insanity defense in New Jersey

2026In Gorthy, the Court addressed the issue of "whether a trial court that has found the defendant competent may compel that defendant to assert the insanity defense, notwithstanding the defendant's decision not to raise that defense." 226 N.J. at 521 .

2024A-2662-21 11 "The insanity defense is 'an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 533 (2016).

2019We noted that the Supreme Court recently held in State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 362 (2013), that such an in depth inquiry was required before accepting a defendant's waiver of an insanity defense.

2016The trial court held a hearing pursuant to the Appellate Division’s decision in State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 81-82 , 417 A.2d 585 (App.Div.1980), overruled by State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 349 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013), to assess the potential role of the insanity defense in defendant’s trial.

2020In recognition of those difficulties and inabilities of prospective jurors, the Court "instructed [trial] courts to 'screen out prospective jurors who could not consider an insanity defense due to their prejudices or biases against it.'" Winder, 200 N.J. at 252 (quoting Moore, 122 N.J. at 454 ).

2020A-2498-17T1 11 In Moore, the Court explained that to properly determine if a juror has a bias or prejudice concerning the insanity defense, a trial court should ask "whether a juror can judge the testimony of psychiatric witnesses by the same standard that he or she would apply to the testimony of any other witness." 122 N.J. at 454 ; see also Winder, 200 N.J. at 253 .

2024Before a jury issue can arise with respect to the existence of a mental disease or defect, and the absence of the requisite state of mind as a result thereof, a defendant must come forward with competent, reliable evidence about the existence of such a disease or defect which a reasonable juror could credit. [State v. Murray, 240 N.J.

2024Before a jury issue can arise with respect to the existence of a mental disease or defect, and the absence of the requisite state of mind as a result thereof, a defendant must come forward with competent, reliable evidence about the existence of such a disease or defect which a reasonable juror could credit. [State v. Murray, 240 N.J.

2016“As the ‘standard for determining criminal responsibility, the insanity defense draws on principles of moral blameworthiness.’ ” State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 242 , 979 A.2d 312 (2009) (quoting State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 602 , 569 A.2d 1314 (1990)).

2016“As the ‘standard for determining criminal responsibility, the insanity defense draws on principles of moral blameworthiness.’ ” State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 242 , 979 A.2d 312 (2009) (quoting State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 602 , 569 A.2d 1314 (1990)).

2022Although trial counsel testified Dr. Latimer was not able to give an opinion to meet "the M'Naghten standard for an insanity defense," he further claimed defendant did not wish to pursue either an insanity or diminished capacity defense after counsel explained success on either would likely not result in her release but in her involuntary commitment under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 and State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975). 4 He further explained that notwithstanding defendant's confession, "from day one, her position to [him] was she didn't do it, the statement was not true." Counsel thus concluded he "was

2017This statute was repealed after the Court in State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 255 (1975) held it unconstitutional because it authorized "involuntary commitment without proof of dangerousness." However, the Court left the preamble to the statute intact, which states that the insanity defense is to be pleaded "upon the trial of any indictment," not before the indictment.

2020In Moore, the Court addressed the adequacy of a voir dire of prospective jurors concerning the insanity defense. 122 N.J. at 453-54 .

2020The Court found it "well established that many laypersons have a great deal of difficulty in understanding the insanity defense, and many people might not be able to consider it as a viable defense." Ibid.

2016The trial court held a hearing pursuant to the Appellate Division’s decision in State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 81-82 , 417 A.2d 585 (App.Div.1980), overruled by State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 349 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013), to assess the potential role of the insanity defense in defendant’s trial.

2016The trial court held a hearing pursuant to the Appellate Division’s decision in State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 81-82 , 417 A.2d 585 (App.Div.1980), overruled by State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 349 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013), to assess the potential role of the insanity defense in defendant’s trial.

2024"The insanity defense exists in criminal law not to identify the mentally ill, but rather to determine who among the mentally ill should be held criminally responsible for their conduct." Id. at 173 (quoting State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470 (1965)).

2024"The insanity defense exists in criminal law not to identify the mentally ill, but rather to determine who among the mentally ill should be held criminally responsible for their conduct." Id. at 173 (quoting State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470 (1965)).

2017Unlike diminished capacity, the insanity defense does not negate the mental elements of a crime, it affords a petit jury the ability to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity," rather than "guilty" or "not guilty." State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 600 (1987).

1988He presented an insanity defense to all charges and argued that if insanity were not established, the evidence of mental disease or defect still showed that the killing, was not “knowing” or “purposeful.” Id. at 593 .

2016The panel held that a trial court is authorized to “raise an insanity defense sua sponte only if the defendant is not capable of making, and has not made, an intelligent and voluntary decision.” Id. at 81 , 417 A.2d 585 (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 (D.C.Ct.App.1979)).

2011Khan, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 81 , 417 A. 2d 585 (quoting Frendak, supra, 408 A. 2d at 379 ). [10] Khan expressed concern that the simultaneous presentation of both a self-defense claim and an insanity defense at a single trial could be "fundamentally unfair" to the defendant.

2012Rejecting his assertion that he was entitled to claim the “sanctuary of the insanity defense,” the court held that “some notion or morality, unrelated to a mental illness, which disagrees with the law and mores of our society is not an insane delusion.” Id. at 495.

2009Of particular note is State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash.2d 789 , 659 P.2d 488, 494-95 (1983), which excluded from the "sanctuary of the insanity defense" a killing done ostensibly to conform with the defendant’s Moscovite beliefs that it was his duty to assassinate an unfaithful spouse.

2024Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175 , A-2662-21 12 States v. Keen, defendant appealed his convictions for bank robbery, contending he had been wrongfully prevented from raising an insanity defense resting solely on his own testimony and that of his family members. 104 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996).

2024Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175 , A-2662-21 12 States v. Keen, defendant appealed his convictions for bank robbery, contending he had been wrongfully prevented from raising an insanity defense resting solely on his own testimony and that of his family members. 104 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996).

2024Ct. 2023) (same); State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Doyle v. State, 5 Our concurring colleague cites Georgia case law to support the assertion that expert testimony should not be required to raise an insanity defense, but Georgia's insanity standard is less rigorous than the M'Naghten test and requires the defendant show only a lack of "mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong," without any requirement of proving "disease." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-2 .

2024Ct. 2023) (same); State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Doyle v. State, 5 Our concurring colleague cites Georgia case law to support the assertion that expert testimony should not be required to raise an insanity defense, but Georgia's insanity standard is less rigorous than the M'Naghten test and requires the defendant show only a lack of "mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong," without any requirement of proving "disease." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-2 .

2024In so concluding, the Keen court applied a standard I urge we adopt: whether there is present a sufficient quantum of evidence to justify a jury instruction on the insanity defense: "[w]here the issue of insanity has otherwise been properly raised, a federal criminal defendant is due a jury instruction on insanity when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that insanity has been shown with convincing clarity . . . ." [Id. at 1116-17 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Whitehead, 896 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1990)) (quoting United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432, 435 (11th Cir.

2024In so concluding, the Keen court applied a standard I urge we adopt: whether there is present a sufficient quantum of evidence to justify a jury instruction on the insanity defense: "[w]here the issue of insanity has otherwise been properly raised, a federal criminal defendant is due a jury instruction on insanity when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that insanity has been shown with convincing clarity . . . ." [Id. at 1116-17 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Whitehead, 896 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1990)) (quoting United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432, 435 (11th Cir.

2024State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280 , 284–85 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Reynolds, 550 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (reaching a similar conclusion adopting the Arizona court's approach in Bay).5 Most other states that have addressed the subject in M'Naghten jurisdictions have required expert testimony.

2024State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280 , 284–85 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Reynolds, 550 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (reaching a similar conclusion adopting the Arizona court's approach in Bay).5 Most other states that have addressed the subject in M'Naghten jurisdictions have required expert testimony.

2024In State v. Burnett, 198 N.J.

2024In State v. Burnett, 198 N.J.

2019In State v. Whitlow , the Court addressed the obligation of a defendant who intends to raise the insanity defense, to submit to a psychiatric examination conducted by the State. 45 N.J. 3 , 8-10, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).

2019In State v. Whitlow , the Court addressed the obligation of a defendant who intends to raise the insanity defense, to submit to a psychiatric examination conducted by the State. 45 N.J. 3 , 8-10, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).

2020See Harris, 141 N.J. at 541 ; cf. State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 319 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to a jury voir dire because "the trial court allowed frank inquiry of the potential jurors about their attitudes towards the insanity defense in the circumstances of [the] case").

2013The defendant had made a pre-trial motion for a non-jury trial because he planned to mount an insanity defense requiring psychiatric testimony on the “abnormal homosexual fantasies that may have moved [him] to attack the victim.” Id. at 307 , 590 A.2d 1144 .

2011Ibid. [10] Again, we emphasize that defendant has not appealed the application of this facet of Khan in this case and the trial court's dual findings of his competency to stand trial but his inability to waive an insanity defense. [11] See State v. Haseen, 191 N.J.Super. 564, 566 , 468 A. 2d 448 (App.Div.1983) (noting that Khan did not require a bifurcated trial when a defendant voluntarily chose to rely on the inconsistent defenses of insanity and alibi); State v. Johnston, 257 N.J.Super. 178, 191-96 , 608 A. 2d 364 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 596 , 617 A. 2d 1219 (1992) (finding tha

2011Ibid. [10] Again, we emphasize that defendant has not appealed the application of this facet of Khan in this case and the trial court's dual findings of his competency to stand trial but his inability to waive an insanity defense. [11] See State v. Haseen, 191 N.J.Super. 564, 566 , 468 A. 2d 448 (App.Div.1983) (noting that Khan did not require a bifurcated trial when a defendant voluntarily chose to rely on the inconsistent defenses of insanity and alibi); State v. Johnston, 257 N.J.Super. 178, 191-96 , 608 A. 2d 364 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 596 , 617 A. 2d 1219 (1992) (finding tha

2020In State v. Harris, the Court reiterated that trial courts are required to "permit a full opportunity to ask prospective jurors about their attitudes toward insanity and mental-health defenses." 141 N.J. 525, 541 (1995).

2020See Harris, 141 N.J. at 541 ; cf. State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 319 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to a jury voir dire because "the trial court allowed frank inquiry of the potential jurors about their attitudes towards the insanity defense in the circumstances of [the] case").

2011Ibid. [10] Again, we emphasize that defendant has not appealed the application of this facet of Khan in this case and the trial court's dual findings of his competency to stand trial but his inability to waive an insanity defense. [11] See State v. Haseen, 191 N.J.Super. 564, 566 , 468 A. 2d 448 (App.Div.1983) (noting that Khan did not require a bifurcated trial when a defendant voluntarily chose to rely on the inconsistent defenses of insanity and alibi); State v. Johnston, 257 N.J.Super. 178, 191-96 , 608 A. 2d 364 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 596 , 617 A. 2d 1219 (1992) (finding tha

1992In State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 , 270 n. 62, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987), the Court noted in a footnote that the trial court gave the jury an insanity charge as well as a diminished capacity charge, even though the defense had waived an insanity defense.

1997In New Jersey, insanity at common-law was determined by applying the M’Naghten standard, which states: If at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong, he was legally insane. [State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 212 , 287 A.2d 715 (1972).] As with involuntary intoxication, entrapment, and duress, the insanity defense has a high potential for serving as an instrument of pretext.

1997In New Jersey, insanity at common-law was determined by applying the M’Naghten standard, which states: If at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong, he was legally insane. [State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 212 , 287 A.2d 715 (1972).] As with involuntary intoxication, entrapment, and duress, the insanity defense has a high potential for serving as an instrument of pretext.