consideration factors in Alabama

1996Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank , 568 So.2d 779 (Ala. 1990).

1995Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank, 568 So.2d 779 (Ala.1990).

2015Ordinarily, both of these determinations will be issues of fact for the jury.’[ 4 ] “Harper, 399 So.2d at 253 .

2015As noted in Harper , however, “[e]ach case will present its own set of facts against which the § 520 guidelines will apply,” and, “[a] finding, guided by a consideration of factors outlined in the Restatement, that the blaster was ‘one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity’ ” is an “issue[ ] of fact for the jury.” 399 So.2d at 253 .

1999Our supreme court recognized in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507 (Ala.1997) (BMW II), that the three guideposts set out by the United States Supreme Court did not exclude a court’s consideration of factors the Alabama Supreme Court had previously prescribed for Alabama courts to consider, in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986).

1999In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507 , (Ala.1997) (" BMW II "), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the three guideposts set out by the United States Supreme Court in BMW I did not exclude a court's consideration of the factors previously prescribed for Alabama courts in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).

1999Our supreme court recognized in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507 (Ala.1997) (BMW II), that the three guideposts set out by the United States Supreme Court did not exclude a court’s consideration of factors the Alabama Supreme Court had previously prescribed for Alabama courts to consider, in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986).

1999In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507 , (Ala.1997) (" BMW II "), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the three guideposts set out by the United States Supreme Court in BMW I did not exclude a court's consideration of the factors previously prescribed for Alabama courts in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), and Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).

1990Batson , 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 .

1990Batson , 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 .

2011See Ex parte Neal, 731 So.2d 621 (Ala.1999); and Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 469-70 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).” 753 So.2d at 1203-04 (footnote omitted).

1999See Ex parte Neal , [Ms. 1971139, January 8, 1999] 731 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1999); and Barbour v. State , 673 So.2d 461 , 469-470 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).

2011See Ex parte Neal, 731 So.2d 621 (Ala.1999); and Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 469-70 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).” 753 So.2d at 1203-04 (footnote omitted).

1999See Ex parte Neal , [Ms. 1971139, January 8, 1999] 731 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1999); and Barbour v. State , 673 So.2d 461 , 469-470 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).

2011See Ex parte Neal, 731 So.2d 621 (Ala.1999); and Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 469-70 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).” 753 So.2d at 1203-04 (footnote omitted).

1999See Ex parte Neal , [Ms. 1971139, January 8, 1999] 731 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1999); and Barbour v. State , 673 So.2d 461 , 469-470 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).

2011See Ex parte Neal, 731 So.2d 621 (Ala.1999); and Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 469-70 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).” 753 So.2d at 1203-04 (footnote omitted).

1999See Ex parte Neal , [Ms. 1971139, January 8, 1999] 731 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1999); and Barbour v. State , 673 So.2d 461 , 469-470 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 , 116 S.Ct. 2556 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1996).

2009Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, supra; see also Campbell v. Campbell, 910 So.2d 1288 (Ala. Civ.App.2005) (reversing an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment when the order did not indicate that the trial court had considered the Kirtland factors, and remanding the cause for a consideration of those factors).

2009Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, supra; see also Campbell v. Campbell, 910 So.2d 1288 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (reversing an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment when the order did not indicate that the trial court had considered the Kirtland factors, and remanding the cause for a consideration of those factors).

2006Thus, where the issue of whether a dating relationship exists is raised by the defendant, the court should first determine whether a dating relationship actually exists in accordance with a consideration of the factors set forth above, and thereafter proceed appropriately in accordance with its findings. "`___ "` 2 These factors are not exclusive and additional considerations may present themselves within the context of a given case. "` 3 There is certainly the potential that individuals could be in a "secret" dating relationship, in which the parties intentionally go out of their way not to h

2006Thus, where the issue of whether a dating relationship exists is raised by the defendant, the court should first determine whether a dating relationship actually exists in accordance with a consideration of the factors set forth above, and thereafter proceed appropriately in accordance with its findings. "`___ "` 2 These factors are not exclusive and additional considerations may present themselves within the context of a given case. "` 3 There is certainly the potential that individuals could be in a "secret" dating relationship, in which the parties intentionally go out of their way not to h

2001Ex parte Devine , supra .

1985Ex parte Devine, supra. The age of the children is now one factor in a long list which is to be considered by the trial court in awarding custody.

1997E.g., A.M. v. State, supra ; A.D.T. v. State, 630 So.2d 165 (Ala. Crim.App.1993).

1997E.g., A.M. v. State, supra; A.D.T. v. State, 630 So.2d 165 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).

1976Powell v. State, 47 Ala.App. 582 , 258 So.2d 923 ; Oury v. State, 53 Ala.App. 240 , 298 So.2d 661 .

1976Powell v. State, 47 Ala.App. 582 , 258 So.2d 923 ; Oury v. State, 53 Ala.App. 240 , 298 So.2d 661 .

1976Powell v. State, 47 Ala.App. 582 , 258 So.2d 923 ; Oury v. State, 53 Ala.App. 240 , 298 So.2d 661 .

1976Powell v. State, 47 Ala.App. 582 , 258 So.2d 923 ; Oury v. State, 53 Ala.App. 240 , 298 So.2d 661 .

1927Henry v. Murphy, 54 Ala. 246, 255 ; Cowan v. Cooper, 41 Ala. 187 ; Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209 ; Huckabee v. Shepherd, 75 Ala. 342 ; Manning v. Pippen, 86 Ala. 357, 363 , 5 So. 572 , 11 Am.

1882Although the authorities are greatly in conflict, we think it may now be considered as the better doctrine, that the consideration clause of a deed is alwa/ys open to xmlimited explanar tdon, “ except for two purpjoses: first, it is not permissible for a party to the deed to prove a different consideration, if such change vary the legal effect of the instrument; and second, the grantor in a deed, who acknowledges the receipt of payment of the consideration, will not be allowed, by disproving that fact, to establish a resulting t/rust in himself.” —Henry v. Murphy, 54 Ala. 246 ; McGehee v. Rump

1916This liability resulted from the breach of the contract of sale (35 Cyc. 520 [VIII, D, 7, b] ; Vastory Clothing Co. v. Stadiem, 149 N. C. 6 , 62 S. E. 778 ) ; and this would not constitute a consideration for such waiver (Shriner v. Craft, supra).

1916This liability resulted from the breach of the contract of sale (35 Cyc. 520 [VIII, D, 7, b] ; Vastory Clothing Co. v. Stadiem, 149 N. C. 6 , 62 S. E. 778 ) ; and this would not constitute a consideration for such waiver (Shriner v. Craft, supra).

1882Although the authorities are greatly in conflict, we think it may now be considered as the better doctrine, that the consideration clause of a deed is alwa/ys open to xmlimited explanar tdon, “ except for two purpjoses: first, it is not permissible for a party to the deed to prove a different consideration, if such change vary the legal effect of the instrument; and second, the grantor in a deed, who acknowledges the receipt of payment of the consideration, will not be allowed, by disproving that fact, to establish a resulting t/rust in himself.” —Henry v. Murphy, 54 Ala. 246 ; McGehee v. Rump

1855In the American courts, however, a different (and, as we think, a sounder) doctrine prevails ; and in every State in which the question has been made, with the exception of North Carolina (Graves v. Carter, 2 Hawks, 576 ; Speirs v. Clay, 4 ib. 22), it has been held, after some struggles and much discussion, that the consideration clause in a deed is not conclusive.— Schilinger v. McCann, 6 Greenl. 364; Tyler v. Carleton, 7 ib. 175; Emmons v. Littlefield, 1 Shep. 233; Burbank v. Gould, 3 ib. 119; Morse v. Shattuck, 4 N. H. 229; Pritchard v. Brown, ib. 397; Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Cla

2008See also Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967) (concluding that evidence is admissible to show what consideration is paid although a deed has been accepted because contractual provisions as to considerations to be paid by the purchaser are ordinarily not merged in the deed); Purbaugh v. Jurgensmeier, 240 Neb. 679 , 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992) (holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed, this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed).

2008See also Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967) (concluding that evidence is admissible to show what consideration is paid although a deed has been accepted because contractual provisions as to considerations to be paid by the purchaser are ordinarily not merged in the deed); Purbaugh v. Jurgensmeier, 240 Neb. 679 , 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992) (holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed, this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed).

2008Garrett v. [Stuart], 1 McCord, 514 [ (1821) ]; Starkie Ev. 1004; [Mead v. Steger ] 5 Port. 506 ; [Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden ] 1 Johns. 139 [3 Am.Dec. 304] [ (1806) ].’ ” In Gilliland v. Hawkins, this Court stated that “ ‘the consideration clause of a deed is open to the influence of parol proof, except for two purposes: First it is not permissible for a party to the deed to prove a different consideration, if such change vary the legal effect of the instrument; and, second, the grantor in a deed, who acknowledges the receipt of payment of the consideration, will not be allowed, by disproving

2008Garrett v. [Stuart], 1 McCord, 514 [(1821)]; Starkie Ev. 1004; [ Mead v. Steger ] 5 Port. 506 ; [ Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden ] 1 Johns. 139 [3 Am.Dec. 304] [(1806)].'" In Gilliland v. Hawkins , this Court stated that *336 "`the consideration clause of a deed is open to the influence of parol proof, except for two purposes: First it is not permissible for a party to the deed to prove a different consideration, if such change vary the legal effect of the instrument; and, second, the grantor in a deed, who acknowledges the receipt of payment of the consideration, will not be allowed, by disprovi

2003The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found addiction to nicotine to be the event starting the running of the limitations period in Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966 (9th Cir.2002), where the Court applied California law to a claim for damages based on nicotine addiction and found the action barred by the statute of limitations.