insanity defense in Oregon

2016The original M’Naghten rule, which early Oregon cases often quoted verbatim, set out a two-part test, one having to do with knowledge of the “nature and quality” of the act and the other having to do with the actor’s knowledge of the act’s wrongfulness: “If at the time of committing an act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know the nature and quality thereof, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong, he should not be held responsible under the criminal law.” Sta

2016The original M’Naghten rule, which early Oregon cases often quoted verbatim, set out a two-part test, one having to do with knowledge of the “nature and quality” of the act and the other having to do with the actor’s knowledge of the act’s wrongfulness: “If at the time of committing an act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know the nature and quality thereof, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong, he should not be held responsible under the criminal law.” Sta

2016The original M’Naghten rule, which early Oregon cases often quoted verbatim, set out a two-part test, one having to do with knowledge of the “nature and quality” of the act and the other having to do with the actor’s knowledge of the act’s wrongfulness: “If at the time of committing an act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know the nature and quality thereof, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong, he should not be held responsible under the criminal law.” Sta

2016The original M’Naghten rule, which early Oregon cases often quoted verbatim, set out a two-part test, one having to do with knowledge of the “nature and quality” of the act and the other having to do with the actor’s knowledge of the act’s wrongfulness: “If at the time of committing an act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know the nature and quality thereof, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong, he should not be held responsible under the criminal law.” Sta

2015The Oregon Supreme Court articulated that former test in State v. Gilmore, 242 Or 463, 468 , 410 P2d 240 (1966): “Insanity, to excuse a crime, must be such a disease of the mind as dethrones reason and renders the person incapable of understanding the nature and quality and consequences of his act or of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such act.” (Emphasis added.) A prior formulation of the test for incapacity due to insanity used the phrase “nature and quality and consequences.” The current statute does not use that phrase.

2015The Oregon Supreme Court articulated that former test in State v. Gilmore, 242 Or 463, 468 , 410 P2d 240 (1966): “Insanity, to excuse a crime, must be such a disease of the mind as dethrones reason and renders the person incapable of understanding the nature and quality and consequences of his act or of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such act.” (Emphasis added.) A prior formulation of the test for incapacity due to insanity used the phrase “nature and quality and consequences.” The current statute does not use that phrase.

2016As noted, 359 Or at 573 , the insan- ity defense was first described in an 1843 case, M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Clark & Fin 200.

2016They distinguish this, the ‘law’s’ meaning, from what they describe as the ‘psychiatric’ meaning—which they take to connote a fuller, deeper knowledge, involving emotional as well as intellectual awareness.” Cite as 359 Or 559 (2016) 581 Goldstein, The Insanity Defense at 49.

2011Thus, the analysis in Olmstead “suggests that ‘partial responsibility’ evidence is inadmissible only when no ‘culpable mental element’ is alleged, i.e., when the crime charged is a strict liability crime.” State v. Smith, 154 Or App 37, 46 , 960 P2d 877 (1998).

2011Thus, the analysis in Olmstead “suggests that ‘partial responsibility’ evidence is inadmissible only when no ‘culpable mental element’ is alleged, i.e., when the crime charged is a strict liability crime.” State v. Smith, 154 Or App 37, 46 , 960 P2d 877 (1998).

2021Id.

2018Smith and Herrera implicate a doctrine described in other states as "settled insanity." That doctrine has "been consistently characterized as a state of mind resulting from 'long-continued,' 'habitual,' 'prolonged,' or 'chronic' alcohol or drug abuse leading to a more or less permanent or 'fixed' state of insanity." See, e.g. , State v. Sexton , 180 Vt. 34 , 46, 904 A.2d 1092 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Congress , 198 Vt. 241 , 114 A.3d 1128 (2014) (explaining doctrine of settled insanity).

2018Smith and Herrera implicate a doctrine described in other states as "settled insanity." That doctrine has "been consistently characterized as a state of mind resulting from 'long-continued,' 'habitual,' 'prolonged,' or 'chronic' alcohol or drug abuse leading to a more or less permanent or 'fixed' state of insanity." See, e.g. , State v. Sexton , 180 Vt. 34 , 46, 904 A.2d 1092 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Congress , 198 Vt. 241 , 114 A.3d 1128 (2014) (explaining doctrine of settled insanity).

2018Smith and Herrera implicate a doctrine described in other states as "settled insanity." That doctrine has "been consistently characterized as a state of mind resulting from 'long-continued,' 'habitual,' 'prolonged,' or 'chronic' alcohol or drug abuse leading to a more or less permanent or 'fixed' state of insanity." See, e.g. , State v. Sexton , 180 Vt. 34 , 46, 904 A.2d 1092 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Congress , 198 Vt. 241 , 114 A.3d 1128 (2014) (explaining doctrine of settled insanity).

2018Smith and Herrera implicate a doctrine described in other states as "settled insanity." That doctrine has "been consistently characterized as a state of mind resulting from 'long-continued,' 'habitual,' 'prolonged,' or 'chronic' alcohol or drug abuse leading to a more or less permanent or 'fixed' state of insanity." See, e.g. , State v. Sexton , 180 Vt. 34 , 46, 904 A.2d 1092 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Congress , 198 Vt. 241 , 114 A.3d 1128 (2014) (explaining doctrine of settled insanity).

2015(Emphasis added.) 6 See Halperin v. Pitts, 352 Or 482, 490 , 287 P3d 1069 (2012) (stating that later-enacted, related statutes may be helpful “for the purpose of demonstrating consistency (or inconsistency) in word usage as indirect evidence of what the enacting legislature most likely intended”).

2015(Emphasis added.) 6 See Halperin v. Pitts, 352 Or 482, 490 , 287 P3d 1069 (2012) (stating that later-enacted, related statutes may be helpful “for the purpose of demonstrating consistency (or inconsistency) in word usage as indirect evidence of what the enacting legislature most likely intended”).

2015And youth specifically asserts that “appreciate,” as used in ORS 419C.349(3), has the same meaning as “appreciate” in Oregon’s statute describing the insanity defense, ORS 161.295(1): “A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law.” As used in that statute, the term “appreciate” has a meaning that encompasses an “emotional as well as intellectual cognition of the act.”

2014In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 , 105 S Ct 1087 , 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), the Court held that a mentally-ill capital defendant was entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist to aid him in presenting an insanity defense, because the testimony of such an expert is often “a virtual necessity if any insanity plea is to have any chance of success.” Id. at 81 .

2014In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 , 105 S Ct 1087 , 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), the Court held that a mentally-ill capital defendant was entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist to aid him in presenting an insanity defense, because the testimony of such an expert is often “a virtual necessity if any insanity plea is to have any chance of success.” Id. at 81 .

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2011Meanwhile, we have rejected the state’s argument that we should decline to exercise our discretion even when the court, and not a jury, is the factfinder, State v. Potts, 242 Or App 352, 353 , 255 P3d 614 (2011); that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the defendant’s principal argument was based on an insanity defense and not that abuse did not occur, State v. Brown, 241 Or App 226, 232 , 250 P3d 386 (2011); and that the error did not usurp the jury’s factfinding function because the same jury acquitted the defendant on other charges, State v. Wedel, 245 Or App 12, 15 ,

2009Id.

2005In support of that contention, petitioner relies on Mueller v. PSRB, 325 Or 332 , 937 P2d 1028 (1997), in which the court concluded that “organic personality disorder” and “organic brain syndrome” are not diagnoses that fall within the “solely a personality disorder” exclusion of ORS 161.295.

2005In support of that contention, petitioner relies on Mueller v. PSRB, 325 Or 332 , 937 P2d 1028 (1997), in which the court concluded that “organic personality disorder” and “organic brain syndrome” are not diagnoses that fall within the “solely a personality disorder” exclusion of ORS 161.295.

2003ORS 161.325(2), in turn, requires a determination of “the offense of which the person otherwise would have been convicted” and findings as to the identity of any victims and whether any victim wishes to receive notification pertaining to defendant’s status. 4 In Strecker, the petitioner successfully asserted an insanity defense concerning crimes arising out of the same criminal episode and was committed to the state mental hospital for an indeterminate period of time before the creation of PSRB. 154 Or App at 132 .

1998State v. Olmstead, 99 Or App 41, 42 , 780 P2d 1201 (1989), rev’d 310 Or 455 , 800 P2d 277 (1990).

1998State v. Olmstead, 99 Or App 41, 42 , 780 P2d 1201 (1989), rev’d 310 Or 455 , 800 P2d 277 (1990).

1998In both the general and the specific contexts, the basic rule in Oregon and in most, if not all, other jurisdictions has been that the sentence that a defendant will receive if convicted, and the disposition that will be made of a defendant who is found to have a mental disorder, are not matters for the jury's consideration, and juries should not be instructed regarding them. [3] In State v. Daley, 54 Or. 514 , 103 P. 502 , 104 P. 1 (1909), the defendant in a murder case raised an insanity defense and requested an instruction that, if the jury found in accordance with the defense, the court wo

1998In both the general and the specific contexts, the basic rule in Oregon and in most, if not all, other jurisdictions has been that the sentence that a defendant will receive if convicted, and the disposition that will be made of a defendant who is found to have a mental disorder, are not matters for the jury's consideration, and juries should not be instructed regarding them. [3] In State v. Daley, 54 Or. 514 , 103 P. 502 , 104 P. 1 (1909), the defendant in a murder case raised an insanity defense and requested an instruction that, if the jury found in accordance with the defense, the court wo

1991In a lower court application of Young , the court in People v. Johns, 122 A.D.2d 74 , 504 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1986), examined a jury charge that in effect limited the application of the insanity defense to the charged crimes of intentional murder and reckless manslaughter and excluded its application if the jury found manslaughter because of extreme emotional disturbance.

1991In a lower court application of Young , the court in People v. Johns, 122 AD2d 74 , 504 NYS2d 485 (1986), examined a jury charge that in effect limited the application of the insanity defense to the charged crimes of intentional murder and reckless manslaughter and excluded its application if the jury found manslaughter because of extreme emotional disturbance.

1991Before the question of whether the person is responsible or not need arise, the evidence has to prove criminal conduct. " (Emphasis added.) In Olmstead , we made the following statements about the insanity defense: "ORS 161.295 presupposes that the state has proved all elements of the crime, whatever they may be: the effect of proving a mental disease or defect is that the defendant is `guilty except for insanity'" Olmstead, supra, 310 Or. at 463 , 800 P.2d 277 (emphasis in original). "[A] person who is found `guilty except for insanity' under ORS 161.295 * * * is not acquitted." Id. "[A] defe

1991Before the question of whether the person is responsible or not need arise, the evidence has to prove criminal conduct. " (Emphasis added.) In Olmstead , we made the following statements about the insanity defense: "ORS 161.295 presupposes that the state has proved all elements of the crime, whatever they may be: the effect of proving a mental disease or defect is that the defendant is `guilty except for insanity'" Olmstead, supra, 310 Or. at 463 , 800 P.2d 277 (emphasis in original). "[A] person who is found `guilty except for insanity' under ORS 161.295 * * * is not acquitted." Id. "[A] defe

1991"We hold that the defense of mental disease or defect requires a finding that the defendant is criminally culpable before a question arises as to whether society will hold the defendant criminally responsible. " 311 Or. at 622 , 816 P.2d at 1161 .

1991"We hold that the defense of mental disease or defect requires a finding that the defendant is criminally culpable before a question arises as to whether society will hold the defendant criminally responsible. " 311 Or. at 622 , 816 P.2d at 1161 .

1986Oregon's insanity defense is contained in ORS 161.295 which, at the time of the alleged offense, provided: "(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. "(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms `mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." The majority summarily disposes of the defense