insanity defense in Kentucky

2024In Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476 (Ky. 2016), the Kentucky Supreme Court considered a similar claim in the context of counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and discuss a possible extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) defense before advising his client to plead guilty.

2021In Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476 (Ky. 2016), the Kentucky Supreme Court considered a similar claim in the context of counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and discuss a possible extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) defense before advising his client to plead guilty.

2020For example, in Dean v. Commonwealth,35 Dean was convicted of capital murder, first degree burglary, and first degree rape.36 On appeal to this Court Dean argued that his Sixth Amendment right to control what defense he asserted was violated when defense counsel presented an insanity defense over his objection, which Dean alleged undermined his defense of innocence.37 He further maintained that “he was prejudiced by the incompatibility of these two defenses, which formed a suspect appeal to the jury.”38 This Court declined to reverse Dean’s conviction “because the conflict asserted [was] more

1994In the ease of Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 (1989), being an opinion published following the Jacobs trial, it was clearly stated that counsel must respect the defendant’s authority to make critical decisions concerning his defense.

2019If such an evaluation is conducted by a qualified mental health professional capable of making an accurate and impartial appraisal of the mental status of the patient, it can be of great assistance to the trial judge in determining whether the insanity defense is appropriate and whether further action is necessary.” 891 S.W.2d. at 385 .

2011In Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383 (Ky.1995) we recognized that in the situation where a defendant is asserting an insanity defense that a neutral mental health expert was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, and that a personal mental health expert should be provided so as to permit that expert to conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense.

2024The remand directive, the Commonwealth argued, could be resolved solely on the deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2024The remand directive, the Commonwealth argued, could be resolved solely on the deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2020For example, in Dean v. Commonwealth,35 Dean was convicted of capital murder, first degree burglary, and first degree rape.36 On appeal to this Court Dean argued that his Sixth Amendment right to control what defense he asserted was violated when defense counsel presented an insanity defense over his objection, which Dean alleged undermined his defense of innocence.37 He further maintained that “he was prejudiced by the incompatibility of these two defenses, which formed a suspect appeal to the jury.”38 This Court declined to reverse Dean’s conviction “because the conflict asserted [was] more

2019Id.

2016The district court stated at the outset it was unaware of any need for a psychiatrist at a transfer hearing, distinguishing that type of proceeding from mounting an insanity defense at trial—the context of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), on which Perkins heavily relied—or seeking to establish mitigating factors at a sentencing hearing.

2016The district court stated at the outset it was unaware of any need for a psychiatrist at a transfer hearing, distinguishing that type of proceeding from mounting an insanity defense at trial—the context of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), on which Perkins heavily relied—or seeking to establish mitigating factors at a sentencing hearing.

2015Stated differently, where there is evidence to create a jury question regarding the insanity defense the presumption of sanity is gone, or as McCormick states it is “spent and disappears.” Id.

2008In upholding the trial court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not challenge the validity of the new psychiatric evaluations: “It is true that a factual basis for a substantial insanity defense was developed in the post-trial affidavits of Dr. Martin and the psychologist.” Id. at 403 .

2006To support his claim that reversal is required, Appellant points to Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. App.1993), [3] where the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction where during the trial the prosecutor misstated the law of the insanity defense and the defendant had made a "very strong case for insanity." Id. at 800 .

2006To support his claim that reversal is required, Appellant points to Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. App.1993), [3] where the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction where during the trial the prosecutor misstated the law of the insanity defense and the defendant had made a "very strong case for insanity." Id. at 800 .

2000In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. May, 860 F.2d 219 (6 th Cir.1988), the court concisely outlined the law on the intentional act exclusions in homeowner’s insurance policies and the effect of the insanity defense thereon.

2000Co. v. Wagner, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 224 (1964), the insanity defense was “substantially narrowed.” May, 860 F.2d at 225 .

2000Co. v. Wagner, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 224 (1964), the insanity defense was “substantially narrowed.” May, 860 F.2d at 225 .

1999Woodward's claim that Payne supra, Mitchell supra, and Steiber, supra , are distinguishable because those cases concern DUI convictions and the insanity defense is unpersuasive.

1999Woodward’s claim that Payne supra, Mitchell supra, and Steiber, supra, are distinguishable because those cases concern DUI convictions and the insanity defense is unpersuasive.

1999Woodward's claim that Payne supra, Mitchell supra, and Steiber, supra , are distinguishable because those cases concern DUI convictions and the insanity defense is unpersuasive.

1999Woodward's claim that Payne supra, Mitchell supra, and Steiber, supra , are distinguishable because those cases concern DUI convictions and the insanity defense is unpersuasive.

1999Woodward’s claim that Payne supra, Mitchell supra, and Steiber, supra, are distinguishable because those cases concern DUI convictions and the insanity defense is unpersuasive.

1996However, in Sanders, supra, a similar case involving an insanity defense, this Court allowed the admission of crime scene photographs.

1996However, in Sanders, supra , a similar case involving an insanity defense, this Court allowed the admission of crime scene photographs.

1995Lyons, supra, held that a person addicted to drugs should not be allowed to raise an insanity defense when a crime is committed by a narcotic addict in order to obtain drug funds and stated: In the first place, there is an element of reasoned choice when an addict knowingly acquires and uses drugs; he could instead have participated in an addiction treatment program. [Citation omitted.] A person is not to be excused for offending “simply because he wanted to very, very badly.” [Citation omitted.] Second, since the defense of insanity is “essentially an acknowl-edgement on the part of society t

1990Second, the evidence of a similar offense in Lincoln County may well have been admissible in rebuttal as bearing on the insanity defense, People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241 , 425 N.Y.S.2d 77 , 401 N.E.2d 199 (1980), but it should not have been admitted during the Commonwealth’s casein-chief, because at that stage the highly inflammatory nature of the evidence far outweighed any probative evidentiary value.

1990Second, the evidence of a similar offense in Lincoln County may well have been admissible in rebuttal as bearing on the insanity defense, People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241 , 425 N.Y.S.2d 77 , 401 N.E.2d 199 (1980), but it should not have been admitted during the Commonwealth’s casein-chief, because at that stage the highly inflammatory nature of the evidence far outweighed any probative evidentiary value.

1989McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464 (1986).