insanity defense in Tennessee

2025This standard of review is similar to the reasonableness standard reviewing courts apply when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence; appellate courts “should consider all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the [S]tate in determining whether the jury appropriately rejected the insanity defense.” Id.

2025Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of fact alone. “[A]ppellate courts in Tennessee should reverse a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense only if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002).

2022State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn. Crim.

2021See State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn. Crim.

2024A jury verdict that rejects an insanity defense is reversible only “if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. “‘Clear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim.

2016This court, in applying this standard, “should consider all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the [S]tate in determining whether the jury appropriately rejected the insanity defense.” Id.

2004The weight and value to be given expert testimony is a question for the jury. [State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn. 1995)].

2004A reviewing court applying the reasonableness standard should consider all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the state in determining whether the jury appropriately rejected the insanity defense. [[Image here]] The weight and value to be given expert testimony is a question for the jury. [State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn.1995) ].

1998The trial judge, apparently referring to the insanity defense as defined in Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977), refused to instruct on that mitigating circumstance because “the magical words ... weren’t developed during proof.” Defense counsel did lodge an objection to the refusal to charge Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(j)(8).

1997W hile Dr. Delmonico’s examination was limited to a one (1) hour interview, and Dr. Fisher saw the Defe ndant o n severa l occasio ns, we a gree with the State that the basic foundation of Dr. Fisher’s conclusion was based upon the fact that if Defen dant did c omm it the act, it was “impulsive behavior.” In Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977), our supreme court specifically rejected application in Tennessee of an insanity defense based upon th e “irresistible im pulse tes t.” In doing so, the supreme court held: -13- Under [the irresistab le impuls e] test, a crim inal defen dant is

2002The changes to the insanity defense in federal courts resulting from the Insanity Defense Refrom Act of 1984 are described by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1986). [7] The 1995 amendment eliminated the volitional prong of the insanity defense i.e., "lacked the capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law." [8] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . [9] People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109 , 165 Ill.

2002Ed .2d 5 60 (197 9); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . -11- sanity issue “unless the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,”9 or “the proof of insanity is overwhelming”10 or the verdict is “contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence,”11 or the “judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.”12 Arkansas appellate courts review a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense to determine “whether there was any substantial evidence to support the verdict.”13 The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that a defendant whose

2003Id. (citing State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn.1995); State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tenn.1994); Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Tenn.1976)).

2003Id. (citing State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn.1995); State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tenn.1994); Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Tenn.1976)).

2024The trial court makes the initial determination of whether entrapment has been “fairly raised” by “consider[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, - 15 - including all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence.” State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tenn. Crim.

2014In State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tenn. Crim.

2005See State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 741 (Tenn. Crim.

2002State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tenn. Crim.

2002Other state appellate courts preclude disturbing the fact-finder’s resolution of the sanity issue “unless the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” 9 or “the proof of insanity is overwhelming” 10 or the verdict is “contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence,” 11 or the “judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.” 12 Arkansas appellate courts review a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense to determine “whether there was any substantial evidence to support the verdict.” 13 The Indiana Supreme Cour

2002Other state appellate courts preclude disturbing the fact-finder's resolution of the sanity issue "unless the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence," [9] or "the proof of insanity is overwhelming" [10] or the verdict is "contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence," [11] or the "judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." [12] Arkansas appellate courts review a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense to determine "whether there was any substantial evidence to support the verdict." [13] The Indiana Su

2002In this Court, the State relies upon United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir.1993), and argues that an appellate court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and reverse a jury verdict rejecting an insanity defense “only if no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

2002In this Court, the State relies upon United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir.1993), and argues that an appellate court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and reverse a jury verdict rejecting an insanity defense “only if no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

2002The changes to the insanity defense in federal courts resulting from the Insanity Defense Refrom Act of 1984 are described by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1986). [7] The 1995 amendment eliminated the volitional prong of the insanity defense i.e., "lacked the capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law." [8] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . [9] People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109 , 165 Ill.

2002The changes to the insanity defense in federal courts resulting from the Insanity Defense Refrom Act of 1984 are described by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1986). [7] The 1995 amendment eliminated the volitional prong of the insanity defense i.e., "lacked the capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law." [8] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . [9] People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109 , 165 Ill.

2002App. Jan. 12, 1998), app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 4, 1999); see also Huskey, 964 S.W.2d at 896 (noting the trial court may sanction a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 12.2 by precluding the insanity defense or the testimony of defense experts); State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20, 25-27 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the defendant has a right to counsel’s advice in deciding whether to present an insanity defense but holding that the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have counsel present during a court-ordered mental examination).

1998Martin, 950 S.W.2d at 26 .

2022As such, evidence to negate the requisite must include expert testimony. “[Diminished capacity] is . . . not a defense at all but merely a rule of evidence.” Id. at 688-89 (quoting United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir. 1987)). “[E]vidence of a mental - 15 - disease or defect that does not rise to the level of an insanity defense, nevertheless, is admissible to negate the requisite culpable mental state for the charged offense.” State v. Terrance Lawrence, a.k.a.

1994Such evidence is deemed admissible even in federal courts where the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 greatly restricts the use of the traditional insanity defense and abolishes the use of “diminished capacity” and “diminished responsibility” defenses in federal courts. 13 See United States v. Moran, 937 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Hood, 857 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir.

2002The changes to the insanity defense in federal courts resulting from the Insanity Defense Refrom Act of 1984 are described by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1986). [7] The 1995 amendment eliminated the volitional prong of the insanity defense i.e., "lacked the capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law." [8] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . [9] People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109 , 165 Ill.

2002The changes to the insanity defense in federal courts resulting from the Insanity Defense Refrom Act of 1984 are described by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1986). [7] The 1995 amendment eliminated the volitional prong of the insanity defense i.e., "lacked the capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law." [8] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 441 . [9] People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109 , 165 Ill.

2002We note that “the right to a defense belongs to the defendant.” Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in declining to present mitigating evidence at the insistence of a competent capital defendant).

1999Again, in Zagorsky 983 S.W.2d at 658-661 , our supreme court held that a competent defendant has exclusive authority to make the ultimate decisions about his case, once having been fully informed of the rights and the potential consequences involved.

2019Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we must determine the harmful effect of the trial court’s error. -28- Before we undertake our harmless error analysis, we must first determine the type of harmless error analysis applicable in this case. “[F]or the purpose of the harmless error analysis,” our supreme court “has recognized three categories of error— structural constitutional error, non-structural constitutional error, and non-constitutional error.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Garrison, 40

2019Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we must determine the harmful effect of the trial court’s error. -28- Before we undertake our harmless error analysis, we must first determine the type of harmless error analysis applicable in this case. “[F]or the purpose of the harmless error analysis,” our supreme court “has recognized three categories of error— structural constitutional error, non-structural constitutional error, and non-constitutional error.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Garrison, 40

2019Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we must determine the harmful effect of the trial court’s error. -28- Before we undertake our harmless error analysis, we must first determine the type of harmless error analysis applicable in this case. “[F]or the purpose of the harmless error analysis,” our supreme court “has recognized three categories of error— structural constitutional error, non-structural constitutional error, and non-constitutional error.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Garrison, 40

2019Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we must determine the harmful effect of the trial court’s error. -28- Before we undertake our harmless error analysis, we must first determine the type of harmless error analysis applicable in this case. “[F]or the purpose of the harmless error analysis,” our supreme court “has recognized three categories of error— structural constitutional error, non-structural constitutional error, and non-constitutional error.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Garrison, 40

2018If a defendant intends to rely on the defense of entrapment, the defendant shall give to the district attorney general a notice comparable to the commission of the prohibited act through the Government’s instigation’” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 451 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). - 11 - that required for an insanity defense under Rule 12.2 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2016Although the State “is required to prove all essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sanity is not an element of a crime.” Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 911 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204-16 (1977)).