insanity defense in Indiana

2023“Rather, a defendant who is mentally ill but fails to establish that he or she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct may be found guilty but mentally ill[.]” Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind. 2010). [22] Because the jury rejected Stahl’s insanity defense, Stahl is appealing from a negative judgment and faces a heavy burden.

2018Thus, "[a] defendant claiming the insanity defense should have prevailed at trial faces a heavy burden because he or she 'is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.' " Galloway v. State , 938 N.E.2d 699 , 709 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146 , 1149 (Ind. 2004) ).

2026On appeal, Guilfoyle claims he presented sufficient evidence to support his insanity defense such that the jury should have found him not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”). 6 [33] We will affirm a jury’s verdict that rejected the insanity defense “unless ‘the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’” Payne v. State, 144 N.E.3d 706 , 709 (Ind. 2020) (emphases added) (quoting Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2018)).

2020We must also look to the defendant’s history of mental illness— an equally relevant “circumstance that a fact-finder may consider in evaluating an insanity defense.” Id. at 1008 (citation omitted).

2024The trial court agreed that Julie’s evidence could be admitted under the effects-of-battery statute only “for maintaining an insanity defense.” Marley, 747 N.E.2d at 1126-27 . 5 In either the use-of-justified-reasonable-force or the insanity scenario, the effects-of-battery defense includes a notice requirement equivalent to the notice required to assert an insanity defense.

2024Accordingly, the insanity defense is not applicable here. [40] The State’s argument, if adopted, would fundamentally and improperly transform a wide range of evidentiary challenges into “insanity.” See id.

2019“We will instead affirm the trial court’s conviction unless ‘the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’” Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004)). [12] Here, Dr. Anderson and Dr. Masbaum agreed that White suffered from schizophrenia, which satisfies the first prong of the insanity defense.

2018Thus, "[a] defendant claiming the insanity defense should have prevailed at trial faces a heavy burden because he or she 'is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.' " Galloway v. State , 938 N.E.2d 699 , 709 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146 , 1149 (Ind. 2004) ).

2026Zamani v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1130, 1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

2026These documented reports clearly provided “defense counsel adequate time to prepare a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense if it were desired and merited.” Zamani, 33 N.E.3d at 1141 .

2024Like the circumstances in McClain that our Supreme Court held to not be an appropriate use of the insanity defense, here Brooks-Brown is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-627 | October 16, 2024 Page 22 of 34 relying on an “induced condition,” not a “mental disease or defect.” 678 N.E.2d at 109 .

2001In this respect, Barrett is to be distinguished from MeClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 105, 108 (Ind.1997), where we held that evidence establishing automatism to negate volun-tariness is not subject to the insanity defense statute if it is not the product of a mental disease or defect.

2012But our supreme court has held that “‘[a] plea of insanity opens the door for the admission of testimony about the defendant’s entire life[.]’” Robinette v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Shepherd v. State, 547 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind. 1989) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts, which included stealing items from several individuals, mistreating a dog, attacking a football coach, and threatening a youth care worker, was properly admitted because the defendant had raised an insanity defense)).

2001Although it is correct that “[a] plea of insanity opens the door for the admission of testimony about the defendant’s entire life,” Shepherd v. State, 547 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind.1989), raising the insanity defense does not allow the admission into evidence of testimony obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights.

2018See Satterfield v. State , 33 N.E.3d 344 , 349-51 (Ind. 2015) (conflicting diagnoses may support an inference of sanity); Lawson , 966 N.E.2d at 1281 (factfinder may consider discrepancies in expert opinion when rejecting the insanity defense).

2018But "the lack of such history is a circumstance that a fact-finder may consider in evaluating an insanity defense." Lawson , 966 N.E.2d at 1282 .

2012Mayes v. State, 440 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 1982).

2012Mayes v. State, 440 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 1982).

2019“We will instead affirm the trial court’s conviction unless ‘the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’” Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004)). [12] Here, Dr. Anderson and Dr. Masbaum agreed that White suffered from schizophrenia, which satisfies the first prong of the insanity defense.

2017Thus, when a defendant claims that an insanity defense should have been successful, the conviction will be set aside only “when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Id. (citation omitted). [13] Gorman contends that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and requests this court to reverse her conviction for resisting law enforcement.

2017Thus, when a defendant claims that an insanity defense should have been successful, the conviction will be set aside only "when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed." Id. (quoting Galloway , 938 N.E.2d at 710 (quoting Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146 , 1149 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis added in Galloway ))). "[T]estimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health at [the] time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later." Id. at 1076 (c

2017Thus, when a defendant claims that an insanity defense should have been successful, the conviction will be set aside only "when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed." Id. (quoting Galloway , 938 N.E.2d at 710 (quoting Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146 , 1149 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis added in Galloway ))). "[T]estimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health at [the] time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later." Id. at 1076 (c

2018The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “a trial court does not err when it refuses to instruct the jury as to a lesser- included offense in a prosecution for murder where the defense of insanity is used to disprove intent to commit the greater offense” and that, “[w]hile [a defendant] would be entitled to a lesser included instruction if a serious evidentiary dispute existed about the level of his mens rea, his interposition of the insanity offense does not by itself raise such a dispute.” Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 475 (Ind. 1998) (citations omitted) (holding that, “[b]ecause the insan

2012In concluding the trial court correctly refused Wilson’s reckless homicide instruction, this Court said, “[bjecause a successful insanity defense would make Wilson nonculpable for any offenses he may have committed, the insanity defense cannot be the mechanism to demonstrate dispute entitling him to a lesser included instruction.” Id. at 475 .

2018Expert opinion provides "a strong justification for raising the insanity defense." Cate , 644 N.E.2d at 547 .

2005Although expert "opinions provide a strong justification for raising the insanity defense, we have never held expert testimony to be conclusive." Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind.1994).

2015Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1406-CR-264 | May 29, 2015 Page 20 of 28 524 N.E.2d at 11 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s belated motion to assert an insanity defense where the defendant did not make showing of good cause as required by statute)); see also Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 895 (Ind. 1985) (holding that, since trial had begun and the defendant failed to offer evidence rising to the level of good cause showing why the defense was not previously raised, the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for psychiatr

2014See Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1988) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the defendant’s belated motion to file an insanity defense where the defendant failed to file his notice within the time set forth in Indiana Code section 35-36-2-1 and where he made no showing of good cause as required by statute).

2024See id. (“McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement.”) (emphases supplied); McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09 (holding that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense and that evidence of such may be presented to dispute whether the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct, as required by Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1 (a)); Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the State must prove that a defendan

2016Id. at 108 (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6 ); see also Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988, 991-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a “small stroke” causing disorientation and memory lapses was not a “mental disease or defect” within the meaning of the insanity statute and that evidence of the condition was relevant to issue of voluntariness). [13] In support of his petition for post-conviction relief, Mazurak submitted several unauthenticated medical records from 2011.

2024Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 146 (construing similar statutory framework).

1997Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 146 (construing similar statutory framework).

2017See Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 1995); Esmond v. State, 20 N.E.3d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

2014The two court-appointed psychiatric examiners determined that “Taylor could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense and that he probably understood right from wrong on the night of the shooting.” Id. at 539 .

2025But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 , 112 S. Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that it might be permissible for a state “to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if . . . the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness”); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 361-[3]70, 103 S. Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (holding that a defendant who successfully establishes the insanity defense may be committed to a mental institution on the ba

2025But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 , 112 S. Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that it might be permissible for a state “to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if . . . the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness”); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 361-[3]70, 103 S. Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (holding that a defendant who successfully establishes the insanity defense may be committed to a mental institution on the ba

2014So long as 6 the testimony of the State’s physician goes to the mental capacity of the defendant, the requirements of the Sixth Amendment have been satisfied.” Id. (emphasis added).

2014So long as the testimony of the State’s physician goes to the mental capacity of the defendant, the requirements of the Sixth Amendment have been satisfied.” Id. (emphasis added).

2012NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur. 9 In Moler, this court criticized Barany as making it “very difficult even for defendants with well- documented mental illnesses to successfully raise the insanity defense” and stated, “In the interests of justice, we hope that our supreme court will revisit this rule.” Moler, 782 N.E.2d at 458–59.

2012In Moler , this court criticized Barany as making it “very difficult even for defendants with well-documented mental illnesses to successfully raise the insanity defense” and stat *1283 ed, "In the interests of justice, we hope that our supreme court will revisit this rule.” Moler, 782 N.E.2d at 458-59 .

1998Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 63-64 (Ind.1995); Green v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ind.1984) (citing Turner v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Ind.1981)). 4 Here, however, defendant contends that a “contrary to law” burden is too great and instead requests that we create a new standard of review for those appeals that challenge a jury’s rejection of a guilty but mentally ill verdict.

1987Turner, supra, 428 N.E.2d at 1247 .

2025In order to dispel the speculation and focus the jury on the issue of guilt, rather than possible punishment, an instruction explaining the consequences of each determination in a general way can be appropriate and beneficial to the accused. 502 N.E.2d 485 , 488 (Ind. 1987).

2000See Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Smith, 502 N.E.2d at 488 ) ("However, in cases involving the insanity defense, there will be increased speculation on the part of the jury on the differences in sentencing between verdicts of guilty, guilty but mentally ill and not responsible by reason of insanity.

2020See Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind. 2000) (quoting skeptical prospective jurors who, during voir dire, referred to the insanity defense as a “cop-out,” a “loophole,” and “a way to get a lesser plea”); Caldwell v. State, 722 N.E.2d 814 , 816–17 (Ind. 2000) (finding reversible error when the trial court failed to either admonish the jury or give the defendant’s tendered instructions after the prosecutor implicitly argued in closing that the defendant would walk free if he were found NGRI); Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 262 , 286 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1972) (concluding that, while a

2020See Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind. 2000) (quoting skeptical prospective jurors who, during voir dire, referred to the insanity defense as a “cop-out,” a “loophole,” and “a way to get a lesser plea”); Caldwell v. State, 722 N.E.2d 814 , 816–17 (Ind. 2000) (finding reversible error when the trial court failed to either admonish the jury or give the defendant’s tendered instructions after the prosecutor implicitly argued in closing that the defendant would walk free if he were found NGRI); Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 262 , 286 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1972) (concluding that, while a

2016In support,, he cites Berry , in which our supreme court recognized that “ ‘[w]here the ingestion of intoxicants, though voluntary, has been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct ... the law does not hold him responsible for his .acts.’” 969 N.E.2d at 38 (quoting Jackson v. State, 273 Ind. 49, 52 , 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980)).

2016In support,, he cites Berry , in which our supreme court recognized that “ ‘[w]here the ingestion of intoxicants, though voluntary, has been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct ... the law does not hold him responsible for his .acts.’” 969 N.E.2d at 38 (quoting Jackson v. State, 273 Ind. 49, 52 , 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980)).

2016However, at least a couple of cases, involving an appeal from an attempted murder conviction, have touched on the fact that voluntary intoxication is not a defense. [17] In Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35 (Ind.2012), our Supreme Court—while addressing a related issue concerning whether Berry, who was convicted of attempted murder, had successfully raised an insanity defense at trial—acknowledged that voluntary intoxication is not a recognized defense.

2016Id. at 39 (emphasis added).