insanity defense in Kansas

1987If he concludes that upon the evidence there'must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion.’ (Syl. ¶ 3.) “In State v. Chase, 207 Kan. 352, 362 , 480 P.2d 62 (1971), we quoted from Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 756 (8th Cir. 1961), as to the test for acquittal in an insanity defense case: “ ‘ “. . . [I]n order to remove this case from the jury’s consideration. . . . ‘reasonable men must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s sanity and . . . reasonable men must conclude that the government has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reaso

1987If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion." (Syl. 3.) "`In State v. Chase, 207 Kan. 352, 362 , 480 P.2d 62 (1971), we quoted from Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 756 (8th Cir.1961), as to the test for acquittal in an insanity defense case: "`"`... [I]n order to remove this case from the jury's consideration, ... "reasonable men must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity and ... reasonable men must conclude that the government has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable dou

2001In State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 200 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), we held the defendant was not entitled to an insanity instruction because the evidence showed `alcohol was the key factor in [the defendant's] loss of control and the sina qua non of all of his difficulties.' We held `"mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication, existing only temporarily at the time of the criminal offense"` does not reach the level of insanity. 212 Kan. at 197 . *921 ....

2001In State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 200 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), we held the defendant was not entitled to an insanity instruction because the evidence showed `alcohol was the key factor in [the defendant's] loss of control and the sina qua non of all of his difficulties.' We held `"mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication, existing only temporarily at the time of the criminal offense"` does not reach the level of insanity. 212 Kan. at 197 . *921 ....

1987If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion." (Syl. 3.) "`In State v. Chase, 207 Kan. 352, 362 , 480 P.2d 62 (1971), we quoted from Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 756 (8th Cir.1961), as to the test for acquittal in an insanity defense case: "`"`... [I]n order to remove this case from the jury's consideration, ... "reasonable men must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity and ... reasonable men must conclude that the government has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable dou

1987If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion." (Syl. 3.) "`In State v. Chase, 207 Kan. 352, 362 , 480 P.2d 62 (1971), we quoted from Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 756 (8th Cir.1961), as to the test for acquittal in an insanity defense case: "`"`... [I]n order to remove this case from the jury's consideration, ... "reasonable men must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity and ... reasonable men must conclude that the government has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable dou

2020See State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 472 , 497 P.2d 275 (1972); State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶ 1, 4 P. 159 (1884) (adopting the M'Naghten rule).

1991In Kansas the test to be applied is the M'Naghten test, which we adopted in State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶ 1, 4 Pac. 159 (1884).

2020See State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 472 , 497 P.2d 275 (1972); State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶ 1, 4 P. 159 (1884) (adopting the M'Naghten rule).

1991In Kansas the test to be applied is the M'Naghten test, which we adopted in State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶ 1, 4 Pac. 159 (1884).

1986Additionally, in In re Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 99 , 612 P.2d 1211 (1980), we noted that evidence a defendant attempted to conceal the crime or his identity as the perpetrator thereof goes a long way to defeat an insanity defense.

1986Additionally, in In re Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 99 , 612 P.2d 1211 (1980), we noted that evidence a defendant attempted to conceal the crime or his identity as the perpetrator thereof goes a long way to defeat an insanity defense.

1996“The trial court properly considered the factual circumstances, thus the period of delay from December 5, 1985, to March 27,1986, was reasonably attributable to the assertion of the insanity defense in accordance with State v. Topham, 231 Kan. 167 , Syl ¶ 1 [, 642 P.2d 986 (1982)].” 242 Kan. at 51 .

1990Furthermore, we note the argument set forth by the defendant in State v. Maas, 242 Kan. 44 , 744 P.2d 1222 (1987), in which the defendant contended the filing of a notice of intent to rely on an insanity defense was not an application by him causing delay since he did not take any affirmative step to delay trial.

2022Because "[f]ew doctrines are as deeply rooted in our common-law heritage as the insanity defense," Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039 , 206 L.

2020Kahler held that Kansas did not abolish the insanity defense, but "only channels to sentencing, the mental health evidence that falls outside its intent-based insanity defense." 140 S. Ct. at 1031 .

2018The Alexander court noted that when presented with an insanity defense "'the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.'" Two of those outcomes were in the realm of common knowledge—but "a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning," as it "means neither freedom nor punishment" but rather commitment for an unspecified amount of time. 240 Kan. at 286 (quoting Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 [D.C. 1957]).

2018Its purpose is not to force the jury into considering disposition, but to educate them regarding the insanity defense." 240 Kan. at 287 .

2007See, e.g., State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744 , 933 P.2d 730 (where defense counsel at arraignment requested a hearing date for anticipated motion to suppress that was later withdrawn, period of time between arraignment and the hearing chargeable to the defendant); City of Dodge City v. Downing, 257 Kan. 561 , 894 P.2d 206 (1995) (period of delay between the date the defendant filed a motion to suppress and a *628 reasonable period of time for the court to rule on it attributed to the defendant); State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3 , 832 P.2d 1176 (1992) (period between date defendant filed notice of intent

2007See, e.g., State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744 , 933 P.2d 730 (where defense counsel at arraignment requested a hearing date for anticipated motion to suppress that was later withdrawn, period of time between arraignment and the hearing chargeable to the defendant); City of Dodge City v. Downing, 257 Kan. 561 , 894 P.2d 206 (1995) (period of delay between the date the defendant filed a motion to suppress and a *628 reasonable period of time for the court to rule on it attributed to the defendant); State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3 , 832 P.2d 1176 (1992) (period between date defendant filed notice of intent

2004One year after Rivera, the Court stated in the second-degree murder case of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 207 , that it was "unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera " and upheld a requirement that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

2004One year after Rivera, the Court stated in the second-degree murder case of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 207 , that it was “unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera” and upheld a requirement that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

2000Hedges’ trial attorney had argued for an insanity defense instruction based on the M’Naghten test, (see State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 809 , 686 P.2d 160 [1984]), which was not applicable at the time of Hedges’ crime, and Hedges deferred to the judgment of his trial attorney.

2000Hedges’ trial attorney had argued for an insanity defense instruction based on the M’Naghten test, (see State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 809 , 686 P.2d 160 [1984]), which was not applicable at the time of Hedges’ crime, and Hedges deferred to the judgment of his trial attorney.

1997There is no prejudicial error where the questionable statements of a prosecuting attorney are provoked and made in response to previous arguments or statements of defense counsel. [Citation omitted.] Since Kansas does not follow the “plain error” rule used in federal courts, reversible error cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct of counsel during closing argument where no contemporaneous objection is lodged. [Citation omitted.] Remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument are harmless error if the court finds that the error had little likelihood of changing the result of th

1997There is no prejudicial error where the questionable statements of a prosecuting attorney are provoked and made in response to previous arguments or statements of defense counsel. [Citation omitted.] Since Kansas does not follow the “plain error” rule used in federal courts, reversible error cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct of counsel during closing argument where no contemporaneous objection is lodged. [Citation omitted.] Remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument are harmless error if the court finds that the error had little likelihood of changing the result of th

1996“The trial court properly considered the factual circumstances, thus the period of delay from December 5, 1985, to March 27,1986, was reasonably attributable to the assertion of the insanity defense in accordance with State v. Topham, 231 Kan. 167 , Syl ¶ 1 [, 642 P.2d 986 (1982)].” 242 Kan. at 51 .

1996“The trial court properly considered the factual circumstances, thus the period of delay from December 5, 1985, to March 27,1986, was reasonably attributable to the assertion of the insanity defense in accordance with State v. Topham, 231 Kan. 167 , Syl ¶ 1 [, 642 P.2d 986 (1982)].” 242 Kan. at 51 .

1996In State v. Warren, 224 Kan. 454 , Syl. ¶ 4, the court stated.: “The time between the date on which a defendant files a motion for a psychiatric examination, and the date on which the report of the psychiatrist is received, is chargeable against the defendant, whether the purpose of the examination is to determine competency to stand trial or to support an insanity defense.” The time for the State to obtain a reciprocal expert report should also be bounded by the State’s request and the receipt of the report.

1990However, we did state “the time between filing of a motion for a psychiatric examination and the date on which the psychiatrist’s report are received are properly chargeable against the defendant.” The court determined this principle applies in *44 connection with an insanity defense or a competency determination. 224 Kan. at 456-57 .

2022State v. Buehler-May, 279 Kan. 371, 378 , 110 P.3d 425 (2005); see State v. Boyd, 216 Kan. 373, 379 , 532 P.2d 1064 (1975) 9 (reviewing district court's decision to disallow an insanity defense pursuant to K.S.A. 22- 3219 for an abuse of discretion).

2022State v. Buehler-May, 279 Kan. 371, 378 , 110 P.3d 425 (2005); see State v. Boyd, 216 Kan. 373, 379 , 532 P.2d 1064 (1975) 9 (reviewing district court's decision to disallow an insanity defense pursuant to K.S.A. 22- 3219 for an abuse of discretion).

2022But "[a] claim that a defendant was denied the constitutional right to present a defense raises a question of law subject to de novo appellate review." Maestas, 298 Kan. at 780 .

2021Baker also commented that "there had to be something more than just one human being wanting to go in and stab another human being and that there had to be some ulterior motive." 4 Kan.

2020He argues: (1) our state's approach to the insanity defense violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) a court order compelling him to produce personal writings made at a detention center while awaiting trial violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (3) the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the incriminating statements made to police; (4) prosecutorial error occurred during closing arguments; (5) 4 cumulative error adversely

2020He argues: (1) our state's approach to the insanity defense violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) a court order compelling him to produce personal writings made at a detention center while awaiting trial violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (3) the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the incriminating statements made to police; (4) prosecutorial error occurred during closing arguments; (5) 4 cumulative error adversely

2017State v. Brown, 235 Kan. 688, 690 , 681 P.2d 1071 (1984).

2017State v. Brown, 235 Kan. 688, 690 , 681 P.2d 1071 (1984).

2012A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the contempt order and held that the trial court’s initial order to produce the report was consistent with K.S.A. 22-3219(2), because the defendant had filed a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense. 20 Kan.

2012Citing Williarns, this court held that the defendant’s conversations with the psychologist remained privileged until the psychologist testified. 259 Kan. at 210 (citing Williams, 20 Kan.

2012See State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229, 248-49 , 284 P.3d 1007 (2012) (citing K.S.A. 22-3219[2] [statute governing today’s nearest analog to insanity defense, i.e., mental disease or defect]; Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423-24 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

2012See State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229, 248-49 , 284 P.3d 1007 (2012) (citing K.S.A. 22-3219[2] [statute governing today’s nearest analog to insanity defense, i.e., mental disease or defect]; Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423-24 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.