insanity defense in Georgia

2020See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 (2) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (holding that “expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant's refusal to assert an insanity defense or that he was mentally ill at the time of the conduct in question.”).

2020See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 (2) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (holding that “expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant's refusal to assert an insanity defense or that he was mentally ill at the time of the conduct in question.”).

2024At trial, Appellant’s counsel made an oral motion in limine “to keep out any testimony from any witness on their opinion as to whether [Appellant] was experiencing symptoms of psychosis on the date of the incident.” After argument from the parties, the trial court ruled that 4 OCGA § 17-7-130.1 provides that “[w]hen a notice of an insanity defense is filed, the court shall appoint at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant and to testify at trial.” See Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 832 (2) (353 SE2d 348) (1987) (explaining that “[i]f the defendant wants to intro

2024At trial, Appellant’s counsel made an oral motion in limine “to keep out any testimony from any witness on their opinion as to whether [Appellant] was experiencing symptoms of psychosis on the date of the incident.” After argument from the parties, the trial court ruled that 4 OCGA § 17-7-130.1 provides that “[w]hen a notice of an insanity defense is filed, the court shall appoint at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant and to testify at trial.” See Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 832 (2) (353 SE2d 348) (1987) (explaining that “[i]f the defendant wants to intro

2014See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (‘“[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’”) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262 ( 282 SE2d 325 ) (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,” because “the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity de

2014See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (‘“[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’”) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262 ( 282 SE2d 325 ) (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,” because “the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity de

2025Guided by these principles, we turn to Owens’s specific claims of ineffective assistance. (a) Owens argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and assert an insanity defense.3 We conclude that Owens has failed to show that his 3 “[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 (4) (a) ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011).

2025Guided by these principles, we turn to Owens’s specific claims of ineffective assistance. (a) Owens argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and assert an insanity defense.3 We conclude that Owens has failed to show that his 3 “[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 (4) (a) ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011).

2020But as explained supra, for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense based on a delusional compulsion, the defendant must show that he was laboring under that compulsion at the time of the criminal act,89 and thus, for purposes of Serdula’s particular ineffective-assistance claim, his mental state at the time of trial is 87 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 749 ( 507 SE2d 555 ) (1998). 88 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012). 89 See Woods, 291 Ga. at

2020But as explained supra, for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense based on a delusional compulsion, the defendant must show that he was laboring under that compulsion at the time of the criminal act,89 and thus, for purposes of Serdula’s particular ineffective-assistance claim, his mental state at the time of trial is 87 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 749 ( 507 SE2d 555 ) (1998). 88 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012). 89 See Woods, 291 Ga. at

2015See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (“ ‘[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’ ”) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262 ( 282 SE2d 325 ) (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,” because “the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity

2015See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-608 ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (“ ‘[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’ ”) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262 ( 282 SE2d 325 ) (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603 ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,” because “the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity

2021See also Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 449 ( 112 SCt 2572 , 120 LE2d 353) (1992) (“Moreover, while the 56 Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried, we have not said that the Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity defense.” (citations omitted)).

2021See also Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 449 ( 112 SCt 2572 , 120 LE2d 353) (1992) (“Moreover, while the 56 Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried, we have not said that the Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity defense.” (citations omitted)).

2026See Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 514 (“Given this record, even if other attorneys might have explored the mental issue further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical judgment of [a]ppellant’s attorney was outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (b) Adams argues that trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance by not raising an insanity defense.

2023Thus, “this is not a case where trial counsel made no effort to investigate the potential for a defense based on mental health issues or relied exclusively upon his own lay evaluation of the mental health of his client,” Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 508, 514 (2) (b) ( 842 SE2d 5 ) (2020) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted), and counsel presented evidence to support an insanity defense through fact witnesses, including witnesses who described Waters’s behavior prior to the shooting and explained the medications he was taking and why they were generally prescribed.

2020But as explained supra, for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense based on a delusional compulsion, the defendant must show that he was laboring under that compulsion at the time of the criminal act,89 and thus, for purposes of Serdula’s particular ineffective-assistance claim, his mental state at the time of trial is 87 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 749 ( 507 SE2d 555 ) (1998). 88 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012). 89 See Woods, 291 Ga. at

2020But as explained supra, for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense based on a delusional compulsion, the defendant must show that he was laboring under that compulsion at the time of the criminal act,89 and thus, for purposes of Serdula’s particular ineffective-assistance claim, his mental state at the time of trial is 87 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 749 ( 507 SE2d 555 ) (1998). 88 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012). 89 See Woods, 291 Ga. at

2004We recognized in Tolbert, supra, 260 Ga. at 528 (2) (b), that a court-appointed medical expert “cannot be classified as an agent of the state, but must be con *839 sidered as an independent and impartial witness.” Accordingly, we held that consistent with the clear legislative intent of OCGA § 17-7-130.1, the State should have an equal opportunity with the defense to obtain the opinion of an independent and impartial mental health expert regarding the issues raised by an insanity defense.

1995Thus, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1, the trial court appointed a psychiatrist "to examine [him] and to testify at the trial." Tolbert v. State, 260 Ga. 527, 528 (2) (b) ( 397 SE2d 439 ) (1990).

2026To overcome this presumption, a defendant wishing to assert an insanity defense has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time the crime was committed.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 881 (2017).

2021See id. at 881 (3) (explaining that the defendant being tried for murdering his sister had not adduced evidence that would support an insanity defense, where “the evidence showed that [the defendant had] knowingly intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so”); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (a) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (“Bipolar Disorder is a mental illness or mental abnormality but is not the equivalent of legal insanity.”); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) ( 454 SE2d 446 ) (199

2025See id.

2020See Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 297-304 ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019). have explored the mental issue further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical judgment of Appellant’s attorney was outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 804 (citation and punctuation omitted); see also, e.g., Whitus, 287 Ga. at 804 (trial counsel who “requested and obtained a full psychiatric evaluation of Appellant” was not deficient for relying on that evaluation and deciding not to request additional testing or to pursue an insanity defense); Arnold, 292 Ga. at 269-271 (where

2023See Whitus, 287 Ga. at 803-805; Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 513-514.6 Thus, under the circumstances presented here, Taylor’s trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient in declining to obtain or introduce evidence (such as the medical intake form) in support of an insanity defense.

2023See also Whitus, 287 Ga. at 803-804 (defendant failed to show that her trial counsel “unreasonably relied on [an expert’s psychiatric] evaluation” and thus failed to show that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to obtain an additional evaluation when her trial counsel “testified that he believed that the evaluation was fair and balanced and that he had no reason to disagree and request additional testing” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 42 Here, Taylor has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to further investigate the possibility of an insanit

2021See id. at 881 (3) (explaining that the defendant being tried for murdering his sister had not adduced evidence that would support an insanity defense, where “the evidence showed that [the defendant had] knowingly intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so”); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (a) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (“Bipolar Disorder is a mental illness or mental abnormality but is not the equivalent of legal insanity.”); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) ( 454 SE2d 446 ) (199

2021See id. at 881 (3) (explaining that the defendant being tried for murdering his sister had not adduced evidence that would support an insanity defense, where “the evidence showed that [the defendant had] knowingly intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so”); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (a) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (“Bipolar Disorder is a mental illness or mental abnormality but is not the equivalent of legal insanity.”); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) ( 454 SE2d 446 ) (199

2020See Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 297-304 ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019). have explored the mental issue further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical judgment of Appellant’s attorney was outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 804 (citation and punctuation omitted); see also, e.g., Whitus, 287 Ga. at 804 (trial counsel who “requested and obtained a full psychiatric evaluation of Appellant” was not deficient for relying on that evaluation and deciding not to request additional testing or to pursue an insanity defense); Arnold, 292 Ga. at 269-271 (where

2019See generally Collins, 306 Ga. at 468 (2); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 302-303 (9) (c) ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019).3 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 provides in subsection (d): In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary, may be permitted to offer: (1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse committed by the deceased, as

2020But as explained supra, for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense based on a delusional compulsion, the defendant must show that he was laboring under that compulsion at the time of the criminal act,89 and thus, for purposes of Serdula’s particular ineffective-assistance claim, his mental state at the time of trial is 87 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 749 ( 507 SE2d 555 ) (1998). 88 Simon, 321 Ga. App. at 3 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) ( 724 SE2d 377 ) (2012). 89 See Woods, 291 Ga. at

2013See, e.g., Simon v. State, 321 Ga. App. 1, 5 (2) ( 740 SE2d 819 ) (2013) (under the circumstances presented, trial court did not err by refusing to recharge on burden of proof for an insanity defense and by referring the jury to charge already given).

2018Accord Williams v. State , 958 S.W.2d 186 , 191-195 (Tex. Crim.

2018Accord Williams v. State, 958 SW2d 186, 191-195 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2015The attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law,” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (II) ( 101 SCt 677 , 66 LE2d 584) (1981), and has long been recognized in Georgia.

2015The attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law,” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (II) ( 101 SCt 677 , 66 LE2d 584) (1981), and has long been recognized in Georgia.

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2019In Neuman , the trial court required the defendant to turn over records from two psychologists, who had been retained by trial counsel for the purpose of exploring an insanity defense, even though those experts would have neither testified at trial nor contributed to the opinion of the expert who would ultimately testify. 297 Ga. at 505 -506 , 773 S.E.2d 716 .

2019In Neuman , the trial court required the defendant to turn over records from two psychologists, who had been retained by trial counsel for the purpose of exploring an insanity defense, even though those experts would have neither testified at trial nor contributed to the opinion of the expert who would ultimately testify. 297 Ga. at 505 -506 , 773 S.E.2d 716 .

2023The trial court held that trial counsel’s decision not to raise an insanity defense at trial was not constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2023The trial court held that trial counsel’s decision not to raise an insanity defense at trial was not constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2026In light of these precedents, efforts to investigate and present evidence related to Williams’s abuse and PTSD allegations “in the hope of obtaining a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter would have been a waste of time, and trial counsel’s failure to do so was therefore neither deficient nor prejudicial.” Collins, 306 Ga. at 467 .

2019See generally Collins, 306 Ga. at 468 (2); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 302-303 (9) (c) ( 824 SE2d 346 ) (2019).3 2 OCGA § 16-3-21 provides in subsection (d): In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification provided by subsection (a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary, may be permitted to offer: (1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse committed by the deceased, as

2026See also Riggs v. State, 306 Ga. 759, 763 (2019) (holding that evidence of “an alleged incident [of sexual abuse] occurring many years earlier ... was 9 simply not relevant to the jury’s determination regarding voluntary manslaughter,” and “in the absence of an insanity defense ... , [the defendant] cannot demonstrate that this evidence was relevant to show his alleged subjective mental state”); Johnson, 297 Ga. at 842–43 (citing cases holding that the defendant’s “fragile mental state” or psychological evidence about the effect of the victim’s conduct on the defendant’s mental state at the ti

2021See, e.g., Vann v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (857 SE2d 677, 680-681) (2021) (concluding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by deciding not to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction where “[a] competent attorney could have assessed that a voluntary manslaughter defense was either unavailable or weak because the evidence did not show, or only questionably showed, 3 See Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (841 SE2d 696) (2020) (explaining that “it is well established that words alone, regardless of the degree of their insulting nature, will not in any case justify the excitement of

2021See id. at 881 (3) (explaining that the defendant being tried for murdering his sister had not adduced evidence that would support an insanity defense, where “the evidence showed that [the defendant had] knowingly intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so”); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (a) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (“Bipolar Disorder is a mental illness or mental abnormality but is not the equivalent of legal insanity.”); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) ( 454 SE2d 446 ) (199

2021See id. at 881 (3) (explaining that the defendant being tried for murdering his sister had not adduced evidence that would support an insanity defense, where “the evidence showed that [the defendant had] knowingly intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so”); Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (a) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (“Bipolar Disorder is a mental illness or mental abnormality but is not the equivalent of legal insanity.”); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) ( 454 SE2d 446 ) (199