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14 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Jackson’s criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses, however, is a distinct issue from his competency to stand trial.”); Mills, 256 A.2d at 756 (“The answer lies in the difference between the mental illness which precludes responsibility for crime 27 dispositions involve mental illness, but only an insanity acquittal requires an affirmative finding that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense. 1974Mills v. State, Del.Supr., 256 A.2d 752 (1969). 6 . “ * * *. [A] sound exercise of the trial court’s discretion will ordinary result in bifurcation whenever a defendant shows that he has a substantial insanity defense and a substantial defense on the merits to any element of the charge, either of which would be prejudiced by simultaneous presentation with the other. | 1 | 2 |
Medina v. Californiagreen1 sentence2023C. § 5010. 104 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1120 (holding that “such administrative release procedure is inapplicable to insanity acquitees committed to the Delaware State Hospital”). 105 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“This analogy is not convincing, because there are significant differences between a claim of incompetence and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.”); see also Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739 (“Petitioner argues that he has already made out a complete insanity defense. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Indianagreen1 sentence2023C. § 5010. 104 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1120 (holding that “such administrative release procedure is inapplicable to insanity acquitees committed to the Delaware State Hospital”). 105 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“This analogy is not convincing, because there are significant differences between a claim of incompetence and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.”); see also Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739 (“Petitioner argues that he has already made out a complete insanity defense. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Lewisgreen1 sentence2023C. § 5010. 104 See Lewis, 403 A.2d at 1120 (holding that “such administrative release procedure is inapplicable to insanity acquitees committed to the Delaware State Hospital”). 105 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“This analogy is not convincing, because there are significant differences between a claim of incompetence and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.”); see also Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739 (“Petitioner argues that he has already made out a complete insanity defense. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pohlot, Stephengreen1 sentence2021Inst. 1962). 14 Kowal, 596 F. Supp at 379 ; see Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 896 . 5 IDRA made it more difficult for the defendant to raise an insanity defense than it had been before the amendments were codified. | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Stategreen1 sentence2021The question presented, therefore, is whether the 2021 amendment deprives the Defendant of a defense he could have raised before the amendments were enacted.10 In answering this question, both sides discuss a district court case, United States v. Kowal.11 Kowal considered whether retroactive application of amendments made to the insanity defense by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (the “IDRA”) would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause to the extent the IDRA removed a defense afforded the defendant under the Model Penal Code that existed prior to the IDRA’s enactment.12 Relevant there, the | 1 | 1 |
Shipley v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Shipley, 570 A.2d at 1171 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). 33 . | 1 | 1 |
Wheat v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Shipley, 570 A.2d at 1171 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). 33 . 2001See Shipley, 570 A.2d at 1171 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). 33 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences1997Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659 (1991); Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 Criminology 393 (1986); State v. Moore, N.J., 122 N.J. 420 , 585 A.2d 864, 881 (1991) (noting public’s concerns about the insanity defense); Erdman v. State, App., 315 Md. 46 , 553 A.2d 244 (1989) (fundamental fairness requires that a jury be instructed on the legal effect of the verdict of NGRI); State v. Shickles, Utah Supr., 760 P.2d 291 (1988) (s 1997Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659 (1991); Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 Criminology 393 (1986); State v. Moore, N.J., 122 N.J. 420 , 585 A.2d 864, 881 (1991) (noting public’s concerns about the insanity defense); Erdman v. State, App., 315 Md. 46 , 553 A.2d 244 (1989) (fundamental fairness requires that a jury be instructed on the legal effect of the verdict of NGRI); State v. Shickles, Utah Supr., 760 P.2d 291 (1988) (s | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See also Daniels v. State, 538 A.2d at 1107 -1108 n. 4. | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117, 136 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Windsorgreen1 sentence1990However, the case’s reporter noted that “in consequence of great doubt of his sanity existing in the public mind, and especially with the medical profession, he has been respited from time to time by the Governor, and is yet (1856) in prison.” Id. at 542. | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Delawaregreen2 sentences1988See Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561, 561-63 , appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976). 1988See Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561, 561-63 , appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Stategreen1 sentence1988See Rivera v. State, Del.Supr., 351 A.2d 561, 561-63 , appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 , 97 S.Ct. 226 , 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dubinagreen2 sentences1969See People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363 , 8 N.W.2d 99 , 145 A.L.R. 886 (1943); Annotation, 145 A.L.R. 892 . 1969See People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363 , 8 N.W.2d 99 , 145 A.L.R. 886 (1943); Annotation, 145 A.L.R. 892 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2026Oct. 21, 2014) (no ineffectiveness where counsel determined his client’s mental health issues didn’t rise to the level of a viable defense, but counsel tried to use issues to lessen the severity of his sentence). 45 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; Ploof I, 75 A.3d at 825; Peters, 283 A.3d at 681 (“A movant must satisfy both prongs—deficient attorney performance and resulting prejudice—to succeed in making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Kourtney Kauffman
green
2 sentences2023In U.S. v. Kauffman27 counsel did not pursue an insanity claim 27 109 F.3d 186 (3d Cir 1997) 14 because he was unaware that an insanity defense existed due to his lack of investigation. 2023In U.S. v. Kauffman27 counsel did not pursue an insanity claim 27 109 F.3d 186 (3d Cir 1997) 14 because he was unaware that an insanity defense existed due to his lack of investigation. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Kowal
green
2 sentences2021The question presented, therefore, is whether the 2021 amendment deprives the Defendant of a defense he could have raised before the amendments were enacted.10 In answering this question, both sides discuss a district court case, United States v. Kowal.11 Kowal considered whether retroactive application of amendments made to the insanity defense by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (the “IDRA”) would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause to the extent the IDRA removed a defense afforded the defendant under the Model Penal Code that existed prior to the IDRA’s enactment.12 Relevant there, the 2021Inst. 1962). 14 Kowal, 596 F. Supp at 379 ; see Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 896 . 5 IDRA made it more difficult for the defendant to raise an insanity defense than it had been before the amendments were codified. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Baynum v. State
green
1 sentence2020State, 211 A.3d 1075 , 2019 WL 2288339 , *2 (Del. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2001We find that the present case is thus distinguishable from Ake , in which the Supreme Court concluded that "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 31 .Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, there is no need to reach Chao’s argumen 2001We find that the present case is thus distinguishable from Ake , in which the Supreme Court concluded that "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 31 .Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, there is no need to reach Chao’s argumen | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ake v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2001We find that the present case is thus distinguishable from Ake , in which the Supreme Court concluded that "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 31 .Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, there is no need to reach Chao’s argumen 2001We find that the present case is thus distinguishable from Ake , in which the Supreme Court concluded that "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 31 .Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, there is no need to reach Chao’s argumen | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Shickles
green
1 sentence1997Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659 (1991); Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 Criminology 393 (1986); State v. Moore, N.J., 122 N.J. 420 , 585 A.2d 864, 881 (1991) (noting public’s concerns about the insanity defense); Erdman v. State, App., 315 Md. 46 , 553 A.2d 244 (1989) (fundamental fairness requires that a jury be instructed on the legal effect of the verdict of NGRI); State v. Shickles, Utah Supr., 760 P.2d 291 (1988) (s | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Erdman v. State
green
2 sentences1997Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659 (1991); Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 Criminology 393 (1986); State v. Moore, N.J., 122 N.J. 420 , 585 A.2d 864, 881 (1991) (noting public’s concerns about the insanity defense); Erdman v. State, App., 315 Md. 46 , 553 A.2d 244 (1989) (fundamental fairness requires that a jury be instructed on the legal effect of the verdict of NGRI); State v. Shickles, Utah Supr., 760 P.2d 291 (1988) (s 1997Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659 (1991); Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 Criminology 393 (1986); State v. Moore, N.J., 122 N.J. 420 , 585 A.2d 864, 881 (1991) (noting public’s concerns about the insanity defense); Erdman v. State, App., 315 Md. 46 , 553 A.2d 244 (1989) (fundamental fairness requires that a jury be instructed on the legal effect of the verdict of NGRI); State v. Shickles, Utah Supr., 760 P.2d 291 (1988) (s | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1990There would be no justification, however, for also directing that defense counsel receive no notice of this examination. 492 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 3149 , 106 L.Ed.2d at 556 . 1990There would be no justification, however, for also directing that defense counsel receive no notice of this examination. 492 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 3149 , 106 L.Ed.2d at 556 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Leland v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Satterwhite v. Texas
green
2 sentences1990In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Estelle v. Smith, supra, that defendants formally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel before submitting to psychiatric examinations designed to determine their future dangerousness. . 1990In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Estelle v. Smith, supra, that defendants formally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel before submitting to psychiatric examinations designed to determine their future dangerousness. . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jones v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1990Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 364 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 3050 n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Marshall A. Contee v. United States
green
1 sentence1974In cases of doubt, the question should be resolved in favor of bifurcation where the evidence on criminal responsibility does not significantly overlap the evidence on the merits and where the same jury can fairly determine both issues. * * ( 410 F.2d at 250 ). 7 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.