (2013). For article, "Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the Obscenity Defense in Copyright," see 20 J. Intell. Prop. L. 209 (2013). For article, "How Law Made Silicon Valley," see 63 Emory L. J. 239 (2014). For article, "Terrorism and Associations," see 63 Emory L. J. 581 (2014). For article, "The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 287 (2014). For article, "Sentencing Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy Nullification," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 375 (2014). For article, "Public Officers and Employees: Employees' Insurance and Benefit Plans," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 177 (2014). For article, "Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013: Article: Constitutional Criminal Procedure," see 65 Emory L.J. 891 (2014). For article, "Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in the Legislative Process," see 64 Emory L.J. 1041 (2015). For article, "Religious Arguments by Citizens to Influence Public Policy: The Lessons of the Establishment Clause," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 273 (2015). For article, "Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading History in Jones," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 471 (2015). For article, "Copyright = Speech," see 65 Emory L.J. 199 (2015). For article, "Freedom from Thought," see 65 Emory L.J. 291 (2015). For article, "Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claim of Wedding Vendors," see 65 Emory L.J. 241 (2015). For article, "Southern Dreams and a New Theory of First Amendment Legal Realism," see 65 Emory L.J. 303 (2015). For article, "Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine," see 65 Emory L.J. 359 (2015). For article, "On the Distinction Between Speech and Action," see 65 Emory L.J. 427 (2015). For article, "Uncertainty is the Only Certainty: A Five Category Test to Clarify the Unsure Boundaries Between Content Based and Content Neutral Restrictions on Speech," see 65 Emory L.J. 455 (2015). For article, "The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization," see 65 Emory L.J. 495 (2015). For article, "Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in the Legislative Process," see 64 Emory L.J. 1041 (2015). For article, "The Copymark Creep: How the Normative Standards of Fan Communities Can Rescue Copyright," see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 459 (2015). For article, "Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014: Employment Discrimination," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 927 (2015). For article, "Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions," see 65 Emory L.J. 661 (2016). For article, "Freedom of Conscience in War Time: World War I and the Limits of Civil Liberties," see 65 Emory L.J. 1051 (2016). For article, "Secret Jurisdiction," see 65 Emory L.J. 1313 (2016). For article, "Contraceptive Coverage Falls, No More: Using RFRA to Limit the Scope of Religious Challenges to the ACA's Contraceptive Mandate," see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 435 (2016). For article, "Cyber Espionage and Electronic Surveillance Beyond the Media Coverage," see 66 Emory L.J. 513 (2017). For article, "Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public," see 66 Emory L.J. 527 (2017). For article, "How Both the EU and the U.S. are 'Stricter' Than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information," see 66 Emory L.J. 617 (2017).
For note, "Communist Aliens and the Right to Bail," see 2 J. of Pub. L. 165 (1953). For note discussing compulsory medical attention in light of constitutional protection of freedom of religion, see 22 Ga. B.J. 558 (1960). For note criticizing court reliance on "wall of separation" doctrine in interpreting "no establishment" clause, see 25 Ga. B.J. 319 (1963). For note discussing prejudicial publicity before and during trial in light of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), see 16 J. of Pub. L. 215 (1967). For note advocating a separate obscenity standard for youth as a potential court escape route from the United States Supreme Court's "Supercensor" role, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 707 (1967). For note suggesting the demise of the "Child Benefit" theory in regards to appropriation of public funds for transportation of pupils to private and public schools, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (1967). For note criticizing school policies governing student personal appearance, see 17 J. Pub. L. 151 (1968). For note criticizing Quiner v. Quiner, 57 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1967), holding abnormal religious convictions of mother were not sufficient grounds upon which to deny custody of child, see 17 J. of Pub. L. 193 (1968). For note, "Substantive Due Process and Felony Treatment of Pot Smokers: The Current Conflict," see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 247 (1968). For notes, "Extension of Sullivan's Actual Malice Standard to Defamation of Public Figures," see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 393 (1968). For note discussing free speech and the parameters of the concept of "state action" in light of Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1968), see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 297 (1969). For note discussing the constitutional origins of the substantive right to family autonomy, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 719 (1969). For note discussing limitations on national police power under this amendment, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 359 (1970). For note discussing the unique position of policemen and firemen in reference to labor-management relations, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 540 (1971). For note on public aid to private sectarian schools in light of this amendment, see 25 Mercer L. Rev. 349 (1974). For note discussing this amendment's protections afforded probationers, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 466 (1974). For note discussing teachers' freedom of expression outside the classroom, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 900 (1974). For note, "Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry Into the Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia," see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 919 (1974). For note, "Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Bar Admission," see 24 Emory L.J. 425 (1975). For note discussing constitutionality of zoning ordinances prohibiting clustering of adult movie theatres, in light of American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 275 (1975). For note discussing the constitutionality of limiting political campaign costs and contributions in light of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), see 25 Emory L.J. 400 (1976). For note analyzing sovereign immunity in this state and proposing implementation of a waiver scheme and creation of a court of claims pursuant to Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. V, see 27 Emory L.J. 717 (1978). For note applying this amendment's free speech tests to commercial and noncommercial defamation of corporations and their products and services, see 27 Emory L.J. 755 (1978). For note discussing this amendment's right of free speech as a source of enlightened and effective decision making by the citizenry, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 811 (1978). For note on standards of fault governing litigants in defamation actions in light of this amendment's rights, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 841 (1978). For note discussing the constitutional conflicts between civil rights and the free exercise of religion in private, racially segregated sectarian schools, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 1099 (1978). For note, "Constitutionally Implied Causes of Action: A Policy of Protection, Expansion, or Restriction?" see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1023 (1979). For note, "Christmas Carols in School Assemblies May be Constitutional," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 627 (1980). For note, "Municipal Display of Religious Symbol Enjoined in California," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 637 (1980). For note as to this amendment's rights of expression on shopping center property, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 637 (1981). For note discussing abortion regulation in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 681 (1981). For note on broadcast negligence and the first amendment, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (1981). For note, "The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or on Camera," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 659 (1982). For note, "Conditioning Access to the Public Forum on the Purchase of Insurance," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1983). For note, "An Assessment of the Use of Cameras in State and Federal Courts," see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 389 (1984). For note discussing the constitutionality of publicly displaying a creche, see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 409 (1984). For note, "Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family Testimonial Privileges," see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 173 (1985). For note, "Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence: The Demise of First Amendment Protection for Symbolic Expression?" see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 1371 (1985). For note, "Zanderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel: More Competition in the Legal Marketplace Through Advertising," see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1649 (1986). For note, "The Striker Amendment to the Food Stamp Act: Politics Chipping Away at the Union, Family, and Social Welfare," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 741 (1988). For note, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 773 (1988). For note, "Sharpening the Prongs of the Establishment Clause: Applying Stricter Scrutiny to Majority Religions," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1085 (1989). For note, "The Equal Access Act and Mergens: Balancing the Religion Clauses in Public Schools," see Ga. L. Rev. 1141 (1990). For note, "Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: What Remains of the Right to Choose?," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 769 (1990). For note, "Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Can the State Regulate the Press in the Interest of Protecting the Privacy of Rape Victims?," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1061 (1990). For note, "Freedom of Religion Doesn't Mean Freedom From All Taxes: A Study of Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1481 (1990). For note, "Free Exercise: A 'Hollow Promise' for the Native American in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith," see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1597 (1991). For note, "Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-mask Laws and the First Amendment," see 25 Ga. L. Rev. 819 (1991). For note, "Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart Those Who Terrorize Others," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 285 (1992). For note, "Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary: If at First You Don't Succeed . . .," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 959 (1993). For note, "Lee v. Weisman: No Reason to Give Thanks," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 985 (1993). For note, "R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Right Decision, Flawed Reasoning," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1015 (1993). For note, "Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.: Advertisement for Hit Man Brings Four Million Dollar Hit to Publisher," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1349 (1993). For note on First Amendment protection of a religion's practice of animal sacrifice, see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1357 (1993). For note, "Constitutional Conflict: The Establishment Clause Meets the Free Speech Clause in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District," see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 875 (1994). For note, "Discussing Constitutional Problems with the 1992 Cable Act Must-Carry Regulation," see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 429 (1995). For note, "Discussing Regulation of Pornography on Integrated Broadband Telecommunications Networks," see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 465 (1995). For note on peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation in the jury selection process, see 29 Ga. L. Rev. 493 (1995). For note, "Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Clarify Establishment Clause Analysis," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1189 (1995). For note, "First Amendment Facelift?: Rehnquist Court Crafts New Scrutiny Level for Content-Neutral, Speech Restricting Injunctions in Madsen v. Women's Health Center," see 46 Mercer L. Rev. No. 3 (1995). For note, "Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich: Applying Overbreath Analysis to Post-Viability Abortion Regulations", see 30 Ga. L. Rev. 1151 (1996). For note, "Tilting at Windmills: Defamation and the Private Person in Cyberspace", see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 547 (1996). For review of 1996 civil practice legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 23 (1996). For review of 1996 legislation relating to filming or videotaping in the courtroom, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 83 (1996). For note, "Another Case of Freedom vs. Safety: Stretching the First Amendment to Protect the Publication of Murder Manuals - Brandenburg Need Not Apply?" see 14 Ga. St. U.L. 875 (1998). For note, "National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: First Amendment Free Speech No Longer Guaranteed for the Arts," see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 791 (1999). For note, "Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination Weights the Balance Between The First Amendment and the State's Compelling Interest in Eradicating Discrimination," see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 3871 (1999). For note, "Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student Prayer Back in the Schoolhouse Gate," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 1309 (2000). For note, "Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States: A Retreat from Full First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 945 (2000). For note, "Bartnicki v. Vopper: The First Amendment versus Privacy and the Ghost of Louis Brandeis," see 53 MercerL. Rev. 893 (2002). For note, see "Filtering Software in Public Libraries: Traditional Collection Decision or Congressionally Induced First Amendment Violation?," see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1029 (2004). For note, "Locke v. Davey: The Fine Line Between Free Exercise and Establishment," see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1093 (2005). For note, "Where's the Wall? Church Property Disputes within the Civil Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law," see 39 Ga. L. Rev. 1027 (2005). For note, "Balancing the First Amendment And Child Protection Goals in Legal Approaches to Restricting Children's Access to Violent Video Games: A Comparison of Germany And the United States," see 34 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 743 (2006). For note, "Sticks and Stones and Shotguns at School: The Ineffectiveness of Constitutional Antibullying Legislation as a Response to School Violence," see 39 Ga. L. Rev. 1109 (2005). For note, "The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis," 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1171 (2006). For note, "Holy Moses: What Do We Do With the Ten Commandments?," see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 645 (2006). For note, "Learning Lessons from Multani: Considering Canada's Response to Religious Garb Issues in Public Schools," see 36 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 159 (2007). For note, "Official, National, Common or Unifying: Do Words Giving Legal Status to Language Diminish Linguistic Human Rights?," see 36 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 221 (2007). For note, "Think Twice Before You Type: Blogging Your Way to Unemployment," see 42 Ga. L. Rev. 615 (2008). For note, "The 'Scope of a Student': How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age of the Internet," see 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1127 (2008). For casenote, "Signed, Your Coach: Restricting Speech in Athletic Recruiting in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1027 (2008). For note, "A Bridge Too Far? Directive 1344.10 and the Military's Inroads on Core Political Speech in Campaign Media," see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 837 (2010). For note, "Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age: How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller's 'Contemporary Community Standards'," see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1029 (2010). For note, "The Thrill of Victory, and the Agony of the Tweet: Online Social Media, the Non-Copyrightability of Events, and How to Avoid a Looming Crisis by Changing Norms," see 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 445 (2010). For note, "Bay Area Rapid Transit Actions of August 11, 2011: How Emerging Digital Technologies Intersect with First Amendment Rights," see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 783 (2013). For note, "An 'Exception' - Ally Difficult Situation: Do the Exceptions, or Lack Thereof, to the 'Speech-and-Display Requirements' for Abortion Invalidate Their Use as Informed Consent?," see 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 521 (2014). For note, "A Compelling Interest? Using Old Conceptions of Public Health Law to Challenge the Affordable Care Act's Contraceptive Mandate," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 613 (2015). For note, "Let My People Grow: Putting a Number on Strict Scrutiny in the Wake of Holt v. Hobbs," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 297 (2016). For note, "Civil Liberty or National Security: The Battle Over IPhone Encryption," see 33 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 485 (2017). For note, "You have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the Pretext of Probable Cause," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 607 (2017).
For comment on Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939), holding unconstitutional ordinances denying permission to hold meetings and distribute pamphlets to labor organizers, see 2 Ga. B.J. 61 (1939). For comment on Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939), holding unconstitutional compulsory flag-salute regulation in school, see 2 Ga. B.J. 74 (1940). For comment on Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939), holding unconstitutional municipal ordinances prohibiting distribution of handbills in public places, see 2 Ga. B.J. 76 (1940). For comment on Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940), holding power of public official to determine what is a religious cause is unconstitutional infringement upon religious liberty, see 3 Ga. B.J. 68 (1940). For comment on Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941), holding free speech and press guarantees extend to publication concerning judicial proceedings pending in court, see 4 Ga. B.J. 63 (1942). For comment as to constitutional permissibility of state and municipal ordinances requiring permit to distribute religious literature, in light of Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 669, 87 L. Ed. 869 (1943), see 5 Ga. B.J. 70 (1943). For comment on West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), holding unconstitutional state law requiring flag salute by students, see 6 Ga. B.J. 249 (1944). For comment on United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947), upholding constitutionality of Hatch Act curbing political activity of state and federal employees, see 9 Ga. B.J. 459 (1947). For comment on Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947), upholding constitutionality of public transportation to children attending parochial schools, see 9 Ga. B.J. 461 (1947). For comment on McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948), holding constitutionally impermissible religious education classes held during school hours, see 10 Ga. B.J. 499 (1948). For comment on Local 309, United Furn. Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948), holding presence of state police officers at union meeting denies workers' freedoms of speech and assembly, see 11 Ga. B.J. 233 (1948). For comment discussing permissible scope of statutes defining unlawful speech, in light of Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 114 (1949). For comment discussing right to distribute religious material in apartment house, in light of Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (1948), see 11 Ga. B.J. 369 (1949). For comment discussing right of parents to teach and instruct children, in light of Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948), see 11 Ga. B.J. 376 (1949). For comment on Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), holding rights of privacy and free association permitted script writers to refuse answers to H.U.A.C. questions on Communist party affiliations, see 12 Ga. B.J. 222 (1949). For comment discussing constitutionality of local motion picture censorship laws, in light of RD-DR Corp. & Film Classics, Inc. v. Smith, 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), see 13 Ga. B.J. 248 (1950). For comment on Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), holding constitutional statutes requiring Bible reading without comment in public school classrooms, see 13 Ga. B.J. 360 (1951). For comment discussing clear and present danger test, in light of United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), see 13 Ga. B.J. 361 (1951). For comment discussing the constitutional issues involved in releasing students from public schools for periodic religious training, in light of Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952), see 1 J. of Pub. L. 212 (1952). For comment discussing the constitutional conflicts involved where outside events, especially press coverage, tends to influence a defendant's opportunity for a fair trial, in light of Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 71 S. Ct. 549, 95 L. Ed. 40 (1951), see 1 J. of Pub. L. 217 (1952). For comment "Moving Picture Censorship and the First Amendment," focusing on Burstyn v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1951), see 1 J. of Pub. L. 224 (1952). For comment "State Regulation of the Hatemonger," focusing on Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952), see 1 J. of Pub. L. 519 (1952). For comment on Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952), as to constitutionality of loyalty oath for public employees, see 2 J. of Pub. L. 188 (1953). For comment on limits of state's control over church's disposition of property, in light of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S. Ct. 143, 97 L. Ed. 120 (1952), see 2 J. of Pub. L. 191 (1953). For comment on Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952), see 15 Ga. B.J. 363 (1953). For comment on Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952), see 15 Ga. B.J. 366 (1953). For comment on Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S. Ct. 526, 97 L. Ed. 828 (1953), see 16 Ga. B.J. 95 (1953). For comment discussing motion picture censorship, in light of Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 346 U.S. 587, 74 S. Ct. 286, 98 L. Ed. 329 (1954), see 5 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1954). For comment on United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S. Ct. 543, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953), holding the term "lobbying activities" within the meaning of a congressional resolution authorizing committee investigation does not include all activities other than representations made to members of Congress of one intending to influence legislation, such as the sale of books of a particular political nature, see 16 Ga. B.J. 350 (1954). For comment on New Am. Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953), holding police chief's threatening of local distributors with prosecution for sale of obscene literature published by plaintiff to the extralegal and beyond the scope of his authority, see 16 Ga. B.J. 494 (1954). For comment, "The 'Right to Work': Individual or Collective Right," focusing on Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956), see 6 J. of Pub. L. 263 (1957). For comment on International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1957) as to the constitutionality of enjoining picketing, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 534 (1957). For comment on Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S. Ct. 1325, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1469 (1957), upholding the enjoining under a New York statute of distribution of certain obscene books, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 548 (1957). For comment on First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508 (1957), upholding requirement of loyalty oath as prerequisite to tax exemption, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 555 (1957). For comment on Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (three judges sitting), holding that the federal district court could not prevent the publication of a congressional handbook even though it falsely and defamatorily stated that plaintiff organization was a communist front, see 19 Ga. B.J. 366 (1957). For comment on Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956), see 19 Ga. B.J. 550 (1957). For comment on Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957), reversing a contempt conviction where appellant refused to testify on this amendment grounds, see 20 Ga. B.J. 411 (1958). For comment on Looper v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957), holding that a shop agreement requiring employees to become a member of a labor organization and contribute dues to be distributed among various political organizations was in violation of the employees' rights as one cannot constitutionally be compelled to contribute moneys to support ideas which one opposes, see 20 Ga. B.J. 540 (1958). For comment on applicability of this amendment to the gathering of news, in light of Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), see 8 J. of Pub. L. 596 (1959). For comment discussing the constitutionality of the statutory prohibition against expenditures by labor unions in connection with federal elections, 18 U.S.C. § 610, see 21 Ga. B.J. 575 (1959). For comment on Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960), see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 284 (1960). For comment regarding right of witness in congressional contempt proceeding to refuse to testify under this amendment and U.S. Const., Amend. 5, in light of Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S. Ct. 1081, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1115 (1959), see 22 Ga. B.J. 404 (1960). For comment discussing constitutionality of prior restraint of distribution of anonymous handbills, in light of California v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 2d 797, 332 P.2d 447 (1958), see 23 Ga. B.J. 123 (1960). For comment on Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 80 S. Ct. 527, 4 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1959), holding due process not denied employees summarily dismissed for invocation of this amendment and U.S. Const., Amend. 5 before congressional subcommittee, see 23 Ga. B.J. 267 (1960). For comment on Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421 (1960), see 23 Ga. B.J. 406 (1961). For comment on Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 81 S. Ct. 391, 5 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1961), holding censorship standards set by state to prevent public display of obscenity do not constitute prior restraint, see 23 Ga. B.J. 554 (1961). For comment discussing constitutionality of state loyalty oaths, in light of Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960), see 23 Ga. B.J. 556 (1961). For comment on Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1962), and the unconstitutionality of state composed prayer in a public school, see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 284 (1962). For comment discussing constitutionality of legislation requiring employees to pay dues to railway union in order to maintain employment, in light of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S. Ct. 784, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1961), see 24 Ga. B.J. 432 (1962). For comment on Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961), holding black muslimism is religion within meaning of this amendment, see 24 Ga. B.J. 519 (1962). For comment on Anderson v. Martin, 206 F. Supp. 700 (D. La. 1962), holding designation of race of candidates on ballot does not violate constitutional rights, see 25 Ga. B.J. 416 (1963). For comment discussing motion picture as protected as speech, in light of Atlanta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 219 Ga. 271, 133 S.E.2d 12 (1963), see 26 Ga. B.J. 442 (1964). For comment discussing immunity of the press from libel or slander suit by "public official" in light of Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S. Ct. 669, 15 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1966), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 476 (1966). For comment on Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 221 Ga. 704, 146 S.E.2d 767 (1966), as to determination of obscenity, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 478 (1966). For comment on Reed v. Garner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966), holding denial of medicare benefits to member of communist affiliated group as an infringement on this amendment's rights, see 16 J. of Pub. L. 240 (1967). For comment on Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966) as to constitutionality of inquiry into Medicare applicant's political affiliation, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 495 (1967). For comment discussing standard of malice in cases involving reckless disregard of truth, in light of St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968), see 17 J. of Pub. L. 426 (1968).
For comment on Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) as to constitutionality of public schools regulation of student appearance, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 252 (1968). For comment discussing probable cause for search warrant in obscenity case, in light of Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 88 S. Ct. 2103, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1313 (1968) (per curiam), see 18 J. of Pub. L. 205 (1969). For comment on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969), discussing limits on regulation of students' symbolic speech, see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 505 (1969). For comment on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969) as to constitutional protection of private possession of obscene material, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 337 (1969). For comment on Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) as to the constitutionality of the State Bar Act (Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969). For comment concerning free speech aspects of F.C.C. fairness doctrine, in light of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), see 19 J. of Pub. L. 129 (1970). For comment discussing Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969), as to federal court injunctions against state court actions banning picketing and urging of boycotts by civil rights organization, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 610 (1970). For comment on Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969), as to the constitutionality of barring a speaker from appearing at a state university, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 689 (1970). For comment on Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041, 90 S. Ct. 680, 24 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1970), see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 438 (1970). For comment on Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971), holding the application of this amendment's privilege in libel actions to be dependent upon whether or not the publication is a matter of public interest, see 20 J. of Pub. L. 601 (1971). For comment on Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as to religious regulations at military academies, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 400 (1971). For comment discussing In re Adoption of "E," 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971), as to the constitutionality of state court's refusal to approve adoption of child solely because of adopting parent's lack of religious beliefs, see 6 Ga. L. Rev. 221 (1971). For comment on Mary Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and aff'd, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973), as to unconstitutionality of statutory limitation on reasons for abortion, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (1971). For comment on Maddox v. Fortson, 226 Ga. 71, 172 S.E.2d 595, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 999, 25 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1970), as to the constitutionality under this amendment and U.S. Const., Amend. 14, of prohibiting succession by an incumbent Governor until after the expiration of a four-year period, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1971). For comment discussing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 33 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1972), as to this amendment's protection for distribution of handbills in privately owned shopping center in situation where reasonable alternative locations for such activity are present, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 177 (1972). For comment on Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971), as to political activities by public employees, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 995 (1972). For comment on Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 225 (1973). For comment on Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 225 (1973). For comment discussing compulsory school attendance duty of parents despite religious convictions protected under this amendment in light of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972), see 24 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1973). For comment discussing the constitutional standard for judging obscenity, in light of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 327 (1973). For comment criticizing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), calling for application of contemporary community standards to determine obscenity, see 23 Emory L.J. 551 (1974). For comment criticizing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1974), holding state right-of-reply statute intrudes upon the freedom of the press, see 24 Emory L.J. 217 (1975). For comment criticizing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1975), holding abortion advertisement protected by commercial speech doctrine, see 24 Emory L.J. 1165 (1975). For comment on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975), holding a state may not impose sanctions on accurate publication of name of rape victim obtained from official court records, see 24 Emory L.J. 1205 (1975). For comment on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975), see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 963 (1975). For comment on permissibility of court rules restricting attorney's right to comment publicly on litigation, in light of Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 289 (1975). For comment discussing defamatory falsehoods and this amendment's protection in light of Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976), see 25 Emory L.J. 705 (1976). For comment on constitutionality of municipal ban on "for sale" and "sold" signs on residential property to prevent panic selling, in light of Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976), see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 230 (1976). For comment on Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 955 S. Ct. 1813, 44 L. Ed. 324 (1975), refusing to allow this amendment's exception to the privilege of legislative immunity, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 1195 (1976). For comment on Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S. Ct. 1614, 52 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1977), as to free speech violation by local ordinance banning "for sale" and "sold" signs on residential property, see 26 Emory L.J. 913 (1977). For comment discussing constitutionality of regulating location of "Adult Theaters" on basis of film content in light of Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976), see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 587 (1977). For comment on Coleman v. Bradford, 238 Ga. 505, 233 S.E.2d 764 (1977), see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1977). For comment on Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) upholding certain prison regulations relating to prisoners "union," see 27 Emory L.J. 137 (1978). For comment discussing doctrine of substituted judgment and constitutional underpinnings of a qualified right to refuse medical treatment asserted for an incompetent, in light of Superintendent of Belcherton State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), see 27 Emory L.J. 425 (1978). For comment on Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977), as to media's nonprotection under this amendment and U.S. Const., Amend. 14 from suit by performer whose "right of publicity" has been infringed, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 861 (1978). For comment discussing impact of this amendment upon state statute prohibiting corporate spending to influence voters on referenda not materially affecting corporation's business in light of First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978), see 28 Emory L.J. 183 (1979). For comment on Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1979), see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1079 (1979). For comment, "Church Property Disputes: The Trend and the Alternative," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 559 (1980). For comment, "The Extent of Accommodation to Employees' Religious Practices Under Title VII: Developments Since Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 595 (1980). For comment, "Private Search and Prior Restraint of Obscene Materials: The Interaction of Two Doctrines," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1029 (1980). For comment on Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979), regarding constitutionality of patronage hiring practices based on political affiliation, see 29 Emory L.J. 1217 (1980). For comment discussing the forcible medication of involuntarily committed mental patients with antipsychotic drugs in light of Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 739 (1981). For comment discussing the legality of secondary boycotts, in light of NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 100 S. Ct. 2372, 65 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1980), and Soft Drink Workers Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 763 (1981). For comment on the definition of religion under the federal Constitution, see 31 Emory L.J. 973 (1982). For comment on Widmar v. Vincent, 450 U.S. 909, 102 S. Ct. 269, 67 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1981), and discussion of the conflict between the religion clauses of the first amendment, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1283 (1982). For comment on Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981), and discussion of proportionality principle in sentencing, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1365 (1982). For comment on Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), holding that a state university's policy of equal access to campus facilities for all organizations including those of a religious character does not violate the establishment of religion clause of the first amendment, see 32 Emory L.J. 319 (1983). For comment, "First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases," see 32 Emory L.J. 619 (1983). For comment, "Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of Researcher-Subject Communications," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 1009 (1983). For comment on ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983), see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1603 (1983). For comment, "A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict," see 35 Emory L.J. 163 (1986). For comment, "The Federal Highway Beautification Act After Metromedia," see 35 Emory L.J. 419 (1986). For comment, "Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis," see 36 Emory L.J. 285 (1987). For comment, "Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions," see 36 Emory L.J. 853 (1987). For comment, "The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - AIDS," see 37 Emory L.J. 217 (1988). For case comment, "Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools: The Constitutionality of Prayer in Public High School Commencement Exercises," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 469 (1988). For comment, "Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo: Use of Official Report Privilege to Protect Defamatory Statements in Press Account Based on Foreign Government Report," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 275 (1988). For comment, "First Amendment Implications of State Takeover Legislation," see 38 Emory L.J. 827 (1989). For comment, "Defamation and Employment Relationships: the New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privilege," see 38 Emory L.J. 871 (1989). For comment, "An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 399 (1990). For comment, "Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities," see 39 Emory L.J. 1351 (1990). For comment, "The Politicization of Art: The National Endowment for the Arts, the First Amendment, and Senator Helms," see 40 Emory L.J. 241 (1991). For comment, "Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: The Supreme Court Deserts the Free Exercise Clause," see 25 Ga. L. Rev. 567 (1991). For comment, "Dances With Justice: Peyotism in the Courts," see 41 Emory L.J. 1121 (1992). For comment, "Can Anyone Own a Piece of the Clock?: The Troublesome Application of Copyright Law to Works of Historical Fiction, Interpretation, and Theory," see 42 Emory L.J. 253 (1993). For comment, "Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial Speech and Nuisance Law," see 42 Emory L.J. 359 (1993). For comment, "Fishkin and Precedent: Liberal Political Theory and the Normative Uses of History," see 42 Emory L.J. 647 (1993). For comment, "Must God Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation Provisions of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act," see 42 Emory L.J. 721 (1993). For comments, "First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle: The Washington Supreme Court Fortifies the Free Exercise Rights of Religious Landmarks Against Historic Preservation Restrictions," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 589 (1993). For comment, "Sex, Violence, and Profanity: Rap Music and the First Amendment," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 667 (1993). For comment, "The Reporter's Privilege in Georgia: 'Qualified' to Do the Job?," see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 495 (1993). For comment, "Media Hybrids and the First Amendment: Constitutional Signposts Along the Information Superhighway," see 44 Emory L.J. 213 (1995). For comment on the use of federal statutes against abortion protestors, see 44 Emory L.J. 433 (1995). For comment on hunter harassment statutes, see 48 Emory L.J. 1023 (1999). For comment, "The Government's Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption," see 49 Emory L.J. 711 (2000). For comment, "Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop on First Amendment Concerns," see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 919 (2000). Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: Whether the application of New Jersey's Public Accommodations Law, forcing the Boy Scouts to include an avowed homosexual, violates the Scouts' First Amendment Freedom of Expressive Association, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 745 (2001). For comment, "No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence," see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1669 (2003). For comment, "Thou Shalt Not Reorganize: Sacraments for Sale First Amendment Prohibitions and Other Complications of Chapter 11 Reorganization for Religious Institutions," see 22 Bank. Dev. J. 293 (2005). For comment, "'The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution': The Parental Free Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children," see 54 Emory L.J. 641 (2005). For comment, "Regulating Nonconnected 527s: Unnecessary, Unwise, and Inconsistent with the First Amendment," see 55 Emory L.J. 193 (2006). For comment, "It's Still Good to be the King: An Argument for Maintaining the Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity," see 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 413 (2007). For comment, "Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006 - The Relationship Between Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the United Kingdom versus the United States," see 21 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 711 (2007). For comment, "Unexcused Absence: Why Public Schools in Religiously Plural Society Must Save a Seat for Religion in the Curriculum," see 56 Emory L.J. 1431 (2007). For comment, "The Case for the Selective Disincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Is Everson a Super-Precedent?," see 56 Emory L.J. 1701 (2007). For comment, "Drafting Glitches in the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998: Amend § 548(A)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code," see 24 Bank. Dev. J. 159 (2008). For comment, "Gag Me with a Rule of Ethics: BAPCPA's Gag Rule and the Debtor Attorney's Right to Free Speech," see 24 Bank. Dev. J. 227 (2008). For comment, "Comment: Is Worship a Unique Subject or a Way of Approaching Many Different Subjects?: Two Recent Decisions that Attempt to Answer This Question Set the Second and Ninth Circuits on a Course Toward State Entanglement With Religion," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1319 (2008). For comment, "'An Era of Human Zoning': Banning Sex Offenders from Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions," see 57 Emory L.J. 1347 (2008). For comment, "'Just Say No' to Pro-Drug and Alcohol Student Speech: The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech Promoting Drug and Alcohol Use," see 57 Emory L.J. 1259 (2008). For comment, "Blessed be the Name of the Code: How to Protect Churches from Tithe Avoidance under the Bankruptcy Code's Fraudulent Transfer Law," see 25 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 599 (2009). For comment, "You've Got Libel: How the Can-Spam Act Delivers Defamation Liability to Spam-Fighters and Why the First Amendment Should Delete the Problem," see 58 Emory L.J. 1013 (2009). For comment, "Pay What You Like - No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses," see 58 Emory L.J. 1495 (2009). For comment, "I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience Rights of Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships," see 59 Emory L.J. 259 (2009). For comment, "Protecting Preachers from Prejudice: Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII," see 59 Emory L.J. 1297 (2010). For comment, "When News Doesn't Want to be Free: Rethinking 'Hot News' to Help Counter Free Riding on Newspaper Content Online," see 60 Emory L.J. 537 (2010). For comment, "You Better Smile When You Say 'Cheese!': Whether the Photograph Requirement for Drivers' Licenses Violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment," see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 611 (2010). For comment, "For God and Money: The Place of the Megachurch Within the Bankruptcy Code," see 27 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 609 (2011). For comment, "Smoking Out Big Tobacco: Can the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Equip the FDA to Regulate Tobacco Without Infringing on the First Amendment?," see 60 Emory L.J. 705 (2011). For comment, "Room for Error Online: Revising Georgia's Retraction Statute to Accommodate the Rise of Internet Media," see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 923 (2012). For comment, "When the Eyes and Ears Become an Arm of the State: The Danger of Privatization through Government Funding of Insular Religious Groups," see 62 Emory L. J. 1411 (2013). For comment, "Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party Financing of American Litigation," see 63 Emory L. J. 489 (2013). For comment, "Pacifism in a Dog-Eat-Dog World: Potential Solutions to School Bullying," see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 753 (2013). For comment, "You Don't Have to, But It's in Your Best Interest: Requiring Express Ideological Statements as Conditions on Federal Funding," see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1129 (2013). For comment, "Saving the Deific Decree Exception to the Insanity Defense in Illinois: How a Broad Interpretation of 'Religious Command' May Cure Establishment Clause Concerns," see 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 56 (2013). For article, "The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism," see 63 Emory L. J. 781 (2014). For comment, "By the Power Vested in Me? Licensing Religious Officials to Solemnize Marriage in the Age of Same-Sex Marriage," see 63 Emory L. J. 979 (2014). For comment, "In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious Liberty," see 64 Emory L.J. 1175 (2015). For comment, "A Troubling Collision: Overbroad Coercion Statutes and Unchecked State Prosecutors," see 65 Emory L.J. 619 (2015). For comment, "Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm of the State Doctrine," see 64 Emory L.J. 819 (2015). For comment, "Resurrecting the Public Voice: The Expansion of Standing in Patent Litigation," see 65 Emory L.J. 893 (2016).
- Where a plaintiff alleges 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the jurisdictional predicate, and alleges federal constitutional predicates, such as fourteenth amendment property rights, first amendment rights to free speech and association, and fifth amendment just compensation or "taking" clause, a federal court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief, as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy. Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 570 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Conspiracy claims based on alleged violations of U.S. Const., amend. 1 may be asserted against federal officials as well as against those acting under color of state law. McDowell v. Cheney, 718 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1993).
- Where plaintiff's original complaint, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations, was filed within two years after the injury, and plaintiff asserted a first amendment claim in an amendment, even though the first amendment expression arose out of the plaintiff's prior activities, the plaintiff's claim for violation of such right arose out of defendant's acts which were the basis of the § 1983 claim and related back to the date of the original complaint. Blue Ridge Mt. Fisheries, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 217 Ga. App. 89, 456 S.E.2d 651 (1995).
Cited in RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950); McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 282, 71 S.E.2d 548 (1952); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960); Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ga. 1960); Suggs v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 219 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Ga. 1960); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 81 S. Ct. 567, 5 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S. Ct. 584, 5 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S. Ct. 1784, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1961); Williams v. State, 217 Ga. 312, 122 S.E.2d 229 (1961); City of Atlanta v. Lopert Pictures Corp., 217 Ga. 432, 122 S.E.2d 916 (1961); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962); City of Atlanta v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 218 Ga. 714, 130 S.E.2d 490 (1963); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 799, 136 S.E.2d 342 (1964); Walker v. State, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 278 (1964); Mack v. Connor, 220 Ga. 450, 139 S.E.2d 286 (1964); Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965); Barnum v. Chambliss, 247 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Ga. 1965); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 16 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1966); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967); Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967); Epstein v. Maddox, 277 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Troutman v. Southern Ry., 296 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1969); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Great Speckled Bird v. Stynchcombe, 298 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Cato v. Georgia, 302 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Wilson v. Gooding, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970); Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. Ga. 1970); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S. Ct. 1970, 29 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971); 1024 Peachtree Corp. v. Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S.E.2d 144 (1971); Edwards v. Sammons, 437 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Cooley v. Endictor, 340 F. Supp. 15 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Dudley v. State, 228 Ga. 551, 186 S.E.2d 875 (1972); Breaux v. State, 230 Ga. 506, 197 S.E.2d 695 (1973); Fishman v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 197 S.E.2d 467 (1973); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Colony Square Co., 482 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1973); Goodman v. Ault, 358 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Ga. 1973); Hipple v. Warner, 368 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S. Ct. 2750, 41 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974); Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974); Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974); Jones v. Ault, 67 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Ga. 1974); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975); Board of Educ. v. AFSCME, 401 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976); Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E.2d 65 (1976); Hall v. State, 139 Ga. App. 488, 229 S.E.2d 12 (1976); Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E.2d 458 (1976); Watts v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 140 Ga. App. 106, 230 S.E.2d 34 (1976); United States v. King, 532 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1976); Nelson v. Rosenthal, 539 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1976); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Pittman v. Cohn Communities, Inc., 240 Ga. 106, 239 S.E.2d 526 (1977); Cargal v. State, 144 Ga. App. 238, 241 S.E.2d 8 (1977); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 439 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Simpson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 657, 242 S.E.2d 265 (1978); Underwood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 684, 242 S.E.2d 339 (1978); Pierce v. State, 145 Ga. App. 680, 244 S.E.2d 589 (1978); Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978); Hess v. State, 146 Ga. App. 874, 247 S.E.2d 546 (1978); Beall v. Department of Revenue, 148 Ga. App. 5, 251 S.E.2d 4 (1978); Speight v. State, 148 Ga. App. 87, 251 S.E.2d 36 (1978); Paperback Book Mart, Inc. v. State, 148 Ga. App. 377, 251 S.E.2d 396 (1978); Love v. Sessions, 568 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1978); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Willingham v. Carter, 447 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. Ga. 1978); United States v. Brown Transp. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Ga. 1978); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Evans v. Just Open Gov't, 242 Ga. 834, 251 S.E.2d 546 (1979); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Playmate Cinema, Inc. v. State, 154 Ga. App. 871, 269 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Gateway Books, Inc. v. State, 247 Ga. 16, 276 S.E.2d 1 (1981); Williams v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 26, 279 S.E.2d 465 (1981); McCrary v. Poythress, 638 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1981); Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 639 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1981); Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981); Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Dunten v. Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Windfaire, Inc. v. Busbee, 523 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Ambassador College v. Geotzke, 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982); Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1982); Lamar v. Banks, 684 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1982); Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1982); Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Ray v. Edwards, 557 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 702 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1983); Fiske v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 568 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.R.D. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Caldwell v. Bateman, 252 Ga. 144, 312 S.E.2d 320 (1984); Ray v. Edwards, 725 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1984); Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 746 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1984); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1984); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985); Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 399 (11th Cir. 1985); Kelly v. Macon-Bibb County Bd. of Elections, 608 F. Supp. 1036 (M.D. Ga. 1985); Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 610 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Stevens v. Gay, 792 F.2d 1000 (11th Cir. 1986); Speedway Grading Corp. v. Gardner, 206 Ga. App. 439, 425 S.E.2d 676 (1992); Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor & Alderman ex rel. City of Savannah, 832 F. Supp. 361 (S.D. Ga. 1993); Ford v. City of Oakwood, 905 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717 (1998); Cox v. Barber, 275 Ga. 415, 568 S.E.2d 478 (2002).
Right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to free society. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
- No public official, absent a showing of clear and present danger, can restrict rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
- The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was ensured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones; the rights of free speech and free press are not confined to any field of human interest. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
Guarantees in U.S. Const., amend. 1 are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 14. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975).
- Rights guaranteed under U.S. Const., amend. 1 are rights more compelling than any national policy promoting racial integration. Daugherty v. City of E. Point, 447 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
- Constitutional protection under U.S. Const., amend. 1 is presumed, and exceptions to protection are few in number. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Under U.S. Const., amend. 1 there is no such thing as a false idea. Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
- The first amendment values applicable to states are protected by powers vested in appellate courts to make an independent review of constitutional claims. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
The first amendment values applicable to states through U.S. Const., amend. 14 are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
First amendment, in conjunction with fourteenth, prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- First amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982), on rehearing, 702 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1985).
- Even where records implicating an individual's first amendment rights are involved, the prohibition against collection of such records is not absolute. Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S. Ct. 1961, 95 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987).
- Private investigator seeking information for commercial solicitation has no first amendment constitutional right of special access to motor vehicle accident reports. Spottsville v. Barnes, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
- There is no first amendment right to ride a motorcycle wearing a baseball cap, a bandanna, or bareheaded. ABATE of Ga., Inc. v. Georgia, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff'd, 264 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2001).
- Legislation which goes beyond this need violates the principle of the Constitution. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d 331 (1961).
Rights protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, though fundamental, are not absolute, and must be tempered to a degree by the concepts of order and a healthy respect for the rights of other citizens. Alonso v. State, 231 Ga. 444, 202 S.E.2d 37 (1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S. Ct. 3062, 41 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1974).
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. Community Action Group v. City of Columbus, 473 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1973).
- First, there must be shown to exist a significant or compelling state interest served by the statute in question. Second, it must be determined whether there is a substantial relationship between the statute and the stated purpose, or compelling interest, of the state. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
- The constitutionality of the ordinance was upheld and the County Board of Commissioners committed no error in employing a "reasonable belief" standard in scrutinizing the studies the county relied upon in enacting the ordinance that prohibited the sale and consumption of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments. Cafe Erotica, Inc. v. Peach County, 272 Ga. 7, 524 S.E.2d 728 (2000).
- They are properly restricted when sufficiently important governmental interest appears. Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 323, 42 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1974), later appeal, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871, 98 S. Ct. 216, 54 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1977).
Conflict between legislative power and individual rights must be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict. A statute touching protected rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 must be narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the state. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- States bear the burden of proving that a particular exception to the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 1 is applicable. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Ultimate balancing of interests of citizen and state with regard to first amendment protection remains in sphere of court. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 is a restraint on government, not on private persons. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Trial court erred by enjoining the parties and counsel from discussing the case with the media or placing information about the case on social media as the court failed to balance the danger with the parties' and counsels' First Amendment rights. Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 787 S.E.2d 785 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1762, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 12 (Ga. 2017).
Standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. Because U.S. Const., amend. 1's freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 397, 24 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970), 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
First amendment rights have assumed a protected place in the jurisprudence. Great care must be taken to assure that vague or overbroad laws do not infringe upon constitutional rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 397, 24 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970), 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
§ 16-10-20 was not void for vagueness. - O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 was not unconstitutionally vague under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, as: (1) the statute gave a defendant ample notice that the prohibited conduct; (2) the statute also provided sufficient objective standards to those who were charged with enforcing it; and (3) a defendant's act was made criminal when a false statement was made, without regard to the result of that act, and the fact that application of the statute's standards sometimes required an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the statute was violated, did not render it unconstitutional. Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 642 S.E.2d 51 (2007).
Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Ga. St. Bar R. 4-102(d):3.6 required a finding that extrajudicial statements to media members would have had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the trial; where, in restricting the extrajudicial statements to the media members by the non-lawyers, the parties, experts, witnesses, and investigators involved in a criminal trial, a trial court failed to find, based on evidence in the record, that the extrajudicial statements would have had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the trial, and to the extent the order contravened Ga. St. Bar R. 4-102(d):3.6, it was overbroad, and was reversed. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. State, 266 Ga. App. 168, 596 S.E.2d 694 (2004).
- Overbreadth doctrine condemns those means to that legitimate end whereby first amendment rights may justifiably be infringed, which comprehend too broad an incursion upon the realm of first amendment activity. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
One of the purposes of striking down statutes which are "overbroad" is to assure the public that the dissemination of materials protected by the first amendment will not be suppressed. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
The purpose of striking down statutes which are "vague" is to prevent the arbitrary enforcement of laws that fail to give officials or the public any notice of what is prohibited. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- Abstention by federal courts, remitting controversy to state courts, is particularly inappropriate in an overbreadth or vagueness case grounded upon U.S. Const., amend. 1. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Attacks on overly broad statutes are allowed with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that the person's own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- The Supreme Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit - in the area of U.S. Const., amend. 1 - attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that the person's own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed and cert denied, 453 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 3151, 69 L. Ed. 2d 999 (1981) '.
- Where a law is substantially overbroad, in that it sweeps within its scope a wide range of both protected and nonprotected expressive activity, and where no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statute in a single proceeding, the courts may reject simple interest balancing and require the legislature to achieve its ends by less drastic means. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828 (M.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Rather than await case-by-case excision of a statute's overbreadth or vagueness through review of its application to particular conduct, which would be needlessly time-consuming and ineffective, courts, under the rubric of the overbreadth doctrine, may invalidate such a statute facially so as to end its deterrence of constitutionally protected activity, since otherwise the overbroad law would remain as a deterrent to others who, because of fear of statutory reprisals, might forego protected activity rather than test their privileges under U.S. Const., amend. 1 administratively or judicially. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Even though a governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can more narrowly be achieved. A governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828 (M.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21(a)(1) was reversed as the statute was an overbroad infringement on defendant's first amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V rights to free speech; the statute does not contain the necessary language setting out the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest as it applies to indecent or obscene speech, whether heard by children or adults, and whether unwelcomed by listeners or spoken with intent to please. McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265, 626 S.E.2d 77 (2005).
- The test that has been enunciated is whether the terms of a statute are so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman & Bd. of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- A statute concerning rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 must not forbid or require the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, because lack of a fair warning to actors or lack of adequate standards to guide enforcers also may lead to a "chill" on privileged activity. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
Absent some qualification on "bias or prejudice", O.C.G.A. § 17-10-17 is left so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; thus, § 17-10-17 is too vague to justify the imposition of enhanced criminal punishment for its violation. Furthermore, § 17-10-17 may not be upheld because it impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications; therefore, the sentence enhancement that defendants selected their victims because of racial bias and prejudice violated defendants' due process rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, 5, 8, and 14 and the corresponding state constitutional provisions and the sentence enhancements were reversed. Botts v. State, 278 Ga. 538, 604 S.E.2d 512 (2004).
- Because a lessor and a lessee did not preserve an "as applied" challenge to two county zoning code provisions, did not seek a special use permit, and lacked standing to make a constitutional challenge, the trial court erred in finding the provisions unconstitutionally vague, regardless of whether they had an otherwise viable facial challenge. Catoosa County v. R.N. Talley Props., LLC, 282 Ga. 373, 651 S.E.2d 7 (2007).
- Choice on that border, always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
- Georgia's Terroristic Threats statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a), did not violate the defendant's First Amendment's right to free speech because the statute's reckless scienter was not overly broad as recklessness clearly required an analysis of the accused's state of mind at the time of the crime, and communicating a threat of violence in a reckless manner did meet the definition of a true threat as recklessness required a knowing act such as conscious disregard of a substantial risk. Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).
Loss of first amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- The United States Supreme Court recognized that mere prosecution under a statute which regulates expression and which is unconstitutional on its face, or under a statute which is being applied in bad faith for purposes of discouraging the exercise of protected rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, gives rise to the irreparable harm which is a prerequisite to injunctive relief; but injunctive relief is not appropriate to interfere with the enforcement of state criminal laws which do not affect these rights, for in such cases mere prosecution will not produce irreparable harm. Eberhart v. Massell, 311 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
- Only within narrow limits and where first amendment rights are involved will federal courts enjoin state or military prosecution. Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
- There is a place in jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 1 for such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate. Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786, 195 S.E.2d 228 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S. Ct. 598, 38 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1973); Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- Order issued in area of rights of U.S. Const., amend. 1 must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- Even in the area of first amendment rights, special circumstances such as bad faith and harassment must be present before a federal court may intervene in an ongoing state proceeding. Sanders v. McAuliffe, 364 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- If prior to the issuance of the injunction an adequate determination is made that certain communication is unprotected by U.S. Const., amend. 1; that the order is based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct; and that the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary, then the injunction is not invalid as an illegal prior restraint. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975).
- See American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- A party's religious belief cannot be accepted as justification for committing an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 636, 58 S. Ct. 23, 82 L. Ed. 495 (1937).
Personal beliefs are not to be considered religious for purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 1. Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
- Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience are unlawful under the state and federal constitutions. Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 636, 58 S. Ct. 23, 82 L. Ed. 495 (1937).
- No external authority is to place itself between the finite being and the infinite when the former is seeking to render the homage that is due, and in a mode which commends itself to the finite being's conscience and judgment as being suitable for the finite being to render, and acceptable to its object; but religious liberty does not include the right to introduce and carry out every scheme or purpose which individuals see fit to claim as a part of their religious system. Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 636, 58 S. Ct. 23, 82 L. Ed. 495 (1937).
- Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation of the free exercise of religion. Restrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only when it is necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
First amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion. The state must be steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and neither favor nor inhibit religion. Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 977, (5th Cir. 1974).
- Ordinance prohibiting the distributing of literature within the city limits without prior written permission from the city manager did not deprive the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, of the constitutional right of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibited the defendant from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which the defendant saw fit to claim as a part of the defendant's religious system. Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 636, 58 S. Ct. 23, 82 L. Ed. 495 (1937).
- A municipal ordinance providing that it shall be illegal "for any person, firm, or corporation to sell or offer for sale any goods, wares, merchandise, pamphlets, magazines, maps, or other article of value, on any Saturday between the hours of 12 noon and 9 P.M. on any of the following congested sidewalks of said city," designating certain sidewalks and providing a penalty therefore, is a valid and reasonable regulation for public safety and convenience, under the police power of the city; and where plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement against them of the ordinance, on the grounds that the magazines sold and offered for sale are devoted to religious subjects, and advocate the adoption of a particular form of religion, the distribution of which being a part of their religious belief, and urge that to prohibit the sale of the magazines would be in violation of their rights of religious freedom under the state and federal constitutions, it is not error to deny an injunction. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
- Ordinance forbidding the sale of pamphlets between the hours of 10 A.M. and 9 P.M., on certain designated sidewalks, and providing a penalty therefore, is a valid reasonable regulation for public safety and convenience, but a proper interpretation excludes its application to the distribution of religious pamphlets or literature by selling or offering them for sale at the prohibited time and place, when such distribution does not interfere with the traffic, and the safety, comfort, or convenience of the public in the use of the street, as such an application would render the ordinance unconstitutional, as a violation of the defendant's constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. Burns v. City of Carrollton, 72 Ga. App. 628, 34 S.E.2d 621 (1945).
- A person's right to exercise religious freedom, which may be manifested by acts, ceases where it overlaps and transgresses the rights of others. Everyone's rights must be exercised with due regard for the rights of others. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
- Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make their own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 323, 42 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1974), later appeal, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871, 98 S. Ct. 216, 54 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1977).
- Under the constitutional provisions, both state and federal, the right to adopt, profess, entertain, or advocate any religious views, or to fail or refuse to do so, is unlimited, and cannot be controlled by any law. There is no authority under the system of jurisprudence to alter, modify, or infringe upon this right. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
- While there is no power to control what a person may believe about religion or the type of religion a person may adopt or profess, yet there is a power under the law to limit the person's acts, even though to do such acts may be part of the person's religious belief. The constitutional guarantee of the exercise of religious freedom does not extend to acts which are inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
- Constitutional guarantee of exercise of religious freedom does not extend to acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society. A person's right to exercise religious freedom, which may be manifested by acts, ceases where it overlaps and transgresses the rights of others. Ferguson v. City of Moultrie, 71 Ga. App. 13, 29 S.E.2d 786 (1944).
- The constitutional right of one to freedom of speech is counterbalanced by the right of the many to their constitutional freedom in the practice of their religion; neither occupies a preferred position in the constitution. Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 848, 136 S.E.2d 358, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 330, 13 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1964).
- Generally, any zoning ordinance that absolutely excludes churches from residential areas is invalid under constitutional guarantees. Churches are, however, subject to reasonable regulation both referring to property in the zone generally and to churches specifically, provided that the regulations are reasonable and contain some standards. Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E.2d 668 (1964).
First amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, states, religious organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969).
Although civil courts are the proper forum for resolving property disputes, in the case of disputes over church properties, they are forbidden from determining ecclesiastical questions in the process. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041, 90 S. Ct. 680, 24 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1970).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice; as a corollary to this commandment, the amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979).
A court could not, consistent with the first amendment, adjudicate a dispute concerning a parliamentary ruling at the 1985 Southern Baptist Convention. The first amendment bars civil court resolution of any controversy concerning a matter of ecclesiastical government. Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S. Ct. 1028, 98 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1988).
- While it is true that the courts may not inquire into a controversy relating to religious matters such as internal church procedures and expulsion from church membership, the trial court does have jurisdiction to resolve issues that do not require an impermissible intrusion or excessive entanglement into ecclesiastical matters without intruding upon religious or doctrinal matters; thus, trial courts may legitimately consider matters such as the distribution or disposition of tangible church property such as bank accounts, realty, and other temporal assets. Members of Calvary Missionary Baptist Church v. Jackson, 259 Ga. App. 647, 578 S.E.2d 275 (2003).
Trial court had jurisdiction to issue an interlocutory injunction against a minister from coming onto church property in order to protect the property rights of the property owner. Anderson v. Dowd, 268 Ga. 146, 485 S.E.2d 764 (1997).
Principle of separation of church and state guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 1 cannot extend beyond the grave any punishment imposed by sentence of courts for whatever term of years, and any attempt to do so will not be effective beyond the limit of the defendant's earthly span of existence. Hill v. State, 119 Ga. App. 612, 168 S.E.2d 327 (1969).
- Because of the hazards to free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern, the first amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes. Hickman v. Owens, 322 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- The term "church" is one of very comprehensive signification, and imports an organization for religious purposes, for the public worship of God. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
Salvation Army is a religion regardless of its lack of traditional houses of worship. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 grants a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, and, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Only in rare instances where a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate is shown can a court uphold state action which imposes even an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Congress may inhibit or prevent acts, as opposed to beliefs, even where those acts are in accord with religious convictions or beliefs, where the public interest concerns outweigh first amendment protections. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Constitutional principles prevent the judiciary, as well as the legislature, from interfering with the free exercise of religion. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise. Whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- The validity of the exclusion of individuals from membership in a church is conclusive upon the civil courts. Anderson v. Dowd, 268 Ga. 146, 485 S.E.2d 764 (1997).
- The blanket prohibition on the use of the public streets, areas, and parks for solicitation or propagation of religious doctrine, regardless of any other circumstances, between the hours of 6:00 P.M. and 9:00 A.M. is overbroad. Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
- Court order requiring a mother to undergo surgery against her religious convictions in order to preserve the life of her fully developed unborn child did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
- A constitutional challenge to a determination that tithing is an unreasonable expense, subjecting a Chapter 7 debtor to dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), is not sustainable, as the free exercise clause does not require the Bankruptcy Code to yield to the debtor's desire to tithe. In re Lee, 162 Bankr. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 did not bar an action by an employee of a for-profit corporation who was terminated because of the employee's rejection of certain religious beliefs. Halverson v. Murzynski, 226 Ga. App. 276, 487 S.E.2d 19 (1997).
- Trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the former board of directors of a church for want of jurisdiction as it could resolve the dispute between the church members and the church's former board of directors as to the removal of the former board of directors, under the Georgia Nonprofit Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. § 14-3-101 et seq., and as to the disposition of church property without considering ecclesiastical matters. Members of Calvary Missionary Baptist Church v. Jackson, 259 Ga. App. 647, 578 S.E.2d 275 (2003).
Establishment clause of first amendment is applicable to state governments by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- The establishment clause only speaks to acts of the United States Congress, and, as applied to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it still is limited only to governmental action respecting an establishment of religion. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- To pass muster under the establishment clause, the challenged state action must pass a three-part constitutional test: such action must have a secular as opposed to a religious purpose; the principal or primary effect of the state action must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, the challenged state action must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The third portion of the test actually raises two questions: it must not appear that the state is involved in the questioned action to an extent sufficient to justify the application of first amendment analysis; and the results of the action must not foster excessive entanglement between the state and religion. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- Excessive entanglement between state and religion for purposes of the establishment clause is defined as an impermissible merging or intermeddling of the proper spheres of religion and government. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
It is effect of state's acts which brings constitutional scrutiny to bear, not the manner of their implementation; state acts may be legislative, administrative, or judicial; so long as they use state resources in a manner offensive to the United States Constitution, federal courts may act. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
Religious accommodation provision of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), violates establishment clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1 where the true purpose of such provision was the advancement of religion, the provision's principal and primary effect was to directly benefit religions, and the enforcement of the provision would result in an impermissible entanglement of government with religion. Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
There is no conflict between establishment and free exercise clause where a court strikes down the religious accommodation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), as unconstitutional because no free exercise problem arises, since no congressional action has taken place; the first amendment religious freedoms are not triggered by congressional inaction, but rather by the United States Congress' failure to adhere to the admonition that "Congress shall make no law". Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- City residents and taxpayers had standing to challenge the display of the city seal used both on city stationery and to emboss official documents, since a non-economic injury which results from a party's being subjected to unwelcome religious statements can support a standing claim. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).
- Normally to have standing in order to bring a suit a party must allege that the challenged action has caused the party injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and the United States Supreme Court has limited citizen standing to bring suits challenging government action when plaintiffs have no interest in the suits other than that shared by all Americans; but, in the context of an establishment clause case, standing is more broadly permitted. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
For the ability to demonstrate Article III standing under the establishment clause, see American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
When establishment clause claim is raised, requirements for standing do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed; rather, a spiritual stake in first amendment values will be sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the establishment clause. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- In order to have standing to sue under the establishment clause, a plaintiff that is not a natural person, such as an organization or an association, must have individual persons or members with a constitutionally protected interest that is being infringed upon. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- Where the individual plaintiffs in the instant case gave testimony on their concerns with the separation of church and state, this was sufficient to demonstrate standing to sue because they have alleged injury in fact to an interest protected by the establishment clause which each has a personal right to enforce. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff 'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
City residents and taxpayers had standing to challenge city's use of word "Christianity" on its official seal, since they unquestionably had a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 628 F. Supp. 839 (M.D. Ga. 1986).
Roman Catholic priest's status as clergyman is sufficient to confer standing to sue under the establishment clause. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- Those who seek immunity from requirements of law on religious grounds must, at the very least, demonstrate adherence to ethical standards and a spiritual discipline. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Religious groups do not enjoy a general immunity from the imposition of property taxes under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).
Unorthodoxy will not serve to disqualify a religious group from tax exemption, as long as the group holds a sincere and meaningful belief in God occupying in the life of its possessors a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions, and dedicates itself to the practice of that belief. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 292 S.E.2d 657 (1982).
Organizations affecting commerce may not escape the coverage of social legislation by showing that they were created for fraternal or religious purposes. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Cult's claims against several denominations alleging spiritual fraud and financial extortion were dismissed as beyond the appropriate judicial exercise of constitutional powers in accordance with the first amendment's separation between church and state. U-John v. Composite Bible-Based Religious Body, 839 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
- The first amendment did not prohibit appellate jurisdiction over an action by church members against a pastor and church seeking dissolution of the church, appointment of a receiver, an injunction against the defendant's disposing of corporate assets, and proper disposition of the assets since the dispute was capable of resolution by reference to neutral principles of law, i.e., applicable provisions of the Georgia Nonprofit Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. § 14-3-101 et seq., without infringing upon any first amendment values. Crocker v. Stevens, 210 Ga. App. 231, 435 S.E.2d 690 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1053, 114 S. Ct. 1613, 128 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1994).
Trial court was not prohibited by the first amendment from exercising judicial authority over competing claims of church groups for ownership of a certificate of deposit. Kidist Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church, Inc. v. Kidist Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church, Inc., 219 Ga. App. 470, 465 S.E.2d 491 (1995).
Georgia trial court did not violate the principle of separation of church and state by exercising jurisdiction in a civil case brought by a church and the church's board of deacons against the pastor and others to have the pastor removed and to have the pastor relinquish control of the church's property because the trial court did not involve itself in ecclesiastical matters when it ordered that persons eligible to vote on whether to retain or discharge the pastor were limited to those in membership with the church under the church's existing bylaws. Further, because the petition in the case involved a dispute over the control of church property, it presented a civil matter over which the trial court had jurisdiction. Smith v. Mount Salem Missionary Baptist Church, 289 Ga. App. 578, 657 S.E.2d 642 (2008).
Trial court's order that a church call for an annual meeting of its membership in accordance with the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 14-3-701 constituted an unconstitutional judicial interference in the government of the church. First Born Church of Living God, Inc. v. Hill, 267 Ga. 633, 481 S.E.2d 221 (1997).
- The first amendment barred the court from exercising judicial authority in a dispute between parishioners and their bishop concerning the bishop's order that icons and an iconscreen in the church be replaced because they were not compatible with the religious organization's practices and principles. Leopold v. St. Paul's Greek Orthodox Church, 235 Ga. App. 188, 509 S.E.2d 121 (1998).
Presence of cross on state park land impermissibly enmeshes state and church by creating the appearance of official backing for Christianity. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- The erection and maintenance of religiously symbolic grave markers in a public graveyard in compliance with the religious sentiments of known descendants does not conflict with U.S. Const., amend. 1 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII. Birdine v. Moreland, 579 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
- The proposed erection and maintenance of a statue of Jesus as a part of a public cemetery memorial has an impermissible religious purpose and, therefore, violates the establishment clause. Birdine v. Moreland, 579 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
- Framed panel of the Ten Commandments and the Great Commandment displayed in a county courthouse violated the establishment clause, warranting court order requiring removal of panel unless remounted within a larger display of non-religious, historical items, to bring it within constitutional parameters. Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129, 114 S. Ct. 2138, 128 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1994).
- Because the state would not contravene the dictates of the establishment clause by neutrally and nonpreferentially allowing a religious organization to display its menorah in a public plaza, the state's exclusion of the menorah was neither necessary, nor narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993).
- A requirement that the Department of Human Resources license a church-operated children's home as a child caring institution pursuant to the Children and Youth Act and department regulations governing child caring institutions does not violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment, nor would it violate the establishment clause of the first amendment, since such a requirement in no way aids, furthers, or confers a special benefit on any religious group. Darrell Dorminey Children's Home v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 260 Ga. 25, 389 S.E.2d 211 (1990).
Appeal by state to single religious group in effort to promote tourism is in any case constitutionally questionable. American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
- No first amendment issue was presented when the court permitted the Christian Bible to go into the jury room at the request of the jurors apparently for consultation, although the possible use of the Bible by jurors cannot be reconciled with the eighth amendment's requirement that any decision to impose death must be the result of discretion which is carefully and narrowly channeled and circumscribed by the secular law of the jurisdiction. Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
- Zoning ordinance that allowed only single family residences in agricultural- residential areas did not violate a minister's right to free exercise of the minister's religion, where the minister rented a portion of the minister's home to a bankrupt family, and the minister was not acting on behalf of the minister's church by accepting rent. Lacey v. State, 270 Ga. 37, 507 S.E.2d 441 (1998).
- If the church government is hierarchical, then "neutral principles of law" are used to determine whether the local church or parent church has the right to control local property; "neutral principles" are state statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination. St. Mary of Egypt Orthodox Church, Inc. v. Townsend, 243 Ga. App. 188, 532 S.E.2d 731 (2000).
- A hierarchical church is associated with other churches that share similar faith and doctrine and have a common ecclesiastical head and, as a matter of constitutional law, a hierarchical religious organization must be permitted to establish the rules and regulations by which it is governed. St. Mary of Egypt Orthodox Church, Inc. v. Townsend, 243 Ga. App. 188, 532 S.E.2d 731 (2000).
- An IRS summons to a bank requesting records relevant to the tax liability of an individual member of a religious organization did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1, as the summons imposed no restriction on the religious organization's freedom to espouse doctrine or solicit support. United States v. Saunders, 621 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
- Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation of the churches, or the appointment of clergy, prohibits the free exercise of religion and violates U.S. Const., amend. 1. Regulation of the employment relationship between a minister and church by the state would result in an encroachment into an area of religious freedom which government is forbidden to enter and would violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Civil court could not take jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical issue involving a clergyman's termination from the clergyman's capacity as minister of two mission churches, because U.S. Const., amend. 1 prohibits such action by the civil judicial system. McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese, 191 Ga. App. 174, 381 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S. Ct. 328, 107 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989).
Superior court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether pastor was wrongfully terminated in violation of church's constitution and bylaws. Bledsoe v. Morningside Baptist Church, 232 Ga. App. 122, 501 S.E.2d 292 (1998).
Courts of Georgia are prohibited from determining issues of expulsion of members, pastors, and the internal procedures of a religious entity. United Baptist Church, Inc. v. Holmes, 232 Ga. App. 253, 500 S.E.2d 653 (1998).
Subject matter jurisdiction was lacking over plaintiff pastor's action alleging that the plaintiff's bishop transferred the plaintiff from one church to another without complying with church rules. Jay v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 242 Ga. App. 833, 531 S.E.2d 369 (2000).
Denial of a prisoner's petition for a name change for religious purposes did not violate the freedom of religion clause. In re Redding, 218 Ga. App. 376, 461 S.E.2d 558 (1995).
- Arbitrary discrimination based upon the religious or racial beliefs of those concerned is constitutionally impermissible. But, rules and regulations are constitutionally valid when they are reasonable and justifiable in the administration of a large prison population, in light of the necessity to maintain prison discipline, and control any dangers and hazards presented. Bethea v. Daggett, 329 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Under U.S. Const., amend. 1, a prisoner has the right to exercise the prisoner's religion, and refusal to permit a prisoner access to religious publications states a cause of action. Neal v. Georgia, 469 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1972).
- Failure of prison authorities to provide means strictly in compliance with Islamic dietary laws and to specially prepare foods under the strict instructions of their religious practice, where the prisoners were otherwise allowed substantial time to practice their religion, was a very minor inconvenience which impinged on the prisoner's full exercise of their religious preferences only in a very limited way. Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868, 94 S. Ct. 177, 38 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1973).
- Prison regulation, to the extent that it prohibited Sunni Muslim inmate at a maximum security prison from growing a beard in conformity with the inmate's religious beliefs, was not violative of the first amendment. Furqan v. Georgia State Bd. of Offender Rehabilitation, 554 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
- Inmate's complaint that prison officials did not make reasonable arrangements for the visitation of ministers from the Nation of Islam Muslim sect stated a prima facie case for relief. Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Practice of having religious invocations delivered prior to public high school football games violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090, 109 S. Ct. 2431, 104 L. Ed. 2d 988 (1989).
- A school district's policy and practice of announcing "secular" activities sponsored by religious organizations through the use of various schools' public address systems and bulletin boards creates excessive entanglement problems. Nartowicz v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984).
- A junior high school's practice of permitting a religious youth group to meet on school property under faculty supervision had the primary effect of advancing or promoting religion when the school district also supported religious assemblies, religious signs, and announcements of church-sponsored activities via bulletin boards and the public address system. Nartowicz v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984).
Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act is constitutional in its entirety, both facially and as applied and did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution when the school principal announced over the intercom the quiet moment. Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).
The Georgia Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act does not violate the establishment clause because it satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon test. The Act does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion and does not create an excessive government entanglement with religion. Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).
- Strict scrutiny review should not have been applied to plaintiff school board members' challenges under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(2) because the statute's nepotism provision prohibited plaintiffs only from running for the school board in districts where certain family members were employed, but the statute did not otherwise impair plaintiffs' right to run for office or to vote; plaintiffs' injury was not so severe as to require strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs' claims that the statute was both too narrow and overbroad also failed; that the statute did not prevent nepotism in all its possible forms did not heighten the severity of the restriction to necessitate strict scrutiny. Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011).
A biology textbook which noted creationism was an explanation for the beginning of life in many cultures that could not be scientifically proved and that science could not resolve disputes about the origin of life did not sponsor religious actions or beliefs, so it did not violate the prohibition of a government establishment of religion, and it was unnecessary to analyze whether it: (1) had a secular purpose; (2) had a primary effect that advanced or inhibited religion; and (3) fostered excessive state entanglement with religion. Moeller v. Schrenko, 251 Ga. App. 151, 554 S.E.2d 198 (2001).
Biology textbook which contained a neutral discussion of creationism did not impinge upon the free exercise of a student's religious beliefs. Moeller v. Schrenko, 251 Ga. App. 151, 554 S.E.2d 198 (2001).
- Freedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1 from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the U.S. Const., amend. 14, from impairment by the states. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
Statements can be without first amendment protection. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- Purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 1 includes the need to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
- Content-neutral restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights in traditional public forums such as streets, are valid only when narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and when the restrictions leave open ample alternative channels of communication. A broad prohibition of all picketing in all streets, alleys, roads, highways, and driveways predominantly dedicated to the use of vehicular traffic did not serve the city's interests in the narrow fashion demanded by the first amendment. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 422 v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
- Principal inquiry in determining whether a legislative act is content-neutral is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys; the government's purpose is the controlling consideration. Thus, regulations that serve purposes unrelated to the content of expression are deemed neutral, even if they have an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others; an ordinance designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses is content-neutral. I.D.K., Inc. v. Ferdinand, 277 Ga. 548, 592 S.E.2d 673 (2004).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 grants constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
First amendment embraces publication, circulation and distribution of books and films. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- Freedom to publish news, without some protected ability to gather it, would render freedom of the press an unduly gossamer right. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
It is apparent that the first amendment right to publish must logically include to some degree a right to gather news fit for publication. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- Creators and disseminators of a song entitled "Suicide Solution" were protected by the first amendment after the parents of a teenage boy who committed suicide after repeatedly listening to the song were unable to demonstrate any manner in which the music could be categorized as speech which incited imminent lawless activity. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916, 113 S. Ct. 325, 121 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1992).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 protects the public and press from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- First amendment does not guarantee press constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Arbitrary interference with access to important information is abridgment of the freedoms of speech and press protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- A function of free speech under the system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech is protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 397, 24 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970), 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
- To withstand constitutional attack, a statute or ordinance which prohibits speech must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. State v. Davis, 246 Ga. 761, 272 S.E.2d 721 (1980).
- Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute literature where, when, and how one chooses, but the right to do so must be adjusted to the rights of others. Durham v. State, 219 Ga. 830, 136 S.E.2d 322 (1964).
Dissemination of individual's opinions on matters of public interest is an "unalienable right" that "governments are instituted among men to secure." The founders were not always convinced that unlimited discussion of public issues would be "for the benefit of all of us" but they firmly adhered to the proposition that the "true liberty of the press" permitted "every man to publish his opinion." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967).
- Role that elected officials play in society makes it imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. The central commitment of the first amendment is that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S. Ct. 339, 17 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1966).
- When taken as it must be as a harmonious part of the entire Constitution, and in light of history, a construction is demanded that the first amendment, by the words "speech" and "press", means only speech and press outside of infringement of the rights of others. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).
- Constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976).
- Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1 from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 14 from invasion by state action. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1958); Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 206 S.E.2d 662, appeal dismissed, 233 Ga. 10, 209 S.E.2d 605 (1974).
- When a state burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion that the burden is connected to such a policy. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff 'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
- States and municipalities may no more interfere with the freedom of speech than may the national government. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Ultimate responsibility to define limits of state power regarding freedom of speech and expression rests with the Supreme Court. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
- Under U.S. Const., amend. 1 even activity which is itself communicative may nevertheless be penalized because of its nonspeech aspect. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1984).
- Constitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. However, the mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 397, 24 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970), 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
- In order for state to proscribe printed material, it must foment imminent lawless conduct, and the threat from such incitement must be seen as posing a clear and present danger. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Talk of clear and present danger arising out of criticism is idle unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a court to carry on the administration of justice. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
- Since speech is normally intended to change the opinions or reinforce the opinions of others, problems arise as to the extent to which mere speech may be curbed when it provokes others into action. A speaker sometimes passes the bounds of arguments and persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot. Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 397, 24 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970), 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
- The expanse of U.S. Const., amend. 1 by necessity includes speech which is aberrant, unpopular, and even revolutionary. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff 'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Speech cannot be stifled by the state merely because it might draw an adverse reaction from a majority of the people. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Material merely advocating illegal action at some future time may not be criminally proscribed by the state. Printed matter either assailing the state's controlled substances laws or extolling the attractions of certain unlawful substances and glorifying the drug culture may not be generally restricted. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff 'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Freedom of speech does not always prevail over property rights. Property rights do not always prevail over the right of free speech. Griffin v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 225 Ga. 859, 171 S.E.2d 618 (1969).
- Businesses which exercise freedom of press are not thereby immune from ordinary forms of taxation. Airport Bookstore, Inc. v. Jackson, 242 Ga. 214, 248 S.E.2d 623 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2182, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1979).
Private property becomes subject to protest or propaganda activity when both of the following are satisfied: (a) the protest is related to the use to which the property is put; and (b) there exists no reasonably effective alternative means of communication to reach the intended audience. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976).
Public forum for expression must be available to all members of the public for the exercise of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Under the constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech, an organization cannot be penalized for disseminating ideas which are not opposed to our system of government, even though such ideas may not meet with the approval of all of the people in the area in which they are advanced. Williamson v. Southern Regional Council, Inc., 223 Ga. 179, 154 S.E.2d 21 (1967).
- Liberty of the press was intended to prevent all previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments in early times to stifle the efforts of patriots towards enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but a person who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
- Guarantees of freedom of speech and press are not designed to prevent censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967).
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free person has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments that person pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if the person publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, the person must take the consequence of the person's own temerity. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
- The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
- Inherent in the right of freedom of the press is a limited right of reasonable access to certain kinds of news. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
The right of access of the news media representatives is no greater and no less than any other member of the general public. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982).
- Two television stations had standing to challenge the modified gag order, notwithstanding that the order did not restrain the stations directly, because the First Amendment offered some protection to news gathering by journalists; federal courts had held in a number of cases that a news organization might have standing to challenge a restraint upon the speech of another when that restraint impaired the organization's own ability to effectively engage in news gathering; and neither the accused nor the state disputed that some persons to whom the modified gag order applied otherwise would be willing to speak with reporters. WXIA-TV v. State of Ga., 303 Ga. 428, 811 S.E.2d 378 (2018).
- Rights guaranteed and protected by the first amendment include the right of access to news or information concerning the operations and activities of government. This right is held by both the general public and the press, with the press acting as a representative or agent of the public as well as on its own behalf. Without such a right, the goals and purposes of the first amendment would be meaningless. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- The right of access to news and information concerning activities of government is qualified, rather than absolute, and is subject to limiting considerations such as confidentiality, security, orderly process, spatial limitation, and doubtless many others. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
The first amendment's protection of a citizen's right to obtain information concerning "the way the country is being run" does not extend to every conceivable avenue a citizen may wish to employ in pursuing this right. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
There does exist a limited right of the public and the press, under the first amendment, to access to information concerning governmental activities. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Material printed by law publisher rating attorneys is protected by the first amendment. Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 248 Ga. 599, 285 S.E.2d 6 (1981).
Live theatre protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. - Live theatrical productions, no less than novels or motion pictures, are media and organs for the expression of public opinion and the propagation of ideas and critical comments and are entitled to first amendment protection. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Theatrical productions are "speech" protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. A musical play is a unitary form of constitutionally protected expression, and may not be separated into speech and nonspeech components. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Motion pictures are within the basic protection of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14, and are afforded the full protection constitutionally guaranteed to all speech or press. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).
Expression by means of motion pictures included within free speech and press guaranty of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70, does not violate right of freedom of expression by restricting outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the rights-of-way of interstate and primary systems of highways in this state. Department of Transp. v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873, 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-16-14 and50-16-16, allowing removal of persons who cause disruptions in state buildings, do not violate the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, the right to assemble peaceably, and petition the government for redress of their grievances. State v. Storey, 181 Ga. App. 161, 351 S.E.2d 502 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017, 107 S. Ct. 1895, 95 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1987).
- Where there is no reasonable relationship between the restraints imposed on freedom of speech and the general welfare of the community, the ordinance is unconstitutional. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d 331 (1961).
- Former Code 1933, § 26-2803, which prohibited misuse of the national flag, was unconstitutional as applied to an individual who burned a flag during a public demonstration protesting the United States' involvement in Iranian affairs since there was no likelihood of imminent public unrest. Monroe v. State Court, 739 F.2d 568 (11th Cir. 1984).
Display of the Georgia state flag did not violate African-American citizen's constitutional rights to equal protection and freedom of expression. Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 1199, 140 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1998).
- For state to withhold expected promotion or pay raise as a sanction for the exercise of the right to free speech is a restriction of that right in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Goolsby v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 141 Ga. App. 605, 234 S.E.2d 165 (1977).
- The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will not hear a claim that a "talking cat's" right to free speech has been infringed by a business license ordinance since, although the talking cat arguably possesses a very unusual ability, a talking cat cannot be considered a "person" and is therefore not protected by the Bill of Rights, and even if the talking cat has such a right, there is no need for the cat's owners to assert the right jus tertii. A talking cat can clearly speak for on their own. Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983).
- Hospital which limited a nurse-midwife's access to certain patients had a primary interest in the safety and health of its patients which outweighed the nurse's right to speak freely on the issue of natural birth, and such limitation therefore did not offend the first amendment. Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 705 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
- Streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of first amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976).
- Cities may place reasonable restrictions on the right to parade in residential areas, but the activity may not be banned in toto. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 422 v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
- Notice of a class action against airlines could be published in in-flight magazines that were carried on defendants' airplanes and posted in defendants' ticket offices without offending the first amendment. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 141 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
- First amendment rights are not surrendered when one rides on or looks at a city bus. Buses operated daily by the city for the transportation of the public - like the city streets, city sidewalks, city auditorium, city coliseum, and city parks - are appropriate places and facilities for the exercise of first amendment rights. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
- Civil rights demonstration on sidewalk opposite courthouse is "speech plus," and is entitled to a lesser degree of protection than pure speech. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1984).
Military base is ordinarily not a public forum for first amendment purposes. M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1986).
- Air Force regulation prohibiting bumper stickers which embarrass or disparage the Commander in Chief was viewpoint neutral, and was reasonable since the military has an interest in promoting order and discipline and only prohibited display of disparaging bumper stickers on base. Ethredge v. Hail, 795 F. Supp. 1152 (M.D. Ga. 1992), order vacated and appeal dismissed, 996 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995).
- When materials are seized in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 1, the appropriate remedy is the return of the seized property, but not its suppression as evidence at trial. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978).
Seizure properly anchored in probable cause can offend constitutional constraints when media of expression, such as movie films, are implicated. Presumptive free speech materials are qualitatively different from other kinds of alleged contraband. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978).
- States may not impose sanctions on publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975).
- The press may not be exposed to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records. Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 512 S.E.2d 347 (1999).
- An argument that State Bar Rules 4-102 (Standard 4), 4-202, 4-203(a)(2), 4-221(d) and 4-225(d) were unconstitutional because they violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and because they impinged upon the first amendment right of free speech and redress was meritless. Cohran v. State Bar, 790 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
- Where a plaintiff contends that a local ordinance is unconstitutional by first amendment standards as denying the plaintiff's freedom of expression by preventing the plaintiff from performing a particular dance, and such dance may also be prohibited by a general statute, but no attack is made on the general statute, and the dance has not been performed, a decision as to the validity of the ordinance would be abstract or advisory only by its very nature, and it is proper to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Jenkins v. Thomas, 124 Ga. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 489 (1971).
Requirement of prior adversary hearing is not warranted to protect first amendment rights where, inter alia, a speedy trial is available in state court. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
- Rules of standing have been expanded in the area of first amendment rights and special considerations are granted to litigants seeking to preserve rights of free expression. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
It is not necessary that a party first expose oneself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that the person claims deters the exercise of the person's constitutional rights. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) and (c), provides protection for acts that can reasonably be construed as acts in furtherance of one's right of free speech or right to petition the government for redress of grievances in connection with an issue of public concern; such acts include any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, or such a statement or petition made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by such a governmental body, even including those that initiate a proceeding to address matters of public concern. Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Soc'y, 264 Ga. App. 356, 590 S.E.2d 737 (2003).
- See R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982).
- People are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors in judgment, or unsubstantiated opinions may be exposed, but not through punishment for contempt for the expression. Under the system of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
- Rule for contempt issued by superior court judge, based on a series of newspaper articles, is fatally defective where the publications complained of were true, they related to a matter in another court and in nowise referred to the court issuing the rule and where they could not have obstructed or impaired the administration of justice in the court. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953).
- Injunction issued pursuant to a city ordinance declaring the actions of abortion protesters to be a public nuisance was not unconstitutional since the protesters were permitted to exercise their right of free speech by engaging in social protest, limited only by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221, 111 S. Ct. 2836, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1991).
- The motorcycle helmet law, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-315, does not require that the Georgia Board of Public Safety issue a list approving specific types of headgear and, therefore, the failure of the board to publish a list of approved headgear and eye-protective devices did not violate the plaintiff's rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. ABATE of Ga., Inc. v. Georgia, 264 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924, 122 S. Ct. 2592, 153 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2002).
- O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b) is unconstitutional under the free speech provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions, U.S. Const., amend. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, because it is not all assisted suicides that are criminalized but only those that include a public advertisement or offer to assist; because the state failed to provide any explanation or evidence as to why a public advertisement or offer to assist in an otherwise legal activity was sufficiently problematic to justify an intrusion on protected speech rights, it could not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 290 Ga. 508, 722 S.E.2d 722 (2012).
- It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
The right of free speech is not an unlimited right. It entitles an individual to advocate certain ideas regardless of their popularity, but it does not extend to the threatening of terror, inciting of riots, or placing another's life or property in danger. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
All speech is not ultimately protected under U.S. Const., amend. 1. State v. Davis, 246 Ga. 761, 272 S.E.2d 721 (1980).
- That a state in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse the freedom of speech and press by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
- A state may penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the representative and constitutional form of government of the United States and the several states, by violence or other unlawful means. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
Freedom of speech and press does not protect disturbances to public peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
Freedom of speech and press does not protect publications prompting the overthrow of government by force, the punishment of those who publish articles which tend to destroy organized society being essential to the security of freedom and the stability of the state. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827 (1932), later appeal, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
Question in every case is whether words used are used in such circumstances and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Speech which advocates a violation of the law is protected except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. State v. Davis, 246 Ga. 761, 272 S.E.2d 721 (1980).
- "Fighting words" constitute one of those narrow speech areas not constitutionally protected. State v. Klinakis, 206 Ga. App. 318, 425 S.E.2d 665 (1992).
- Whether certain words were "fighting" words, tending to provoke violence, was a question of fact to be decided by the jury, not a question of law to be decided by the court. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985).
- The communication of terroristic threats to another person to commit a crime of violence upon that person clearly falls outside of those communications and expressions which are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
- Utterances which are not an essential part of any exposition of idea or which are not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion are not within the purview of U.S. Const., amend. 1. United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931, 96 S. Ct. 281, 46 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1975).
Extortionate speech has no constitutional protection. United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955, 96 S. Ct. 1430, 47 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1976).
- Recognized exceptions to constitutionally guaranteed speech include obscene material, fighting words, defamation, intolerable invasions of privacy, disruptions of the classroom, incitement to imminent lawless activity, and solicitation of illegal activity. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff 'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
There are various defined categories of speech or communicative conduct which are not entitled to constitutional protection. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
O.C.G.A. § 15-19-51(a)(7) did not limit defendant's right to free speech under U.S. Const., amend. 1 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. V, as defendant had no right to engage in speech which was calculated to deceive or mislead people into thinking that the defendant was qualified to practice law. Marks v. State, 280 Ga. 70, 623 S.E.2d 504 (2005).
- Utterance can be suppressed or penalized on ground that it tends to incite immediate breach of peace, if the words used are such in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
The utterance is not protected if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
- When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that freedom of speech sanctions are an incitement to riot. There might exist special, limited circumstances in which speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected by the broad guarantee of U.S. Const., amend. 1. Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786, 195 S.E.2d 228 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S. Ct. 598, 38 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1973).
- There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Atlanta Coop. News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- Motion pictures are not to be regarded as a part of the press of the country or organs of public opinion and as such entitled to the protection afforded the press. RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853, 1 S. Ct. 80, 95 L. Ed. 625 (1950).
- The exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
- Statements made in the presence of the court or outside of the presence of the court are protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech of the U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14 and by the Georgia Constitution 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, while contemptuous statements are not so protected. A statement is contemptuous and therefore not constitutionally protected when it poses a present danger to the orderly administration of justice but neither an inherent nor a reasonable tendency to do so is enough to justify a restriction of free expression. Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789, 325 S.E.2d 131 (1985).
- Limitations on free speech assume different proportion when expression is directed toward trial as compared to grand jury investigation. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
Publisher of newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. A publisher has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967).
- Acts of nonstudents on the grounds of a private university performed in observance of a vigil in memory of a well-known public figure were enjoined where such acts constituted trespass and nuisance. Griffin v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 225 Ga. 859, 171 S.E.2d 618 (1969).
Hair style may be distinguished from other forms of expression in that it is not a direct, primary right under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Even where the wearing of long hair is assumed to be symbolic expression, it falls within that type of expression which is manifested through conduct and is therefore subject to reasonable state regulation in furtherance of a legitimate state interest. Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957, 91 S. Ct. 355, 27 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1970).
Hair length is not an absolute first amendment right. Howell v. Wolf, 331 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Right to wear one's hair as one sees fit has not been found to be within the periphery of any of our specific constitutional rights. There is no constitutionally protected right - plainly expressed or within the penumbra, the shadow, of the U.S. Const., amends. 1, 8, 9, 10 or 14 - to wear one's hair in a public high school in the length and style that suits the wearer. Ashley v. City of Macon, 377 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 505 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1975).
- First amendment rights are not violated by the state's refusal to allow a person to hold oneself out to the public under a degree which the person has not earned. Oliver v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- State may prohibit picketing directed at achieving a union shop in violation of state law. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1984).
Draft card burning is conduct not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1984).
State subdivision can constitutionally restrict facial hair of its male police officers because of its strong interest in having law enforcement personnel present a uniform appearance to the public. Nalley v. Douglas County, 498 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- For purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 1, whether an utterance is suppressed under criminal law or penalized under tort law makes no difference. What a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
- Under first amendment jurisprudence, the adult should not be subjected to liability solely on the ground that statements uttered by the adult constituted an invitation to a child to do something causing the child injury, unless what the adult invited the child to do presented a clear and present danger that injury would in fact result. Although what the defendants allegedly invited the child to do during the course of a television broadcast posed a foreseeable risk of injury, it did not pose a clear and present danger of injury. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
There is no absolute first amendment right to inspect judicial records. Instead, the media's access to judicial materials rests on a common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records. United States v. Eaves, 685 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
- Plaintiff's ante litem notice under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 against the city did not constitute speech protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1997).
- City ordinances prohibiting disorderly conduct in the city have no connection whatever with infringement of the constitutional rights in U.S. Const., amend. 1. Bennett v. City of Dalton, 69 Ga. App. 438, 25 S.E.2d 726, appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 712, 64 S. Ct. 197, 88 L. Ed. 418 (1943).
- An ordinance forbidding the operation upon the public streets, alleys, or thoroughfares by any person, firm, or corporation of a loud speaker or public address system from any vehicle is not an infringement upon the rights of the defendant granted to the defendant by the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States. The thoroughfares of cities are maintained by the public and to say that anyone has a constitutional right to use, on these streets, a loud speaker or public address system from any vehicle seems to overlap and interfere with the constitutional rights of other people. It makes no difference whether the violator is using the loud speaker to broadcast what the violater terms recorded sermons or using the loudspeaker for vending goods or promoting some political candidate or for some other purpose. Brinkman v. City of Gainesville, 83 Ga. App. 508, 64 S.E.2d 344 (1951).
- Ordinance of City of Baxley shows on its face that it is repugnant to and violative of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States in that it places a condition precedent upon, and otherwise unlawfully restricts, the defendant's freedom of speech as well as freedom of the press and freedom of lawful assembly by requiring, as conditions precedent to the exercise of those rights, the issuance of a license which the mayor and city council are authorized by the ordinance to grant or refuse in their discretion, and the payment of a license fee which is discriminatory and unreasonable in amount and constitutes a prohibitory flat tax upon the privilege of soliciting persons to join a labor union. Staub v. City of Baxley, 97 Ga. App. 221, 102 S.E.2d 643 (1958).
- Governments may enact ordinances for legitimate purposes requiring those who would exercise their freedom of speech to obtain a license in advance; fees intended for the purpose of reimbursement of the costs of administering a licensing scheme that impacts businesses exercising their first amendment rights have been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to withstand constitutional muster. I.D.K., Inc. v. Ferdinand, 277 Ga. 548, 592 S.E.2d 673 (2004).
- The portion of a county ordinance that required portable signs to be set back from the building setback line did not further the county's substantial governmental interests in either traffic safety or aesthetics and was, accordingly, unconstitutional. Dills v. Cobb County, 593 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1985).
- The Olympic Sign Ordinance, which creates a five-member committee charged with recommending "Concentrated Sign Districts" within the City of Atlanta and empowers the committee to grant permits to those desiring to erect signs pursuant to that ordinance and which permits only those signs which in some way promote an Olympic-related event, is unconstitutional in that it violates the first and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Outdoor Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 885 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
- The 1994 Sign Ordinance, a comprehensive regulatory framework for the posting of all signs within the City of Atlanta, does not violate equal protection or free speech guarantees. Outdoor Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 885 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
County ordinance's ban of off-premise, commercial billboards was an unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech, in the absence of any evidence that county officials considered esthetics and traffic safety before adopting the ordinance. Adams Outdoor Adv. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Fulton County, 738 F. Supp. 1431 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
- Ordinance prohibiting off-premises signs in the city's historic district and in various specific locations was viewpoint neutral and did not favor commercial over non-commercial speech. Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1993).
The government's interest in the aesthetics of a designated historic district were sufficiently significant to override the first amendment rights of a property owner to off-premise noncommercial signs. Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1993).
- System of exemptions from the sign-permitting process did not violate the first amendment since the ordinance exempted from permitting requirements and permit fees and not from a general ban of all off-premise billboards; and since the exemptions did not favor commercial over noncommercial messages or express a preference between different noncommercial messages. Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1993).
Ordinance limiting the maximum number of portable display signs that can be issued to a business to one temporary permit for every six months, the permit to last for a maximum of 16 days, was constitutional. Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1993).
- The free speech guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments are violated by an assembly and parade ordinance that permits a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order since the decision how much to charge for police protection or administrative time - or even whether to charge at all - is left to the whim of the administrator, without any articulated standards either in the ordinance or in the county's established practice, and because the fee will depend on the administrator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992).
Neither the $1,000 cap on the fee charged, nor even some lower nominal cap, can save an unconstitutional assembly and parade ordinance because the level of the fee is irrelevant; a tax based on the content of the speech does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992).
- The needs of the municipal authorities for notice of the time at which a parade, march, demonstration, assembly, or picketing is to take place in order to protect the general public, including those participating in such an activity, overbalances the inconvenience to plaintiffs of foreseeing the activity and applying for a permit by 4:00 P.M. on the day before the activity. Jackson v. Dobbs, 329 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971).
- The requirement that a parade permit be secured in order to enable municipal authorities to limit the amount of interference with use of the sidewalks by other members of the public by regulating the time, place, and manner of the parade, is valid under the first amendment. Jackson v. Dobbs, 329 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971).
Ordinance banning parades on Saturday mornings was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058, 117 S. Ct. 688, 136 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1997).
- There is a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating "nonspeech" so as to justify incidental limitations on first amendment rights only if the governmental regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Municipality may not empower its licensing officials to dispense or withhold permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade, according to their own opinions regarding the potential effect of the activity in question on the "welfare," "decency," or "morals" of the community. Municipal officials do not, solely by reason of their authority to manage a municipal civic center and auditorium, have the unfettered right to censor and monitor the types of speech, and to prescribe the types of productions which may be performed in such a public auditorium. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
City officials have an obligation to make a municipal auditorium available to all for the exercise of first amendment rights despite the fact that the potential users might be able to go elsewhere or that they hope to make money. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- City may set up various procedural rules so that one person cannot monopolize a municipal auditorium or use it for a purpose for which it is not physically suited. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- In a prior restraint of speech setting, to determine what level of scrutiny applies to an ordinance, a court must decide whether the regulation is related to the suppression of expression; if the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy the "less stringent" O'Brien standard for evaluating restrictions on symbolic speech. I.D.K., Inc. v. Ferdinand, 277 Ga. 548, 592 S.E.2d 673 (2004).
- Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid states to punish use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech. In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
- State has power constitutionally to punish "fighting" words under carefully drawn statutes not also susceptible of application to protected expression. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972).
- An administrative order barring from a U.S. Air Force base "bumper stickers or other paraphernalia" that "embarrass or disparage" the President was viewpoint neutral and reasonable; accordingly, the order did not violate the first amendment. Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995).
- Federal government regulations governing freestanding emergency care clinics violated first amendment rights of plaintiff physicians, where the regulations were more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest of prohibiting misleading advertising and were impermissibly vague in providing that facilities which used such terms as "emergency," "crisis," "sudden," "acute," or a similar meaning term fell within the regulatory ambit. Primary Care Physicians Group v. Ledbetter, 634 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
- A federal regulation prohibiting solicitation of contributions on postal property did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1. United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986).
- Institute which certifies those who offer tax service to the public failed in its attempt to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from enforcement of a directive prohibiting the use of the term "certified" by an individual who practices as an "enrolled agent" for the Internal Revenue Service; the institute failed to establish that the directive placed an unconstitutional burden on its first amendment rights in that it did not show any instance of threatened enforcement action by the Internal Revenue Service and did not show a concrete factual situation sufficient to establish a case in controversy. Institute of Certified Practitioners, Inc. v. Bentsen, 874 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- A statute which makes unlawful economic exploitation of racial bias and panic-selling is one regulating conduct, and any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is justified by the government's interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory housing practices and is not violative of the first amendment. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).
- The application of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-30 (refusal to disperse) to members of the Revolutionary Communist Party involved in an angry public confrontation with residents of an apartment complex, in the absence of any violent acts or of efforts of the police to respond directly to any illegal conduct without focusing enforcement efforts on those engaged in speech, was unconstitutional. Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Allowing a public official, through the exercise of a broad discretion, to determine which expression of views will be heard and which will be silenced permits the official to act as a censor. Inherent in any such censoring system is the danger that some individual will be denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the U.S. Const., amend. 14. Therefore, it is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretional licensing power. Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
- The freedom of expression guarantee under the Constitution has been consistently recognized as being narrower than an unlimited license to talk; and regulatory statutes not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise are not regarded as violating the constitutional guarantee when justified by valid governmental interests. Aycock v. Police Comm., 133 Ga. App. 883, 212 S.E.2d 456 (1975); Hodnett v. City of Atlanta, 145 Ga. App. 285, 243 S.E.2d 605 (1978).
- While a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on the use of its streets and sidewalks for first amendment purposes, what a municipality may not do under the first and fourteenth amendments is to discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976).
- Licensing of bookstores and movie theaters is not a per se violation of U.S. Const., amend. 1. A city may enact an ordinance, for legitimate purposes, requiring those who would exercise their freedom of speech to obtain a license in advance. Airport Bookstore, Inc. v. Jackson, 242 Ga. 214, 248 S.E.2d 623 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2182, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1979).
- A zoning ordinance, regulating the location of adult motion picture theaters and treating them differently from other motion picture theaters, does not violate the first or fourteenth amendments because even though a city may not suppress adult films, it may place them in a different classification from other films and regulate them. Airport Bookstore, Inc. v. Jackson, 242 Ga. 214, 248 S.E.2d 623 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2182, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1979).
- Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations concerning speech may be necessary to further significant governmental interests and are permitted. A city ordinance prohibiting the display of "For Sale" signs in an effort to promote racial integration and prevent "white flight" violates a property owners' first amendment rights and is unconstitutional. Daugherty v. City of E. Point, 447 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
- If printed material is not protected by the first amendment, the state has nearly free rein to regulate and control its publication and distribution. If, however, even a portion of the material enjoys constitutional protections, the state as a rule may only limit its publication under the most compelling circumstances, and with the least restrictive interference. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Ordinance prohibiting the distribution of printed materials to homes violated the freedom of speech and press under the United States and Georgia Constitutions because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the city's interest in preventing litter and failed to provide for meaningful alternatives of communication. Statesboro Publ. Co. v. City of Sylvania, 271 Ga. 92, 516 S.E.2d 926 (1999).
- Where the state imposed a blanket restriction on printed material, not merely a regulation within the confines of a school during school hours, the restriction as to minors' access to the material must be struck down as it would be if it infringed the freedom of expression of adults as well. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature anywhere in public park except at one of two specified booths, limiting number of leafleteers to four at each booth, requiring acquisition of a permit seven days in advance, and extensive identifying information in application for permit went beyond the narrow regulation allowed by the Constitution. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n v. Zauber, 262 Ga. 661, 424 S.E.2d 279 (1993).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-31 of the Workers' Compensation Truth in Advertising Act of 1995, requiring advertisers of workers' compensation services to include a notice regarding criminal penalties for filing fraudulent claims, violated U.S. Const., amend. 1. Tillman v. Miller, 133 F.3d 1402 (11th Cir. 1998).
- Injunction restricting a protester's activities on a portico of and inside a federal building was valid, only insofar as it did not prohibit the protestor from engaging in any expressive conduct at all inside the building or on the portico, including such activity as wearing a political button, or talking with someone about the day's news events. United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1991).
Injunction preventing a protester from using an unenclosed plaza of a federal building as the protester's residence was valid, only insofar as it did not prohibit the protester from sleeping in the unenclosed plaza, if the protester did so as part of a protest. United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1991).
A prior injunction against defendant placing certain restrictions on the defendant's activities on federal property did not forever guarantee the defendant immunity from other reasonable restrictions on first amendment activity that the government placed on all persons seeking to use the property. United States v. Gilbert, 945 F. Supp. 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd, 130 F.3d 1458 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1088, 118 S. Ct. 1547, 140 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1998).
- An ordinance which makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1958).
- Because the Mass Gatherings Act, O.C.G.A. T. 31, Ch. 27 fails to provide a time limit within which the Department of Human Resources (DHR) must act upon an application for a permit, it delegates overly broad discretion to the DHR and, therefore, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of first amendment rights. Bo Fancy Prods., Inc. v. Rabun County Bd. of Comm'rs, 267 Ga. 341, 478 S.E.2d 373 (1996).
- A charter and ordinance which forbids the showing of any picture without its having been approved by a censor does not on its face offend the United States Constitution. K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).
- While prior restraints are not per se indefensible, they bear a heavy presumption of invalidity. United States v. Book Bin, 306 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 91 S. Ct. 423, 27 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1971).
Any imposition of prior restraint upon expression bears a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Prior restraint upon expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, but even where this presumption might otherwise be overcome the restraint must be the product of careful procedural provisions designed to assure the fullest consideration of the matter at hand which the circumstances permit. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
There is a strong presumption against the constitutional validity of a system of prior restraint. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- No government may impose a prior restraint unless it has shown, at the very least, that the particular speech it is attempting to suppress is overwhelmingly likely to fall outside the protection of the first amendment. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979).
There is a heavy burden on the defendants to justify their actions where they constitute a prior restraint. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Public officials who attempt prior restraint on speech are able to justify it only by showing an overwhelming contrary state interest, such as a clear and present danger of great violence and severe injury. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Mere raising of possibility of criminal violations does not justify imposition of prior restraint upon expression. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Statute prohibiting mailing of printed matter containing information concerning procuring of abortions is unconstitutional because such matter is protected speech under the first amendment and is entitled to be transmitted without prior restraint. Atlanta Coop. News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- A publisher cannot be restrained by a prior order from publishing what the publisher desires to publish, but this in no sense exonerates such publisher from liability for what the publisher has published. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
- Right to mail letters is first amendment right and prior restraint on that right, which bears heavy presumption of invalidity, must be carefully scrutinized. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- The power of a court of the United States to enjoin publication of information about a person, without regard to truth, falsity, or defamatory character of that information is a matter of concern. Such an injunction, enforceable through the contempt power, constitutes a prior restraint by the United States against the publication of facts which the community has a right to know and which any party has the right to publish. A court is without power to make such an order. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- Local ordinance requiring numerous, extensive, and imprecise licensing standards and a high license fee from theaters showing "adult", but not obscene, films imposed invalid restraints on rights of U.S. Const., amend. 1. Coleman v. Bradford, 238 Ga. 505, 233 S.E.2d 764 (1977).
- Modified gag order, which restrained the lawyers, court personnel, and current and retired law enforcement personnel from making extrajudicial, public statements on certain subjects related to a murder case, was vacated because the significant media interest in the case did not show any likelihood that the persons to whom the modified gag order was directed would make prejudicial statements; the record did not suggest that any lawyers, court personnel, or law enforcement personnel had disclosed sensitive or confidential information; and the accused and the state failed to identify a single statement attributed to anyone to whom the modified gag order applied that was likely to prejudice the accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury. WXIA-TV v. State of Ga., 303 Ga. 428, 811 S.E.2d 378 (2018).
- Court orders limiting communications regarding ongoing litigation between a class and class opponents did not constitute unconstitutional prior restraint. Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985).
- Fundamental purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 1 is to foreclose governmental control or manipulation of sentiments uttered to the public; therefore, before presumptively protected material is involuntarily removed from the market place by governmental activity which arguably is not directed toward that end, competing private and public policy interests must be carefully balanced in light of all the circumstances. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 436 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Before state officials may undertake a series of warrantless arrests which generate reasonably foreseeable effects in terms of removing presumptively protected speech from the public eye, judicial intervention of some dimension is constitutionally required. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 436 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
Courts must look through form to substance in determining whether system of informal censorship has been formulated; if a system of prior restraint is found, it comes before a federal district court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 436 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by first amendment interest, differences in characteristics of news media justify differences in the first amendment standards applied to them. Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate there is no unabridgeable right of U.S. Const., amend. 1 to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. United States v. WIYN Radio, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ga. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 614 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Cable television is entitled to the same first amendment protection as newspapers. The natural monopoly argument does not apply to cable television operators; granting an exclusive franchise does not serve an important or substantial governmental interest. Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 992 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1993).
Personal attack rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission does not constitute an unlawful restraint upon the broadcast licensee's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 of freedom of speech and of the press. United States v. WIYN Radio, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ga. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 614 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Because racehorse trainer and jockey were public figures, federal district court construed their invasion of privacy claims against filmmakers who used actors to portray them in a movie about a racehorse's career as right of publicity claims and held that use of their names and likenesses in a fictionalized dramatization of past newsworthy events was protected by the First Amendment. Thoroughbred Legends, LLC v. Walt Disney Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2008).
- Where statements which defendant was charged with making and with encouraging others to make on the defendant's radio show were quite clearly unrelated to any legitimate form of journalistic endeavor, the defendant was not protected on ground of "journalistic privilege" in the defendant's refusal to divulge the identity of his news sources for the allegedly defamatory statements. Georgia Communications Corp. v. Horne, 164 Ga. App. 227, 294 S.E.2d 725 (1982).
- Broadcaster may be liable even for newsworthy report if it contains a defamatory statement and the broadcaster failed to employ the procedures a reasonable broadcaster under the circumstances would have employed to assure the accuracy of the statement before broadcasting the report. Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368 S.E.2d 350, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 368 S.E.2d 350 (1988).
- The fact that a broadcaster may be constitutionally prohibited by statute from removing defamatory statements contained in speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public office does not demonstrate any right under U.S. Const., amend. 1 of a candidate to access. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- The fact that the Federal Communications Commission did not order the station to air plaintiff's message at the time an exemption from § 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., was requested is no evidence that the commission would have or did approve of the station's decision to refuse the commercial. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Since broadcasters are not instrumentalities or agents of the government, but operate as private parties under government regulation, determination of whether there has been governmental action in any particular case turns on whether the government in fact was in some way involved in bringing about the alleged violation, either by requiring or urging the broadcaster to commit the challenged action. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Since broadcasters exercise wide discretion over the content and format of their programming, where a broadcast licensee acts in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and where those acts are in no way sanctioned by a governmental body such as the Federal Communications Commission, they are private and not governmental acts for purposes of first amendment analysis. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Existence of regulations does not automatically transform regulated entity into government instrumentality for purposes of first amendment analysis. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
Public television station's rules and regulations requiring that producers be respectful of others at the production facility were reasonable and the station's action in barring a violator from the facility was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate the producer's first amendment rights. Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
- Once it is determined that a broadcaster acts as a private person subject to government regulations, a broadcaster's actions cannot be imputed to the government unless they are in some way approved or sanctioned by the government. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Where plaintiff failed to seek compliance with the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., before the Federal Communications Commission, that body's silence cannot be turned into governmental action for first amendment purposes. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
- As a general rule, a plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction when copyright liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing infringement. However, the broadcast media present an unusual order of first amendment values due to the inherent difficulty in allocating a scarce number of broadcast frequencies among applicants. Under these circumstances, caution in fashioning a remedy is indicated and broad injunctive relief will not be granted to a broadcaster unless entitlement to and need for such relief is clear and convincing. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1867, 85 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1985).
A federal court, in fashioning a permanent injunction against a "TV news clip" service, which violated a television station's copyright by copying and selling that station's newscasts, was not free to exempt portions of broadcasts on a subject/format basis, i.e., to exempt film footage of public events. Accordingly, the news service was permanently enjoined from copying and selling copies of the television station's newscasts, in whole or in part. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1987).
Off-the-air video-taping of live television news broadcasts by television news monitoring service, followed by the marketing and sale of news tapes to interested members of the public, infringes the broadcaster's copyright under federal law. The first amendment does not prohibit interference with such activities. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1867, 85 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1985).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 did not conflict with a television station's effort to enforce its copyright against a business which videotaped its news broadcasts and sold the tapes to the subjects of the news reports. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1867, 85 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1985).
- Any injunction that would prevent the copying of a cable television network's newscasts "in any part" would be inconsistent with the federal Copyright Act, particularly its fair use provisions, and both the copyright clause and the first amendment to the Constitution. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).
- Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission's decision to air a debate between Democrat and Republican candidates for Governor, while excluding a Libertarian candidate, was not viewpoint restrictive and did not violate the first amendment. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816, 112 S. Ct. 71, 116 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1991).
- The press has no first amendment right of access to communications between counsel and the court which take place at the bench or in chambers, particularly when those communications involve evidence which the court determines to be inadmissible and which, if disclosed, could deprive the defendant of the fair trial by an impartial jury that the Constitution guarantees. United States v. Moody, 746 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
First amendment protects the right of public employees to associate, speak, and petition freely, as well as the right of associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members. The government may not retaliate against individuals or associations for their exercise of first amendment rights by imposing sanctions for the expression of particular views it opposes. Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1988).
- Speech involving matters of public concern is protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, whereas speech involving matters relating to a public employee's personal interest is not. Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086, 105 S. Ct. 590, 83 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1984).
Threshold inquiry surrounding a first amendment claim as to a "reprimand" in public employment is whether plaintiff's speech and speech-related conduct involved matters of "public concern," rather than matters relating to plaintiff 's personal interest. If plaintiff's speech cannot be characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for the court to scrutinize the reasons for the alleged reprimand. Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
- A state employee's claim that the employee was demoted on the basis of the exercise of constitutionally protected speech failed where: (1) the employee's conduct was closely connected with, and actually classified as, insubordination; (2) the employee's speech substantially interfered with the working operation of the employee's supervisors, and to a lesser extent disrupted subordinates' working environment; and (3) the demotion would have occurred in spite of the exercise of the speech. Howkins v. Caldwell, 587 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S. Ct. 2361, 86 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1985).
- In determining whether an employee has suffered retaliation for protected speech the court must employ a four-part test: First, the court must determine whether the employee's speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern; second, the court must weigh the employee's first amendment interest against the interest of the state, as an employer; third, should the employee prevail on the balancing test, the fact-finder must determine whether the employee's speech played a substantial part in the government's decision to demote or discharge the employee; and finally, if the employee shows that the speech was a substantial motivating factor in the employment decision, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct. Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S. Ct. 2708, 129 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1994).
- The Pickering balancing test, and the remainder of the qualified immunity inquiry, must be done before a case is sent to a jury for its determination of whether a plaintiff was actually fired for the plaintiff's speech. To do otherwise deprives defendants of the benefit of their qualified immunity defense. The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Vista Community Servs. v. Dean, 107 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1997).
Where a causal link between the employee's speech and the adverse employment decision is lacking, a claim of retaliatory discharge must fail and it is unnecessary to consider other elements of the test for retaliation. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 1996).
Employee's private and informal complaints which focused primarily on how the employee's colleagues behaved toward the employee and how that conduct affected the employee's work did not rise to the level of public concern for purposes of the employee's first amendment retaliation claim. Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1997).
- To be protected by the first amendment, a public employee's statements must relate to a matter of public concern; that is, to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Suber v. Bulloch County Bd. of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Ga. 1989).
Absent extraordinary circumstances, an employee's speech is beyond the protection of the first amendment when the employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest. Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1992).
Municipal housing authority employee's complaints challenging the employee's termination from the employee's job could properly be characterized as constituting speech on "a matter of public concern" protected by the first amendment. Therefore, the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer was inappropriate. Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904 (11th Cir. 1993).
Where a corrections officer's comments during a private conversation with an inmate did not involve facts, but instead expressed the officer's personal opinion about another officer's job performance, the officer did not speak on a matter of public concern, and the officer's actions, having the potential for compromising the safety and security of the institution, justified the officer's discharge. Department of Cors. v. Derry, 235 Ga. App. 622, 510 S.E.2d 832 (1998).
Alleged incidents of speech and association by plaintiff hospital employees were not afforded first amendment protection where the matter was best described as nothing more than private workplace grievances that took place at a public hospital. Nero v. Hospital Auth., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Ga. 1999).
Statement of assistant county clerk to the clerk's employer, in the employer's capacity as a county commissioner, that the county could not lawfully refuse to pay overtime wages did not relate to a matter of public concern. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2001).
- The speech retaliation cases do not dictate the conclusion that an unsuccessful attempt to prevent protected speech violates the first amendment. Suissa v. Fulton County, 74 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled in part by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Overruled in part, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002).
- Employee's speech, which was driven by the employee's own entirely rational self-interest in improving the conditions of employment towards an environment free of sexual harassment, concerned a private not public matter for which demotion or discharge were not constitutionally redressable. Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S. Ct. 2708, 129 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1994).
- Statements involving matters of personal disagreement between a school teacher and the teacher's school administration were not related to matters of public concern, and were, therefore, not protected under the first amendment. Suber v. Bulloch County Bd. of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Ga. 1989).
- An employee's first amendment interest is entitled to more weight where the employee is acting as a whistle-blower exposing government corruption. Abernathy v. City of Cartersville, 642 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Sheriff who terminated a deputy's employment for cooperating with a law enforcement investigation into corruption at the sheriff's department violated the deputy's first amendment rights and the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. Cooper v. Smith, 89 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 1996).
- Non-renewal of state educational agency's employment contract with personal finance teacher was held not to be a retaliatory measure for the teacher's testimony in another discriminatory hearing where defendant's actions were justified ultimately by the declining enrollment in the course. Durrani v. Valdosta Tech. Inst., 810 F. Supp. 301 (M.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 443 (11th Cir. 1993).
- In a case where questions arising under the federal Constitution are properly invoked, the state Supreme Court is bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as respects such questions. Accordingly, the court held, under those decisions, that the superior court did not err in refusing to enjoin the defendants from picketing customers of their employer, since to have done so would have denied them their right of free speech. Mason & Dixon Lines v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E.2d 841 (1942).
- Where an order of court forbidding the use of threats, violence, and intimidation for the purpose of preventing others from engaging in their employment during a labor strike is violated, the violator can find no protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Lassiter v. Swift & Co., 204 Ga. 561, 50 S.E.2d 359 (1948).
- The judicial theory that peaceful picketing is a form of free speech, which is protected by the federal and state Constitutions, cannot be stretched to shield malevolent picketing for the purpose of injuring the employer and aiding an unlawful strike. Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708 (1956); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 118, 86 S. Ct. 1306, 16 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1966).
- Where the United States Supreme Court has not held that an employee can by closed shop employment contracts be required as an alternative to losing the employee's job to join a union which will use contributions the employee makes to it to promote ideological and political issues and candidates the employee opposes, therefore, the state Supreme Court held that the petition of these employees seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the employment contract and decree it void because of such uses of their contributions alleged a cause of action and it was error to dismiss the cause of action. Looper v. Georgia, S. & Fla. Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957).
Peaceful picketing with object of eliminating racial discrimination in department stores open to general public is a right embraced in free speech under the first amendment to the Constitution, and made applicable to the states by U.S. Const., amend. 14. Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964).
- Where the sole purpose of the picketing of plaintiff's place of business was to injure and damage the plaintiff's business, as punishment for the alleged beating of a Negro boy who worked for the plaintiff, the picketing was unlawful and not protected under the free speech provisions of the federal and state Constitutions. NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 118, 86 S. Ct. 1306, 16 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1966).
- Vital considerations to be weighed in balancing a public employee's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 and the rights of the state as an employer are whether the statements were directed toward a person with whom the speaker would normally be in daily contact, and whether such speech raised questions concerning either maintenance of discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers. Cotten v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 395 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
In determining whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected, the court must balance the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Courts v. Economic Opportunity Auth. For Savannah - Chatham County Area, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
Balancing test is to be applied in determining whether public employer may inhibit its employee's rights of free speech. In striking this balance between interests of a governmental employee as a citizen and interests of the government in promoting efficiency of the services it performs through its employees, there are factual matters appropriate for determination by a jury. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
In determining whether a government employee's speech is constitutionally protected, the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern must be balanced against the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Press v. Board of Regents, 489 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
- In weighing the interests of the state versus that of citizen employee, the importance of confidentiality and harmony is relevant. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- Police officer is not denied freedom of speech by rule which forbids the officer from publicly criticizing official actions of a superior officer because finding such a rule unconstitutional would enable a police officer to engage in the rankest form of insubordination, which would lead to the complete disruption and destruction of the relationship between the superior and subordinate with the concomitant impairment of an effective municipal police department. Aycock v. Police Comm., 133 Ga. App. 883, 212 S.E.2d 456 (1975).
Under the Pickering balancing test for evaluating public employee speech restrictions, a county's questioning of officers about their off-duty union activities while conducting a disciplinary investigation of the local police union's president for "mutinous" comments the president made about replacing the incumbent police chief violated the First Amendment because it had a chilling effect on associational rights. Local 491 v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
- Government employee may be required to forfeit the employee's right to publicly and truthfully criticize the employee's superiors if the employee occupies a high ranking position which requires continued loyalty to them and if such criticism actually undermines their working relationship. Courts v. Economic Opportunity Auth. For Savannah - Chatham County Area, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
- Where federal employee alleges that the employee's dismissal was due to a conspiracy of superiors who acted in retaliation to the employee's criticism, the employee may not claim a violation of the employee's right to free speech. Metz v. McKinley, 583 F. Supp. 683 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 747 F.2d 709 (11th Cir. 1984).
Police officer's claim of theft by high police officials was within the area of "public concern" in which public employees may exercise their right of free speech as plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff was terminated from employment as a result of the plaintiff's testimony before a grand jury regarding improper actions by superior officers. Abernathy v. City of Cartersville, 642 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
- Although a police captain could not have been lawfully demoted or terminated for expressing the captain's displeasure with the police chief under the proper circumstances, the captain's speech was not protected when it disrupted the efficient functioning of the police department. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989).
- A firefighter's obscene comments regarding superiors made in front of the firefighter's co-workers, in violation of an administrative rule stating that "An employee shall be civil, orderly, and courteous to ... supervisors, and shall not use coarse, insensitive, abusive, violent or profane language," was not constitutionally protected. Also, the rule itself, as limited to on-duty conduct and speech, was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Marshall v. City of Atlanta, 614 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 174 (11th Cir. 1985).
- A public employee's use of racial epithets in reference to coworkers was not protected speech about matters of public concern and, thus, a first amendment analysis would not be used to examine the propriety of the employee's termination. Wright v. Glynn County Bd. of Comm'rs, 932 F. Supp. 1476 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
- A police officer's disparaging remarks about the police chief were protected by the first amendment where the remarks were made while the officer was off-duty, out of uniform, out of the department's jurisdiction, and speaking to another off-duty officer that the officer considered a friend and where the police department made no showing of actual harm or a reasonable likelihood of harm to its efficiency, discipline, or harmony. Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1982).
An employee's freedom of speech is protected under the first amendment when the interest of an employee in commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the interests of the employer in performing public services efficiently. Because of the case-by-case nature of the balancing test, qualified immunity will always protect an employer unless the employee's speech would definitely and necessarily pass the balancing test. Therefore, a police officer who supported the mayor's opponent was entitled to first amendment protection. Clark v. City of Zebulon, 156 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
- Police officers were improperly dismissed for failing to obey a city resolution requiring a flag patch on police uniforms after they removed the patches in protest of police practices as the officers were exercising constitutionally protected rights. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S. Ct. 3571, 82 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1984).
- Undercover investigator who refused to discuss with supervisor an on-going investigation into alleged illegal actions of the supervisor did not have the investigator's free speech rights violated when the sheriff's office transferred and subsequently dismissed investigator. Although the investigator's speech was a matter of public concern, the investigator's first amendment interests did not obviously outweigh the interest of the sheriff's department in providing efficient service, and the investigator failed to establish that the investigator would not have been discharged but for the speech at issue. Smith v. Upson County, 859 F. Supp. 1504 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1392 (11th Cir. 1995).
- Public employees, like all citizens, enjoy the right and privilege of freedom of speech as guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 1 which includes the freedom to associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas. As such, public employees cannot be prohibited from participating in the activities of labor unions. Likewise, they cannot be penalized for advocating the right of public employees to strike or for joining unions which so contend. While they may so associate and advocate and not be retaliated against for doing so, they cannot go further and by striking compel their public employer to recognize or bargain with a union. When they do go further and by striking seek to force their public employer to recognize or bargain with a union they have gone beyond the outer limits of their constitutional protections of free expression and association, and they are not constitutionally insulated from being fired or otherwise penalized for refraining and continuing to refrain from working. Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
- It is question of fact whether city delegated to Director of Bureau of Corrections the final or ultimate authority to make personnel decisions in the Bureau of Corrections with respect to work assignments, transfers, days off, discipline, hiring and firing of employees, and restrictions concerning employees' rights to engage in certain free speech activity. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
- In a case by a former Bureau of Corrections employee claiming that the employee was constructively discharged for exercise of the employee's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, the Director of Correction's official conduct must be considered that of one whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy for which the city may be held responsible where such conduct involves areas in which the director is the final authority or repository of power. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Government employee has the burden of proving that the employee's speech was constitutionally protected and that its exercise was a substantial factor in the employee's discharge. Courts v. Economic Opportunity Auth. For Savannah - Chatham County Area, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
Where former correctional officer attempted to organize "sick out" among officers in protest of alleged improper treatment of prisoners and unsatisfactory working conditions and brought suit claiming constructive discharge for exercise of right of freedom of speech under U.S. Const., amend. 1, for the government to prevail it must show that the employee's conduct substantially interfered with the discharge of duties and responsibilities inherent in governmental employment, while for plaintiff to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted retaliation by the governmental employer was motivated specifically by what has been determined to be protected speech. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
- In an action claiming improper dismissal on the basis of an exercise of first amendment rights, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the plaintiff's speech or conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision not to hire the plaintiff and that the speech or conduct was constitutionally protected. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S. Ct. 3571, 82 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1984).
- Where a firefighter demonstrated that the firefighter engaged in conduct protected by the first amendment and that this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in a defendant city's decision to abolish the firefighter's position and to demote the firefighter, the burden shifted to the city to prove that it would have reached the same decisions as to the abolition and demotion even in the absence of the firefighter's protected conduct. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1982).
- It was a question of law whether plaintiff's attempt to organize a "sick out" among the plaintiff's fellow employees was protected speech under U.S. Const., amend. 1 and the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. Determining whether plaintiff's attempt to organize a "sick out" constituted protected speech is but a legal inference drawn from the basic facts in the case and is reviewable as any other legal ruling or conclusion. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
- If plaintiff's attempt to organize a "sick out" among the plaintiff's fellow employees is found to be protected speech under the first amendment, it is then a question of fact whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged because of it. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
Bona fide factual dispute, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether a county tax appraiser was terminated in retaliation for the appraiser's public speeches supporting a system of appraising personalty known as "trending." Lovell v. Floyd County, 710 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
- Whether plaintiff was constructively discharged for reasons that impermissibly abridged the plaintiff's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 was ultimately a question of law for the trial court. Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).
- In a case involving discharge of appellee, a police officer, for leaking information about falsification of records by one official for the protection of another official, although the working relationship of the parties was damaged, this exigency paled before the need of the public to know of the malfeasance involved, and the right of the appellee to make it known both for the appellee's own protection and as the appellee's duty as servant to the people. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- Although protection under the first amendment is not dependent upon the "social worth" of ideas, the nature of the communication is relevant to the balancing of the interests of the employee as a citizen against the interest of the governmental unit. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- The balancing analysis under U.S. Const., amend. 1 with regard to a discharge from employment for communication is the same regardless of the existence of a confidentiality policy. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- Analysis under U.S. Const., amend. 1 requires that the quality and nature of the speech be balanced with the exigencies of the work place but with the far greater weight attached to the interest of the public. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 forbids abridgment of freedom of speech. Neither the amendment itself nor the United States Supreme Court decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with an employer rather than to spread the employee's views before the public. Press v. Board of Regents, 489 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
- The conduct for which a union employee was disciplined - arranging for a meeting between an injured co-employee and an attorney for the purpose of filing a suit against the employer and personally taking the co-employee to meet with the attorney - was not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Woodrum v. Southern Ry., 750 F.2d 876 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821, 106 S. Ct. 71, 88 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1985).
- A city firefighter who helped form a local firefighters union, spoke out on many issues affecting firefighters, and filed an affidavit in support of a challenge of the city's failure to validate promotion exams as required by the city personnel management policy engaged in conduct protected by the first amendment. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1982).
- The government, as employer, has a legitimate interest in prohibiting public officials from using their authority to coerce their inferior employees into contributing to their campaigns. McCallum v. Hinson, 489 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
- Deputies who claimed that they were not rehired because of their failure to support a new sheriff when the sheriff was a candidate were not protected by the first amendment since their term of office ended with the term of the former sheriff and the newly elected sheriff had the right not to retain the deputies. Brett v. Jefferson County, 925 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 123 F.3d 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).
Court clerk's termination of a deputy clerk, who had advised the clerk that the deputy clerk planned to run against the clerk for the position of clerk in the upcoming election, did not violate the deputy clerk's free speech rights as guaranteed by the first amendment. Zellner v. Ham, 735 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
Dismissal of employee who wrote critical editorials in an employees' newsletter violated the employee's free speech rights, where there was no evidence that the employee's speech impeded the employee's ability to do work, disrupted the employee's working relationships, or affected the morale of fellow employees. Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1990).
- Public officials are permitted to recover in libel only when they prove that the publication involved was deliberately falsified, or published recklessly despite the publisher's awareness of probable falsity. Investigatory failures alone are held insufficient to satisfy this standard. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967).
The first amendment mandates that a public figure plaintiff prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Barber v. Perdue, 194 Ga. App. 287, 390 S.E.2d 234 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S. Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1990).
To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action for libel and slander, a plaintiff who is a public figure must produce evidence that the speaker knew the charge was false or at least had serious doubts concerning its truth. Smith v. Turner, 764 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
- U.S. Const., amend. 1 limits the state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of the official's official conduct. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
Protection under the first amendment is conditioned on a lack of actual malice, i.e., knowledge on the part of the person claiming first amendment protection that a statement is false, or reckless disregard of whether or not it is false. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- Actual malice is not presumed, but is a matter of proof by the plaintiff. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
The constitutional standard demands that proof of actual malice be made with convincing clarity. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- Statements made by the press about a private individual which concern a matter of public interest are still granted a conditional privilege to the extent that such statements are not subject to "strict liability" which might otherwise be imposed at common law. However, there is no longer a constitutional requirement that the individual must prove actual malice in order to recover, and the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the standard of the majority of states, i.e., ordinary care. Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368 S.E.2d 350, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 368 S.E.2d 350 (1988).
Publications concerning matters of public interest are protected by the first amendment absent proof of actual malice. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- Guarantees under U.S. Const., amend. 1 are applicable to misstatements of fact in discussing public figures. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- Freedom of discussion must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- The constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of statutes designed to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
Criminal defamation statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-40, requiring a communication which "tends to provoke a breach of the peace" is vague and overbroad under U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Williamson v. State, 249 Ga. 851, 295 S.E.2d 305 (1982).
- An article in a Time, Inc., publication, focusing on Augusta, the Masters' Golf Tournament, and the public accommodations available for the many thousands of spectators, was of a legitimate public interest, and entitled to protection. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- In an action for libel where the publisher is protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, unless the trial court finds, on the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions, or other documentary evidence, that the plaintiff can prove actual malice, i.e., actual knowledge of the statement's falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, it should grant summary judgment for the defendant. Summary judgment for publishers is proper where the record is devoid of genuine issues of fact as to whether the alleged defamatory statement was published with actual knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- A publisher's motion for summary judgment may not be allowed where facts were presented from which a jury could find that a statement was made with actual malice. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
- In a libel suit, reckless conduct on the part of a publisher is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the defendant's publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. Jackson v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 324 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
It is not sufficient to measure reckless disregard by what a reasonably prudent man would have done under similar circumstances nor whether a reasonably prudent man would have conducted further investigation. Rather, the evidence must show in a clear and convincing manner that defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the defendant's statements. Miller v. Woods, 180 Ga. App. 486, 349 S.E.2d 505 (1986).
- Since the appellee did not include in an amended complaint a plea for special damages under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(g), the defamation count of the amended complaint was limited to a claim alleging slander per se; employment of the Milkovich factors determined only that the alleged opinion was actionable as slander, but the Milkovich factors had no bearing on whether the words used constituted slander per se; statements which could have been interpreted as having the purpose of injuring the appellee's business by stating or implying that the appellee was going out of the real estate development business in which the appellee was still engaged and leaving the area were not recognizable as injurious on their face, and the appellant was entitled to summary judgment on the appellee's slander per se claim. Bellemeade, LLC v. Stoker, 280 Ga. 635, 631 S.E.2d 693 (2006).
- A public figure cannot recover for libel unless the public figure demonstrates actual malice or the publishing of a knowing falsehood with reckless disregard of the truth. Jackson v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 324 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Classroom discussion regarding America's involvement in Iraq was not an action intended to thrust the professor into the forefront of controversy in any public forum, and the trial court erred in finding that the professor was a limited-purpose public figure and requiring a showing of actual malice on the part of a reporter, newspapers, and others in the professor's defamation claims; rather, the professor was a private person to whom a negligence standard applied and, as there was no claim by defendants that they were not negligent, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to them. Sewell v. Trib Publ'ns, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 250, 622 S.E.2d 919 (2005).
Facts concerning plaintiff in libel suit allowing court to infer that the plaintiff is a "public figure". See Jackson v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 324 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- The constitutional protection of freedom of the press requires that a public official not be allowed to collect damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to the official's official conduct unless the official can prove that the statement was made with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- The limited protection of U.S. Const., amend. 1 reaches publications regarding all "public figures," not just those who are public officials. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- For public officers and public figures to recover for damage to their reputations for libelous falsehoods, they must prove either knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. All other plaintiffs must prove at least negligent falsehood, but if the publication about them was in an area of legitimate public interest, then they too must prove deliberate or reckless error. In all actions for libel or slander, actual damages must be proved, and awards of punitive damages will be strictly limited. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- In a libel suit for an allegedly defamatory falsehood, U.S. Const., amend. 1 requires that the plaintiff not be permitted to recover damages except upon a clear and convincing showing that the falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Publications concerning matters of public interest are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, absent proof of actual malice. Actual malice may be inferred when the investigation for a story which is not "hot news" was grossly inadequate under the circumstances. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Forcing a defendant to go to trial when the defendant has acted with the first amendment's protection can in itself be a curtailment of freedom of the press, even if the defendant should subsequently prevail on the merits. Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Just as a prior restraint may not be imposed upon material thought to be obscene without adequate safeguards, so, too, a prior restraint may not be imposed upon a suspected libel without adequate safeguards. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
- Libel, like obscenity, is not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Thus, an injunction directed against a libel is not unconstitutional. Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
One may attain status of public figure by position alone, or by commanding a substantial amount of public interest. In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that the individual becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects oneself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- "Public figures" are those persons who, though not public officials, are involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest and include artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, anyone who is famous or infamous because of who the person is or what the person has done. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- Since a chief of police is a public official, the police commissioner's memorandum recommending the chief's reduction to patrolman must have contained false allegations which were uttered with actual malice in order for the allegations therein to be libelous. Miller v. Woods, 180 Ga. App. 486, 349 S.E.2d 505 (1986).
Police officer is properly classified as a "public official" for purposes of libel and slander suits regarding comments on the officer's official activities. Pierce v. Pacific & S. Co., 166 Ga. App. 113, 303 S.E.2d 316 (1983).
- A sports figure who, years earlier, played for a college football team and who was personally involved in a controversial incident during one particular game, was considered a public figure, whose actions on the field sportswriters could criticize within the protective "breathing space" required by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Holt v. Cox Enters., 590 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
- A public figure might be allowed a civil remedy for a statement about the public figure only if the speaker knew the speaker's statement was false, or entertained serious doubts as to whether it was true or false. The defamatory statement against a public figure may be false but it is still not actionable unless it was uttered with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- Knowledge of the falsity of the statement, a reckless disregard of whether it was false or true, or a serious doubt as to its truth, is imperative to proof of malice in the constitutional sense as to statements within the immunity of U.S. Const., amend. 1. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- Unless the court finds, on the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions, or other documentary evidence, that the plaintiff public figure can prove actual malice, it should grant summary judgment for the defendant. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- The speaker's motives, though malicious in the statutory or common-law sense; what a reasonable man in the same circumstances may have said; and the lack of or inadequacy of prior investigation; all are inapplicable to the question of actual malice in the constitutional sense as to defamation of a public figure. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Actual malice is a constitutional issue to be decided initially by the trial judge vis-a-vis motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Whether a matter is of public or general concern is a question of law for the court. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- Although the issue of whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure poses a mixed question of law and fact, it is nevertheless one for the court, not the jury, to determine. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- Summary judgment procedures have been determined to be particularly appropriate in defamation actions where the first amendment is applicable. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Because of the importance of free speech, summary judgment is the rule, and not the exception, in defamation cases. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
In libel cases, where no substantial danger to reputation is apparent, summary judgment is appropriate, since the press should be more carefully guarded against exposure to liability for defamation than where clearly defamatory content warns it of liability. Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S. Ct. 62, 62 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1979).
- Constitutional malice does not involve motives of the speaker or publisher, though they may be wrong, but rather it is the publisher's awareness of actual or probable falsity, or the publisher's reckless disregard for their falsity. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- Malice in the constitutional sense is distinguished from common-law sense of ill will, hatred, or charges calculated to injure. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Actual malice in the sense of libeling a public official does not necessarily extend to ill will, hatred, or actions calculated to injury, for this may run afoul of the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment. Miller v. Woods, 180 Ga. App. 486, 349 S.E.2d 505 (1986).
- To prove actual malice there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the defendant's publication. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Given that defendants, a newspaper, its editor, and a columnist, so doubted the truthfulness of their articles (alleging that a deputy sheriff beat an arrestee to death with a flashlight) that they refused to print contradictory versions of the events, actual malice could be inferred; as a result, the trial court properly denied their motions for a directed verdict and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to a deputy sheriff in the deputy's libel action. Lake Park Post, Inc. v. Farmer, 264 Ga. App. 299, 590 S.E.2d 254 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 875, 125 S. Ct. 104, 160 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2004).
- If a prima facie showing is made that there did not exist actual malice in the constitutional sense, the burden is cast upon the plaintiff public figure to come forward with proof that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. If the plaintiff fails in this duty of rebuttal, summary judgment is proper. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
- The first amendment guarantees to an individual the right to vindicate the individual's reputation and good name in the civil courts. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- Private individuals cannot recover unless the defamation is the result of fault or negligence on the part of the publisher. Recovery is restricted to actual or special damages. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
Convincing clarity is the constitutional standard to proof actual malice. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- In an action for libel or slander where actual malice is shown, presumed and punitive damages are recoverable if the applicable state law permits such damages, and hence special damages need not be shown. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- United States Supreme Court has equated reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity; thus, in a libel or slander action there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the defendant's publication. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- In an action by a high school football coach against the superintendent of schools and a television station news reporter, a television news report concerning allegations of the coach's prior involvement in illegal gambling did not constitute "defamacast," slander, or false light, or invasion of privacy, even if the reporter failed to investigate adequately. Brewer v. Rogers, 211 Ga. App. 343, 439 S.E.2d 77 (1993).
- Damages cannot be awarded to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct in the absence of proof of actual malice or reckless disregard of whether the statement was true or false. Even where the statement is false, the plaintiff must meet this standard. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- In an action for libel or slander it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the proof shows plaintiff to be a public official. Similarly, while the issue of whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure poses a mixed question of law and fact, it is nevertheless one for the court, not the jury, to determine. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- A governmental entity is absolutely barred from prosecuting a cause of action for libel regardless of whether the libel was against the governmental entity in its governmental or its proprietary function. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981).
- An individual, albeit a government official, libeled for action taken in the official's official capacity may sue for libel. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981).
Hospital authority cannot sue for libel. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981).
- All citizens of the United States are guaranteed freedom of expression. This freedom does not extend to obscenity because it is utterly without redeeming social importance. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
Obscenity is not entitled to protection under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
It is firmly established that obscenity is not protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment and may be regulated by the state. Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
Free expression is rooted deeply in our way of life and cannot be suppressed through statutes which compromise the exercise of this freedom. This does not mean that one is free to express obscenity. Injunctive procedures are available to stop obscene expressions. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
Obscenity is not protected by the free speech clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1 and may be regulated by the state. S.S.W. Corp. v. Slaton, 231 Ga. 734, 204 S.E.2d 155 (1974).
- U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14 prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969).
Obscenity is not within the protected pale of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. However, the private possession of obscene materials is protected. Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 592, 90 S. Ct. 1351, 25 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1970).
State and federal governments may not constitutionally prohibit mere possession of admittedly obscene material in the privacy of one's own home. United States v. Thevis, 320 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
- The states have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, including so-called "adult" theaters from which minors are excluded. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
The sale and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, on remand, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
- No reason exists why the sale and delivery of films should be immune to state control any more than the sale and delivery of multiple copies of an obscene book, pamphlet, or magazine. Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, on remand, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
- Implicit in the history of the first amendment is rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S. Ct. 281, 30 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1971).
The Constitution offers no protection to pornography without redeeming literary or artistic qualities. Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
- Obscenity is not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1; but this does not mean that literature which is in fact obscene is not entitled to the same procedural safeguards that are thrown around nonobscene materials. Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
- Portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature, and scientific works, is not in itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- The states have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize the state's right to maintain a decent society. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
- Devices "designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs," are prohibited from distribution under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80, and are not protected expressions under either U.S. Const., amend. 1 or the free speech clause of the Georgia Constitution. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. 129, 526 S.E.2d 336 (2000).
- What is obscene and what is not obscene is sometimes separated by a line which is finely drawn. Accordingly, U.S. Const., amend. 14 requires that regulation by the states of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
While freedom of expression does not extend to obscenity, state regulation of obscenity must conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line. Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
- Definition of obscenity simply cannot be so reduced to a standard applied by a particular local community. Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972).
- The term "community" means, not the minute local community, but society at large, that is, the public, or people in general. Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972).
- A jury conscientiously striving to define the relevant community of persons, the "average person," by whose standards obscenity is to be judged would reach a much lower "average" when children are part of the equation than if they restricted their consideration to the effect of allegedly obscene materials on adults. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978).
- The concept of obscenity is the meaning applied by society at large which may vary "from time to time," but "not from county to county, or town to town." Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972).
Foul words do not, standing alone, constitute obscene expression. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Lewd and obscene utterances are not an essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973).
- The test for obscenity is whether or not to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972); Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court has set down three basic guidelines for determining whether material could be judged obscene and therefore regulated by the state: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
A particular issue of a self-styled "magazine for men" fell within O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80 (distributing obscene material) in that: (1) It contained a large number of photographs of women in various degrees of nudity, depicting sexual conduct and lewd exhibition in a patently offensive way; (2) the magazine's overwhelming effect, obviously planned, was to create sexual excitement and stimulation, predominantly appealing, as a whole, to the prurient interest, even though there were items that concerned topics other than sex; and (3) the magazine, taken as a whole, had no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, although there may have been some slight literary, artistic, and political value to a small number of items. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Webb, 594 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
- When examining a publication to determine whether it is obscene, the three-prong test is conjunctive so every element of the test must be met before a publication may be adjudicated obscene. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Courts may find material obscene where the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, where the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matter, and where the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972); Gornto v. McDougall, 336 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D. Ga. 1972), appeal dismissed, 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest, i.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- An arguably obscene book or magazine is going to be published or banned as a discrete unit, and must be judged as a "whole" to determine whether it is obscene. A magazine is a "whole" within the meaning of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), and it must be judged as such. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
In determining whether a work is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of facts are whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
In considering whether an allegedly obscene work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, each magazine must be treated as a separate work that is to be taken as a whole. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Trial court properly suppressed videotapes that were seized from defendant's home during the execution of a search warrant, as the description in the warrant that the items sought were videotapes that were instruments used in the crimes of molesting and sexually exploiting children did not meet the particularity requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, especially in light of the fact that the videotapes involved activity protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, where there was no evidence of any videotape activity involving the victim, and the warrant did not elaborate on what types of videotapes were to be seized, leaving that determination solely to the discretion of the officers, which amounted to an impermissible general warrant; circumstances may make an exact search warrant description of instrumentalities a virtual impossibility and, in those circumstances, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items sought, but a warrant authorizing the seizure of "videotapes" with nothing more does not pass constitutional muster. State v. Kramer, 260 Ga. App. 546, 580 S.E.2d 314 (2003).
- Fact that sexual activity depicted by a film is simulated does not prevent it from being obscene. Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, on remand, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939, 94 S. Ct. 3227, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1974).
Former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80), was not violative of U.S. Const., amends. 1, 4, 5, 9, and 14 on the ground that the constitutional right to mere possession of obscene material necessarily implies the right to purchase such material and, hence, the right of others to distribute it. Gornto v. State, 227 Ga. 46, 178 S.E.2d 894 (1970).
Former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80) is constitutionally sound against attacks alleging amendment violations. Brown v. State, 156 Ga. App. 201, 274 S.E.2d 572 (1980).
Former Code 1933, § 26-2610 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39) was not unconstitutional as a violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Grantham v. State, 151 Ga. App. 707, 261 S.E.2d 445, aff'd, 244 Ga. 775, 262 S.E.2d 777 (1979).
- O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-102 -16-12-104, which make it a criminal offense to sell to minors or to display in a place accessible to minors any material deemed "harmful to minors", produced only a slight burden on adults' access to protected material and fully comported with the first amendment. American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941, 111 S. Ct. 2237, 114 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1991).
- O.C.G.A. § 16-12-103(b)(2), prohibiting the admission of persons between 18 and 21 years of age to premises where sexually explicit performances are exhibited, is unconstitutional as an infringement on free speech rights without proof of a compelling state interest justifying the application of such restriction. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 269 Ga. 486, 500 S.E.2d 574 (1998).
- Constitutional attack upon former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80) that the constructive knowledge as found therein is a violation of the constitutional requirements as to scienter was not meritorious. Showcase Cinemas, Inc. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 225, 274 S.E.2d 578 (1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 934, 101 S. Ct. 2037, 68 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1981).
Statute prohibiting certain nude and sexual conduct on premises where alcoholic beverages are sold or dispensed for consumption on the premises infringes upon protected speech and must fall as an improper exercise of the state's police power. Harris v. Entertainment Sys., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989).
Although a state may have a certain amount of its police power restored to it under the twenty-first amendment that would otherwise be limited under the first amendment, the expression involved in an establishment offering sexually-oriented communication where alcohol is served is still within the purview of the first amendment, and is still protected by Georgia's free expression guarantees. Because Georgia has no constitutional equivalent to the twenty-first amendment, the state's police power, though possibly not limited under the U.S. Constitution, is limited by Georgia's Constitution. Harris v. Entertainment Sys., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989).
- The provisions of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VII, giving the state authority to regulate alcoholic beverages and to delegate authority to counties and municipalities to regulate the exhibition of nudity in connection with the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages, did not violate the U.S. Const., amend. 1. Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818, 118 S. Ct. 70, 139 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1997).
- Construing an exception in a county ordinance prohibiting nude dancing on premises selling alcohol as requiring that a business be found to be "mainstream" before the exception applied, constituted an improper prior restraint on protected speech. S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 215 Ga. App. 73, 449 S.E.2d 868 (1994).
- Where there was no evidence that, before passing an ordinance to regulate adult entertainment establishments, the county commission considered and relied upon adverse secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses, the ordinance could not pass constitutional muster. Chambers v. Peach County, 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996).
- It is error to dismiss, for failure to state a claim, constitutional challenges to a city ordinance prohibiting private modeling sessions or other sexual displays in one-on-one sessions and close mingling between customers and employees of adult entertainment establishments. Quetgles v. City of Columbus, 264 Ga. 708, 450 S.E.2d 677 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083, 115 S. Ct. 1794, 131 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1995).
Nightclub's First Amendment challenge to a city's ordinances restricting the sale of alcohol in nude dancing establishments was rejected because under intermediate scrutiny, the ordinances furthered important government interests of preserving the quality of urban life and reducing criminal activity. Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga. , 816 S.E.2d 31 (2018).
- Municipal ordinance prohibiting total nude dancing and placing restrictions on partial nude dancing was an unconstitutional infringement on protected expression as overly broad and void for vagueness. Pel Assoc., Inc. v. Joseph, 262 Ga. 904, 427 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
- Municipal ordinance's distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream performances was not constitutionally impermissible; the twenty-first amendment outweighs any first amendment interest in nude dancing. Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen, 840 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
Constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting nudity in establishments serving alcoholic beverages was established where it was shown to further an important government interest by the city's proof of reliance on specific studies showing a correlation between adult establishments and crime, and proof that the motivating factor for passage of the ordinance was crime prevention. World Famous Dudley's Food & Spirits, Inc. v. City of College Park, 265 Ga. 618, 458 S.E.2d 823 (1995).
A city ordinance adopted pursuant to the authority of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VII, and providing that a liquor license would not be issued for locations where adult entertainment licenses were required did not violate constitutional free speech guarantees. Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818, 118 S. Ct. 70, 139 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1997).
- County ordinance restricting adult entertainment establishments offering nude dancing and alcohol was sufficiently narrow in its descriptions of prohibited attire and conduct to pass constitutional challenges for "overbreadth". S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267, 430 S.E.2d 726 (1993).
- Interlocutory judicial restraint of obscene material, with adequate provision being made that claims can proceed to final judgment at the earliest practicable date, is not violative of first amendment rights. S.S.W. Corp. v. Slaton, 231 Ga. 734, 204 S.E.2d 155 (1974).
Arrest and seizure of obscene materials without constitutionally sufficient warrant is unreasonable and the evidence is not admissible. Wood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E.2d 743 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899, 99 S. Ct. 265, 58 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1978).
- Where, after viewing a film, a superior court judge finds probable cause that the film is obscene and enjoins the defendant from exhibiting or showing the film in public within the jurisdiction of the court, the injunction feature of the order should be limited so as to provide that it shall continue only "until further order of the court." Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S.E.2d 464, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1003, 92 S. Ct. 560, 30 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1971).
Public officials may impose a prior restraint upon obscene motion pictures. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Unconstitutional system of prior restraint with respect to certain men's magazines was engaged in by local law enforcement authorities where such authorities did not obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate based upon a threshold determination of obscenity before making a series of arrests of dealers and distributors on charges that their dealings in such magazines violated obscenity laws. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 436 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Where officer's activities constituted a calculated scheme of warrantless arrests and harassing visits to retailers of publications, the substance of the procedures resulted in a "constructive seizure" of the magazines from the shelves of the retail establishments and created an informal system of prior restraint in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- The requirement that there be a prior adversary judicial hearing on the question of obscenity before a seizure does not mean that courts, either federal or state, desire to protect obscenity. It does mean that the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that lest the nonobscene and the constitutionally protected be suppressed it is better that some judicial officer first after hearing competent evidence judicially determine that the challenged matter is obscene before its seizure. Nor is it any reflection upon law enforcement officers to suggest that a judicial officer trained in the process of weighing evidence and making decisions is better equipped than they to pass upon the important and sometimes difficult question of obscenity. This is so because the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for sensitive tools. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
- There must be some judicial determination of obscenity before a seizure or "constructive seizure" may occur. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
Any seizure of allegedly obscene film should be preceded by state court finding of obscenity in an adversary judicial hearing. A prior adversary judicial hearing designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity must be held before the state may seize any motion picture film. Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
Seizure and confiscation of materials in advance of adversary hearing on issue of obscenity is now prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
Criminal prosecution or threat thereof prior to adversary determination of obscenity constitutes an unconstitutional burden upon the freedom of expression. Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
Any criminal prosecution prior to an adversary hearing without plaintiff having the subsequent opportunity to refrain from selling materials determined to be obscene is violative of the plaintiff's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
Police officers may not indiscriminately seize as contraband items they consider obscene publications without adequate safeguards to assure constitutional protection to possible nonobscene material. The owner of the property must be afforded an adversary hearing as to obscenity before the warrant issues to seize the obscene material. State v. Smalley, 138 Ga. App. 747, 227 S.E.2d 488 (1976); Lee v. City of Rome, 866 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- There is no prior restraint of the freedom of expression by any unlawful state-initiated or state-enforced restraint where a warrantless arrest is made but no obscene materials are seized. Wood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E.2d 743 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899, 99 S. Ct. 265, 58 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1978).
- The government-instituted proceeding must place the defendant exhibitor or seller on notice as to what film or publication the defendant has exhibited, sold, or held for sale that the government seeks to seize or suppress. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
- It is illegal for officers to seize a movie film unless and until there has been held a prior adversary judicial hearing upon the question of obscenity. Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
- Retailer or distributor of presumptively protected material must be afforded greater procedural safeguards before seizure or "constructive seizure" may take place. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
When dealing in area of presumptively protected material, greater procedural safeguards must be afforded before occurrence of "constructive seizure"; this usually involves the requirement of a judicial determination of some type by a neutral, detached magistrate either before or immediately after the seizure of allegedly obscene material. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- The Constitution at a minimum apparently requires the imposition of a neutral, detached magistrate in the procedure to make an independent judicial determination of probable cause prior to issuing an arrest warrant or some other warrant authorizing the seizure of allegedly obscene material to be used as evidence. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- A warrant was clearly insufficient on its face to show probable cause if it merely stated the bold conclusion of the affiant district attorney that the defendant exhibited two named films which were obscene material. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972).
- Admission in evidence of allegedly obscene motion picture films seized under the authority of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on a police officer's affidavit giving the films' titles, and stating that the officer had determined from personal observation of the films and of the theater's billboard that they were obscene, was erroneous as the issuance of the warrant without the justice of the peace's inquiry into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972).
- Temporary restraints to preserve the status quo in this regard are authorized after an adversary hearing and when followed by a prompt final determination of obscenity. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
- There is a necessity for early and definitive judicial review in matters involving rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, particularly in obscenity cases. United States v. One Carton Containing Quantity of Paperback Books, 324 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
A judge may act as a finder of fact in civil proceedings involving obscenity. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
- In each case, the government must institute judicial proceedings whereby the material or film is seized or suppressed, and it must further bear the burden of proof of the obscenity of the material or film. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
- In obscenity case, it was not error to charge that "every person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their act, but that presumption may be rebutted." Such charge is not burden-shifting and does not contravene Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), where the jury is also instructed such presumption may be rebutted. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- In trial of case involving distribution of obscene material, charge by court on constructive knowledge as contained in former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80) was not subject to complaint that it shifts burden of proof and relieved the state of proving every essential element of the crime in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14, where the front cover of the magazine would put anyone on notice as to its contents. Spry v. State, 156 Ga. App. 74, 274 S.E.2d 2 (1980).
Court did not err in charging jury on constructive knowledge of obscene nature of contents of magazines which defendants possessed. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- To assist the jury in determining the issue of obscenity, the jury may consider the setting in which the publication was presented to the public, and view the publications against a background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- To aid jury in its determination of whether materials are obscene, methods of their creation, promotion, or dissemination are relevant. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- The jury could find the material obscene if they found the material was pandered, that is, the distribution was a "commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal." This phrase has come to be known as the "Ginzburg pandering instruction." Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- The government need not offer extensive evidence of the methods of production, editorial goals, if any, or methods of operation in order for the evidence to be sufficient to trigger the "Ginzburg pandering instruction." Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- Absent a clear indication from either the Georgia Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court that the term "acceptance," when charged to a jury in the context of instructions concerning the difficult legal concept of "community standards," impermissibly expands the parameters of the standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973) beyond the scope contemplated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, there is no harmful error predicated solely upon the use of the word "acceptance" in lieu of the word "tolerance" in obscenity prosecutions. Brown v. State, 156 Ga. App. 201, 274 S.E.2d 572 (1980).
- It is inconceivable how a jury could apply an obscenity test to a film without having seen it, i.e., make a sophisticated value judgment on the libidinous effect of a visual experience, without having had the experience. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972).
Appellate courts must review independently the constitutional fact of obscenity. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).
- Where allegedly obscene films and projectors are seized as evidence of a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80) and the case is pending in the state courts, the federal courts will not interfere with the pending case by requiring release of the contraband as an unconstitutional seizure. G & E Bus. Servs., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 480 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
- After applicants complied with all the requirements necessary for obtaining business licenses to sell materials that are protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, a municipality must issue the licenses applied for and thereafter suppress the sale of pornographic materials through proper proceedings that will not damage the doctrine of prior restraint. Mayor of Savannah v. TWA, Inc., 233 Ga. 885, 214 S.E.2d 370 (1975).
- Language such as calling a police officer a "[goddamn] liar" and telling the officer to "[fuck off]" is not protected by the first amendment. Evans v. State, 188 Ga. App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52 (1988).
When an arrestee allegedly called an officer "a fucking asshole" and was arrested, the officer was properly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the arrestee's claims under the Fourth Amendment because the officer did not have arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for disorderly conduct under Georgia law since the arrestee was not shouting and did not appear to be a danger to anyone as the arrestee walked away. Merenda v. Tabor, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).
- Where publications depict acts of natural and aberrational sexual conduct, including the participants' genitals, solely for their own lewd and lascivious purpose and there is no discernible meaning other than pornographic, these magazines are obscene as a matter of law and fact. The magazines are not protected expression under U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. Whisenhunt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 583, 275 S.E.2d 82 (1980).
- Where defendant's films amounted to nothing more than a public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct, for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, the films were not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1 and were obscene within the definition of former Code 1933, § 26-2101(b) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80). Clayton v. State, 149 Ga. App. 374, 254 S.E.2d 495 (1979).
Motel owner's interest in providing obscene films to guests at the motel in the privacy of their own rooms was not protected by the first amendment, notwithstanding the possibility that the people receiving the objects of the owner's commerce might be shielded from state regulation in their use of the obscene materials. Majmundar v. Veline, 256 Ga. 8, 342 S.E.2d 682 (1986).
- In a prosecution for child molestation based on defendant's forcing a minor to watch sexually explicit videotapes with the defendant, the defendant's claimed first amendment right to possess and view the tapes was not a defense. Stroeining v. State, 226 Ga. App. 410, 486 S.E.2d 670 (1997).
Statute regulating profane words on bumper stickers unconstitutionally restricts freedom of expression as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and by the Georgia Constitution. Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 400 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
First amendment freedoms extend to political activities such as running for elective office; and state election practices must therefore serve legitimate state interest narrowly and fairly to avoid obstructing and diluting these fundamental liberties. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
A political speech would be subject to first amendment protections. Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S. Ct. 1961, 95 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987).
- Restrictions upon political speech should not lightly be imposed, and the public should generally be able to speak on public issues free from fear of resulting criminal or civil penalties. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- An ordinance restricting political activity, despite the fact that it applies to public employees, must be tested by traditional overbreadth principles. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Where the political activities of a public employee are unrelated to the performance of the employee's duties, the employee is to be treated, for purposes of adjudicating the employees rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, as a member of the general public. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- A city ordinance proscribing city firemen from "contributing any money to any candidate, soliciting votes, or prominently identifying themselves in a political race with or against any candidate for office" is an overbroad and unconstitutionally vague restriction upon the firemen's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1, despite its application to public employees. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
- Applying the Schacht standard rather than the Pickering standard, a federal district court held that a county's policy restricting expressive conduct, i.e., the wearing of police uniforms by officers speaking at county commission meetings, which had been enforced evenhandedly and in a content-neutral fashion, did not unconstitutionally abridge the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, either facially or as applied. Local 491 v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
- In a suit filed by a number of political organizations and individuals seeking access to the general election ballot, the plaintiffs demonstrated "some actual or threatened injuries" and, thus, had standing, although they were unable to comply with the election law provisions restricting ballot access. There was, however, an insufficient factual record to carry out a constitutional analysis. Specifically, the state failed to introduce evidence to justify both the interests it asserted and the burdens it imposed on those seeking ballot access. Bergland v. Harris, 767 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1985).
- The right to appear on a general election ballot is constitutionally favored, but less than fundamental. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).
- While voting rights and the right to run for public office are core constitutional rights, an attempted deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights is not the same as an actual deprivation. Furthermore, incurring legal fees to vindicate rights does not itself establish that those rights were violated. Thus, plaintiff, a school board member, pursing attempted violations of plaintiff's right to run and hold a designated seat in a predefined district, could not succeed as an injunction in another lawsuit and failure of preclearance interfered with the implementation of the efforts of defendants, the local voting registrars; since the attempt to deprive plaintiff of plaintiff's constitutional rights did not succeed, neither can plaintiff's lawsuit succeed. Cook v. Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2009).
- The Georgia Secretary of State's preparation of the ballot for Georgia without making substantive determinations (which are left to the parties) is not state action. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).
- State statute creating the presidential candidate selection committee, by identifying three logically representative members of each party to serve on the committee, and by providing a check against arbitrariness by allowing only one member of the party on the committee to override the unanimous decision of the committee, is narrowly tailored to advance the interests of the state in conducting orderly and efficient elections and allowing the parties to choose their candidates, and is not in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).
- State may constitutionally disenfranchise otherwise qualified voters because they have been convicted of a felony since the state has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- In requesting the county board of commissioners to submit a package bond issue to the voters instead of three separate bond issues, the county board of education did not time and structure the school bond referendum with the intent of diluting minority voting strength and manipulating the minority vote in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1, 13, 14, and 15. Lucas v. Townsend, 783 F. Supp. 605 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 967 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1992).
- Where the evidence was insufficient to support application of the coconspirator exception to the Noerr-Rennington doctrine, immunizing genuine political lobbying of government officials from antitrust laws, defendant chiropractic board of examiner's appearances and other communications to the state chiropractic licensing boards qualified as protected petitioning activity and could not serve as the basis for antitrust liability. Sherman College v. American Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854, 108 S. Ct. 160, 98 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1987).
- A political party's choice among the various ways of determining the makeup of a state's delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the Constitution. Stuckey v. Richardson, 188 Ga. App. 147, 372 S.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 372 S.E.2d 458 (1988).
Dispute concerning the internal affairs of the Georgia Republican Party was a nonjusticiable controversy which had to be resolved by the 1988 National Republican Convention rather than by the Georgia courts. Stuckey v. Richardson, 188 Ga. App. 147, 372 S.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 372 S.E.2d 458 (1988).
- O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a), which restricts election campaign activities and public opinion polling within 250 feet (changed to 50 feet by the 1989 amendment) of a polling place, infringes upon the first amendment's protection of political speech; however, a 25-foot limit on campaign and polling activities withstands constitutional scrutiny, and enforcement beyond that limit would be permanently enjoined. NBC v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
- Activities in the exercise of first amendment freedoms may not be harshly channeled and controlled simply by being deemed "contributions to a political campaign," for these activities are constitutionally protected from significant legislative chilling. Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 474, 208 S.E.2d 68 (1974).
Soliciting signatures for a petition, particularly one designed to petition the government for municipal annexation or incorporation, is constitutionally protected speech and conduct. Committee for Sandy Springs, Ga., Inc. v. Cleland, 708 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
- Limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from the candidate's personal funds are constitutionally infirm. State Ethics Comm'n v. McDowell, 238 Ga. 141, 231 S.E.2d 734 (1977).
- The state has a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the democratic process by forbidding a regulated entity from contributing to the holder of the office which oversees the regulation of the entity, or a candidate for that office; thus, O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1(b), which is narrowly tailored to meet this interest, is constitutional. Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm'n, 262 Ga. 855, 426 S.E.2d 890 (1993).
- Because defendant had a right under the first amendment to engage in expressive activity (distributing leaflets encouraging older workers to unite in order to gain political power to oppose age discrimination) at the time and place involved here (in the parking lot of a department of labor facility), the defendant could not be convicted of criminal trespass because the state would not be able to prove that the defendant was present "without authority." This holding, however, must not be misunderstood to constitute a declaration that all property owned by the State of Georgia is now totally open to all expressive activity by all persons, or even that all state-owned parking lots are available for that purpose. Langton v. State, 261 Ga. 878, 413 S.E.2d 708 (1992).
- Former Code 1933, § 34-1933 (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-570), providing that any person who buys or sells, or offers to buy or sell, or knowingly participates in the buying or selling of votes, at any primary or election, shall be guilty of a felony, was not void for vagueness or overbreadth. King v. State, 244 Ga. 536, 261 S.E.2d 333 (1979).
Bribery statute is not an impermissible restraint upon free speech under U.S. Const., amend. 1; the bribery statute, which places no limitation upon amounts of contributions or expenditures, restricts the purposes for which any benefit, reward or consideration may be offered or given to, or solicited or accepted by, a public officer. State v. Agan, 259 Ga. 541, 384 S.E.2d 863 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 108 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1990).
- Provisions of county personnel regulations which required the chief investigator for the solicitor general of the county: (1) to take a leave without pay from the investigator's employment with the county in order to file as a candidate or conduct an election campaign; and (2) to forfeit the investigator's employment with the county in order to serve as nonpartisan mayor of a town in another county, violated the investigator's first amendment rights and, therefore, were unconstitutional as applied to the investigator. Segars v. Fulton County, 644 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Termination of plaintiff's position as a parole review officer of the board of pardons and paroles after the plaintiff's election to county and state political party committees did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights of due process and equal protection or the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights of political speech and association. MacKenzie v. Snow, 675 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
- First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was not violated by the arrest of citizens who attended a city council meeting to express views on renaming a public park but were disruptive because the mayor's attempts to control the arrestees' conduct was not based on disapproval of the arrestees' viewpoints but on a desire to maintain order; therefore, it was content-neutral. Harris v. City of Valdosta, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Ga. 2009).
- If there is no question of security or discipline involved, and no other conflicting and compelling state interest, the state may not curtail a prisoner's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Neal v. Georgia, 469 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1972).
- As to rights of prisoners under U.S. Const., amend. 1, the Supreme Court has apparently discarded the use of such rigid standards as "rational nexus" and "compelling state interest," and has substituted in their place a more flexible balancing of the competing interests in each case. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
- A federal prisoner is not stripped of the prisoner's constitutional rights when the prisoner enters the prison gate; but a prisoner only retains those rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 that are not inconsistent with the prisoner's status as a prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
- Although incarcerated, a prisoner was not barred from asserting claims of first amendment violations when prison officials refused to deliver a magazine to the inmate. However, where the magazine contained inflammatory material which could have lead to disorder and violence within the prison, the prison officials did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights by denying delivery of a single magazine to ensure the safety of officials and inmates. Olson v. Loy, 951 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
- Where prison regulations affecting rights under the first amendment of inmates are challenged, the courts will examine the interests sought to be protected by the challenged regulations and determine whether these objectives are, in fact, furthered by the regulations in a means which does not unduly interfere with constitutional rights. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
Correspondence and visitation rights of prisoners protected in some degree by the first amendment. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
Regulations affecting either correspondence or visitation rights of prisoners must be tailored to achieve substantial governmental interests. However, governmental interests need not be as compelling when the form of expression regulated is just one of a series of alternative forms of communication, and the means used to achieve governmental interests need not be as tailored when interests under the first amendment are less substantial, but where the institutional concern for security and rehabilitation becomes more pressing. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
Prisoners have no absolute correspondence or visitation rights with respect to friends, pen pals, fiancees, and even women who have borne the children of prisoners. When an inmate seeks to have his girl friend or paramour visit him, prison officials are entitled to look more closely at the relationship than if the visitor were a wife and make an independent judgment as to the appropriateness of the visit. This, however, does not give prison officials free rein to grant and deny visitation privileges at will. Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977).
- Inmates do not have an absolute right to visitation, such privileges being subject to the prison authorities' discretion provided that the visitation policies meet legitimate penological objectives; concerns that former prison employees visiting inmates may pose a threat to security because of their knowledge of security procedures constitutes a legitimate penological objective. Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521 (11th Cir. 1994).
Censorship of prisoner mail is allowed if: (1) the regulation or practice in question furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (2) the limitation of rights is no greater than generally necessary to protect one or more legitimate governmental interests. Legitimate governmental interests include the security and order of penal institutions and the rehabilitation of inmates. Blue v. Hogan, 553 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1977); Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
- Censorship of prisoner's reading material is allowed only when the government shows that the censorship furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and that the censorship is no greater a limitation on the prisoner's rights than generally necessary to protect one or more legitimate governmental interests. Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
- The decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards, since the interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communications by letter, grounded as it is in U.S. Const., amend. 1, is plainly a "liberty" interest within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
- Unless a letter contains a threat to prison order and security or is in direct violation of law, there is usually no constitutionally sufficient reason to stop it. Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
- Outgoing letters from prisoners may be inspected and, when deemed necessary, read to determine whether they contain escape plots, violations of law, or threats to the institution. Letters containing simply profane or obscene language, however, are not the proper subject of direct censorship through either halting the letter or suspending the mailing privilege. Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
- A prisoner retains a constitutional right to bodily privacy and the district court improperly dismissed a class action for injunctive relief based on alleged violations of this right involving the supervision of male personal hygiene by female correctional officers. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993).
Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public. Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 783 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S. Ct. 272, 93 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1986).
- Search, confiscation, or destruction of an inmate's material in retaliation for the inmate's filing lawsuits and administrative grievances violates both the inmate's right of access to the courts and the inmate's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1986).
- The first amendment prohibits state officials from retaliating against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 261, 112 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1990).
To state a first amendment claim for retaliation, a prisoner need not allege violation of a separate and distinct constitutional right. The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free speech. The penalty need not rise to the level of a separate constitutional violation. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 261, 112 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1990).
- An allegation that prison officials seized a prisoner's pleadings and law book and destroyed other legal papers clearly states a claim of denial of access to the courts. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1986).
- The first amendment prohibits state officials from denying a prisoner's legal right of access to the courts. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 261, 112 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1990).
The Constitution forbids courts to abridge inmates' rights to have meaningful access to and communications with the courts, and a blanket declaration that all filings would be "null and void by operation of law" was impermissible. Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 512 S.E.2d 312 (1999).
- It is state's option to choose method by which to implement prison inmate's right of access to courts; a law library is only one alternative which fills this responsibility. Bell v. Hopper, 511 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
- An inmate does not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of prison guards relative to a prison policy prohibiting its employees from communicating directly with the parole board on behalf of prisoners. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045, 115 S. Ct. 641, 130 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994).
- O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1182, which criminalized upbraiding, insulting, or abusing a public school teacher or administrator in the presence of a pupil while on the premises of a public school or school bus, was unconstitutionally overbroad because words which merely offended, angered, or frustrated could not be prohibited in violation of freedom of speech. Further, the statute did not tie the statute's prohibited expression to the disruption of school activities or specific times. West v. State, 300 Ga. 39, 793 S.E.2d 57 (2016).
First amendment does not prevent a board of education from limiting the use of school facilities solely to educational purposes. If, however, the schools choose to open their doors to expression by outside groups and individuals, they must do so under principles that are consistent with U.S. Const., amend. 1. Searcey v. Crim, 642 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ga. 1986), modified, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1987). See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Denying "peace activists" an opportunity equal to the one afforded military recruiters to place their literature on school bulletin boards and in the offices of school guidance counselors and to participate in school "Career Days" and "Youth Motivation Days" violated their rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. Searcey v. Crim, 642 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ga. 1986), modified, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1987). See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Language of an oath "to refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing to or teaching any theory of government or economics or social relations which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism and high ideals of Americanism" provides no ascertainable standard of conduct. It is vague and uncertain in that there is no definition of fundamental principles of patriotism or high ideals of Americanism and one would necessarily teach at one's peril in the areas of government, economics, or social relations. This language is, thus, unconstitutional and void under U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. It constitutes a denial of due process under U.S. Const., amend. 14 in light of the penal provision, and a prohibited inhibition on the first amendment's right to freedom of speech, which right is protected from state invasion by U.S. Const., amend. 14. Georgia Conference of Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 246 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
- The first amendment gives a teacher the right to speak the teacher's mind; but it does not give the teacher the right to disrupt a school, or to choose its principals, or to sabotage its programs. Glover v. Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 434 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970).
- While teachers unquestionably enjoy the right under U.S. Const., amend. 1 to comment upon matters of public concern and to offer constructive criticism of school policy under the umbrella of academic freedom, the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees must be balanced. Cotten v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 395 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
- A discharged or nonrenewed teacher asserting a constitutionally "protected" right was entitled to a de novo hearing in federal court regardless of whether that teacher resorted to an administrative hearing or whether such hearing purported to decide the issue, and the teacher should have been allowed to present evidence in the court that other teachers had engaged in similar "improper" conduct, such as that which allegedly justifiably caused the teacher's discharge, known to school personnel and the board, and those teachers were not disciplined, raising an inference that the teacher in question was disciplined for reasons other than "improper" conduct. Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
- Where plaintiff-professor contended that the professor was deprived of employment and employment benefits because of the exercise of the professor's freedom of speech rights, in addition to finding a violation of the professor's free speech rights, the jury also had to determine whether the conduct of one or more of the defendants was so egregious as to warrant the award of punitive damages in some amount. Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Minors possess first amendment rights. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Student's protected expression may only be reasonably regulated in carefully restricted circumstances at school in order to avoid any material disruption of the classroom, any substantial disorder of school work, and any invasion of the rights of others. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
Under U.S. Const., amend. 1: (1) expression by high school students can be prohibited altogether if it materially and substantially interferes with school activities, or with the rights of other students or teachers, or if the school administration can demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the expression would engender such material and substantial interference; (2) expression by high school students cannot be prohibited solely because other students, teachers, administrators, or parents may disagree with its content; (3) efforts at expression by high school students may be subjected to prior screening under clear and reasonable regulations; and (4) expression by high school students may be limited in manner, place, or time by means of reasonable and equally applied regulations. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Demand that a student make an apology to a teacher and class for "off-color" remarks the student made in the classroom did not violate the student's first amendment rights. Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998).
- Where a questionnaire solicits the views of faculty on a broad range of issues, such as the degree of mutual confidence existing between administration and faculty, the extent to which good teaching and good research are rewarded, the extent to which faculty opinions are listened to and respected, the effectiveness of the administration in dealing with grievances, the accuracy and completeness of information used to evaluate teachers, and other matters that are of public importance and concern, comment upon them is protected speech. Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
- The question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the school board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question, free and open debate is vital to informed decision making by the electorate; teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent; accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
A confidentiality policy would constitute a defense to a complaint under U.S. Const., amend. 1 only if it: (1) factually existed; (2) was consistent with other state statutes and regulations; (3) was not vague; (4) did not proscribe protected speech overbroadly; (5) was communicated to the appellant, and (6) was not void as a matter of public policy in its instant application. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S. Ct. 3063, 69 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
- School administrators need not await occurrence of actual disruption before exercising reasonable restraint over a student publication, but mere undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Censorship of constitutionally protected expression of student publication at state-supported institutions cannot be imposed by suspending the editors, suppressing circulation, requiring imprimatur of controversial articles, excising repugnant material, withdrawing financial support, or asserting any other form of censorial oversight based on the institution's power of the purse. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- The primary issue is whether school officials can demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the prohibited expression would have engendered material and substantial interference with school activities or with the rights of others. Reineke v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- In order for the state in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- Where plaintiff-professor contended that the professor had been deprived of employment and employment benefits because the professor exercised the professor's freedom of speech rights by speaking out against preferential treatment given university athletes, principles of relevancy did not preclude the professor from proving the truth of the assertions that revenue-producing athletes (scholarship athletes) and other influential students received preferential academic treatment at the university. Other purposes for which this evidence would have been relevant included proof of motive and state of mind of the defendants for the purpose of determining the level and nature of their misconduct, evidence critical to assessment of the credibility of both defendants, and evidence that the stated reasons for the job action were pretextual. Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
- School board regulations barring "Career Day" participants from criticizing the opportunities provided by other participants, through providing students with valid and informative disadvantages of that career, violated the first amendment right to freedom of speech. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd as modified sub nom. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
- "Commercial speech" is speech which does nothing more than propose commercial transaction. State interest cannot negate the protections afforded speech, even commercial in content, by U.S. Const., amend. 1. Daugherty v. City of E. Point, 447 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
- Federal government may in some circumstances prohibit purely commercial speech made in connection with conduct which Congress can permissibly regulate or prohibit. While speech made in a political or informational context deserves the highest degree of protection from governmental restraint, government may regulate speech made incidental to a purely commercial activity. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1973).
- While freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion enjoys the fullest protection of the first amendment, the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).
Commercial speech is unprotected by the first amendment. Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S. Ct. 1580, 39 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1974).
- First amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, directly advances that interest, and reaches no farther than necessary to accomplish the given objective. H & H Operations, Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S. Ct. 2037, 72 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1982).
There is no substantial governmental interest in permitting commercial signs yet prohibiting posting of prices. Numbers (prices) are not esthetically inferior to letters of the alphabet forming words (name of the business and products available). H & H Operations, Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S. Ct. 2037, 72 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1982).
- Where two disputing parties in positions of equal bargaining power agree, through a settlement stipulation, to restrict, in a limited degree, their first amendment rights on commercial speech, the court enforcement of that agreement is not governmental action for first amendment purposes. United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940 (11th Cir. 1995).
- O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53, by criminalizing requests for public records for commercial solicitation purposes, implicates U.S. Const., amend. 1. Statewide Detective Agency v. Miller, 115 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 1997).
§ 16-8-60(b). - Trial court did not err in finding that O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60(b) was not unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad and was not preempted by federal law, as: (1) the statute aimed to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns; (2) it did not impinge upon pure speech, but, at most, regulated a combination of commercial conduct and speech; (3) its deterrent effect on legitimate expression was minimal; and (4) it plainly prohibited the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that did not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 638 S.E.2d 292 (2006).
- Although expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free expression or free press guarantee of the first and fourteenth amendments, the right of commercial exploitation of a film does not represent a great public interest, but amounts to a private right. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
- Where the purpose of a business license tax was for the purpose of revenue raising and not for the control of solicitation, it was not in violation of freedom of speech and association. Miles v. City Council, 551 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983).
City sign ordinance that prohibited the display of noncommercial messages at locations where commercial messages were permitted was unconstitutional. Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).
Ordinance that restricted signs in residential zoning districts to on-premise signs and certain temporary or special signs, allowing temporary political signs, but not providing for permanent signs expressing the political, religious, or other noncommercial views of residents, was unconstitutional. Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).
County ordinance which prohibited off-premise signs in commercially-zoned areas, including all commercial signs, and then permitted the county to decide on a case-by-case basis which signs were allowed, violated the First Amendment. By initially declaring all signs as illegal and allowing the county to exempt from the ban only on a case-by-case basis, the ordinance was more extensive than was necessary to protect against misleading commercial speech and provided insufficient protection for protected speech, both commercial and otherwise. Fulton County v. Galberaith, 282 Ga. 314, 647 S.E.2d 24 (2007).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a city in a suit brought by an outdoor sign company challenging the constitutionality of the city's sign ordinance as the company's sign applications failed to meet the city's height and size restrictions and the restrictions were constitutional. Since the company lacked standing to challenge any other provision of the ordinance, the trial court should not have addressed the company's constitutional arguments concerning other provisions of the ordinance, though that appellate court determination did not change the grant of summary judgment to the city. Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Roswell, 283 Ga. 417, 658 S.E.2d 587 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 222, 172 L. Ed. 2d 143 (2008).
City ordinance which prohibits billboards, defined as offsite advertising signs, does not impermissibly restrict commercial speech. Southlake Prop. Assoc. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997).
- While commercial speech is entitled to some protection, deceptive or misleading advertising disserves the aims of the first amendment. Misleading advertising is subject to restraint, and false advertising may be prohibited entirely. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
- City bus company's written advertising policy that restricted access to its advertising space to those ads which do not support or oppose any position in regard to a matter of public controversy was void for vagueness and overbreadth. National Abortion Fed'n v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
- Former O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9, prohibiting the inspection of law enforcement records for the purpose of using information contained in the records for commercial solicitation, violated first amendment commercial speech rights. Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- Trial court erred in upholding a city's decision to suspend a liquor license for 30 days for violations of the Jasper, Ga., Alcoholic Beverages Ordinance, which banned alcohol advertisements, because the ordinance was a blanket prohibition on commercial speech that violated the first amendment as the city did not show that the ordinance advanced the substantial governmental interest of temperance and that the ordinance was no more restrictive than necessary. Folsom v. City of Jasper, 279 Ga. 260, 612 S.E.2d 287 (2005).
Jasper, Ga., Alcoholic Beverages Ordinance, which authorized the city council to suspend or revoke an alcohol license if the council determined to its own satisfaction that the licensee was guilty of any violation of federal or state law, was facially overbroad as it did not limit the types of violations that would justify revocation of a license to those violations related to the regulatory purpose of the license; however, the ordinance was not overbroad as applied to a cafe owner as the alleged violation of the ordinance was the battery of a patron by a cafe employee and the risk of unruly patrons, and an overzealous response to that unruliness by employees was one of the reasons for the regulation of the sale and consumption of alcohol. Folsom v. City of Jasper, 279 Ga. 260, 612 S.E.2d 287 (2005).
- City ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol at an erotic dance establishment was constitutional. The adult entertainment establishment ordinance was narrowly drawn to promote the city's interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments. Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993).
A legislative restriction on adult entertainment must satisfy a tripartite test in order to comport with the free speech guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. The constitutionality of a law regulating adult entertainment will be upheld only (1) if it furthers an important government interest; (2) if that government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that government interest. Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council, 264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
Where the stated purpose of a municipal ordinance regulating adult entertainment on premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages was to reduce criminal activity and deterioration of neighborhoods as pernicious secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, the city failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact as to these issues. Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council, 264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
County ordinance prohibiting nude dancing at establishments that serve alcohol did not violate first amendment rights of operators of the establishments. Wise Enters. v. Unified Gov't, 217 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2000).
- A statute proscribing any form of off-site advertising for commercial establishments featuring nude dancing impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the state's legitimate interest in preventing hazards to the traveling public, and thus, impermissibly infringes the right of free speech. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97, 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).
Internet users had standing to bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1, prohibiting internet transmissions which falsely identify the sender or use trade names or logos without legal authority because a credible threat of prosecution existed. American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
Internet users challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1, prohibiting internet transmissions which falsely identify the sender or use trade names or logos without legal authority, were entitled to a preliminary injunction because they were likely to show that the section imposed content-based restrictions not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, it was vague and overbroad, there was a substantial threat of irreparable injury, and the balance of hardships weighed heavily in plaintiffs' favor. American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
- Although the right of a free press embodied in the first amendment is guaranteed, the individual's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process clause and in the other individual provisions of the bill of rights is absolute, and where prejudicial news coverage is present, the burden is on the government to protect the rights of the defendant. While government has no authority to restrain the reporting of the press, nor to dictate what it does or does not report, a person accused of crime has the right to expect that the government of the accused and its judicial officers to protect the accused from massive and prejudicial publicity surrounding the case. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1505, 47 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1976).
- Where a third party seeks access to material disclosed during discovery and covered by a protective order, the constitutional right of access requires a showing of good cause, and not a showing of a compelling interest, by the party seeking protection. Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001).
- No first amendment right of public access to search warrants, and affidavits filed in support of the warrants, exists. This is so even after the search warrants have been executed, to the extent that secrecy of the warrant materials is necessary to preserve the grand jury's processes inviolate. In re Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 900 F. Supp. 489 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
- There is no first amendment right of access to search warrant affidavits. In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
- A restraining order which prohibited a newspaper from publishing any information on an alleged suspect in a murder case which was obtained through discovery without the newspaper first following a procedure of notifying the court of its intent to disclose any information and obtaining the permission of the court to disclose in the event an objection was filed constituted an unwarranted restraint upon the newspaper's liberty of speech and of the press. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981).
- By passing the rape shield statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, the legislature has stated as a matter of public policy that, where the crime involved is rape, sexual assault or attempted sexual assault, the legitimate public interest in the identity of the victim does not outweigh the victim's privacy interest. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 208 Ga. App. 111, 430 S.E.2d 18 (1993).
- The victim of a sexual assault could not recover damages from a newspaper for invasion of privacy since, when she shot and killed the perpetrator of the assault, she became the object of legitimate public interest and the newspaper had the right under the United States and Georgia Constitutions to accurately report facts regarding the incident, including her name. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 263 Ga. 677, 436 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
- Publishing 20-year-old nude photos of an aspiring model who later became a professional wrestler and whose murder was highly publicized did not fall within Georgia's right of publicity newsworthiness exception; the photos were unrelated to the incident of public concern, the model's death, and thus, a right of publicity case filed by plaintiff, the mother and personal representative for the daughter's estate, against defendant publisher, could be pursued; under the First Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V, every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication had to have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest in order to fall within the newsworthiness exception. Toffoloni v. LFB Publ'g Group, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, mot. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1689, 176 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2010).
Georgia "Anti-Mask Act", O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38, which proscribes intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior, does not violate the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection of the law. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
- While the institution of criminal prosecution to penalize the exercise of first amendment rights is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate some evidence of retaliatory motive or bad faith in order to succeed in such an action. Howell v. Roberts, 656 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
- False statement statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, when properly construed to require that the defendant make the false statement with knowledge and intent that the statement may come within the jurisdiction of a state or local government agency, is constitutional because correctly interpreted, the statute raises no substantial constitutional concern on the statute's face; the statute requires a defendant to know and intend, that is, to contemplate or expect, that his or her false statement will come to the attention of a state or local department or agency with the authority to act on the statement, and as properly construed, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 may only be applied to conduct that persons of common intelligence would know was wrongful because it could result in harm to the government. Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515, 712 S.E.2d 838 (2011), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 60, 183 L. Ed. 2d 711 (2012).
- Bribery statute (O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) does not violate the first amendment on its face since it includes corrupt intent as an element. Therefore, the section was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant's offer of campaign contributions to influence the decision of county commissioners' regarding the defendant's zoning variance request. Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1023, 118 S. Ct. 1305, 140 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1998).
- Mere fact that defendant is exercising the defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 does not shield the defendant from observance of normal traffic regulations, such as under former Code 1933, § 68A-507(b) (see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-98). Zeiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 610, 231 S.E.2d 494 (1976).
- Local ordinance providing that "No person shall remain or loiter upon any premises to which the public has access, including but not limited to such places as business and shopping area parking lots, where the person's presence upon such premises is unrelated to the normal activity, use or business for which such premises are made available to the public" violates U.S. Const., amend. 1 and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Bullock v. City of Dallas, 248 Ga. 164, 281 S.E.2d 613 (1981).
- O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2(e)(1), obscene Internet contact with a child, did not effect a real and substantial constraint upon constitutionally protected expression and, therefore, did not violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee; the word "contact" was modified by the phrase "that is intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of either the child or the person," rendering it unlikely that innocuous communications would violate the statute. Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568, 788 S.E.2d 468 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1328, 197 L. Ed. 2d 517 (U.S. 2017).
- Undeniably, U.S. Const., amend. 1 in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose the individual's associational relationships; however, the protections of U.S. Const., amend. 1, unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under U.S. Const., amend. 5, do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S. Ct. 584, 5 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1961).
- When first amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown. Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S. Ct. 584, 5 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1961).
- The freedom to assemble, a right zealously guarded by the courts, and properly so, finds its primary limitation in the words of the first amendment "to peacefully assemble." Durham v. State, 219 Ga. 830, 136 S.E.2d 322 (1964).
- The freedom of association which the Supreme Court has recognized as protected by the first amendment is a right to freedom of expression through associational affiliations. Eberhart v. Massell, 311 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
- The fact that revealing names of members of a grand jury may diminish their desire to associate with the organization has no constitutional significance unless protected free speech interests are implicated. Thus, on a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, the motion will be quashed where the potential impact on free speech rights is only speculative. In re Roberts, 650 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 1988).
- The elements of which the right of free association is composed include as an obvious minimum the right to organize and join any association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas, regardless of the nature of such beliefs and ideas, or whether they pertain to religious, political, economic, social, civil, cultural, or other matters. The right of association also includes the right to adhere to an organization without public identification, and the right not to be compelled to join any organization, but the full enjoyment of these rights is limited to organizations for lawful purposes which are carrying on their activities in a lawful manner. Further, the right of association, like the right of expression in general may not be used as a mere excuse for criminal conduct. Eberhart v. Massell, 311 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Right of association is protected by the first amendment. Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
In addition to protection of "pure" and "symbolic" speech, the first amendment protects the rights of assembly and association. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
U.S. Const., amend. 1 has the effect of creating a constitutional right of free association. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
Only natural persons can maintain an action for interference with the right of association. Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 570 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1984).
- The Republican Party enjoys a constitutionally protected right of freedom of association, which encompasses its decision to exclude a candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States as a candidate on the Republican Primary ballot because the candidate's political beliefs are inconsistent with those of the Republican Party. Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1086, 112 S. Ct. 1152, 117 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1992).
First amendment to United States Constitution protects right to union organization and activity. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
- Primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition of student organization is denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
The three circumstances under which university facilities may be denied to registered campus organization are: refusal to abide by reasonable regulations; a demonstrated danger of violence or disruption at the meeting; and that the meeting itself would violate either state or federal law. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
Invoking of any justification for denial of university facilities to campus organization amounts to prior restraint on first amendment freedoms and places a heavy burden on the university to justify denial. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- Denial of university recognition affected the first amendment rights of members of a student organization and recognition could be denied by a university only under narrowly limited circumstances. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- Officials of a state-supported university may not deny use of university facilities to a campus homosexual organization without demonstrating the organization's refusal to abide by reasonable regulations, a clear and present danger of violence or disruption, or that holding the meeting itself would violate state or federal law. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the due process clause of the first amendment which embraces freedom of speech. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
- Where a group is engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs, whether they be political, economic, religious, or cultural, compelled disclosure of affiliation with such a group constitutes a restraint on one's freedom of association. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
- Against any impediment to the first amendment right which a particular statute creates, there must be considered the importance and value to the public of the goal which the statute accomplishes. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
- The restrictions on the exercise of rights of political expression and association of government employees must be in furtherance of a significant governmental interest. Galer v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 239 Ga. 268, 236 S.E.2d 617 (1977).
The Attorney General, that is, the State of Georgia's interest, as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the Attorney General's office's important public service outweighs plaintiff's personal associational interests in a lesbian marriage. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049, 118 S. Ct. 693, 139 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1998).
- It is clear that government employees may be subject to restrictions on the exercise of their rights of political association and expression beyond that permissible if applied to private citizens. Galer v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 239 Ga. 268, 236 S.E.2d 617 (1977).
- As is the case with free speech, the fact that a public employee is retaliated against for exercising constitutionally protected associational rights does not automatically render the retaliatory action unconstitutional. Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
Demotion of a county correctional officer under a regulation prohibiting correctional officers from associating, corresponding, or doing business with active probationers unless they first receive special permission did not violate the officer's right of free association. Ross v. Clayton County, 173 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999).
- Where a former school principal alleged: (1) that the principal was denied a comparable position because the principal associated with parents and others who protested a school board's plan to close several schools; and (2) that the principal was denied a comparable position because the principal brought the principal's minister and a school board member to a meeting with the assistant superintendent concerning the principal's job assignment, the principal sufficiently alleged constitutionally protected associational activity. Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
Fact that an under-30 candidate may not run for Lieutenant Governor does not deny right of association to those voters who might wish to "associate" with such a candidate by voting for that candidate. Traylor v. Democratic Party, 241 Ga. 429, 246 S.E.2d 192 (1978).
Former Code 1933, § 91-134 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-16-11) was not facially overbroad nor so vague as to violate freedoms of assembly or speech. State v. Boone, 243 Ga. 416, 254 S.E.2d 367, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898, 100 S. Ct. 206, 62 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1979).
Former Code 1933, §§ 91-134 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-16-11) and 91-9908 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-16-16) were not overbroad as sweeping within their prohibitions what may not be punished under U.S. Const., amends. 1 and 14. State v. Boone, 243 Ga. 416, 254 S.E.2d 367, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898, 100 S. Ct. 206, 62 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1979).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-16-14 and50-16-16, allowing removal of persons who cause disruptions in state buildings, did not violate first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and the right to assemble peaceably and petition the government for redress of their grievances. State v. Storey, 181 Ga. App. 161, 351 S.E.2d 502 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017, 107 S. Ct. 1895, 95 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1987).
Requirement that one judge of a court of limited jurisdiction be available on a 24-hour basis to issue warrants does not infringe on the right to assemble as guaranteed in the state and federal Constitutions. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).
- The right to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free speech, but also as part of free assembly. McCallum v. Hinson, 489 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
- Although there are limits placed on what adverse action a state may take against an employee who maintains associations thought undesirable by the state, it is not at all clear that the state may not refuse to do business with an independent contractor solely because it disapproves of the contractor's associations. Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 570 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1984).
Termination of plaintiff's position as a parole review officer of the board of pardons and paroles after the plaintiff's election to county and state political party committees did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights of due process and equal protection or the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights of political speech and association. MacKenzie v. Snow, 675 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
- A city ordinance that required all taxi drivers to be affiliated with a taxicab company and that required all taxicab companies formed after the ordinance's effective date to own or lease at least 25 vehicles did not violate the drivers' rights of association. Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Comm. v. City of Atlanta, 584 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
- Neither the first amendment nor the fourth amendment required a federal district court to quash a subpoena to obtain a brokerage firm's records relating to members of an association, where the subpoena had been issued in connection with an investigation of possible criminal violations of the tax laws and the association's financial system may have been used to evade requirements for reporting taxable income. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 1988).
Georgia "Anti-Mask Act", O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38, which proscribes intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior, does not violate the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection of the law. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
- Trial court properly denied the appellants' motion to dismiss various counts charging the appellants with gang-related crimes under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., since properly construed O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) did not directly or indirectly infringe upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association as, to support a conviction, gang conduct or participation was required. Further, reading of § 16-15-4(a) according to the natural and obvious import of the statute's language and in conjunction with the specific definitions in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3, the statute provided a sufficiently definite warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct and was not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, thus, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (2009).
- Plaintiffs, whose jobs were terminated when their department was eliminated, neither alleged in their complaint nor presented any evidence to establish the existence at any time of an association which was entitled to special constitutional protection. Consequently, defendants did not violate any "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" with respect to plaintiffs and each was thus entitled to qualified immunity. Cummings v. DeKalb County, 24 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111 , 115 S. Ct. 901, 130 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1995).
- African-American citizen's argument that the state flag, incorporating the stars and bars of the Confederate flag, compelled the citizen to be the courier of an ideological message that the citizen found morally objectionable failed because the flag on its face did not promulgate a sufficiently clear message of discrimination and because the record contained no evidence that the citizen was forced to acknowledge the flag in any way. Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 1199, 140 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1998); Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 1199, 140 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1998).
- Appellant, a juvenile, was not entitled to the dismissal of two counts of street gang criminal activity based on the juvenile's contention that the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., was overbroad because the statute criminalized the constitutionally protected freedom of association; criminal gang activity was not a protected activity even when committed by a group exercising the group's constitutional right to free association. In re K.R.S., 284 Ga. 853, 672 S.E.2d 622 (2009).
- The first amendment, which protects controversial as well as conventional dialogue, extends to petitions for redress of grievances as well as to advocacy and debate. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 474 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977, 96 S. Ct. 1483, 47 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976).
- Plaintiff 's freely exercised first amendment right to petition various federal agencies for redress of grievances does not create in the government a corresponding duty to act. Gordon v. Heimann, 514 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Congress is not prohibited by the first amendment guaranty of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances from exercising measures of self-protection in requiring disclosures of lobbying activities; and since legislation in the area may be enacted, investigation by legislative agencies is authorized. Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 365 U.S. 399, 81 S. Ct. 567, 5 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1961).
- In order to petition the government for redress of grievances, one may employ an agent or attorney to use their influence to gain access to a public official. Moreover, once having obtained an audience, the attorney may fairly present to the official the merits of the client's case and urge the official's support for that position. Troutman v. Southern Ry., 441 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871, 92 S. Ct. 81, 30 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1971).
- Plaintiff, as a Georgia farmer, has a property interest in the farmer's business, i.e., selling merchandise at a public market, and could not be deprived of that interest without a due process preejectment hearing even in the absence of a state statute providing for such a hearing. Wilder v. Irvin, 423 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
- The decision by the National Eye Institute to financially underwrite a medical research study hardly constitutes the type of governmental decision making and policymaking that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was designed to protect; it is thus unlikely that collaborative efforts to obtain federal grant money and to act pursuant to the protocol outlined in such a study is covered by Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust liability, which is rooted in the first amendment protection of the right to petition the government. Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
- While there is no statute dealing specifically with the question of prohibition against the levying of a license tax on newspapers by a municipality, if such a levy is determined to be regulatory in nature it would be in contravention to U.S. Const., amend. 1 and U.S. Const., amend. 14 and would therefore be null and void. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 115.
Constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits municipality from levying regulatory license tax on newspapers where such a levy subjects the newspaper to operational and expressional control by the municipality. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 115.
- Statutes which possibly infringe on amendment rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1 and U.S. Const., amend. 14, should be narrowly construed, and construed as explicit, not vague, so as to avoid the question of the statute's constitutionality whenever possible. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-15.
- State Board of Education policy or standard requiring physical examination of student prior to participation in interscholastic athletic activities does not infringe upon parental rights under U.S. Const., amend. 1. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-78.
- Freedom of religion constitutes one of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice embraced within the concept of substantive due process and hence guaranteed against state encroachment by U.S. Const., amend. 14. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 349.
- Use of prison labor gratuitously to clear and maintain church grounds and cemeteries violates constitutional limitations on separation of church and state. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 349.
- State Board of Corrections (now Department of Offender Rehabilitation) can expend state funds for employment of chaplains and construction and maintenance of chapels in the various prison branches and can legally permit religious organizations to conduct services in such chapels. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 361.
State may hire staff of prison chaplains whose duties are nonsectarian without violating establishment clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1. If the hiring of prison chaplains did infringe upon the establishment clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1, it would be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to secure the prisoner's right of worship as guaranteed under the free exercise clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-3.
- State Merit System's creation of the position of religious therapy program director in the Department of Offender Rehabilitation is not in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 1 so long as his duties are nonsectarian. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-3.
- Employment of religious therapy program director for state prisons does not violate the establishment clause of U.S. Const., amend. 1. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-3.
Georgia Residential Finance Authority may lend general reserve funds to religiously-motivated housing sponsor which charges in-kind interest, provided the funds are not encumbered or derived from the public treasury, the authority's own purpose is secular and nondiscriminatory, the program in fact is financially sound and secular, and it can be monitored without entanglement. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-15.
- Georgia Building Authority's presentation of a nativity scene as a part of a planned Christmas program in the capitol rotunda would be in violation of both the Georgia and United States Constitutions. Additionally, the unattended display of a Menorah in front of the capitol would be in violation of the establishment clause of the United States Constitution. However, a Menorah candlelighting ceremony conducted by private citizens in front of the capitol would not violate the Constitution of the United States or the Georgia Constitution. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-38.
University's recognition of a student organization that requires its voting members to profess its religious beliefs would not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-32.
- There is no legal impediment to a university system institution's allowing a student to satisfy an internship at a sectarian facility which limits employment to persons of its particular religious faith or persuasion. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-01.
- Public school courses that include references to the Bible may survive first amendment scrutiny only if their content is determined to be secular and they are taught in a secular, objective manner. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-16.
- The failure of the Used Motor Vehicle Dealers' and Used Motor Vehicle Parts Dealers' Registration Act ( § 43-47-1 et seq.) to include an exemption for religious organizations does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-8.
- The "respect for the creator" portion of the character education program authorized by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-145 and the provision of O.C.G.A. § 50-3-4.1 allowing display of the motto "In God We Trust" in public do not violate the separation of church and state provisions of either the state or federal constitution. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-9.
- Media possess no constitutional or statutory rights of access to prisons or inmates above those possessed by general public, i.e., media access to prisons and inmates is in the discretion of the warden. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-151.
As to censoring state prison inmate's newspaper, see 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-70.
As to introduction of obscene publications into state prison, see 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-70.
- Statute prohibiting contributions to a political campaign by a person acting on behalf of a public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission does not unconstitutionally infringe guarantees of freedom of speech and association. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56.
- Where there is governmental oversight or involvement, a student-run newspaper at a state educational institution is subject to free speech requirements of the first amendment. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-7.
A condition-of-entry rule of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games prohibiting spectators from carrying flags "other than those of participating countries" was questionable under the Constitution. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U96-13.
As to use of bullhorns and camping overnight by demonstrators on state prison grounds, see 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-70.
- The portion of the Georgia loyalty oath which requires one to swear to support the Constitutions of Georgia and the United States is constitutional and valid, but the portion of the Georgia loyalty oath which requires one to disavow membership in the Communist Party is violative of the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and should not be administered. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-19.
University's refusal to recognize a student organization that requires its voting members to profess its religious beliefs would violate the first amendment rights of expressive association. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-32.
- It is ethically improper for a lawyer to advertise for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement and without complying with the disciplinary standards of conduct applicable to lawyer referral services. Adv. Op. No. 05-6 (May 3, 2007).
Interference With Right to Free Exercise of Religion, 63 POF3d 195.
Controlling Trial Publicity, 1 Am. Jur. Trials 303.
Homeowners' Association Defense: Free Speech, 93 Am. Jur. Trials 293.
- Validity of legislation directed against social or industrial propaganda deemed to be of a dangerous tendency, 1 A.L.R. 336; 20 A.L.R. 1535; 73 A.L.R. 1494.
Right of association to expel or discipline member for exercising a right, or performing duty, as a citizen, 14 A.L.R. 1446.
What amounts to vagrancy, 14 A.L.R. 1482.
Contract to pay for services or reimburse expenditures as within constitutional inhibition of aid to sectarian institutions, 22 A.L.R. 1319; 55 A.L.R. 320.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance relating to distribution of advertising matter, 22 A.L.R. 1484; 114 A.L.R. 1446.
Constitutionality, construction, and effect of censorship laws, 64 A.L.R. 505.
Validity of statute or ordinance against picketing, 108 A.L.R. 1119; 122 A.L.R. 1043; 125 A.L.R. 963; 130 A.L.R. 1303.
Constitutionality of statute regulating or imposing tax or license fee upon newspapers or magazines, 110 A.L.R. 327.
Power of Legislature or school authorities to prescribe and enforce oath of allegiance, "salute to flag," or other ritual of a patriotic character, 110 A.L.R. 383; 120 A.L.R. 655; 127 A.L.R. 1502; 141 A.L.R. 1030; 147 A.L.R. 698.
Validity of statutory or municipal regulation of soliciting of alms or contributions for charitable, religious, or individual purposes, 128 A.L.R. 1361; 130 A.L.R. 1504.
Injunction against picketing per se, where past picketing has been accompanied by violence or other improper conduct, 132 A.L.R. 1218.
Use of streets or parks for religious purposes, 133 A.L.R. 1402.
Right of privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22; 57 A.L.R.3d 16.
Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance prohibiting solicitation of passers-by in street in front of place of business, 139 A.L.R. 1197.
Constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion as applied to license taxes or regulations, 141 A.L.R. 538; 146 A.L.R. 109; 152 A.L.R. 322.
Sectarianism in schools, 141 A.L.R. 1144.
Unfair labor practice, within National Labor Relations Act or similar state statute, predicated upon expressions of opinion or statements by employer concerning labor unions, 146 A.L.R. 1024.
Freedom of speech and press as limitation on power to punish for contempt, 159 A.L.R. 1379.
Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties, 163 A.L.R. 1358.
Constitutionality of statute respecting employer's control of or interference with political affiliations or activities of employees, 166 A.L.R. 707.
Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance regarding solicitation of persons to join an organization or society or to pay membership fees or dues, 167 A.L.R. 697.
Right of school authorities to release pupils during school hours for purpose of attending religious education classes, 2 A.L.R.2d 1371.
Religious beliefs of parents as defense to prosecution for failure to comply with compulsory education law, 3 A.L.R.2d 1401.
Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loud-speaker broadcasts in streets and other public places, 10 A.L.R.2d 627.
Picketing of place of business by persons not employed therein, 11 A.L.R.2d 1274.
Suspension or expulsion from church or religious society and the remedies therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 421.
Bible distribution or reading in public schools, 45 A.L.R.2d 742.
Wearing of religious garb by public-school teachers, 60 A.L.R.2d 300.
Zoning regulations as affecting churches, 74 A.L.R.2d 377; 62 A.L.R.3d 197.
Public payment of tuition, scholarship, or the like, as respects sectarian school, 81 A.L.R.2d 1309.
Prayers in public schools, 86 A.L.R.2d 1304.
Defamatory nature of statements reflecting on plaintiff's religious beliefs, standing, or activities, 87 A.L.R.2d 453.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring or prohibiting posting or other publication of price of commodity or services, 89 A.L.R.2d 901; 80 A.L.R.3d 740.
Furnishing free textbooks to sectarian school or student therein, 93 A.L.R.2d 986.
Nonlabor picketing or boycott, 93 A.L.R.2d 1284.
Modern concept of obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1158.
Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1214; 93 A.L.R.3d 297.
Scope and extent and remedy or sanctions for infringement, of accused's right to communicate with his attorney, 5 A.L.R.3d 1360.
Power of courts or other public agencies, in the absence of statutory authority, to order compulsory medical care for adult, 9 A.L.R.3d 1391.
Legality of peaceful labor picketing on private property, 10 A.L.R.3d 846.
Maintenance of lawyer reference system by organization having no legal interest in proceedings, 11 A.L.R.3d 1206.
Provision of religious facilities for prisoners, 12 A.L.R.3d 1276.
Invasion of privacy by publication dealing with one other than plaintiff, 18 A.L.R.3d 873.
Right of publisher of newspaper or magazine, in absence of contractual obligation, to refuse publication of advertisement, 18 A.L.R.3d 1286.
Validity and effect of gift for charitable purposes which excludes otherwise qualified beneficiaries because of their race or religion, 25 A.L.R.3d 736.
Participation of student in demonstration on or near campus as warranting imposition of criminal liability for breach of peace, disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, or similar offense, 32 A.L.R.3d 551.
Participation of student in demonstration on or near campus as warranting expulsion or suspension from school or college, 32 A.L.R.3d 864.
Free exercise of religion as defense to prosecution for narcotic or psychedelic drug offense, 35 A.L.R.3d 939.
Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances regulating telephone answering services, 35 A.L.R.3d 1430.
Erection, maintenance, or display of religious structures or symbols on public property as violation of religious freedom, 36 A.L.R.3d 1256.
Student organization registration statement, filed with public school or state university or college, as open to inspection by public, 37 A.L.R.3d 1311.
Validity of blasphemy statutes or ordinances, 41 A.L.R.3d 519.
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding pharmacist to advertise prices of drugs or medicines, 44 A.L.R.3d 1301.
Censorship of convicted prisoners' "legal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.
Censorship of convicted prisoners' "nonlegal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1192.
Religion as factor in adoption proceedings, 48 A.L.R.3d 383.
Validity, construction, and application of statute prohibiting loitering for the purpose of using or possessing dangerous drugs, 48 A.L.R.3d 1271.
Operation of nude-model photographic studio as offense, 48 A.L.R.3d 1313.
Right of accused to have press or other media representatives excluded from criminal trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1007.
Libel and slander: charges of slumlordism or the like as actionable, 49 A.L.R.3d 1074.
Topless or bottomless dancing or similar conduct as offense, 49 A.L.R.3d 1084.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance forbidding unauthorized persons to enter upon or remain in school building or premises, 50 A.L.R.3d 340.
Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.
Determination of property rights between local church and parent church body: modern view, 52 A.L.R.3d 324.
Right to discipline pupil for conduct away from school grounds or not immediately connected with school activities, 53 A.L.R.3d 1124.
Invasion of privacy by radio or television, 56 A.L.R.3d 386.
Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16.
Consumer picketing to protest products, prices, or services, 62 A.L.R.3d 227.
Application of state law to sex discrimination in employment advertising, 66 A.L.R.3d 1237.
Criminal offenses under statutes and ordinances regulating charitable solicitations, 76 A.L.R.3d 924.
Validity of regulation of college or university denying or restricting right of student to receive visitors in dormitory, 78 A.L.R.3d 1109.
Power of corporation to make political contribution or expenditure under state law, 79 A.L.R.3d 491.
Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.
Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.
Validity of sex education programs in public schools, 82 A.L.R.3d 579.
Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming, or hygiene, 88 A.L.R.3d 150.
Wills: condition that devisee or legatee shall renounce, embrace, or adhere to specified religious faith, 89 A.L.R.3d 984.
Validity, under establishment of religion clause of federal or state constitution, of provision making day of religious observance a legal holiday, 90 A.L.R.3d 752.
State regulation of the giving or making of political contributions or expenditures by private individuals, 94 A.L.R.3d 944.
Constitutionality of state legislation imposing criminal penalties for personal possession or use of marijuana, 96 A.L.R.3d 225.
Privilege of newsgatherer against disclosure of confidential sources or information, 99 A.L.R.3d 37.
Identification of jobseeker by race, religion, national origin, sex, or age, in "Situation Wanted" employment advertising as violation of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154.
Defamation: publication of "Letter to Editor" in newspaper as actionable, 99 A.L.R.3d 573.
Validity of "war zone" ordinances restricting location of sex-oriented businesses, 1 A.L.R.4th 1297.
Validity and construction of state statute or ordinance prohibiting picketing, parading, demonstrating, or appearing in public while masked or disguised, 2 A.L.R.4th 1241.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance prohibiting use of "obscene" language in public, 2 A.L.R.4th 1331.
Validity of ordinances restricting location of "adult entertainment" or sex-oriented business, 10 A.L.R.4th 524, 10 A.L.R.5th 538.
Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.
Validity, under federal and state establishment of religion provisions, of prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors on specific religious holidays, 27 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 29 A.L.R.4th 287.
Oral communications insulting to particular state judge, made to third party out of judge's physical presence, as criminal contempt, 30 A.L.R.4th 155.
Advertising as ground for disciplining attorney, 30 A.L.R.4th 742.
Judicial review of termination of pastor's employment by local church or temple, 31 A.L.R.4th 851.
Validity of state judicial or bar association rule forbidding use of law firm name unless it contains exclusively names of persons who are or were members of that state's bar, as it applies to out-of-state law firm, 33 A.L.R.4th 404.
Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by members of governing body of public institution of higher learning in course of official proceedings, 33 A.L.R.4th 632.
Validity of local or state denial of public school courses or activities to private or parochial school students, 43 A.L.R.4th 776.
Validity and construction of terroristic threat statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949.
Judicial power to order discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment, 48 A.L.R.4th 67.
Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees, 51 A.L.R.4th 702.
Validity and construction of state court's order precluding publicity or comment about pending civil case by counsel, parties, or witnesses, 56 A.L.R.4th 1214.
Tax on hotel-motel room occupancy, 58 A.L.R.4th 274.
Validity and construction of prison regulation of inmates' possession of personal property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800.
Invasion of privacy by a clergyman, church, or religious group, 67 A.L.R.4th 1086.
Intrusion by news-gathering entity as invasion of right of privacy, 69 A.L.R.4th 1059.
Search and seizure of telephone company records pertaining to subscriber as violation of subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th 536.
Bank's liability, under state law, for disclosing financial information concerning depositor or customer, 81 A.L.R.4th 377.
Validity of state or local government regulation requiring private school to report attendance and similar information to government - post-Yoder cases, 8 A.L.R.5th 875.
Obscenity prosecution: statutory exemption based on dissemination to persons or entities having scientific, educational, or similar justification for possession of such materials, 13 A.L.R.5th 567.
Validity and construction of statutes prohibiting harassment of hunters, fishermen, or trappers, 17 A.L.R.5th 837.
Who is "public figure" for purposes of defamation action, 19 A.L.R.5th 1.
Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered, 21 A.L.R.5th 248.
Musical sound recording as punishable obscenity, 30 A.L.R.5th 718.
Liability for discharge of employee from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.
Propriety of exclusion of press or other media representatives from civil trial, 39 A.L.R.5th 103.
Propriety of publishing identity of sexual assault victim, 40 A.L.R.5th 787.
Validity, construction, and application of state statutes or ordinances regulating sexual performance by child, 42 A.L.R.5th 291.
Free exercise of religion as applied to individual's objection to obtaining or disclosing social security number, 93 A.L.R.5th 1.
Validity of state statutes and administrative regulations regulating internet communications under commerce clause and First Amendment of federal constitution, 98 A.L.R.5th 167.
First Amendment protection afforded to commercial and home video games, 106 A.L.R.5th 337.
First amendment challenges to display of religious symbols on public property, 107 A.L.R.5th 1.
First Amendment protection afforded to comic books, comic strips, and cartoons, 118 A.L.R.5th 213.
Landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried couple as protected by landlord's religious beliefs, 10 A.L.R.6th 513.
Free exercise of religion clause of federal constitution as applied to individual's objection to obtaining or disclosing Social Security number, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 908.
Validity of union procedures for fixing and reviewing agency fees of nonunion employees under public employees representation contract - post-Hudson cases, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 894.
Validity and effect of restraints on postverdict communication between news media and jurors in federal case, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 415.
Free exercise of religion clause of first amendment as defense to tort liability, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 754.
Artist's speech and due process rights in artistic production which has been sold to another, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 912.
First amendment guaranty of freedom of speech or press as defense to liability stemming from speech allegedly causing bodily injury, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 26.
Giving of invocation with religious content at public-school-sponsored events to which public is invited or admitted as violation of establishment clause of first amendment, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 206.
Validity, construction, and application of § 504 of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (29 USCS § 504), precluding certain convicted persons from serving in union office for specified period, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 481.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of compensatory damages in civil actions for deprivation of rights under 42 USCS § 1983 - modern cases, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 501.
Validity, construction, and application of 18 USCS § 2251, penalizing sexual exploitation of children, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 643.
Immunity of federal tax agent from suit based upon agent's effort to enforce or collect tax, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 700.
Constitutionality of teaching or suppressing teaching of Biblical creationism or Darwinian evolution theory in public schools, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 537.
Constitutionality of teaching or otherwise promoting secular humanism in public schools, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 538.
First amendment protection for publicly employed firefighters subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 396.
First amendment protection for public hospital or health employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 21.
First amendment protection for judges or government attorneys subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 117.
First amendment protection for law enforcement employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 9
Constitutionality of regulation or policy governing prayer, meditation, or "moment of silence" in public schools, 110 A.L.R. Fed. 211.
Bible distribution or use in public schools - modern cases, 111 A.L.R. Fed. 121.
Right of access to federal district court guilty plea proceeding or records pertaining to entry or acceptance of guilty plea in criminal prosecution, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 621.
Construction and application of 18 USCS § 922(e), prohibiting delivery of firearms to common carrier, 125 A.L.R. Fed. 613.
Propriety and Scope of Protective Order Against Disclosure of Material Already Entered into Evidence in Federal Court Trial, 138 A.L.R. Fed. 153.
What constitutes "hybrid rights" claim under Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 163 A.L.R. Fed. 493.
Protection of commercial speech under first amendment - Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 1
Defamation of psychiatrist, psychologist, or counselor, 67 A.L.R.6th 437.
Constitutionality of Restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - characteristics of forum, 70 A.L.R.6th 513.
Constitutionality of restricting public speech in street, sidewalk, park, or other public forum - manner of restriction, 71 A.L.R.6th 471.
Constitutional challenges to compelled speech - general principles, 72 A.L.R.6th 513.
Statement in advertisements, product brochures or other promotional materials as constituting 'affirmation of fact' giving rise to express warranty under UCC § 2-313(1)(a), 83 A.L.R.6th 1.
Liability of law school for deceptive acts or practices, false advertising, and otherwise, based upon employment information for graduates, 91 A.L.R.6th 383.
Liability of public school or school district under U.S. Constitution for bullying, harassment, or intimidation of student by another student, 98 A.L.R.6th 599.
Adverse employment action taken against employee for social media communications, 103 A.L.R.6th 19.
Provisions of divorce, child custody, or child support orders as infringing on federal or state constitutional guarantees of free speech, 2 A.L.R.7th 6.
Invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising - Consent and waiver, 13 A.L.R.7th 4.
Invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising - First Amendment cases, 15 A.L.R.7th 6.
Application of First Amendment in school context - Supreme Court cases, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.
Validity, application, and construction of religion-based challenges to health insurance contraceptive coverage mandated by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act preventive services requirement, 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-13(a)(4), and its regulations, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 585.
Prisoner beard regulations as religious discrimination under First Amendment or Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 439.
First Amendment protection for school principals subjected to demotion, transfer, or reassignment because of speech, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.
Validity, construction, and application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) exempting activities of religious organizations from operation of Title VII equal employment opportunity provisions, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 6.
Construction and application of ERISA church plan exemption, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(2), 10 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.
Employer's grooming policy as religious discrimination under federal law, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1.
University code or policy forbidding speech or conduct that is offensive, degrading, or the like as violative of First Amendment Rights, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 2.