37 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1876–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clanton v. Teledyne Neoshogreen2 sentences2006Preliminarily, we observe that “ ‘[t]he fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.’ ” Clanton v. Teledyne Neosho, 960 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo.App.1998) (citation omitted). 2006Preliminarily, we observe that "`[t]he fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.'" Clanton v. Teledyne Neosho, 960 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo.App.1998) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State of Missouri v. Sylvester Portergreen2 sentences2024The doctrine was abolished on the basis that it required “appellate courts to engage in credibility determinations that are properly left to judges and juries sitting as triers of fact.” Id. at 213 ; see also State v. Pilant, 437 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (recognizing the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished the doctrine of destructive contradictions in Porter, because, among other reasons, it requires an appellate court “to act as the finder of fact”; the holding in Porter precludes this Court’s consideration of the doctrine and, therefore, limits its review of the appellant’s point 2024The doctrine was abolished on the basis that it required “appellate courts to engage in credibility determinations that are properly left to judges and juries sitting as triers of fact.” Id. at 213 ; see also State v. Pilant, 437 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (recognizing the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished the doctrine of destructive contradictions in Porter, because, among other reasons, it requires an appellate court “to act as the finder of fact”; the holding in Porter precludes this Court’s consideration of the doctrine and, therefore, limits its review of the appellant’s point | 1 | 1 |
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MATTHEW G. PILANTgreen2 sentences2024The doctrine was abolished on the basis that it required “appellate courts to engage in credibility determinations that are properly left to judges and juries sitting as triers of fact.” Id. at 213 ; see also State v. Pilant, 437 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (recognizing the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished the doctrine of destructive contradictions in Porter, because, among other reasons, it requires an appellate court “to act as the finder of fact”; the holding in Porter precludes this Court’s consideration of the doctrine and, therefore, limits its review of the appellant’s point 2024Like this Court in Porter and Pilant, this Court limits its review of Point II to “the sufficiency of the evidence under our general standard of review for such challenges.” Pilant, 437 S.W.3d at 839 . | 1 | 1 |
SPRINGLEAF FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. BENNIE A. SHULL, Defendant-Respondent.green1 sentence2022Additionally, a key consideration under the waiver doctrine is to avoid requiring the parties “to litigate the same underlying facts before two separate tribunals,” which has been held to be “antagonistic to judicial economy, the purposes of arbitration, and common sense.” Millennium, 562 $.W.3d at 378-79 (citing Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1094 ); Springleaf, 500 S.W.3d at 281 (noting duplication of efforts and inconsistent judgments may be indicative of waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Waxmangreen1 sentence2020“We review the trial court's ruling in closing argument for an abuse of discretion.” Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal citation omitted); see also Travelers Commercial Cas. | 1 | 1 |
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C.green1 sentence2020Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 94 (Mo. banc 2010) (providing that the consideration of factors such as race is equally “reprehensible” even where an employer has other reasons for its decision). | 1 | 1 |
Arthur Fels Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Pollockgreen1 sentence2014Co. v. Pollock, 149 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Mo. 1941) (“inadequacy does not constitute a failure of consideration”). 5 Even if courts (in hindsight) continue to indulge the now-preempted notion that arbitration is always “bad” for the employee and “good” for the employer, it does not follow that any employee agreeing to arbitrate her claims has made a bad bargain when viewed at the time the promise is made, as a consideration analysis demands. | 1 | 1 |
Lake Cable, Inc. v. Trittlergreen1 sentence2001A finding of consideration does not depend on “the existence of a consideration clause or a money payment.” Lake Cable, Inc. v. Trittler, 914 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Mo.App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Halupa v. Halupagreen1 sentence1999Halupa v. Halupa, 943 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Reedgreen1 sentence1994In re Marriage of Reed, 762 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Mo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Stotzenberger v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences1976Stotzenberger v. Perkins, 332 Mo. 391 , 58 S.W.2d 983, 986 [2] (1933); 154 A.L.R. 11 . 1976Stotzenberger v. Perkins, 332 Mo. 391 , 58 S.W.2d 983, 986 [2] (1933); 154 A.L.R. 11 . | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Pagegreen2 sentences1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Colandrogreen2 sentences1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Steensengreen2 sentences1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1 |
McNaulty v. Stategreen2 sentences1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Uptegrovegreen1 sentence2024The doctrine was abolished on the basis that it required “appellate courts to engage in credibility determinations that are properly left to judges and juries sitting as triers of fact.” Id. at 213 ; see also State v. Pilant, 437 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (recognizing the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished the doctrine of destructive contradictions in Porter, because, among other reasons, it requires an appellate court “to act as the finder of fact”; the holding in Porter precludes this Court’s consideration of the doctrine and, therefore, limits its review of the appellant’s point | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fontaine v. Boatmens' Savings Institution
neutral
2 sentences1909As to the parties to a deed, the consideration clause is only in the nature of a receipt and is open to explanations and contradictions, not for the purpose of defeating the deed as a conveyance, but for the purpose of showing the true consideration. [Fontaine v. Boatmen’s Savings Institution, 57 Mo. 552 ; Wood v. Broadley, 76 Mo. 33 .] Generally, however, the recital in the consideration clause is not evidence of the amount paid, or the value of the premises as to third persons.” As there was no proof of the amount of the consideration paid by the plaintiff or by Henry to the defendant, we th 1886As to the parties to a deed, the consideration clause is ;prima facie evidence, but it has the force and effect only óf a receipt, and is open to explanation and contradiction, not for the purpose of defeating the deed as a conveyance, but for the purpose of showing the true consideration. 57 Mo. 552 ; 76 Mo. 33 . | 3 | 1886–1909 |
Hollocher v. Hollocher
neutral
2 sentences1904Thus in O’Day v. Conn, 131 Mo. l. c. 327, it was said: “It is now well settled that ‘not only the amount of the consideration may be questioned by oral testimony, but the parties are not estopped from showing the character of the consideration to be different from that stated. ’ ’ ’ [Hollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. 267 ; Fontaine v. Bank, 57 Mo. 552 ; Henderson v. Henderson’s Exrs., 13 Mo. 151 ; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 465 ; Laudman v. Ingram, 49 Mo. 212 ; Jackson v. Railroad, 54 Mo. App. 642 ; Squier v. Evans, 127 Mo. 514 .] The evidence offered by plaintiff and admitted by tlie court had 1886Liebke v. Knapp, 79 Mo. 27 ; Fontaine v. Boatmen’s Sa vings Institution, 57 Mo. 561; Hollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. 267 ; Baile v. Insurance Co., 73 Mo. 371 Hall v. Morgan, 79 Mo. 51 . | 3 | 1883–1904 |
Henderson v. Henderson's Executors
neutral
2 sentences1904Thus in O’Day v. Conn, 131 Mo. l. c. 327, it was said: “It is now well settled that ‘not only the amount of the consideration may be questioned by oral testimony, but the parties are not estopped from showing the character of the consideration to be different from that stated. ’ ’ ’ [Hollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. 267 ; Fontaine v. Bank, 57 Mo. 552 ; Henderson v. Henderson’s Exrs., 13 Mo. 151 ; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 465 ; Laudman v. Ingram, 49 Mo. 212 ; Jackson v. Railroad, 54 Mo. App. 642 ; Squier v. Evans, 127 Mo. 514 .] The evidence offered by plaintiff and admitted by tlie court had 1876Henderson’s Ex’rs ( 13 Mo. 151 ), it was observed, “ how far the ordinary clause in a deed, acknowledging the receipt of the purchase money, ought to preclude all parol evidence to show the real consideration, either as to amount or character, is a question upon which the decisions have not been uniform. | 2 | 1876–1904 |
Rhonda J. Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust
green
1 sentence2022Additionally, a key consideration under the waiver doctrine is to avoid requiring the parties “to litigate the same underlying facts before two separate tribunals,” which has been held to be “antagonistic to judicial economy, the purposes of arbitration, and common sense.” Millennium, 562 $.W.3d at 378-79 (citing Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1094 ); Springleaf, 500 S.W.3d at 281 (noting duplication of efforts and inconsistent judgments may be indicative of waiver). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Morrow is Irrelevant In an effort to avoid the obvious and unavoidable conclusions of a consideration analysis focusing on the multifaceted exchange of promises between her and Bristol Care regarding her promotion to facility administrator, Ms. Baker relies heavily on Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo.App.2008). 2014Morrow is Irrelevant In an effort to avoid the obvious and unavoidable conclusions of a consideration analysis focusing on the multifaceted exchange of promises between her and Bristol Care regarding her promotion to facility administrator, Ms. Baker relies heavily on Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. App. 2008). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Stowe v. Spence
green
1 sentence2011The court in Petry employed the Michel four-factor best interest test, which was overruled in Stowe, 41 S.W.3d at 469 ; however, the consideration of such factors still would be consistent with an analysis that requires the trial court to consider "all relevant factors.” | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cook v. State
neutral
2 sentences1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Burris
green
1 sentence1975The court quoted Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343 , 80 A. 571, 576 (1911), “‘The-practical effect of such cross-examination may well have been to brand the defendant as a bad man, and to cause the jurors to approach a consideration of his defense from that standpoint, or at least to raise doubts in their minds in passing upon his character evidence.’ ” See also Cook v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 285 , 253 P. 1029 (1927); McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317 , 135 S.W.2d 987, 988 (1939); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524 , 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 [2-5] (1937); State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628 , 190 N.W. 38 (1922 | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Payne v. Smith
green
1 sentence1968The appellant also cites a list of contributory negligence cases, instances of contributory negligence as a matter of law (Roux v. Pettus, Mo. App., 293 S.W.2d 144 ; Payne v. Smith, Mo., 322 S.W.2d 764 ) but it is not necessary here to enter upon a consideration of the doctrine of contributory negligence and its rationale. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Roux v. Pettus
green
1 sentence1968The appellant also cites a list of contributory negligence cases, instances of contributory negligence as a matter of law (Roux v. Pettus, Mo. App., 293 S.W.2d 144 ; Payne v. Smith, Mo., 322 S.W.2d 764 ) but it is not necessary here to enter upon a consideration of the doctrine of contributory negligence and its rationale. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State Ex Rel. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Allen
neutral
1 sentence1949The question of what causes of action are included (that is the question of the power of the agent to receive service) is a matter of substantive right." [ 345 Mo. 671 , 136 S.W.2d 311 ] (Italics ours). | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Soukup v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.
green
1 sentence1944Corporation, 108 S.W.2d 86 , l.c. 92.] To the above we should add: Courts are not permitted to exercise their inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists. [State ex rel. v. Shain et al., 166 S.W.2d 484 , l.c. 487.] In the case at bar, while the provision for term insurance does not appear in the consideration clause, it is stated in said clause that the contract is "subject to the conditions herein;" and immediately below the consideration clause, on the front page of the policy, in large type, appears a statement directing attention to conditions affecting the | 1 | 1944–1944 |
State Ex Rel. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Shain
green
1 sentence1944Corporation, 108 S.W.2d 86 , l.c. 92.] To the above we should add: Courts are not permitted to exercise their inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists. [State ex rel. v. Shain et al., 166 S.W.2d 484 , l.c. 487.] In the case at bar, while the provision for term insurance does not appear in the consideration clause, it is stated in said clause that the contract is "subject to the conditions herein;" and immediately below the consideration clause, on the front page of the policy, in large type, appears a statement directing attention to conditions affecting the | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Edwards County v. White County
green
1 sentence1929In Edwards County v. White County, 85 Ill. 390 , a county boundary line was considered. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Edwards v. Latimer green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Goodman v. Griffith neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Third National Bank v. St. Charles Savings Bank green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| McDaniel v. United Railways Co. green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Laclede Laundry Co. v. Freudenstein neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Versteeg v. Wabash Railroad neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Patterson v. Cappon neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Gore v. Brockman neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Trent v. Lechtman Printing Co. neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Raymond v. White neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Giles v. Bradley neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Rice v. Kansas Pacific Railway green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| George v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Shickle v. Watts green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Van Cleve v. Berkey green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Berry v. Rood green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Laudman v. Ingram neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Squier v. Evans neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Witbeck v. . Waine green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Dobyns v. Rice neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Holt v. Holt neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Armstrong v. Agricultural Insurance green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Devens v. Mechanics & Traders' Insurance green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Brink v. . Hanover Fire Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Goodwin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.