insanity defense in District of Columbia

2026Mr. Campbell appeals his convictions, arguing that (1) the government presented insufficient evidence to refute his claim of self-defense and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry under Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979), as to whether he was intelligently and voluntarily deciding to forgo an insanity defense.

2026Focusing on the facts of this case, see Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380 ; see also Phenis, 909 A.2d at 159 n.20, the court must “ascertain” whether Mr. Campbell “was advised about” and made a voluntary and intelligent decision at the time of trial to waive an insanity defense.

2007When the insanity defense is implicated, however, “the rules by which we apply the principles of responsibility must serve simultaneously the legitimate concerns of the community for its security and the proper administration of its criminal justice system as well as the interests of the individual defendant. [Doctrines of exculpation] involve a moral choice by the community to withhold a finding of responsibility and its consequence of punishment.” Bet hea, supra, 365 A.2d at 90 n. 55.

2007When the insanity defense is implicated, however, “the rules by which we apply the principles of responsibility must serve simultaneously the legitimate concerns of the community for its security and the proper administration of its criminal justice system as well as the interests of the individual defendant. [Doctrines of exculpation] involve a moral choice by the community to withhold a finding of responsibility and its consequence of punishment.” Bet hea, supra, 365 A.2d at 90 n. 55.

1989Contrary to counsel’s assumption, in the absence of a defendant’s announced desire to waive an insanity defense, Anderson v. Sorrell, 481 A.2d 766 (D.C.1984), does not require a Frendak inquiry before the court orders a productivity examination.

1987The trial court shall have the latitude described in Anderson, 481 A.2d at 769-71 , including the discretion to order psychiatric evaluations which address details of the crime if necessary to resolve appellant’s capacity for waiver. (1) If, as a result of the Frendak inquiry, the court concludes that appellant made a voluntary and intelligent decision at the time of trial to waive an insanity defense, that will end the matter; the convictions shall stand.

2006Supporting this conclusion were several factors, including: 1) the defendant’s bizarre behavior soon after the crime as observed by the investigating detectives and the officers at the District of Columbia Jail, and as exhibited in court at the preliminary hearing and on the first day of trial; 2) the defendant’s desire (expressed through counsel) to assert an insanity defense during trial; 3) the defendant’s “lack of cooperation with mental health professionals and his subsequent denial of his mental illness to the trial court;” and 4) a doctor’s report at sentencing indicating that the defen

2006Supporting this conclusion were several factors, including: 1) the defendant's bizarre behavior soon after the crime as observed by the investigating detectives and the officers at the District of Columbia Jail, and as exhibited in court at the preliminary hearing and on the first day of trial; 2) the defendant's desire (expressed through counsel) to assert an insanity defense during trial; 3) the defendant's "lack of cooperation with mental health professionals and his subsequent denial of his mental illness to the trial court;" and 4) a doctor's report at sentencing indicating that the defen

2024Similarly, in Patton, this court also found that a Frendak inquiry was required because the defendant’s bizarre pretrial behavior; the defendant’s desire to assert an insanity defense during trial; the defendant’s lack of cooperation with mental health professionals and denial of his mental illness during trial; a psychologist’s concern about the defendant’s mental illness during sentencing; and the trial judge’s serious concern about defendant’s mental illness should have given the trial court notice of its responsibility to conduct a Frendak inquiry. 782 A.2d at 313 .

2012Mid-trial, when the defendant’s trial counsel moved to withdraw on the ground that she had been ineffective in not properly explaining to the defendant the insanity defense, the trial court demurred, commenting that “you have to have an insanity defense available to waive it” and stated that the crime “was not a product of insanity” and that “a perfectly sane person ... has no insanity defense.” Id. at 309 .

2024Id. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Frendak court distinguished between three determinations that the trial court must make when the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense, and the time of trial, are at issue: 3 In Whalem v. United States, the court considered whether a defendant who was competent to assist in his defense may refuse to plead insanity even though there is evidence to support an insanity defense and held that, while the defendant may refuse to raise the insanity defense, they may not prevent the court from raising it. 346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C.

2001Frendak states that even when a defendant has decided to forego an insanity defense, the trial judge “will still have the duty to confront the insanity issue if the evidence adduced in the proceedings raises a ‘sufficient question as to a defendant’s mental responsibility at the time of the crime.’” 408 A.2d at 379 (quoting Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 337 , 346 F.2d 812, 818 (1965)) (emphasis added).

1982II Upon the trial court's finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that "any person" who successfully raises an insanity defense "shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release." D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor [6] have been termed both "mandatory," Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. d

1982II Upon the trial court's finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that "any person" who successfully raises an insanity defense "shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release." D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor [6] have been termed both "mandatory," Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. d

1982II Upon the trial court’s finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that “any person” who successfully raises an insanity defense “shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release.” D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor 6 have been termed both “mandatory,” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. den

1982II Upon the trial court's finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that "any person" who successfully raises an insanity defense "shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release." D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor [6] have been termed both "mandatory," Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. d

2013In any case, “[t]he procedure adopted ... must effectuate the purpose of bifurcation by guarding against two types of prejudice inherent in a unitary trial involving insanity: (1) prejudice to a defendant’s insanity defense arising from the evidence on the merits, and (2) prejudice to a defendant’s defense on the merits arising from the insanity evidence.” Jackson, 404 A.2d at 925 .

1985The bifurcation procedure serves to mitigate two types of prejudice that might occur in *1073 a unitary trial: “(1) prejudice to a defendant’s insanity defense arising from the evidence on the merits, and (2) prejudice to a defendant’s defense on the merits arising from the insanity evidence.” Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 925 (D.C.1979).

1981At the outset of the Gaither opinion, we observed that in evaluating the request for appointment of a psychiatrist under § ll-2605(a) the court is not concerned with the ultimate question of whether or not the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, but rather “whether the evidence of mental disorder is such that a reasonable attorney would pursue an insanity defense.” Gaither, supra at 1367 (emphasis added).

1981At the outset of the Gaither opinion, we observed that in evaluating the request for appointment of a psychiatrist under § 11-2605(a) the court is not concerned with the ultimate question of whether or not the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, but rather "whether the evidence of mental disorder is such that a reasonable attorney would pursue an insanity defense." Gaither, supra at 1367 (emphasis added).

1987We have previously held that a defendant’s expert psychiatric witness called to support an insanity defense “must inform the jury as to the bases for his conclusions as well as the nature of the disability, its characteristics, and its symptomology.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 81 (D.C.1976), ce rt. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977); see also United States v. Tyler, 376 A.2d 798, 806 (D.C.1977).

1979Tyler, supra at 803; Bethea, supra; United States v. Shorter, supra. 10 The first phase of a bifurcated criminal proceeding is analogous to the factfinding proceeding of the juvenile process during which the Division is permitted to determine only whether the juvenile committed the act charged.

1996The government argued that absent an insanity defense, “the principles of diminished capacity should not be incorporated into our rules of criminal adjudication.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 85 (D.C.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977).

1987We have previously held that a defendant’s expert psychiatric witness called to support an insanity defense “must inform the jury as to the bases for his conclusions as well as the nature of the disability, its characteristics, and its symptomology.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 81 (D.C.1976), ce rt. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977); see also United States v. Tyler, 376 A.2d 798, 806 (D.C.1977).

1996The government argued that absent an insanity defense, “the principles of diminished capacity should not be incorporated into our rules of criminal adjudication.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 85 (D.C.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977).

1987We have previously held that a defendant’s expert psychiatric witness called to support an insanity defense “must inform the jury as to the bases for his conclusions as well as the nature of the disability, its characteristics, and its symptomology.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 81 (D.C.1976), ce rt. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977); see also United States v. Tyler, 376 A.2d 798, 806 (D.C.1977).

1996The government argued that absent an insanity defense, “the principles of diminished capacity should not be incorporated into our rules of criminal adjudication.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 85 (D.C.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977).

1987We have previously held that a defendant’s expert psychiatric witness called to support an insanity defense “must inform the jury as to the bases for his conclusions as well as the nature of the disability, its characteristics, and its symptomology.” Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 81 (D.C.1976), ce rt. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977); see also United States v. Tyler, 376 A.2d 798, 806 (D.C.1977).

2012Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C.1979) (“[WJhenever the evidence suggests a substantial question of the defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime, the trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense.”); see also Phenis v. United States, 909 A.2d 138, 154 (D.C.2006) (noting that an inquiry into whether the defendant "can intelligently and voluntarily waive the insanity defense and has do

2012We acknowledge that there are reasons to question the continuing validity of some aspects of the course described in Frendak, see, e.g., Phenis, 909 A.2d at 164-65 (Glickman, J., concurring) (expressing "serious misgivings” about Frendak’s holding that the trial court has “discretion to raise an insanity defense sua sponte " where "the defendant is not capable of making, and has not made, an intelligent and voluntary decision”); however, we deem it premature to address such concerns here and thus leave them for a future matter.

2006Only then, in the second phase, may the trier of fact reach the question of insanity.” See, e.g., Frendak, 408 A.2d at 369 n. 4; Kleinbart v. United States, 426 A.2d 343, 355 (D.C.1981). .

1988Because appellant did not plead insanity and seek a bifurcated trial as in Kleinbart v. United States, 426 A.2d 343 (D.C.1981), but proceeded as he did, the critical issues for the jury related to the nature of appellant’s own perceptions of the situation and whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.

1979See Robertson, supra, 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 335 , 507 F.2d at 1158 ; cf. id. 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 342 n.13, 507 F.2d at 1165 n.13 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (pointing to examples of "horrors" in other countries that might arise here if courts were permitted to raise the insanity defense over the wishes of a competent defendant). [22] In any event, a defendant may choose to forego the defense because of a feeling that he or she is not insane, or that raising the defense would be equivalent to an admission of guilt.

1979See Robertson, supra, 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 335 , 507 F.2d at 1158 ; cf. id. 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 342 n.13, 507 F.2d at 1165 n.13 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (pointing to examples of "horrors" in other countries that might arise here if courts were permitted to raise the insanity defense over the wishes of a competent defendant). [22] In any event, a defendant may choose to forego the defense because of a feeling that he or she is not insane, or that raising the defense would be equivalent to an admission of guilt.

2024See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (it is not unconstitutional for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who professes belief in his innocence, but insists on pleading guilty); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (out of respect for the individual’s choice, a court cannot require a defendant to accept an attorney when they wish to appear pro se). 12 (1) whether the defendant is presently competent to stand trial; (2) if so, whether he or she, based on present mental capacity, can intelligently and voluntarily waive the insanity defense an

1979Elizabeths Hospital, testified at the hearing, explaining that appellant had a "paranoid personality" with "some tendency to lap over into some psychotic thinking." When asked whether Titlow's murder had been a product of this condition, Dr. Pepper responded that "at some level in the workings of Miss Frendak's mind, at some level of psychodynamics . . . there is a causal connection between her mental illness and the event." He testified, however, that he was "unable to discover the cause and effect relationship." Although neither *369 Dr. Kirby nor Dr. Yochelson discussed appellant's present

2024See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (it is not unconstitutional for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who professes belief in his innocence, but insists on pleading guilty); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (out of respect for the individual’s choice, a court cannot require a defendant to accept an attorney when they wish to appear pro se). 12 (1) whether the defendant is presently competent to stand trial; (2) if so, whether he or she, based on present mental capacity, can intelligently and voluntarily waive the insanity defense an

1979Elizabeths Hospital, testified at the hearing, explaining that appellant had a "paranoid personality" with "some tendency to lap over into some psychotic thinking." When asked whether Titlow's murder had been a product of this condition, Dr. Pepper responded that "at some level in the workings of Miss Frendak's mind, at some level of psychodynamics . . . there is a causal connection between her mental illness and the event." He testified, however, that he was "unable to discover the cause and effect relationship." Although neither *369 Dr. Kirby nor Dr. Yochelson discussed appellant's present

2013The court has since upheld the Bethea rule and described it as a “general rule ... prohibiting differentiation of a defendant’s intellectual abilities outside the context of the insanity defense....” O’Brien v. United States, 962 A.2d 282, 301 (D.C.2008); see also Smith v. United States, 686 A.2d 537, 548-49 (D.C.1996); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 455 (D.C.1981); Jones v. United States, 386 A.2d 308, 312 (D.C.1978).

1986Moreover, the court notes that the Court of Appeals in its decision in Doepel v. United States, (supra) at p. 453, held that the defendant’s written confession was “sufficient evidence to justify the verdict of guilty” to the Murder I offense, and refused to find error with the trial court’s treatment of the defendant’s insanity defense when he raised the issue of “pathological intoxication.” The correctness of this order of denial is before us.

2006Compare Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 560 (D.C.1977) (finding sufficient evidence to go to the jury on appellant’s insanity defense where expert testimony established that defendant was suffering from alcoholism and an alcohol-induced blackout that may have interfered with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts, and noting that “though drug [ ] addiction standing alone does not permit a finding of nonresponsibility for a crime, it may do so in combination with other substantial evidence to this effect”), with Barrett v. United States, 377 A.2d 62, 63 (1977) (finding th

2006Compare Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 560 (D.C.1977) (finding sufficient evidence to go to the jury on appellant's insanity defense where expert testimony established that defendant was suffering from alcoholism and an alcohol-induced blackout that may have interfered with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts, and noting that "though drug [] addiction standing alone does not permit a finding of nonresponsibility for a crime, it may do so in combination with other substantial evidence to this effect"), with Barrett v. United States, 377 A.2d 62, 63 (1977) (finding tha

1990See United States v. Wright, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 309 , 511 F.2d 1311 (1975). 4 .

1990See United States v. Wright, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 309 , 511 F.2d 1311 (1975). 4 .

1987See Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380-81 . (2) If, however, the court concludes that appellant did not make such a waiver, then the court— (a) shall determine whether appellant presently wishes to waive the insanity defense; (b) if he does not, 2 or if he is presently incapable of making a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to do so, the court shall order a productivity examination, assuring appellant that his disclosures in that context cannot be used against him, Anderson, 481 A.2d at 769 (citing White v. United States, 451 A.2d 848, 851 (D.C. 1982)), and that the psychiatric report(s) will b

1987See Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380-81 . (2) If, however, the court concludes that appellant did not make such a waiver, then the court— (a) shall determine whether appellant presently wishes to waive the insanity defense; (b) if he does not, 2 or if he is presently incapable of making a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to do so, the court shall order a productivity examination, assuring appellant that his disclosures in that context cannot be used against him, Anderson, 481 A.2d at 769 (citing White v. United States, 451 A.2d 848, 851 (D.C. 1982)), and that the psychiatric report(s) will b

2013Analysis This jurisdiction long ago settled that bifurcation may be necessary in some, but not all, insanity cases to avoid the “substantial prejudice [that] may result from the simultaneous trial on the pleas of insanity and ‘not guilty.’ ” Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281, 282 (D.C.Cir.1966) (citations omitted); see also Lucas v. United States, 497 A.2d 1070, 1073 (D.C.1985) (“The presence of a substantial insanity defense does not, of itself, require bifurcation.”). 4 The trial judge here was careful to assess Mr. Jackson’s proffers on both his merits and insanity defenses, and to weig

1979Holmes v. United States, supra, 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 154 , 363 F.2d at 283 . 21 The procedure adopted, however, must effectuate the purpose of bifurcation by guarding against two types of prejudice inherent in a unitary trial involving insanity: (1) prejudice to a defendant’s insanity defense arising from the evidence on the merits, and (2) prejudice to a defendant’s defense on the merits arising from the insanity evidence.

1979Second, Frendak — joined by the government and amicus curiae — attacks the present validity of Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S. App.D.C 331, 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial judge has discretion to raise an insanity defense over the objection of a defendant found competent to stand trial.

1979Second, Frendak — joined by the government and amicus curiae — attacks the present validity of Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S. App.D.C 331, 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial judge has discretion to raise an insanity defense over the objection of a defendant found competent to stand trial.

1982II Upon the trial court’s finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that “any person” who successfully raises an insanity defense “shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release.” D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor 6 have been termed both “mandatory,” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. den

1982II Upon the trial court's finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that "any person" who successfully raises an insanity defense "shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release." D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor [6] have been termed both "mandatory," Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. d

2008The insanity defense requires a showing of “a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and his mental disease.” Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1378 .

2008See Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1378 .

1982II Upon the trial court’s finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that “any person” who successfully raises an insanity defense “shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release.” D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor 6 have been termed both “mandatory,” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. den

1982II Upon the trial court's finding that appellee was not guilty by reason of insanity, appellee became subject to the legislative provision that "any person" who successfully raises an insanity defense "shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release." D.C.Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(1); see note 1, supra. This commitment provision and its predecessor [6] have been termed both "mandatory," Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 , 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067 , 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 92 and n.62 (1975), cert. d