105 New York opinions name it 10 courts 1843–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eschbach v. Eschbachgreen2 sentences2025See Eschbach v. Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167 (1982); see also Matter of Kadi W. v. ACS-Kings , 167 AD3d 757 (2d Dept. 2018) . 2009As explained in our prior decision, a determination of the child’s best interests requires the consideration of factors “such as maintaining stability for the child, the child’s wishes, the home environment with each parent, each parent’s past performance, relative fitness, ability to guide and provide for the child’s overall well-being, and the willingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other parent” (Matter of Smith v Miller, 4 AD3d 697, 698 [2004]; see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 172 [1982]; Matter of Fullam v Fullam, 39 AD3d 897, 897 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 802 [20 | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Jennifer VV. v. Lawrence WW.green2 sentences2022Accordingly, Family Court preceded to conduct a best interests analysis, which involves "the consideration of factors such as the past performance and relative fitness of the parents, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child[] and the other parent, their fidelity to prior court orders and their ability to both provide a stable home environment and further the child[]'s overall well-being" ( Matter of Jennifer VV. v Lawrence WW. , 186 AD3d 946, 948 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Turner v Turner , 166 AD3d 1339 , 1339 [2018]). 2022Accordingly, Family Court preceded to conduct a best interests analysis, which involves "the consideration of factors such as the past performance and relative fitness of the parents, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child[] and the other parent, their fidelity to prior court orders and their ability to both provide a stable home environment and further the child[]'s overall well-being" ( Matter of Jennifer VV. v Lawrence WW. , 186 AD3d 946, 948 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Turner v Turner , 166 AD3d 1339 , 1339 [2018]). | 2 | 2 |
Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.green2 sentences2015The determination of whether a lawsuit warrants certification as a class action under the relevant statutory criteria rests within the sound discretion of the trial court (see City of New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499, 509 [2010]; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43, 52 [1999]), and must be grounded upon a consideration of the factors set forth in CPLR 901 (a) and 902. 2015The determination of whether a lawsuit warrants certification as a class action under the relevant statutory criteria rests within the sound discretion of the trial court ( see City of New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499, 509 ; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43, 52 ), and must be grounded upon a consideration of the factors set forth in CPLR 901(a) and 902. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Glynngreen2 sentences2013Nor do we find that the deficiencies in the allocution are cured by defendant’s written appeal waiver, inasmuch as that document erroneously sets forth the purported consideration for the waiver 3 with no attempt to correct the inaccurate information or otherwise detail the correct terms (compare People v Glynn, 73 AD3d 1290, 1290-1291 [2010]). 2013Nor do we find that the deficiencies in the allocution are cured by defendant’s written appeal waiver, inasmuch as that document erroneously sets forth the purported consideration for the waiver 3 with no attempt to correct the inaccurate information or otherwise detail the correct terms (compare People v Glynn, 73 AD3d 1290, 1290-1291 [2010]). | 2 | 2 |
Farnham v. Kittingergreen2 sentences2013It is the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing that the claimed exception applies and, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, we must strictly construe the exception so as not to defeat the statute’s broad purpose (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 529-530 [1994]; Morales v Coram Materials Corp., 51 AD3d 86, 90-91 [2008]). 2013It is the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing that the claimed exception applies and, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, we must strictly construe the exception so as not to defeat the statute’s broad purpose (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 529-530 [1994]; Morales v Coram Materials Corp., 51 AD3d 86, 90-91 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Dean v. Glens Falls Country Club, Inc.green2 sentences2013Shooting Preserve, 192 AD2d 633, 633 [1993]; Dean v Glens Falls Country Club, 170 AD2d 798, 799 [1991]). 2013Shooting Preserve, 192 AD2d 633, 633 [1993]; Dean v Glens Falls Country Club, 170 AD2d 798, 799 [1991]). | 2 | 2 |
Bellone v. J.R. Shooting Preserve, Inc.green2 sentences2013Shooting Preserve, 192 AD2d 633, 633 [1993]; Dean v Glens Falls Country Club, 170 AD2d 798, 799 [1991]). 2013Shooting Preserve, 192 AD2d 633, 633 [1993]; Dean v Glens Falls Country Club, 170 AD2d 798, 799 [1991]). | 2 | 2 |
Morales v. Coram Materials Corp.green2 sentences2013It is the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing that the claimed exception applies and, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, we must strictly construe the exception so as not to defeat the statute’s broad purpose (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 529-530 [1994]; Morales v Coram Materials Corp., 51 AD3d 86, 90-91 [2008]). 2013It is the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing that the claimed exception applies and, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, we must strictly construe the exception so as not to defeat the statute’s broad purpose (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 529-530 [1994]; Morales v Coram Materials Corp., 51 AD3d 86, 90-91 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc.green2 sentences2011As the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Cumberland, the decision to apply collateral estoppel should be made upon a consideration of the doctrine’s underlying purpose, namely, “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose” (262 Conn at 59, 808 A2d at 1117 , quoting Isaac v Truck Serv., Inc., 253 Conn 416, 422, 752 A2d 509, 513 [2000]). 2011As the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Cumberland, the decision to apply collateral estoppel should be made upon a consideration of the doctrine’s underlying purpose, namely, “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose” (262 Conn at 59, 808 A2d at 1117 , quoting Isaac v Truck Serv., Inc., 253 Conn 416, 422, 752 A2d 509, 513 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Millergreen2 sentences2009As explained in our prior decision, a determination of the child’s best interests requires the consideration of factors “such as maintaining stability for the child, the child’s wishes, the home environment with each parent, each parent’s past performance, relative fitness, ability to guide and provide for the child’s overall well-being, and the willingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other parent” (Matter of Smith v Miller, 4 AD3d 697, 698 [2004]; see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 172 [1982]; Matter of Fullam v Fullam, 39 AD3d 897, 897 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 802 [20 2007Accordingly, the father is correct that Family Court erred in failing to consider whether granting the parties joint custody and awarding him physical custody would be in the child’s best interests, a determination that requires the consideration of such factors as “maintaining stability for the child, the child’s wishes, the home environment with each parent, each parent’s past performance, relative fitness, ability to guide and provide for the child’s overall well-being, and the willingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other parent” (Matter of Smith v Miller, 4 AD3d 697, | 2 | 2 |
MATTER OF TROPEA v. Tropeagreen1 sentence2025"Where, as here, a parent seeks to relocate with the child and an initial custody determination has yet to be rendered, the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) need not be strictly applied" ( Matter of Shane FF. v Alicia GG. , 199 AD3d 1264, 1265 [3d Dept 2021] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Alexander K. v Jaheria L. , 230 AD3d 966 , 966-967 [3d Dept 2024]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Shane FF. v. Alicia GG.green1 sentence2025"Where, as here, a parent seeks to relocate with the child and an initial custody determination has yet to be rendered, the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) need not be strictly applied" ( Matter of Shane FF. v Alicia GG. , 199 AD3d 1264, 1265 [3d Dept 2021] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Alexander K. v Jaheria L. , 230 AD3d 966 , 966-967 [3d Dept 2024]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Christopher L. v. Paula L.green1 sentence2024The father appeals. [FN1] "In an initial custody determination, Family Court's paramount consideration is the best interests of the children," which requires the consideration of factors such as "the quality of the parents' respective home environments, the need for stability in the children's lives, each parent's willingness to promote a positive relationship between the children and the other parent and each parent's past performance, relative fitness and ability to provide for the children's intellectual and emotional development and overall well-being" ( Matter of William Z. v Kimberly Z. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Stephen G. v. Lara H.green1 sentence2024"Although joint legal custody is an aspirational goal in every custody matter, joint legal custody may not be feasible or appropriate in cases where the parents are unable to effectively and directly communicate with one another to care for the child[ren]'s needs" ( Matter of Brenna EE. v Andrew DD. , 214 AD3d 1039 , 1040 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Stephen G. v Lara H. , 139 AD3d 1131, 1132 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1187 [2016]). | 1 | 1 |
Stephen G. v. Lara H.green1 sentence2024"Although joint legal custody is an aspirational goal in every custody matter, joint legal custody may not be feasible or appropriate in cases where the parents are unable to effectively and directly communicate with one another to care for the child[ren]'s needs" ( Matter of Brenna EE. v Andrew DD. , 214 AD3d 1039 , 1040 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Stephen G. v Lara H. , 139 AD3d 1131, 1132 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1187 [2016]). | 1 | 1 |
Vickie F. v. Joseph G.green1 sentence2021We accord great deference to the fact-finding and credibility determinations of Family Court in determining that question, and will not disturb its findings so long as they are supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Vickie F. v Joseph G. , 195 AD3d 1064, 1066 [2021]; Matter of Kelly CC. v Zaron BB. , 191 AD3d 1101 , 1103 [2021]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Jamie UU. v. Dametrius VV.green1 sentence2021The question accordingly became what custodial arrangement would serve the best interests of the child, an assessment involving the consideration of factors including "the quality of each parent's home environment, the need for stability in the child's life, the parents' past performance, the willingness of each parent to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent and the ability to provide for the child's intellectual [*2]and emotional development and overall well-being" ( Matter of Jamie UU. v Dametrius VV. , 196 AD3d 759, 760-761 [2021]; see Matter of Daniel G. v | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Daniel G. v. Marie H.green1 sentence2021The question accordingly became what custodial arrangement would serve the best interests of the child, an assessment involving the consideration of factors including "the quality of each parent's home environment, the need for stability in the child's life, the parents' past performance, the willingness of each parent to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent and the ability to provide for the child's intellectual [*2]and emotional development and overall well-being" ( Matter of Jamie UU. v Dametrius VV. , 196 AD3d 759, 760-761 [2021]; see Matter of Daniel G. v | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of LeadingAge N.Y., Inc. v. Shahgreen | 1 | 1 |
NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. New York State Office of Parksgreen1 sentence2020We accordingly undertake the inquiry first set forth in Boreali v Axelrod ( 71 NY2d 1 [1987]) to determine whether petitioner exceeded the legislative power delegated to her, which involves the consideration of factors such as: "whether (1) the agency did more than balanc[e] costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines, but instead made value judgments entail[ing] difficult and complex choices between broad policy goals to resolve social problems; (2) the agency merely filled in details of a broad policy or if it wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules wit | 1 | 1 |
| Community Board 7 v. Schaffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Weyerhaeuser Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Puccia v. Farleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cummings v. Central Tractor Farm & Country, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Lawton v. Lawtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Southammavong v. Sisengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Brown v. Akatsugreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of New York v. Maulgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seacord v. Seacordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cruz v. New York City Housing Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mosher v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Freeman v. Freemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oneida County Commissioner of Social Services v. William S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Santos v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Grotongreen | 1 | 1 |
| MATTER OF KING v. New York State Div. of Parolegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbertred | 1 | 1 |
| MATTER OF CASSANO v. Cassanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
M'Crea v. Purmort
green
2 sentences1920In McCrea v. Purmort ( 16 Wend. 460 ) the law is thus stated: “ The consideration clause in a deed, that is, the clause acknowledging the receipt of a certain sum of money as the consideration of the conveyance or transfer, is open to explanation by parol proof. 1858By the later cases, it is well settled that that clause may be contradicted by oral evidence as well in regard to the amount expressed as to the fact of its payment, and also as to the quality of the consideration. ( Sheppard v. Little, 14 John., 210; Bowen v. Bell, 20 id., 338 ; *531 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend., 460 ; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306 .) If the opinion of Mr. Justice Cowen in McCrea v. Purmort is to be followed, and I do not see why it should nut be, the consideration clause is of no greater effect than a separate receipt for the money, which might always be explained. | 7 | 1843–1920 |
People v. Taranovich
green
2 sentences1996In any event, after a consideration of the factors delineated in People v Taranovich ( 37 NY2d 442 ), we find that the defendant was not denied a speedy trial since much of the delay resulted from his deliberate avoidance of apprehension (see, People v Cropper, supra; People v Morales, 199 AD2d 284 ), and there is no indication that the defense was impaired by reason of the delay (see, Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530 ; People v Penna, 203 AD2d 392 ). 1994In any event, after a consideration of the factors set forth in People v Taranovich ( 37 NY2d 442 ), we find the defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. | 5 | 1987–1996 |
Adams v. Hull
neutral
2 sentences1907For earlier cases illustrating the application of the same principle, see Adams v. Hull ( 2 Den. 306 ); Wheeler v. Billings ( 38 N. Y. 263 ). 1858By the later cases, it is well settled that that clause may be contradicted by oral evidence as well in regard to the amount expressed as to the fact of its payment, and also as to the quality of the consideration. ( Sheppard v. Little, 14 John., 210; Bowen v. Bell, 20 id., 338 ; *531 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend., 460 ; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306 .) If the opinion of Mr. Justice Cowen in McCrea v. Purmort is to be followed, and I do not see why it should nut be, the consideration clause is of no greater effect than a separate receipt for the money, which might always be explained. | 5 | 1858–1907 |
People Ex Rel. Parker v. Hasenauer
green
2 sentences1999Parker v Hasenauer, 62 NY2d 777, 779 ). 1999Parker v Hasenauer, 62 NY2d 777, 779 ). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Wheeler v. . Billings
neutral
2 sentences1907For earlier cases illustrating the application of the same principle, see Adams v. Hull ( 2 Den. 306 ); Wheeler v. Billings ( 38 N. Y. 263 ). 1894Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263 ; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54, 59 ; Ferris v. Hard, 135 N. Y. 354, 363 , 32 N. E. 129 ; Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455 ; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306 . | 2 | 1894–1907 |
Shephard v. Little
neutral
2 sentences1858By the later cases, it is well settled that that clause may be contradicted by oral evidence as well in regard to the amount expressed as to the fact of its payment, and also as to the quality of the consideration. ( Sheppard v. Little, 14 John., 210; Bowen v. Bell, 20 id., 338 ; *531 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend., 460 ; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306 .) If the opinion of Mr. Justice Cowen in McCrea v. Purmort is to be followed, and I do not see why it should nut be, the consideration clause is of no greater effect than a separate receipt for the money, which might always be explained. 1858By the later cases, it is well settled that that clause may be contradicted by oral evidence as well in regard to the amount expressed as to the fact of its payment, and also as to the quality of the consideration. ( Sheppard v. Little, 14 John., 210; Bowen v. Bell, 20 id., 338 ; *531 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend., 460 ; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306 .) If the opinion of Mr. Justice Cowen in McCrea v. Purmort is to be followed, and I do not see why it should nut be, the consideration clause is of no greater effect than a separate receipt for the money, which might always be explained. | 2 | 1858–1878 |
Witbeck v. . Waine
green
2 sentences1873It was the obligation of the purchasers which was left open for adjustment when the deed was given; and although the execution and acceptance of a deed may be evidence prima facie of the completion of the whole contract, the presumption is, in this case, rebutted by proof of the express agreement of the parties. ( Wilbech v. Waine, 16 N.Y., 532 ; Morris v. Whitcher, 20 id., 41.) Nor does the principle which excludes proof of a parol cotemporaneous agreement to contradict, supplement or vary a written instrument, apply to prevent a recovery in this action. 1873It was the obligation of the purchasers which was left open for adjustment when the deed was given; and although the execution and acceptance of a deed may be evidence prima facie of the completion of the whole contract, the presumption is, in this case, rebutted by proof of the express agreement of the parties. ( Wilbech v. Waine, 16 N. Y., 532 ; Morris v. Whitcher, 20 id., 41.) Hor does the principle which excludes proof "of a parol eoteinporaneous agreement to contradict, supplement or vary a written instrument, apply to prevent a recovery in this action. | 2 | 1873–1873 |
People v. Linares
green
1 sentence2023After conducting such an inquiry, the court should grant a defendant's motion for substitution only upon a showing of "good cause," which is to be determined based upon a consideration of such factors as "'the timing of the defendant's request, its effect on the progress of the case and whether counsel will likely provide the defendant with meaningful assistance'" ( People v Porto , 16 NY3d at 100 , quoting People v Linares , 2 NY3d 507, 510 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Toledo
green
1 sentence2023Here, "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that defendant's complaints about defense counsel suggested a serious possibility of good cause for a substitution of counsel requiring a need for further inquiry . . . the court afforded defendant the opportunity to express his objections concerning defense counsel" and reasonably concluded that his objections were without merit ( People v Bethany , 144 AD3d 1666, 1669 ; see People v Scott , 189 AD3d 2110 , 2110; People v Toledo , 144 AD3d 1332, 1334 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Bethany
green
1 sentence2023Here, "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that defendant's complaints about defense counsel suggested a serious possibility of good cause for a substitution of counsel requiring a need for further inquiry . . . the court afforded defendant the opportunity to express his objections concerning defense counsel" and reasonably concluded that his objections were without merit ( People v Bethany , 144 AD3d 1666, 1669 ; see People v Scott , 189 AD3d 2110 , 2110; People v Toledo , 144 AD3d 1332, 1334 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Porto
green
1 sentence2023After conducting such an inquiry, the court should grant a defendant's motion for substitution only upon a showing of "good cause," which is to be determined based upon a consideration of such factors as "'the timing of the defendant's request, its effect on the progress of the case and whether counsel will likely provide the defendant with meaningful assistance'" ( People v Porto , 16 NY3d at 100 , quoting People v Linares , 2 NY3d 507, 510 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Boreali v. Axelrod green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolk green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People ex rel. Marvin v. Bigger green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Moezinia v. Ashkenazi neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Greenough v. Imrie green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Marrero green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| MATTER OF SILMON v. Travis green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In re the Arbitration between Stewart Tabori & Chang, Inc. & Stewart green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Zurat v. Town Board, Stockport green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Venable v. Venable green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Blair v. Blair green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Morales neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Cropper green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Penna neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Barker v. Wingo green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Rosario green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Goldstein green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.