insanity defense in Pennsylvania

2024“An insanity defense focuses upon a defendant’s capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 302 A.3d 780, 784 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761 , 788 n.29 (Pa. 2004)).

2011In some ways this is true; however, the insanity defense, unlike an Atkins determination, "focuses upon a defendant’s capacity[] at the time of the offense,” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274 , 865 A.2d 761, 788 (2004), and serves to negate an element of the crime charged, see Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161 , 683 A.2d 1181, 1204 (1996).

2023See supra n.1 (defining imperfect self-defense, which will mitigate first-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1263 (Pa. 2013) (“A defense of diminished capacity negates the element of specific intent, and thus mitigates first-degree murder to third-degree murder. . . . [T]o prove diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication, a defendant must show that he was overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and sensibilities.” (cleaned up)); Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 962 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining that if “the Commonwealth [is] unabl

2023Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951 , 958–59 (Pa.Super. 2011). ____________________________________________ 1 See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise abrogate the common law defense of insanity (M’Naghten’s Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date of this section”). -6- J-S18041-23 Appellant claims the trial court should have allowed him to present an insanity defense through the testimony of his expert, Dr. Morrow, as well as multiple lay witnesses.

2025Appellant further asserts that, - 12 - J-S20006-25 if counsel informed him that he could have lodged a legal insanity defense at trial, he would not have entered a guilty plea in this matter.3 “An insanity defense focuses upon a defendant's capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 302 A.3d 780, 784 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

2025Appellant further asserts that, - 12 - J-S20006-25 if counsel informed him that he could have lodged a legal insanity defense at trial, he would not have entered a guilty plea in this matter.3 “An insanity defense focuses upon a defendant's capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 302 A.3d 780, 784 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

2025Overcoming this burden is “tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 292 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

2025Furthermore, it is within the factfinder’s right to disbelieve an insanity defense and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses. - 13 - J-S10005-25 Commonwealth v. Watson, 292 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

2023Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 901 (Pa. 2011); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 788 (Pa. 2004) (“[a] defense of insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the defendant, while maintaining the absence of legal culpability”).

2011To take appellant’s examples, in Pennsylvania, the factfinder at trial — oftentimes a jury — decides whether the accused has met his burden to prove an insanity defense, pursuant to statute. 18 Pa.C.S. § 315; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 900-01 (Pa.2011).

1990Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979), this Court rejected the defendant’s insanity defense based on the theory that his behavior resulted from a passive pathological condition triggered by the ingestion of alcohol.

1990Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305 , 396 A.2d 1183 (1979), this Court rejected the defendant’s insanity defense based on the theory that his behavior resulted from a passive pathological condition triggered by the ingestion of alcohol.

2025“An insanity defense focuses upon a defendant’s capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.” Id.

2023See id.; see also Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 739 (fact-finders are free to reject or accept an insanity defense), and Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“it is not the function of the appellate court - 14 - J-A02038-23 to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.

2026The jury could therefore find that the defendant was guilty of committing an assault – having engaged in knowing or intentional conduct – but that issue would be separate from whether the defendant was insane, i.e., “laboring from a defect of reason so grave as to not have known the nature and quality of the acts they were doing, or if they did know the nature and quality of the acts, they were unable to comprehend that what they were doing was wrong.” Id. -8- J-S45007-25 Generally, then, the trial court may properly instruct the jury that “it must first determine that the Commonwealth has pro

2009“The legislature, in formulating the guilty but mentally ill verdict has established an intermediate category to deal with situations where a defendant’s mental illness does not deprive him of substantial capacity sufficient to satisfy the insanity test but does warrant treatment in addition to incarceration.” Id. at 581, 543 A.2d at 1122 . .

2026The jury could therefore find that the defendant was guilty of committing an assault – having engaged in knowing or intentional conduct – but that issue would be separate from whether the defendant was insane, i.e., “laboring from a defect of reason so grave as to not have known the nature and quality of the acts they were doing, or if they did know the nature and quality of the acts, they were unable to comprehend that what they were doing was wrong.” Id. -8- J-S45007-25 Generally, then, the trial court may properly instruct the jury that “it must first determine that the Commonwealth has pro

2024“It has long been accepted that criminal defendants may be presumed sane for purposes of determining their criminal liability.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 292 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d 329, 341 (Pa. 2008) (stating, “the placement of the burden with the defendant to prove -9- J-A11044-24 insanity by a preponderance of the evidence does not offend constitutional norms.”).

2012Thus, the Superior Court concluded that "Appellant's waiver cannot be undone at a second trial, despite the fact that he did not present an insanity defense at the second trial." Rosen, 988 A.2d at 149 (citing Santiago, 662 A.2d at 614 , and Chmiel, 738 A.2d at 422 ).

2012Applying this principle in Santiago , we determined, "Like the defendant in Boyle who waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying in his first trial, [Santiago] voluntarily waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege when he decided to pursue an insanity defense in his first trial." Santiago, 662 A.2d at 615 .

2023To prevail on an insanity defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time he committed the offense, due to a defect of reason or disease of mind, he either did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know that the act was wrong. 18 Pa.C.S. § 315; Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458 , 587 A.2d 687, 690-91 (Pa. 1991).

2023To prevail on an insanity defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time he committed the offense, due to a defect of reason or disease of mind, he either did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know that the act was wrong. 18 Pa.C.S. § 315; Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458 , 587 A.2d 687, 690-91 (Pa. 1991).

2025See Yeomans, supra. Hence, the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant could not “demonstrate[] that an insanity defense would have been applicable here” and, in turn, did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.

2025See Yeomans, supra. Hence, the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant could not “demonstrate[] that an insanity defense would have been applicable here” and, in turn, did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.

2008See Clark, 548 U.S. at 771 , 126 S.Ct. at 2732 . 11 Although the matter of distinguishing the intent element of crimes from the insanity defense and guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict may entail some subtlety, this appeal is more straightforward than the present briefs portray, because Appellant’s trial objection was very limited.

2008See Clark, 548 U.S. at 771 , 126 S.Ct. at 2732 . 11 Although the matter of distinguishing the intent element of crimes from the insanity defense and guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict may entail some subtlety, this appeal is more straightforward than the present briefs portray, because Appellant’s trial objection was very limited.

2023Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 249 (Pa.Super. 2008) (holding that the jury was within their rights to disbelieve the defendant’s insanity defense and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses).

2008Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 249 (Pa.Super.2008) (holding that the jury was within their rights to disbelieve the defendant’s insanity defense and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses). ¶ 12 Our review of the record reflects that, in rendering the verdict, the trial court specifically stated Appellant did “not meet the McNaughton standard and was not insane at the time [of the murder], though [Appellant] was certainly suffering from mental disorders.” N.T., 6/24/06, at 20.

2023Op. at 39. 11 See id. at 4 n.7; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011). 12 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(d). [J-35A-2023 and J-35B-2023] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5 Mr. Brady: Certainly there is an element of an insanity defense.

2023Op. at 39. 11 See id. at 4 n.7; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011). 12 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(d). [J-35A-2023 and J-35B-2023] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5 Mr. Brady: Certainly there is an element of an insanity defense.

2023See id.; see also Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 739 (fact-finders are free to reject or accept an insanity defense), and Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“it is not the function of the appellate court - 14 - J-A02038-23 to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.

2023See id.; see also Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 739 (fact-finders are free to reject or accept an insanity defense), and Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283 , 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“it is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.

2016See Commonwealth v. Cross, 634 A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833 (1994), In Cross, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: . . .

2015See Commonwealth v. Cross, 634 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833 (1994), The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: . . .

2016See Commonwealth v. Cross, 634 A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833 (1994), In Cross, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: . . .

2016See Cross, supra at 175-76 .

2026The jury could therefore find that the defendant was guilty of committing an assault – having engaged in knowing or intentional conduct – but that issue would be separate from whether the defendant was insane, i.e., “laboring from a defect of reason so grave as to not have known the nature and quality of the acts they were doing, or if they did know the nature and quality of the acts, they were unable to comprehend that what they were doing was wrong.” Id. -8- J-S45007-25 Generally, then, the trial court may properly instruct the jury that “it must first determine that the Commonwealth has pro

2020In Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 , 980–81 (Pa.Super. 1999), this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the prosecution to admit evidence of defendant’s prior substance abuse in rebuttal after the defense had raised an insanity defense to the murder charge and had offered expert testimony to show the appellant’s mental illness was not the result of substance abuse.

2008As further developed below, in Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 519 Pa. 200 , 546 A.2d 601 (1988), this Court determined that Section 314(a) does not impose a burden of proof concerning a defendant’s mental illness on either party, but rather, is implicated where an insanity defense fails but evidence of the defendant’s mental illness nevertheless “preponderates.” See id. at 212-13 , 546 A.2d at 607 .

2008As further developed below, in Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 519 Pa. 200 , 546 A.2d 601 (1988), this Court determined that Section 314(a) does not impose a burden of proof concerning a defendant’s mental illness on either party, but rather, is implicated where an insanity defense fails but evidence of the defendant’s mental illness nevertheless “preponderates.” See id. at 212-13 , 546 A.2d at 607 .

2019In the absence of an insanity defense, "evidence of mental illness is irrelevant and therefore, inadmissible." Id.

2017This limitation is set forth in Section 315(a) of the Crimes Code: The mental soundness of an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense. 18 Pa. C.S. § 315(a); see Hatfield, 579 A.2d at 947 (holding that evidence of mental illness is irrelevant to guilt where a defendant does not invoke an insanity defense). 6 Thus, under Section 314(a), if a defendant wishes to plead not guilty on the basis of his ment

2023The Third Circuit found that counsel was ineffective, reasoning that “though [defense counsel] may have found the strength of the government’s case daunting, we can imagine no reasonable professional calculation which would support [counsel’s] failure to conduct any pre-trial investigation into the facts and law of an insanity defense[.]” Id. at 190 .

2011See United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir.1997) (finding no reasonable basis where there was evidence of the defendant's psychosis but trial counsel did not pursue any investigation into an insanity defense); United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir.1989) ("Ineffectiveness is generally clear in the context of complete failure to investigate because counsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made.").