insanity defense in California

2025Rather, it erects an absolute bar prohibiting use of one’s voluntary ingestion of intoxicants as the sole basis for an insanity defense, regardless whether the substances caused organic damage or a settled mental defect or disorder which persists after the immediate effects of the intoxicant have worn off.” (Robinson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 .) However, “[w]here the mental disease or defect is caused in part by an addiction or abuse of alcohol,” the defendant may still be entitled to an insanity defense and whether the defense applies becomes a question of fact 14 for the jurors to res

2024Section 29.8 states, in pertinent part, “In any criminal proceeding in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall not be found by the trier of fact solely on the basis 37 of a personality or adjustment disorder, a seizure disorder, or an addiction to, or abuse of, intoxicating substances.” (Italics added.) Stated differently, section 29.8 “provides that if an accused’s insanity is caused solely by abuse of or addiction to intoxicating substances, then the insanity defense is not available to him or her.” (People v. Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 427 (R

2006(People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 251 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 605 P.2d 830 ]; People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 330-331 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 583 P.2d 1308 ].) Under the Drew test, a person is legally insane if “ ‘as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ ” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 345.) Defense counsel had fully prepared a diminished capacity defense and therefore should have been well aware of the possibility of an insanity defense.

1993Defendant is right that the prosecutor misstated the law in remarking that the penalty factor on impairment of capacity, was “the old insanity defense” (see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 720-721 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 755 P.2d 253 ])—although his mistake is readily understandable (cf. People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 336-337, 339-348 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 ] [adopting the standard proposed by the Am.

2022(People v. Anderson (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 831, 837, fn. 2 [“Insanity under Penal Code sections 1026 and 1027 deals with insanity at the time of the offense and is a different species of mental condition than present insanity.”].) “A defendant is mentally incompetent [to stand trial] if, as a result of 16. a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) As noted above, the insanity defense requires different proof—i.e., an

2015Regarding the second prong of the insanity test, the question is “whether a defendant can distinguish, not the legal rightness or wrongness of his [or her] act, but its moral rightness or wrongness.” (People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1272 (Stress).) “Thus, if a person is incapable, because of a mental disease or defect, of understanding that his [or her] actions are morally wrong—that is, in violation of generally accepted standards of moral obligation—then that person is legally insane, regardless of whether he [or she] knows his [or her] actions are illegal. [Citation.]” (People

2025In some cases the defense of legal insanity might not be proved, based on the weight of the evidence and the facts as the jury finds them, when the mental disease or mental defect, is caused primarily by an addiction to, or an abuse of, intoxicating substances.’ ” (Cabonce, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436 .) On appeal, Cabonce argued the second paragraph of the final instruction “impermissibly allowed the jury to reject the insanity defense if it found his intoxication at the time of the [crime] was merely the primary cause of his mental disease or defect.” (Cabonce, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th a

2025In some cases the defense of legal insanity might not be proved, based on the weight of the evidence and the facts as the jury finds them, when the mental disease or mental defect, is caused primarily by an addiction to, or an abuse of, intoxicating substances.’ ” (Cabonce, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436 .) On appeal, Cabonce argued the second paragraph of the final instruction “impermissibly allowed the jury to reject the insanity defense if it found his intoxication at the time of the [crime] was merely the primary cause of his mental disease or defect.” (Cabonce, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th a

2013Code, § 354.) 11 “CALJIC No. 4.00, the standard instruction on the insanity defense . . . states: ‘A person is legally insane when by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 830-831 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 ]; see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 721 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 755 P.2d 253 ] [“Whereas the insanity instruction requires that a defendant lack ‘substanti

2013Code, § 354.) 11 “CALJIC No. 4.00, the standard instruction on the insanity defense . . . states: ‘A person is legally insane when by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 830-831 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 ]; see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 721 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 755 P.2d 253 ] [“Whereas the insanity instruction requires that a defendant lack ‘substanti

2026We disagree. “ ‘[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused.’ ” (Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 608 , quoting People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1274 .) Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he fact that a defendant claims and believes that his acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a finding of legal insanity.’ ” (Coddington, at p. 609, italics added, quoting People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 734 .) Here, both of the defense’s proposed instructions im

2022(Id. at pp. 608–609.) Thus, a “defendant is sane if he knows his act violates generally accepted standards of moral obligation whatever his own moral evaluation may be.” (People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1274 .) While a defendant’s perspective of the morality of his action(s) “need not reflect the principles of a recognized religion and does not demand belief in a God or other supreme being, it does require a sincerely held belief grounded in generally accepted ethical or moral principles derived from an external source. ‘[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense me

2025We Agree with Ceja and Severance Defendant urges us to disregard Ceja and Severance because they adopt analysis from Justice Brown’s concurring opinion in Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 528 , which likened the affirmative defense of insanity to the affirmative defense of double jeopardy when concluding the trial court could direct a verdict on sanity without violating the defendant’s right to trial by jury.

2003But, respondent correctly points out that the outcome in People v. Hernandez related to procedural improprieties utilized by the trial court and that the Supreme Court specifically disavowed deciding whether “imposing a directed verdict to an insanity defense would violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 527 .) Referring to the fact that the burden is on the defendant in connection with an NGI proceeding, respondent contends that an NGI proceeding is a

2026Its rationale is that mental illness caused the defendant to perceive an illusory threat, form an actual belief in the need to kill in self-defense, and act on that belief without wrongful intent.” (Elmore, 59 Cal.4th at p. 140 .) Absent from this statement of the insanity defense is any mention of imminence.

2016Analysis Because appellant did not raise an insanity defense, there was (and is) a conclusive presumption of his mental capacity to commit the crimes for which he was convicted. (§ 1016, subd. 6; People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 141, fn. 12 .

2025The “issues involved in an insanity defense are not the same as those involved in a competency to stand trial evaluation” (People v. Campbell (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1653, 1662, fn. 3 ; see People v. Coogler (1969) 71 Cal.2d 153, 168, fn. 7 [noting the factors that may tend to establish the defendant’s disability under § 1367 do not necessarily coincide with those that tend to 9. establish he was insane under the M’Naghten test2 at time of the crime]; People v. Brock (1962) 57 Cal.2d 644 , 648–649 [discussing the differences between sanity under § 1368 and sanity under the M’Naghten test].) And

2001In People v. Coogler (1969)... 71 Cal.2d 153, 169 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 454 P.2d 686 ], we upheld the competency of counsel who chose to introduce such evidence at the guilt phase only: ‘His decision not to enter an insanity plea may have been based upon a fear that such a plea would prejudice his client’s claim of diminished capacity; if the jury knew that an insanity hearing would follow in the event of defendant’s conviction, it might treat summarily the psychiatric testimony as to whether defendant could form the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged.’ Even more certain than this co

2023(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 (Clark); Henning, at p. 397; People v. Clemons (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1251 (Clemons).) A competent defendant who makes an unequivocal request to enter an NGI plea has a statutory right to do so. (§ 1018; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 963 ; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 ; Henning, at pp. 397-398.) “[A] defendant . . . cannot be compelled by counsel to abandon [an insanity defense] merely because counsel disagrees with the tactics of that decision.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 900 .) We note that on June 9, 2021,

1989As this court has remarked, "a capital defendant representing himself under Faretta has no duty to `present a defense' but may simply `put the state to its proof' ... [and] can presumably also take the stand and confess guilt." ( People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, fn. 7 (per Mosk, J.).) (17) Similarly, neither the trial court nor defense counsel can compel a competent defendant to present an insanity defense, no matter how strong the available evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of the charged acts. ( People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717-718 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 773 , 54

2026We disagree. “ ‘[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused.’ ” (Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 608 , quoting People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1274 .) Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he fact that a defendant claims and believes that his acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a finding of legal insanity.’ ” (Coddington, at p. 609, italics added, quoting People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 734 .) Here, both of the defense’s proposed instructions im

2026As the M’Naghten court itself made clear, “ ‘if under the influence of [a] delusion [the defendant] supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment.’ ” (People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 (Rittger) quoting M’Naghten’s Case, supra, 8 Eng.Rep. at p. 723.) This is the primary argument upon which Joseph’s insanity defense appears to rely.

2023In Henning, we held that a trial court’s erroneous denial of the right to plead NGI “does not warrant reversal if an insanity defense is baseless.” (Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 400 .) We declined to reverse the judgment, because “the record affirmatively demonstrates the lack of credible basis for an insanity defense.” (Id. at p. 401.) We noted, inter alia, that the record contained no evidence of mental defect or condition that rendered the defendant incapable of appreciating that his acts were wrongful.

2022Because defendant obtained a full consideration of the facts underlying his desired NGI defense, his claim does not rise to a federal constitutional level and “is therefore subject to Watson harmless error analysis.” (Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 398 .) In such situations, “a trial court’s failure to allow a defendant to plead NGI is harmless when the record affirmatively shows the insanity defense lacks evidentiary support.” (Id. 14. at p. 399.) Accordingly, we next consider whether defendant’s NGI defense had evidentiary support.

2021(Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 667 .) He was charged with murder, pleaded not guilty, and raised an insanity defense.

2014(See Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 768 ; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1112 .) “As a result of these developments, the current state of California law on the insanity defense and proof of the defendant‟s mental state is generally consistent with the principles set out in Wells.” (Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 15 Defendant claims the legislative history of these amendments demonstrates an intent to allow claims of delusional self-defense.

1984At the time the decision in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795 , was issued the Legislature had before it a bill which would have added an element of volition to the insanity test. ( 61 Cal.2d at p. 803, fn. 5 .) And at the time of the decision in People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565 , the Legislature was considering revision of the Penal Code in a manner which would not have spoken in terms of the M'Naghten formulation.

1984At the time the decision in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795 , was issued the Legislature had before it a bill which would have added an element of volition to the insanity test. ( 61 Cal.2d at p. 803, fn. 5 .) And at the time of the decision in People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565 , the Legislature was considering revision of the Penal Code in a manner which would not have spoken in terms of the M’Naghten formulation.

2015Defendant’s final claim is that he was prevented from presenting a complete insanity defense because it was impossible to show that he could not distinguish right from wrong except by way of expert conjecture, which is not necessarily conclusive under Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795 .

2015Defendant’s final claim is that he was prevented from presenting a complete insanity defense because it was impossible to show that he could not distinguish right from wrong except by way of expert conjecture, which is not necessarily conclusive under Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795 .

2022(See Severance, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 314 [“trial courts have the inherent power to remove an insanity defense from the jury when there is no evidence to support it and in such a circumstance ‘there is no constitutional infirmity, either under the California Constitution or the United States Constitution, for a judge to remove the issue of sanity from the jury’ ”], quoting Ceja, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089 .)24 For the first time in his reply brief, defendant asserts section 1140 precludes discharging a jury “ ‘unless it has rendered a verdict in open court or has declared an inab

2015Regarding the second prong of the insanity test, the question is “whether a defendant can distinguish, not the legal rightness or wrongness of his [or her] act, but its moral rightness or wrongness.” (People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1272 (Stress).) “Thus, if a person is incapable, because of a mental disease or defect, of understanding that his [or her] actions are morally wrong—that is, in violation of generally accepted standards of moral obligation—then that person is legally insane, regardless of whether he [or she] knows his [or her] actions are illegal. [Citation.]” (People

1985(See also Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660, 666 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 ], suggesting that punishment for the status of being mentally ill would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.) Scholars, too, suggest that abolition of the traditional insanity defense may be constitutionally impermissible if the result would be imposition of punishment on a mentally ill person for acts done without criminal intent.

1985(See also Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660, 666 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 ], suggesting that punishment for the status of being mentally ill would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.) Scholars, too, suggest that abolition of the traditional insanity defense may be constitutionally impermissible if the result would be imposition of punishment on a mentally ill person for acts done without criminal intent.

2014Code § 25, subd. (a), as providing that defendant may be found insane if he did not know the nature and quality of his act or if he did not know the act to be morally wrong].)” Our Supreme Court also explained in People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774 , 830–831 that CALJIC No. 4.00,5 which similarly defines the insanity defense and also tracks section 25, subdivision (b), is a correct statement of the law.

2013Code, § 354.) 11 “CALJIC No. 4.00, the standard instruction on the insanity defense . . . states: ‘A person is legally insane when by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 830-831 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 ]; see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 721 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 755 P.2d 253 ] [“Whereas the insanity instruction requires that a defendant lack ‘substanti

2025Just as a criminal defendant may be ‘precluded from presenting to a jury defense such as unconsciousness [citation], diminished capacity 20 [citation], [or] entrapment [citation], where there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the particular facts underlying the instruction requested exist’ (People v. Mapp (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 350 ), so a criminal defendant may be precluded, through the grant of a directed verdict, from presenting an insanity defense where the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant was insane at the tim

2006Just as a criminal defendant may be “precluded from presenting to a jury defense such as unconsciousness [citation], diminished capacity [citation], [or] entrapment [citation], where there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the particular facts underlying the instruction requested exist” (People v. Mapp (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 350 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 177 ]), so a criminal defendant may be precluded, through the grant of a directed verdict, from presenting an insanity defense where the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant was

2025The court held a closed hearing, pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 , at which defendant listed issues with counsel’s representation.

2009Although the trial court erred in failing to allow defendant to enter an NGI plea, we find the error harmless because the record affirmatively demonstrates the lack of credible evidence for an insanity defense. 2 A In January 2008, defendant moved to substitute his appointed attorney pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2023(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 .) People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822 , upon which Moustafa relies, is distinguishable.

2016Standard of Review and Applicable Law To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (Strickland).) “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.) “ ‘Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible; and counsel’s decisionmaki

2021The insanity defense Steskal cites, however, is a traditional defense to criminal liability that “surfaced over two centuries ago” (Clark v. Arizona (2006) 548 U.S. 735, 749 ) and is unrelated to sentencing.

2016The prosecutor then obtained Solomon’s agreement that “[a]t this point [appellant has] entered a plea of . . . not guilty by reason of insanity” and “that’s the difference between going to State Prison and a hospital.” On appeal, appellant contends the prosecutor’s questioning was improper because it effectively “invited jurors to draw an adverse inference from [appellant’s] entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, his presentation of an insanity defense, and his exercise of his right to a jury trial on this issue. . . . [T]he prosecutor here suggested that jurors infer, from [appe