insanity defense in Arizona

2024B. ¶33 Martinez insists that “[a]n interpretation of Arizona’s GEI scheme that concludes the insane are convicted of a crime would render it unconstitutional” because such an interpretation impermissibly diminishes Arizona’s moral-incapacity defense. 4 We do not address this argument, 4 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 , 770–71 (2006) (explaining that a defendant must have some ability to introduce “mental-disease and capacity evidence”); Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271 , 284–86 (2020) (explaining that either a moral-incapacity or diminished-capacity defense satisfy the constitutional

2019See Clark , 548 U.S. at 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 ("[W]e understand that Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease."); Leteve , 237 Ariz. at 524 ¶ 20, 354 P.3d at 401 (reaffirming that diminished capacity evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea and describing such evidence as a "mental disorder short of insanity" (citing Mott , 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1050 )); State v. Jacobson , 244 Ariz. 187 , 193 ¶ 21, 418 P.3d 960 , 966 (App. 2017) (stating expert evidence that hormonal changes "could affect planning, t

2020State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 523, ¶ 18 (2015). ¶10 Absent an insanity defense, Arizona bars defendants from offering evidence suggesting a mental disorder prevented them from forming the mens rea element of a charged offense.

2019See Clark , 548 U.S. at 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 ("[W]e understand that Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease."); Leteve , 237 Ariz. at 524 ¶ 20, 354 P.3d at 401 (reaffirming that diminished capacity evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea and describing such evidence as a "mental disorder short of insanity" (citing Mott , 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1050 )); State v. Jacobson , 244 Ariz. 187 , 193 ¶ 21, 418 P.3d 960 , 966 (App. 2017) (stating expert evidence that hormonal changes "could affect planning, t

2016After reviewing Austin’s four arguments, 1 id. at 399-403 , 788 P.2d at 132-36 , this court found, as relevant here, “the trial court properly required disclosure of the names and reports of mental health experts retained by [the defendant], but failed to shield from disclosure statements made by [the defendant] concerning the offenses,” id. at 403 , 788 P.2d at 136 . ¶ 8 Although Austin has remained unchallenged, its premise was based on the insanity affirmative defense, that is, not guilty by reason of insanity, State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192 , 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (stating *254 t

2016After reviewing Austin’s four arguments, 1 id. at 399-403 , 788 P.2d at 132-36 , this court found, as relevant here, “the trial court properly required disclosure of the names and reports of mental health experts retained by [the defendant], but failed to shield from disclosure statements made by [the defendant] concerning the offenses,” id. at 403 , 788 P.2d at 136 . ¶ 8 Although Austin has remained unchallenged, its premise was based on the insanity affirmative defense, that is, not guilty by reason of insanity, State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192 , 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (stating *254 t

2019See Clark , 548 U.S. at 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 ("[W]e understand that Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease."); Leteve , 237 Ariz. at 524 ¶ 20, 354 P.3d at 401 (reaffirming that diminished capacity evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea and describing such evidence as a "mental disorder short of insanity" (citing Mott , 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1050 )); State v. Jacobson , 244 Ariz. 187 , 193 ¶ 21, 418 P.3d 960 , 966 (App. 2017) (stating expert evidence that hormonal changes "could affect planning, t

2019See Clark , 548 U.S. at 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 ("[W]e understand that Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease."); Leteve , 237 Ariz. at 524 ¶ 20, 354 P.3d at 401 (reaffirming that diminished capacity evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea and describing such evidence as a "mental disorder short of insanity" (citing Mott , 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1050 )); State v. Jacobson , 244 Ariz. 187 , 193 ¶ 21, 418 P.3d 960 , 966 (App. 2017) (stating expert evidence that hormonal changes "could affect planning, t

2024Cf. Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 102-03 (1984) (“Suggestion by question or innuendo of unfavorable matter which is not in evidence and . . . for which no proof exists is improper and can constitute misconduct.”). ¶96 For example, in State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶¶ 38, 42-46 (1998), our supreme court concluded that a prosecutor had committed misconduct during cross-examination of a defense expert on the insanity defense.

2020See Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 390 ¶ 99 (finding that a prosecutor’s comments equating defense counsel to Don Quixote improperly impugned counsel’s integrity); compare State v. Amaya- Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152 , 171–72 (1990) (finding a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel “blind sided witnesses,” used “innuendo and inference,” made an “outrageous” argument, and accused witnesses were “not improper . . . and certainly did not rise to the level of fundamental error”), with State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72 , 86 ¶ 61 (1998) (finding misconduct for a prosecutor’s remarks that defense counsel and experts “f

2017Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. at 216 -17 ¶¶ 39, 45, 303 P.3d 519 ; see Cheever, 134 S.Ct. at 603 (holding that a defendant’s statements to an examiner are only admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting defendant’s insanity evidence); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325 , 746 P.2d 491 (distinguishing between the admissibility of “statements relating to the issue of insanity from [inadmissible] statements wholly unrelated to that issue but tending to prove guilt”). ¶ 20 We therefore hold that under Rule 11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental health exam must

2017Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. at 216 -17 ¶¶ 39, 45; see Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 603 (holding that a defendant’s statements to an examiner are only admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting defendant’s insanity evidence); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325 (distinguishing between the admissibility of “statements relating to the issue of insanity from [inadmissible] statements wholly unrelated to that issue but tending to prove guilt”). ¶20 We therefore hold that under Rule 11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental health exam must disclose a complete copy of h

2007“Before we may engage in a fundamental error analysis, however, we must first find that the trial court committed some error.” State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 385 , 814 P.2d 333, 342 (1991). ¶ 15 We therefore must determine whether the proposed testimony of Wright’s expert falls into the category of observation evidence, which may be admitted short of an insanity defense to rebut the mens rea element, or capacity evidence, which may not.

2007“Before we may engage in a fundamental error analysis, however, we must first find that the trial court committed some error.” State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 385 , 814 P.2d 333, 342 (1991). ¶ 15 We therefore must determine whether the proposed testimony of Wright’s expert falls into the category of observation evidence, which may be admitted short of an insanity defense to rebut the mens rea element, or capacity evidence, which may not.

1988See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36 , 628 P.2d 580, 583-84 (1981).

1988See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36 , 628 P.2d 580, 583-84 (1981).

2020See Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 390 ¶ 99 (finding that a prosecutor’s comments equating defense counsel to Don Quixote improperly impugned counsel’s integrity); compare State v. Amaya- Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152 , 171–72 (1990) (finding a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel “blind sided witnesses,” used “innuendo and inference,” made an “outrageous” argument, and accused witnesses were “not improper . . . and certainly did not rise to the level of fundamental error”), with State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72 , 86 ¶ 61 (1998) (finding misconduct for a prosecutor’s remarks that defense counsel and experts “f

2009But because neither party has argued on appeal that McKeon was incorrectly decided, we do not decide today whether we agree with the McKeon majority or concurrence. 5 See Portillo, 182 Ariz. at 594 , 898 P.2d at 972 ; Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 173 , 800 P.2d at 1281 . ¶9 At Edmisten’s request, the trial court provided the following instruction on involuntary intoxication: Intoxication resulting from the involuntary use of alcohol or drugs may be considered by you with respect to the culpable mental state required to prove an offense.

2017Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission of a defendant’s statements “unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule 11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s statements about the pending charges are not admissible “without his [ ] consent.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. 208 , 217 ¶ 44, 303 P.3d 519, 528 (2013) (stating defendant waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by placing his mental health at issue; by doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission of his statements “for purposes of [Rule 11.7(b)(1) ]”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325-26

2017Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission of a defendant’s statements “unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule 11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s statements about the pending charges are not admissible “without his [ ] consent.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. 208 , 217 ¶ 44, 303 P.3d 519, 528 (2013) (stating defendant waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by placing his mental health at issue; by doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission of his statements “for purposes of [Rule 11.7(b)(1) ]”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325-26

2017Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission of a defendant’s statements “unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule 11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s statements about the pending charges are not admissible “without his [ ] consent.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. 208 , 217 ¶ 44, 303 P.3d 519, 528 (2013) (stating defendant waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by placing his mental health at issue; by doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission of his statements “for purposes of [Rule 11.7(b)(1) ]”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325-26

2017Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission of a defendant’s statements “unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule 11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s statements about the pending charges are not admissible “without his [ ] consent.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 232 Ariz. 208 , 217 ¶ 44, 303 P.3d 519, 528 (2013) (stating defendant waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1) by placing his mental health at issue; by doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission of his statements “for purposes of [Rule 11.7(b)(1) ]”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 325-26

2004With specific reference to our decision in Hughes , we declared in Jorgenson : [Zawada’s method of prosecution] was “a dishonest way to represent the State ..., and it was especially dishonest ... where the evidence of insanity was substantial, and where the [s]tate had no evidence that [Defendant] had fabricated an insanity defense.” We unanimously concluded that the “evidence of mental illness was *238 overwhelming” and Defendant’s case for acquittal on grounds of insanity was “substantial.” The state overwhelmed Defendant’s insanity defense, “but it did not do so with evidence; it did so wi

2004With specific reference to our decision in Hughes , we declared in Jorgenson : [Zawada’s method of prosecution] was “a dishonest way to represent the State ..., and it was especially dishonest ... where the evidence of insanity was substantial, and where the [s]tate had no evidence that [Defendant] had fabricated an insanity defense.” We unanimously concluded that the “evidence of mental illness was *238 overwhelming” and Defendant’s case for acquittal on grounds of insanity was “substantial.” The state overwhelmed Defendant’s insanity defense, “but it did not do so with evidence; it did so wi

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1989State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424 , 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988) (error in defining the terms used in instructing the jury on the quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish the insanity defense is fundamental).

1989State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424 , 763 E.2d 239, 244 (1988) (error in defining the terms used in instructing the jury on the quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish the insanity defense is fundamental).

1988State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 100 , 664 P.2d 637, 644 (1983).

1988State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 100 , 664 P.2d 637, 644 (1983).

2024Cf. Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 102-03 (1984) (“Suggestion by question or innuendo of unfavorable matter which is not in evidence and . . . for which no proof exists is improper and can constitute misconduct.”). ¶96 For example, in State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶¶ 38, 42-46 (1998), our supreme court concluded that a prosecutor had committed misconduct during cross-examination of a defense expert on the insanity defense.

2022Criminal Rule 11.8 allows the same to determine a defendant’s mental health at the time of the offense. 3 STATE v. HON LABIANCA/PEDRO Opinion of the Court on motion of the state.” Id. at 500 (quoting Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 954 (5th Cir. 1986)). ¶8 Our supreme court identified several federal cases holding that courts may compel defendants to submit to a psychiatric examination if they raise an insanity defense.

2020Id. ("Conditions that do not constitute legal insanity include . . . momentary, temporary conditions arising from . . . circumstances . . . passion growing out of anger . . . or other motives in a person who does not suffer from a mental disease or defect . . . manifested only by criminal conduct."); see State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (holding that "wrong" for an insanity defense is defined by community standards of morality and not personal beliefs).

2020Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶ 12 .

2019See Malone , 245 Ariz. at 106 ¶¶ 7, 9, 425 P.3d at 595 , 597 .

2018PINEDA/STATE Opinion of the Court did not raise an insanity defense, but instead intended to present expert testimony pertaining to his mental condition to negate the element of intent. 143 Ariz. 314, 316 (App. 1984).