insanity defense in Texas

2023The insanity defense “intertwin[es] moral, legal, and medical judgments.” Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 950 (quotation omitted).

2023Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 953 . 17 Finally, the insanity defense is not available when the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated or temporarily insane due to intoxication.

2021In sum, when presented with an insanity defense, the factfinder’s ultimate question is whether “the defendant factually know[s] that society considers [his] conduct against the law, even though [he], due to his mental disease or defect, may think that the conduct is morally justified.” Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 .

2019PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a); Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 (noting that “wrong,” in the context of an insanity defense, means “illegal” by societal standards); Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 877-78 (stating that the insanity defense focuses on whether the accused understood the nature of her action and whether she knew she should not do it); Thi-Zeluff v. State Page 14 see also McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 639 .

2020Ultimately, the issue of whether the insanity defense was proved is a decision lying within “the province of the jury, not only as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, but also as to the limits of the defense itself.” Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2019PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a); Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 (noting that “wrong,” in the context of an insanity defense, means “illegal” by societal standards); Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 877-78 (stating that the insanity defense focuses on whether the accused understood the nature of her action and whether she knew she should not do it); Thi-Zeluff v. State Page 14 see also McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 639 .

2013Thus, to establish an insanity defense or the related defense of "involuntary intoxication," a defendant must prove that he “did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Id.

2013Thus, to establish an insanity defense or the related defense of “involuntary intoxication,” a defendant must prove that he “did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Id.

2023App. 1978); see Love v. State, 909 S.W.2d 930, 943 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) (“Medically, an individual may be insane from a mental disease or defect yet, legally, he is not relieved of the criminal responsibility for that crime unless his mental condition reached the point where he was unable to distinguish right from wrong.”). 18 The Court of Criminal Appeals considered what manner of testimony is sufficient to raise an insanity defense in Pacheco v. State. 757 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. Crim.

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “predicated lay opinion 18 testimony when considered with facts and circumstances concerning an accused and of the offense may be sufficient to raise [the insanity defense].” Pacheco v. State, 757 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 ; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). 14 Analysis Appellant first claims the performance of his trial counsel was deficient because counsel should have investigated an insanity defense.

2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 ; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). 14 Analysis Appellant first claims the performance of his trial counsel was deficient because counsel should have investigated an insanity defense.

2010Moreover, as I read it, his questioning of the psychologists was not directed at showing an insanity defense (which, of course, would have been inconsistent with his guilty plea in the first place, see Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (“[a] plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defenses ... ”)), but at showing his need for treatment rather than merely a long prison sentence.

2010Moreover, as I read it, his questioning of the psychologists was not directed at showing an insanity defense (which, of course, would have been inconsistent with his guilty plea in the first place, see Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim.App.1986) ("[a] plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defenses ...")), but at showing his need for treatment rather than merely a long prison sentence.

2004See Beasley v. State, 810 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref'd) (holding that the insanity defense is not available in DWI case).

2004See Beasley v. State , 810 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d) (holding that the insanity defense is not available in DWI case).

2023See Gottson v. State, 940 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d) (no ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel “did investigate and research the possibility of an insanity defense”); Taylor v. State, No. 06-09-00128-CR, 2010 WL 2802455 , at *5 (Tex. App.— Texarkana July 16, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (no ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel “believed Taylor could discern right from wrong, and Taylor has presented no significant evidence to undermine Bass’s belief, we cannot say Bass was ineffective for failing to further i

2010The decision not to pursue an insanity defense is a matter of trial strategy, see Gottson v. State, 940 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d), and we cannot conclude that counsel’s failure to seek an insanity defense sooner than he did so in this case lacked a plausible basis.

2016See Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Conrad, 77 S.W.3d at 426-27 (cases holding counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense did not prejudice defense when despite history of mental illness, there was no evidence showing appellant’s insanity- at time of offense).

2015See Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Conrad v. State, 77 S.W.3d 424 , 426–27 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (cases holding counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense did not prejudice the defense when despite history of mental illness, there was no evidence showing appellant’s insanity at the time of the offense).

2009See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 ; Randon v. State, 178 S.W.3d 95, 102-03 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see also Fox v. State, 175 S.W.3d 475, 487-88 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that nothing presented for review absent explanation as to why counsel did not present expert testimony); Teixeira v. State, 89 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that there must be some showing in the record that expert would have testified in a manner that would have benefited defendant).

2009See Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 ; Randon v. State , 178 S.W.3d 95 , 102–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see also Fox v. State , 175 S.W.3d 475 , 487–88 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding that nothing presented for review absent explanation as to why counsel did not present expert testimony); Teixeira v. State , 89 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding that there must be some showing in the record that expert would have testified in a manner that would have benefitted defendant).

2008A month earlier, appellant’s wife, Lavon, had told Carol that appellant’s mental health was 1 The State dismissed the charges concerning a tenth officer before trial because the officer could not be located. 2 Ruffin v. State, 234 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.–Waco 2007) (“because Ruffin was not being prosecuted for homicide and was not pursuing an insanity defense, the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State’s objection to Dr. Carter’s testimony.”). 3 Appellant’s question for review is as follows: Did the court of appeals err in holding appellant was barred from introducing me

2008Ruffin v. State , 234 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007) ("because Ruffin was not being prosecuted for homicide and was not pursuing an insanity defense, the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State's objection to Dr. Carter's testimony."). 3.

2007Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim.

2004Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1053 , 121 S.Ct. 2196 , 149 L.Ed.2d 1027 (2001); see Rodriguez v. State, supra (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to obtain a competency evaluation when the defendant pled -the insanity de *927 fense to a murder charge because counsel may well have believed that defendant was competent to stand trial but was legally insane at the time of the offense); Huseman v. State, 96 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding it was reasonable to conclude that when counsel filed a motion for

2013In the seminal case of Ake v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court determined that an indigent defendant who relied on an insanity defense in a 4 capital case had a constitutional right to the assistance of a state-provided psychiatric expert. 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).

2012Busby v. State, 990 S.W.2d 263, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see Ake, 470 U.S. at 82 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 ("without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.”). .

2012On page 645 of our Smith opinion, we held that it was within a trial court's discretion to disallow a query into prospective jurors’ "thoughts” about the insanity defense, in the interest of time limitations, because it "presents so broad a question as to constitute a global fishing expedition.” Id. at 645 .

2003In Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), the trial court did not permit the defendant to ask venire members what "their thoughts" were on the insanity defense.

2016See Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Conrad, 77 S.W.3d at 426-27 (cases holding counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense did not prejudice defense when despite history of mental illness, there was no evidence showing appellant’s insanity- at time of offense).

2015See Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Conrad v. State, 77 S.W.3d 424 , 426–27 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (cases holding counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense did not prejudice the defense when despite history of mental illness, there was no evidence showing appellant’s insanity at the time of the offense).

2020App. 2007); Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62-63 (holding no duty on trial court to sua sponte instruct jury on unrequested defensive issues, even defensive issues raised by evidence at trial.) Recognizing that defensive issues involve strategic decisions best addressed by appellant and his counsel, the only court to directly address in a published opinion the issue raised by appellant in this case held that “[a] criminal defendant who desires 14 to raise the insanity defense does so by following the guidelines set forth in chapter 46C of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” Hill v. State, 320 S.W.3d

2010See Wagner , 687 S.W.2d at 306 .

2013Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim.App.2007) (defenses that are subject to the doctrine of confession and avoidance do not negate any element of the offense; they excuse what would otherwise amount to criminal conduct); see, e.g., Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) ("The purpose of the insanity defense issue is to determine whether the accused should be held responsible for the crime, or whether his mental condition will excuse holding him responsible.”); Rodriguez v. State, 368 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (affirmative defense

2013App. 1978) ("The purpose of the insanity defense issue is to determine whether the accused should be held responsible for the crime, or whether his mental condition will excuse holding him responsible."); Rodriguez v. State, 368 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (affirmative defense of duress "'by definition, does not negate any element of the offense, including culpable intent; it only excuses what would otherwise constitute criminal conduct.'"); Zamora v. State, 508 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim.

2025Second, the record does not establish that “the insanity defense would have been validly raised and likely to succeed at trial.” Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d at 870 ; see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (explaining that “where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial”).

2009Under Hill, part of this analysis necessarily includes a consideration of whether the insanity defense would have been validly raised and likely to succeed at trial. 474 U.S. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2008A month earlier, appellant’s wife, Lavon, had told Carol that appellant’s mental health was 1 The State dismissed the charges concerning a tenth officer before trial because the officer could not be located. 2 Ruffin v. State, 234 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.–Waco 2007) (“because Ruffin was not being prosecuted for homicide and was not pursuing an insanity defense, the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State’s objection to Dr. Carter’s testimony.”). 3 Appellant’s question for review is as follows: Did the court of appeals err in holding appellant was barred from introducing me

2008Ruffin v. State, 234 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007) ("because Ruffin was not being prosecuted for homicide and was not pursuing an insanity defense, the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State’s objection to Dr. Carter’s testimony.”). 3 .Appellant’s question for review is as follows: Did the court of appeals err in holding appellant was barred from introducing mental impairment evidence that showed he was only guilty of a lesser-included of *588 fense because it believed this Court intended to limit such evidence to murder cases in its decision in Jackson v. State? 4 .

2025Id. at 592 ; see Kelly v. State, 195 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of mental disease or defect does not, standing alone, equate to evidence of insanity.”).

2023App. 1988); see Kelly, 195 S.W.3d at 756 (applying Pacheco standard).

2025Further, there is no affirmative evidence in the record that, had counsel also advised Huff to raise an insanity defense, Huff would have reconsidered and “pled not guilty by reason of insanity.” See id.

2025Second, the record does not establish that “the insanity defense would have been validly raised and likely to succeed at trial.” Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d at 870 ; see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (explaining that “where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial”).

2022App. 1974); Taylor v. State, 885 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04 (a); Taylor v. State, 885 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671 .

2014The evidence that Laura was not legally insane at the time of the shooting and supporting the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was “manifestly unjust,” “conscience-shocking,” or “clearly biased.” See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671 .