insanity defense in Illinois

2025People v. Frank-McCarron, 403 Ill.

2024People v. Frank- McCarron, 403 Ill.

2017App. 3d 72, 74-76 (1992)) and the insanity defense (People v. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d 301, 311 (1986)), when those biases might affect the jurors’ ability to decide the case impartially. ¶ 30 Encalado informed the court that he intended to introduce evidence that Y.C. and C.C. had agreed to exchange sex for money and drugs, and after they delivered the agreed services, he robbed them of the amounts he had paid them.

2017App. 3d 72, 74-76 (1992)) and the insanity defense (People v. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d 301, 311 (1986)) when those biases might affect the jurors’ ability to decide the case impartially. ¶ 30 Encalado informed the court that he intended to introduce evidence that Y.C. and C.C. had agreed to exchange sex for money and drugs, and after they delivered the agreed services, he robbed them of the amounts he had paid them.

2026“Where the record establishes that counsel had reason to know, from an objective standpoint, that a possible defense, such as insanity, was available, failure to investigate fully can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 76 Section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 2018)) sets forth the insanity defense as follows: “A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his condu

2026“Where the record establishes that counsel had reason to know, from an objective standpoint, that a possible defense, such as insanity, was available, failure to investigate fully can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 76 Section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 2018)) sets forth the insanity defense as follows: “A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his condu

2010Thus, defendant was entitled to a new trial at which he would be “allowed to present an insanity defense based on his inability to conform his conduct to the law” and “required to prove his insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 159 .

2010Thus, defendant was entitled to a new trial at which he would be “allowed to present an insanity defense based on his inability to conform his conduct to the law” and “required to prove his insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 159 .

2016App. 3d at 879 . ¶ 47 “Courts consider the standard of proof when deciding whether an insanity instruction must be given.” Id.

2011"Of particular relevance are observations by lay witnesses made shortly before or after the crime was committed." Id. ¶ 28 Here, Clark alleged that Peccarelli failed to investigate a known witness who was offering to present evidence that could support an insanity defense.

2024Id. at 283 (“[F]or hundreds of years jurists and judges have recognized insanity (however defined) as relieving responsibility for a crime.”); see Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-52 (2006) (cataloguing various approaches to the insanity defense).

2024This long-established approach to the insanity defense is known as the moral incapacity test (Clark, 548 U.S. at 751 ) and applies when the defendant’s insanity “obliterat[es] the sense of right and wrong as to the particular act done,” Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 392 (1863).

2000Although the insanity defense upon which the defendant relied is a well-recognized legal defense, it remains a subject of intense controversy and has been described as “a defense which is known to be subject to bias or prejudice.” People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 65 (1986).

2000Although the insanity defense upon which the defendant relied is a well-recognized legal defense, it remains a subject of intense controversy and has been described as "a defense which is known to be subject to bias or prejudice." People v. Bowel , 111 Ill. 2d 58, 65 (1986).

1990In so contending, the defendant focuses upon an anomaly, discussed by our supreme court in People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 176 , 529 N.E.2d 972 , that existed because of the interrelationship between the then existing GBMI statute and the insanity defense.

1990In so contending, the defendant focuses upon an anomaly, discussed by our supreme court in People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 176 , 529 N.E.2d 972 , that existed because of the interrelationship between the then existing GBMI statute and the insanity defense.

2021Defendant “failed to plead facts that demonstrate that his attorney’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when the attorney failed to investigate and present an insanity defense.” People v. Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d 363, 372 (2000).

2021Like in People v. Wilson, “we do not believe that the sum of the evidence available to trial counsel would have placed a reasonable attorney on notice that an insanity defense was a possibility.” Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d at 372 .

2006At the time Moore and Williams were decided, the standard of proof for an insanity defense was “preponderance of the evidence.” See Moore, 147 Ill.

2006At the time Moore and Williams were decided, the standard of proof for an insanity defense was “preponderance of the evidence.” See Moore, 147 Ill.

1987App. 3d 138, 142 , 392 N.E.2d 775 .) Because the outcome of the fitness hearing may have been different had defense counsel investigated defendant’s mental condition and history and because such investigation may have led him to assert an insanity defense at trial ( 74 Ill.

1987App. 3d 138, 142 , 392 N.E.2d 775 .) Because the outcome of the fitness hearing may have been different had defense counsel investigated defendant’s mental condition and history and because such investigation may have led him to assert an insanity defense at trial ( 74 Ill.

2025People v. Wood, 2014 IL App (1st) 121408, ¶ 75 .

2022See People v. Wood, 2014 IL App (1st) 121408, ¶ 77 . ¶ 37 We have already concluded that there is no evidence to support the prejudice component—that defendant would succeed if he had raised an insanity defense.

2021“A voluntary intoxication or a voluntary drugged condition precludes the use of the insanity defense unless the mental disease or defect is traceable to the habitual or chronic use of drugs or alcohol [citation] and such use results in a ‘settled’ or ‘fixed’ permanent type of insanity. [Citations.]” Id. at 408 .

2021“A voluntary intoxication or a voluntary drugged condition precludes the use of the insanity defense unless the mental disease or defect is traceable to the habitual or chronic use of drugs or alcohol [citation] and such use results in a ‘settled’ or ‘fixed’ permanent type of insanity. [Citations.]” Id. at 408 .

2020The First District held the trial court erred by not permitting questioning regarding the burden of proof for the insanity defense after a juror inquired “whether the standard upon which she should base her opinion of the credibility of the expert witnesses was beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 62 .

2006See People v. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d 301, 313 , 493 N.E.2d 339 (1986) (The insanity defense remains a subject of intense controversy, known to be subject to bias or prejudice); People v. Gregg, 315 Ill.

2024This theory is unsound as a matter of law.”)); (2) counsel believed an insanity defense to be viable but failed to adequately present the defense (see Penn, 2022 IL App (4th) 210084-U , ¶ 48 (failing to introduce evidence of insanity or raise the defense before closing - 14 - arguments)); (3) an expert opined that defendant’s conduct at the time of the offense indicated she lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct (see Young, 220 Ill.

2007App. 3d 98 , 581 N.E.2d 371 (1991), where the court found defense counsel ineffective for failing to raise an insanity defense at a discharge hearing.

2022As we discussed in Hulitt, “[t]he doctrine of diminished capacity, also known as the doctrine of diminished or partial responsibility, allows a defendant to offer evidence of her mental condition in relation to her capacity to form the mens rea or intent required for commission of the charged offense. [Citation.] Similar to the insanity defense in that it calls into question the mental abnormality of a defendant, it differs in that it may be raised by a defendant who is legally sane.” Id. at 640-41 . ¶ 35 This case is analogous to Hulitt, where we found that the defendant’s proposed mental hea

2020Prior to trial, the defendant claimed that she did not intend to raise an insanity defense, but instead wanted to raise a “reasonable doubt defense” through the expert testimony of a psychologist showing that she suffered from postpartum depression which left her “ ‘unable to appreciate the danger of her actions toward [her daughter].’ ” Id.

2025Id. § 6-2(e). ¶ 36 Here, both Strickland prongs are satisfied for the same reason: the existing evidence to support an insanity defense was so strong that trial counsel’s failure to raise the defense was both unreasonable and prejudicial.

2024App. 3d 232 , 869 N.E.2d 437 (2007), and People v. Penn, 2022 IL App (4th) 210084-U , all of which examined defense counsel’s performance during discharge proceedings and concluded counsel was ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense.

2000Application of Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications by Defendant to Nontestifying Psychiatrist Who Examined Defendant for Fitness and Sanity In People v. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d 125 (1995), the supreme court addressed the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a nontestifying psychiatrist who examines the accused at the request of defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense.

2000The trial court quashed the subpoenas and held that “a psychiatrist hired by defense counsel to examine the client for purposes of trial preparation is an agent of defense counsel and therefore the communications between the defendant and the defense-retained psychiatrist are protected by the attorney-client privilege. *** [T]he privilege is not waived by the assertion of the insanity defense; the State is not allowed to discover or elicit the opinions and notes of the defense psychiatrist unless the psychiatrist testifies at trial.” Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d at 129 .

2016Nobody ever said he was insane at the time of the offense, and I’m not -- and this is what I have brought up repeatedly with [defense counsel] in regards to this because how is it that you present this defense if you don’t have a witness to say that he was insane at the time of the offense or is currently legally insane?” Defense counsel responded that Illinois law does not require a defendant to present expert opinion that he is insane in order to raise the insanity defense, citing People v. Childs, 51 Ill. 2d 247 (1972).

1988We recognize that in People v. Childs (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 247 , 281 N.E.2d 631 , the Illinois Supreme Court held evidence of an accused’s mental illness was sufficiently relevant to constitute some evidence of an insanity defense, thus raising that issue.