insanity defense in North Carolina

2007See Ingle, 336 N.C. at 629 , 445 S.E.2d at 886 (“The ability to distinguish between right and wrong and the ability to premeditate and deliberate are entirely different considerations.”); see also, State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243 , 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) (distinguishing between evidence presented to support an insanity defense and evidence to negate premeditation and deliberation).

2007See Ingle, 336 N.C. at 629 , 445 S.E.2d at 886 (“The ability to distinguish between right and wrong and the ability to premeditate and deliberate are entirely different considerations.”); see also, State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243 , 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) (distinguishing between evidence presented to support an insanity defense and evidence to negate premeditation and deliberation).

1988Defendant here, by contrast, presented his evidence not to support an insanity defense— ie. a defense of incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and in respect to the offense, id. at 569 , 213 S.E. 2d at 318 — but to show a mental condition which could have been found to negate the capacity to premeditate and deliberate, evidence which we have herein held was proper under the new rules.

1988Defendant here, by contrast, presented his evidence not to support an insanity defense— ie. a defense of incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and in respect to the offense, id. at 569 , 213 S.E. 2d at 318 — but to show a mental condition which could have been found to negate the capacity to premeditate and deliberate, evidence which we have herein held was proper under the new rules.

2016See State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 15 , 224 S.E.2d 595, 604 (1976).

2016See State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 15 , 224 S.E.2d 595, 604 (1976).

2025However, the D.C. Circuit later overturned Whalem, recognizing “[n]o other federal court of appeals has imposed a duty upon the district court to raise the insanity defense; indeed, only a few have even considered the issue.” United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1545 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

2017The D.C. Circuit also recognized that "[n]o other federal court of appeals has imposed a duty upon the district court to raise the insanity defense; *580 indeed, only a few have even considered the issue." Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).

2014In Clark, we cited to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 , 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990), in which [O]ur Supreme Court specifically addressed -7- the constitutional propriety of multiple psychiatric examinations when used by the State for the purpose of rebutting a defendant's assertion of the insanity defense.

2014In Clark, we cited to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 , 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 , 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990), in which [O]ur Supreme Court specifically addressed -7- the constitutional propriety of multiple psychiatric examinations when used by the State for the purpose of rebutting a defendant's assertion of the insanity defense.

1988State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238 , 204 S.E. 2d 649 (1974).

1988State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238 , 204 S.E. 2d 649 (1974).

2019Just as with the insanity defense at issue in Dalton, the diminished capacity defense requires the defendant’s own attorney to provide evidence of the defendant’s mental illness. -6- See, e.g., id. at 320 , 794 S.E.2d at 491 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Because the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity, even the defendant’s own attorney may provide evidence that the defendant’s mental illness caused him or her to engage in conduct that a jury might find shocking or reprehensible.” (citing State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743, 746-47 , 259 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1979))).

2019Just as with the insanity defense at issue in Dalton, the diminished capacity defense requires the defendant’s own attorney to provide evidence of the defendant’s mental illness. -6- See, e.g., id. at 320 , 794 S.E.2d at 491 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Because the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity, even the defendant’s own attorney may provide evidence that the defendant’s mental illness caused him or her to engage in conduct that a jury might find shocking or reprehensible.” (citing State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743, 746-47 , 259 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1979))).

2019Just as with the insanity defense at issue in Dalton, the diminished capacity defense requires the defendant’s own attorney to provide evidence of the defendant’s mental illness. -6- See, e.g., id. at 320 , 794 S.E.2d at 491 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Because the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity, even the defendant’s own attorney may provide evidence that the defendant’s mental illness caused him or her to engage in conduct that a jury might find shocking or reprehensible.” (citing State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743, 746-47 , 259 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1979))).

2019Just as with the insanity defense at issue in Dalton, the diminished capacity defense requires the defendant’s own attorney to provide evidence of the defendant’s mental illness. -6- See, e.g., id. at 320 , 794 S.E.2d at 491 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Because the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity, even the defendant’s own attorney may provide evidence that the defendant’s mental illness caused him or her to engage in conduct that a jury might find shocking or reprehensible.” (citing State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743, 746-47 , 259 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1979))).

2017See United States v. Wattleton , 296 F.3d 1184 , 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) ("we agree with [the defendant] that whether to raise the insanity defense is a decision for the defendant and his counsel"); Petrovich v. Leonardo , 229 F.3d 384 , 386 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[t]he decision to assert an affirmative defense is akin to other, fundamental trial decisions, such as the decision to plead to a lesser charge or to assert a plea of insanity"); State v. Gorthy , 226 N.J. 516 , 145 A.3d 146 , 157 (2016) ("Accordingly, if the trial court has made a finding of competency, it should not interpose its own judgm

2017See State v. Cooper , 286 N.C. 549 , 591, 213 S.E.2d 305 , 332 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting), disavowed in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard , 300 N.C. 223 , 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980). 5 Godinez recognizes that whereas a finding of competence to stand trial establishes a defendant's competence to waive fundamental rights at trial and competence to make critical decisions such as whether to raise affirmative defenses, and waiver of certain rights such as the waiver of right to counsel or the right to trial by pleading guilty, it also requires assurances that the defendant's waiver is "kn

2017See State v. Cooper , 286 N.C. 549 , 591, 213 S.E.2d 305 , 332 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting), disavowed in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard , 300 N.C. 223 , 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980). 5 Godinez recognizes that whereas a finding of competence to stand trial establishes a defendant's competence to waive fundamental rights at trial and competence to make critical decisions such as whether to raise affirmative defenses, and waiver of certain rights such as the waiver of right to counsel or the right to trial by pleading guilty, it also requires assurances that the defendant's waiver is "kn

2017See United States v. Wattleton , 296 F.3d 1184 , 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) ("we agree with [the defendant] that whether to raise the insanity defense is a decision for the defendant and his counsel"); Petrovich v. Leonardo , 229 F.3d 384 , 386 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[t]he decision to assert an affirmative defense is akin to other, fundamental trial decisions, such as the decision to plead to a lesser charge or to assert a plea of insanity"); State v. Gorthy , 226 N.J. 516 , 145 A.3d 146 , 157 (2016) ("Accordingly, if the trial court has made a finding of competency, it should not interpose its own judgm

2017See United States v. Wattleton , 296 F.3d 1184 , 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) ("we agree with [the defendant] that whether to raise the insanity defense is a decision for the defendant and his counsel"); Petrovich v. Leonardo , 229 F.3d 384 , 386 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[t]he decision to assert an affirmative defense is akin to other, fundamental trial decisions, such as the decision to plead to a lesser charge or to assert a plea of insanity"); State v. Gorthy , 226 N.J. 516 , 145 A.3d 146 , 157 (2016) ("Accordingly, if the trial court has made a finding of competency, it should not interpose its own judgm

2017See State v. Cooper , 286 N.C. 549 , 591, 213 S.E.2d 305 , 332 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting), disavowed in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard , 300 N.C. 223 , 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980). 5 Godinez recognizes that whereas a finding of competence to stand trial establishes a defendant's competence to waive fundamental rights at trial and competence to make critical decisions such as whether to raise affirmative defenses, and waiver of certain rights such as the waiver of right to counsel or the right to trial by pleading guilty, it also requires assurances that the defendant's waiver is "kn

2017See State v. Cooper , 286 N.C. 549 , 591, 213 S.E.2d 305 , 332 (1975) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting), disavowed in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard , 300 N.C. 223 , 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980). 5 Godinez recognizes that whereas a finding of competence to stand trial establishes a defendant's competence to waive fundamental rights at trial and competence to make critical decisions such as whether to raise affirmative defenses, and waiver of certain rights such as the waiver of right to counsel or the right to trial by pleading guilty, it also requires assurances that the defendant's waiver is "kn

2017See United States v. Wattleton , 296 F.3d 1184 , 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) ("we agree with [the defendant] that whether to raise the insanity defense is a decision for the defendant and his counsel"); Petrovich v. Leonardo , 229 F.3d 384 , 386 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[t]he decision to assert an affirmative defense is akin to other, fundamental trial decisions, such as the decision to plead to a lesser charge or to assert a plea of insanity"); State v. Gorthy , 226 N.J. 516 , 145 A.3d 146 , 157 (2016) ("Accordingly, if the trial court has made a finding of competency, it should not interpose its own judgm

2009This aggravating factor may be imposed when the evidence shows that the defendant’s weapon “in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person” and that “a great risk of death was knowingly created.” State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605 , 398 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1990) (citing State v. Carver, 319 N.C. 665 , 356 S.E.2d 349 (1987)).

2009Thus, like a defendant who interposes an insanity defense, a defendant asserting mental retardation is entitled to an instruction by the trial court regarding punishment “sufficient to remove any hesitancy of the jury in returning a [finding of mental retardation], engendered by a fear that by so doing they would be releasing the defend ant at large in the community.” State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 727 , 295 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1982).

2009Thus, like a defendant who interposes an insanity defense, a defendant asserting mental retardation is entitled to an instruction by the trial court regarding punishment “sufficient to remove any hesitancy of the jury in returning a [finding of mental retardation], engendered by a fear that by so doing they would be releasing the defend ant at large in the community.” State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 727 , 295 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1982).