insanity defense in Florida

2011See Grier v. State, 928 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); cf. Smith v. State, 521 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla.1988) (finding that the inadequacy of the old standard jury instruction on the insanity defense was not so flawed as to deprive the defendant of his defense or of a fair trial).

2002In Smith v. State, 521 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court was asked to determine whether the trial court had committed fundamental error by instructing the jury with an erroneous standard instruction on the insanity defense which improperly explained the law with respect to the burden of proof in insanity cases.

1994In Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971), this Court considered whether a defendant can be compelled to submit to psychiatric examinations when an insanity defense is offered.

1994In Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971), this Court considered whether a defendant can be compelled to submit to psychiatric examinations when an insanity defense is offered.

2013In Burwick , this Court addressed following issue: [Wjhether the state may introduce evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest conduct, including silence and the request to see an attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, as it relates solely to the issue of mental condition near the time of the offense when the defendant has asserted the insanity defense and the evidence is presented by the state in rebuttal. 442 So.2d at 945 (citation omitted).

1989Blaylock argues that such evidence should have been excluded because, in a post- Miranda setting, a request for an attorney may not be used to rebut an insanity defense, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); State v. Burwick, 442 So.2d 944 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 , 104 S.Ct. 1719 , 80 L.Ed.2d 191 (1984); Diaz v. State, 492 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and that a different rule should not be applied here merely because the police had not yet read the defendant his rights.

1993The trial court relied on Henry v. State, 574 So.2d 66, 70 (Fla. 1991), where we stated that when "a defendant seeks to pursue an insanity defense, the state should have an equal opportunity to obtain evidence relevant to that issue." The district court, however, distinguished Henry and held that "denial of the motion to compel would not preclude or prejudice the prosecution's use of its psychiatric testimony as to the viability of appellant's asserted defense based on her disclosed statements to Dr. Krop." 589 So.2d at 1369 .

1991Due to the clear distinctions between an insanity defense and the self defense issue in the present case, we are unable to agree with the trial judge's reliance on Henry v. State, 574 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1991), as "constitutionally similar." In Henry a divided court did conclude that the insanity defense was properly struck when defendant refused compliance with a pre-trial order for examination by the prosecution's designated expert. [1] The opinion states: It is undisputed that parties in a civil case can require another party to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination, so long as the exam

2023See State v. Tribble, 179 Vt. 235 , 892 A.2d 232, 248 (2005) (noting “that Vermont’s procedure for raising an insanity defense is equivalent to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity”).

2023See State v. Tribble, 179 Vt. 235 , 892 A.2d 232, 248 (2005) (noting “that Vermont’s procedure for raising an insanity defense is equivalent to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity”).

2015Appellant cites Watts v. State, 136 So. 3d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), which held that a sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advising a defendant to enter a plea without informing him that an insanity defense was available should be addressed in an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing of record to refute it.

2015Appellant cites Waits v. State, 136 So.3d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), which held that a sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advising a defendant to enter a plea without informing him that an insanity defense was available should be addressed in an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing of record to refute it.

1999He relies on Rosso v. State, 505 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), in which the court reversed a conviction because the state had argued, in effect, that the insanity defense was being used to avoid responsibility.

1994The insanity defense was attacked in Rosso v. State, 505 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), on facts analogous to the factual circumstances of the instant case.

2020After the multiple appeals, reversals, retrials, and appeals, 1 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 1994 but 1 See Morgan v. State, 392 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981) (Morgan I) (conviction and sentence of death reversed because bifurcated insanity procedure used in Morgan’s trial was subsequently held to be unconstitutional); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1984) (Morgan II) (conviction and sentence reversed because trial court erred in refusing to permit Morgan to raise the insanity defense); Morgan v. State, 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989) (Morgan III) (conviction and sentence re

1995As in Morgan v. State, 453 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1984), we can find nothing in this record to justify the trial court's refusal to permit Rosado to raise the insanity defense, his only defense to the charges.

1988First, the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the burden of proof on an insanity defense in accord with Yohn v. State, 476 So.2d 123 (Fla.1985).

1987In support of his Motion for Rehearing appellant cites us to this court’s opinion in Lentz v. State, 498 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) in which this court reversed a first degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. 1 This court based its decision on the trial court’s failure to give an instruction on the state’s burden to prove the defendant's sanity, an element which is omitted from the insanity defense instruction that was given, Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) 3.04(b), as disapproved in Yohn v. State, 476 So.2d 123 (1985).

2017Id. at 1355 .

2017Id. at 1355 .

2016The more difficult issue is whether Jackson established prejudice under the second prong of Strickland , which requires Jackson to demonstrate that but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, there was a reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been different, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 .

2004In its initial order summarily denying this ground, the trial court held that Spencer failed to meet the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) — trial counsel's omission was outside the range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards — because Spencer failed to show that insanity was a defense available to him for the charged crimes.

2015Any inquiry into those communications would clearly violate the basic attorney-client privilege.”) (quoting the former version of rule 3.216(a)); Townsend v. State, 420 So.2d 615, 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that privately retained psychiatrist is subject to the attorney-client privilege unless used as a witness); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640, 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (holding, generally, that the doctrine of attorney-client privilege bars the state from deposing and calling as witnesses psychiatrists hired by an accused or his counsel for the sole purpose of aiding in the preparation of

1991Appellant relies on Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) which held that the doctrine of attorney-client privilege bars the state from calling as a witness a psychiatrist hired by an accused or his counsel for the sole purpose of aiding the defense attorney's preparation of an insanity defense.

2019Competency to stand trial and insanity at the time of the offense involve the defendant’s mental state at separate and distinct points in time.” Patton v. State, 784 So. 2d 380, 387 (Fla. 2000); see also State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 340-41 (Fla. 1980) (“The judge’s knowledge of results of examinations ordered in connection with the defendant’s reliance on the defense of insanity may or may not give rise to reasonable doubt of his competence to stand trial.”).

2012Id. at 387 .

2015See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (3d Cir.1975) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney he is assisting.... [W]hen, as here, the defendant does not call the expert the same privilege applies with respect to communications from the defendant as applies to such communications to the attorney himself....

1977Likewise, in United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir.1975), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the assertion of an insanity defense did not result in the waiver of the attorney-client privilege accorded to a psychiatric consultation made in the preparation of trial.

2014Muhammad v. State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992).

2003Although our opinion in Muhammad II indicated that the trial court had not addressed the merits of "whether the alleged Brady violation would require a new trial," Muhammad II, 603 So.2d at 490 , the nature of the documents that were presented on remand would not require either a new sentencing phase or a new trial.

2014The claims appealed after denial of the initial postconviction motion were; (1) summary denial was erroneous; (2) a reliable transcript and critical records were not included in the record on appeal; (3) Muhammad was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); (4) Muhammad’s constitutional rights were violated when the appointed mental health expert failed to conduct a competent evaluation, causing counsel to render ineffective assistance; (5) Muhammad was denied effective assistance of counsel when defense

2014The claims appealed after denial of the initial postconviction motion were: (1) summary denial was erroneous; (2) a reliable transcript and critical records were not included in the record on appeal; (3) Muhammad was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (4) Muhammad‟s constitutional rights were violated when the appointed mental health expert failed to conduct a competent evaluation, causing counsel to render ineffective assistance; (5) Muhammad was denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel was ordered not to prese

2012These may be summarily denied on the authority of Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 63 (Fla. 2003), and Gutierrez v. State, 860 So.2d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

2012Cf. Gutierrez v. State, 860 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (finding that no evidentiary hearing was needed on Gutierrez’s claim that counsel failed to investigate an insanity defense when Gutierrez never claimed that he was insane at the time of the offenses).

1991NOTES [1] Appellant's points concerning the sufficiency of evidence of premeditation and his presence at jury selection have been considered and do not merit discussion. [2] The state argues on cross appeal that appellant's expert testimony offered under the "guise" of M'Naughton so deviated from the legal requirements of the insanity defense, the court should have stricken it under Hall v. State, 568 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1990) ("Expert testimony that a defendant suffered from a mental infirmity, disease, or defect without concluding that, as a result, the defendant could not distinguish right from

1991NOTES [1] Appellant's points concerning the sufficiency of evidence of premeditation and his presence at jury selection have been considered and do not merit discussion. [2] The state argues on cross appeal that appellant's expert testimony offered under the "guise" of M'Naughton so deviated from the legal requirements of the insanity defense, the court should have stricken it under Hall v. State, 568 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1990) ("Expert testimony that a defendant suffered from a mental infirmity, disease, or defect without concluding that, as a result, the defendant could not distinguish right from