consideration factors in Oregon

2021Id. at 436 .

2018Id. at 436 , 877 P.2d 1196 .

2014See, e.g., People v. Chung, 195 Cal App 4th 721, 732, 110 Cal Rptr 3d 253, 261 (2010) (exigent circumstances exception permitted warrantless entry where officer had probable cause to believe that the crime of animal cruelty was in progress); State v. Stone, 321 Mont 489, 498 , 92 P3d 1178 (2004) (probable cause to believe that crime of animal cruelty was in progress and harm to animals was imminent permitted warrantless entry and seizure of starving rabbits); Pine v. State, 889 SW2d 625, 631 (Tex App 1994) (warrantless seizure permissible where “deputy had probable cause to believe the animal

2014See, e.g., People v. Chung, 195 Cal App 4th 721, 732, 110 Cal Rptr 3d 253, 261 (2010) (exigent circumstances exception permitted warrantless entry where officer had probable cause to believe that the crime of animal cruelty was in progress); State v. Stone, 321 Mont 489, 498 , 92 P3d 1178 (2004) (probable cause to believe that crime of animal cruelty was in progress and harm to animals was imminent permitted warrantless entry and seizure of starving rabbits); Pine v. State, 889 SW2d 625, 631 (Tex App 1994) (warrantless seizure permissible where “deputy had probable cause to believe the animal

1976If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important respects, he may permit its introduction in evidence. * * *’ [Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d 914 (9th Cir 1960).]” State v. Anderson, 242 Or 368, 374-75 , 409 P2d 681 (1966). *237 Using the criteria set out in Anderson , we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the pistol.

1976If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important respects, he may permit its introduction in evidence. * * *’ [Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d 914 (9th Cir 1960).]” State v. Anderson, 242 Or 368, 374-75 , 409 P2d 681 (1966). *237 Using the criteria set out in Anderson , we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the pistol.

2024If a youth is being supervised by the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA), at least 45 days before the hearing, unless Cite as 331 Or App 1 (2024) 3 good cause is shown, OYA is required to file certain records and materials for the court’s consideration at the hearing.

2018We concluded that, "[b]ecause the state's issue preclusion instruction removed *440 an element from the jury's consideration in violation of defendant's right to a jury trial under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the trial court erred in giving the state's instruction." Id. at 194 , 335 P.3d 1266 .

2018We concluded that, "[b]ecause the state's issue preclusion instruction removed *440 an element from the jury's consideration in violation of defendant's right to a jury trial under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the trial court erred in giving the state's instruction." Id. at 194 , 335 P.3d 1266 .

2014Although that statutory option is a consideration in our analysis, see Stevens, 311 Or at 129-30 , defendants did not impeach the officer’s testimony by offering evidence that, if the officer had used that option, he could have obtained a warrant more quickly. 14 Other state courts also have held that warrantless entries, searches, or seizures undertaken to protect animals are permissible when there is proba- ble cause to believe that a crime is being committed and warrantless action is necessary to prevent the criminal act from causing further serious injury.

2013Such factors include “the opportunity that the witness had at the time to get a clear view of the persons involved in the crime and the attention he or she gave to their identifying features, the timing and completeness of the description given by the witness after the event, the certainty expressed by the witness in that description and in making the subsequent identification, and, of course, the lapse of time between the original observation and the subsequent identification.” Id. at 737-38 (quoting Classen, 285 Or at 232-33 ).

2012In fact, the court emphasized, “to give meaning to our recognition * * * that the statute must be interpreted in light of the purposes of the [act], it is essential that we consider the factors which make up the ‘nature of work’ test.” Id. at 197 .

2012The court explained that, although “control is an essential ingredient in the test for determining who is a servant within the meaning of the [workers’ compensation act],” the statutes do not “preclude a consideration of the factors germane to the relative nature of the work test in deciding whether there was sufficient control to denominate the relationship as one of master and servant.” Id.

2008We begin our analysis by noting that petitioner’s only argument in support of its petition for attorney fees is that “[t]his case involved a tax assessment against a small employer, the cost of which to defend was significant in relation to the amount wrongfully assessed.” However, in Barbara Parmenter Living Trust v. Lemon, 345 Or 334, 343-44 , 194 P3d 796 (2008), this court held that the reasonableness of the amount of fees requested in light of the recovery made was not a relevant consideration under the factors listed in ORS 20.075(1).

2008We begin our analysis by noting that petitioner’s only argument in support of its petition for attorney fees is that “[t]his case involved a tax assessment against a small employer, the cost of which to defend was significant in relation to the amount wrongfully assessed.” However, in Barbara Parmenter Living Trust v. Lemon, 345 Or 334, 343-44 , 194 P3d 796 (2008), this court held that the reasonableness of the amount of fees requested in light of the recovery made was not a relevant consideration under the factors listed in ORS 20.075(1).

2007In some ways, the facts of this case resemble those in State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 572 , 113 P3d 423 , cert den, 546 US 1044 (2005), even though the Gibson court did not identify “plan” or “preparation” as a consideration in its analysis of the OEC 404(3) question.

2007ORCP 15 also does not aid defendant. 7 We assume defendant refers specifically to ORCP 15 D, which provides: “The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made, or allow any other pleading or motion after the time limited by the procedural rules, or by an order enlarge such time.” In Husted v. SCI Oregon Funeral Services, Inc., 209 Or App 45, 49 , 146 P3d 376 (2006), we held that ORCP 15 D did not excuse the plaintiffs untimely filing of her attorney fee statement under ORCP 68 C(4)(a), because the plaintiff had never sought an extension

2007ORCP 15 also does not aid defendant. 7 We assume defendant refers specifically to ORCP 15 D, which provides: “The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made, or allow any other pleading or motion after the time limited by the procedural rules, or by an order enlarge such time.” In Husted v. SCI Oregon Funeral Services, Inc., 209 Or App 45, 49 , 146 P3d 376 (2006), we held that ORCP 15 D did not excuse the plaintiffs untimely filing of her attorney fee statement under ORCP 68 C(4)(a), because the plaintiff had never sought an extension

2007In some ways, the facts of this case resemble those in State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 572 , 113 P3d 423 , cert den, 546 US 1044 (2005), even though the Gibson court did not identify “plan” or “preparation” as a consideration in its analysis of the OEC 404(3) question.

2007In some ways, the facts of this case resemble those in State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 572 , 113 P3d 423 , cert den, 546 US 1044 (2005), even though the Gibson court did not identify “plan” or “preparation” as a consideration in its analysis of the OEC 404(3) question.

2007Tsukamaki, 199 Or App at 584 .

2005However, Kunze , issued after the trial court's decision in this case, makes clear that whether assets have been commingled with the marital estate ordinarily is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the statutory presumption of equal contribution has been rebutted. 337 Or. at 142 n. 12, 92 P.3d 100 .

2005However, Kunze , issued after the trial court's decision in this case, makes clear that whether assets have been commingled with the marital estate ordinarily is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the statutory presumption of equal contribution has been rebutted. 337 Or. at 142 n. 12, 92 P.3d 100 .

2004We held in Klein that the Hawthorne store did not have characteristics sufficient to establish that Fred Meyer had “expressly or impliedly invited the public to use the Hawthorne store as a forum for public assembly.” Klein, 168 Or App at 269 .

1995For example, in McClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Or 629 , 265 P 412 (1928), the Supreme Court determined that the University of Oregon could not issue construction bonds without violating the constitutional prohibition on the state incurring indebtedness.

1987The final determination is “tempered” by the court’s consideration of factors such as the interrelationship of child support and the division of property, indirect forms of child support, the income of a spouse or domestic associate, special hardships and the ability to pay. 290 Or at 685 .

1983(Emphasis supplied.) See also 1000 Friends v. LCDC, 292 Or 735 , 642 P2d 1158 (1982). *235 In this case, LCDC’s “built or committed” exceptions policy excuses local governments from the consideration of factors made mandatory by Goal 2.

1983(Emphasis supplied.) See also 1000 Friends v. LCDC, 292 Or 735 , 642 P2d 1158 (1982). *235 In this case, LCDC’s “built or committed” exceptions policy excuses local governments from the consideration of factors made mandatory by Goal 2.

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1976Affirmed. 1 State v. Weller, 263 Or 132 , 501 P2d 794 (1972); State v. Oare, 249 Or 597 , 439 P2d 885 (1968); State v. Moore, 14 Or App 268 , 511 P2d 880 (1973).

1959It has been said that an expert is one who has acquired “certain habits of judgment, based on experience or special observation.” Kelley v. Richardson, 69 Mich 430 , 37 NW 514 (1888).

1959It has been said that an expert is one who has acquired “certain habits of judgment, based on experience or special observation.” Kelley v. Richardson, 69 Mich 430 , 37 NW 514 (1888).