consideration factors in Connecticut

2000Co., 236 Conn. 582, 592 , 674 A.2d 1290 (1996), we concluded that the doctrine’s underlying policies were not sufficiently compelling to preclude the postmarital dissolution assertion of tort actions “based on claims arising between married persons . ...” A similar analysis in the present case leads us to conclude that where the parties litigate to judgment, on the small claims docket, a claim for property damage to a motor vehicle arising out of a motor vehicle accident, that judgment will not bar a subsequent action, on the regular docket, for personal injuries arising out of the same accide

2000Co., 236 Conn. 582, 592 , 674 A.2d 1290 (1996), we concluded that the doctrine’s underlying policies were not sufficiently compelling to preclude the postmarital dissolution assertion of tort actions “based on claims arising between married persons . ...” A similar analysis in the present case leads us to conclude that where the parties litigate to judgment, on the small claims docket, a claim for property damage to a motor vehicle arising out of a motor vehicle accident, that judgment will not bar a subsequent action, on the regular docket, for personal injuries arising out of the same accide

1998The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Miller , 239 Conn. 313 , 322 , 684 A.2d 1173 (1996). "[A] decision whether to apply the doctrine of res judicata to claims that have not actually been litigated should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close . .

1998The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Miller , 239 Conn. 313 , 322 , 684 A.2d 1173 (1996). "[A] decision whether to apply the doctrine of res judicata to claims that have not actually been litigated should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close . .

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2017Because [the doctrine is a] judicially created [rule] of reason that [is] enforced on public policy grounds; **66 Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 , 248 Conn. 108 , 127, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999) ; we have observed that whether to apply [the] doctrine in any particular case should be made based [on] a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim....

2017Because [the doctrine is a] judicially created [rule] of reason that [is] enforced on public policy grounds; **66 Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 , 248 Conn. 108 , 127, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999) ; we have observed that whether to apply [the] doctrine in any particular case should be made based [on] a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim....

2018The purposes of res judicata are "promoting judicial economy, minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments and providing repose to parties." Weiss v. Weiss , supra, 297 Conn. at 465 , 998 A.2d 766 .

2018The purposes of res judicata are "promoting judicial economy, minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments and providing repose to parties." Weiss v. Weiss , supra, 297 Conn. at 465 , 998 A.2d 766 .

2018Although an exchange of promises usually will satisfy the consideration requirement ... a promise to do that which one is already bound by his contract to do is not sufficient consideration to support an additional promise by the other party to the contract." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin , 72 Conn. App. 14 , 23, 804 A.2d 865 (2002).

2018Although an exchange of promises usually will satisfy the consideration requirement ... a promise to do that which one is already bound by his contract to do is not sufficient consideration to support an additional promise by the other party to the contract." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin , 72 Conn. App. 14 , 23, 804 A.2d 865 (2002).

2009Last, we emphasize that “an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 242 , 636 A.2d 760 (1994). *434 The defendant makes several arguments in support of his claim, many of which, however, are based on factors not on the record or presented to the court, or are claims of which the court wa

2009Last, we emphasize that “an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 242 , 636 A.2d 760 (1994). *434 The defendant makes several arguments in support of his claim, many of which, however, are based on factors not on the record or presented to the court, or are claims of which the court wa

1996"An exchange of promises is sufficient consideration to support a contract." Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527 , 531 , 218 A.2d 526 (1966).

1996"An exchange of promises is sufficient consideration to support a contract." Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527 , 531 , 218 A.2d 526 (1966).

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2020B The plaintiffs next argue that the department’s find- ings as to subdivisions (6), (7) and (8) are not supported by substantial evidence, and that the findings as to subdivisions (3) and (10) are irreconcilable. ‘‘In deter- mining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer . . . to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence pre- sented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 400 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245 Conn.

2020B The plaintiffs next argue that the department’s find- ings as to subdivisions (6), (7) and (8) are not supported by substantial evidence, and that the findings as to subdivisions (3) and (10) are irreconcilable. ‘‘In deter- mining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer . . . to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence pre- sented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 400 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245 Conn.

2020B The plaintiffs next argue that the department’s find- ings as to subdivisions (6), (7) and (8) are not supported by substantial evidence, and that the findings as to subdivisions (3) and (10) are irreconcilable. ‘‘In deter- mining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer . . . to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence pre- sented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 400 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245 Conn.

2020B The plaintiffs next argue that the department’s find- ings as to subdivisions (6), (7) and (8) are not supported by substantial evidence, and that the findings as to subdivisions (3) and (10) are irreconcilable. ‘‘In deter- mining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer . . . to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence pre- sented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 400 , 710 A.2d 807 , cert. denied, 245 Conn.

2017The analysis set forth in Willamette Management Associates, Inc. , and Spilke reflects that, in determining whether the filing of an amended complaint following a finding of default effectively extinguished the default and afforded a defendant an opportunity to plead in response, the dispositive inquiry is whether the amendment reflected a substantial change to the pleadings in effect at the time that the default was entered. 10 In Willamette Management Associates, Inc. , this court, citing Mazulis v. Zeldner , 116 Conn. 314 , 317, 164 A. 713 (1933), stated that a primary consideration in this

2017The analysis set forth in Willamette Management Associates, Inc. , and Spilke reflects that, in determining whether the filing of an amended complaint following a finding of default effectively extinguished the default and afforded a defendant an opportunity to plead in response, the dispositive inquiry is whether the amendment reflected a substantial change to the pleadings in effect at the time that the default was entered. 10 In Willamette Management Associates, Inc. , this court, citing Mazulis v. Zeldner , 116 Conn. 314 , 317, 164 A. 713 (1933), stated that a primary consideration in this

2017A court has the discretion to consider many factors when considering a request for a continuance, including "the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay ... the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; [and] the defendant's personal responsibility for the timing of the request .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record,

2017A court has the discretion to consider many factors when considering a request for a continuance, including "the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay ... the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; [and] the defendant's personal responsibility for the timing of the request .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record,

2003Our assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of discretion is limited to a consideration of those factors on the record known to the court at the time it rendered a decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wegman, 70 Conn. App. 171, 174-75 , 798 A.2d 454 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 918 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002).

2003Our assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of discretion is limited to a consideration of those factors on the record known to the court at the time it rendered a decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wegman, 70 Conn. App. 171, 174-75 , 798 A.2d 454 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 918 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002).

2026“Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Citations Bobe v. Commissioner of Correction omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Stephenson, 181 Conn. App. 614 , 629–31, 187 A.3d 528 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 908 , 192 A.3d 427 (2018).

2026“Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Citations Bobe v. Commissioner of Correction omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Stephenson, 181 Conn. App. 614 , 629–31, 187 A.3d 528 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 908 , 192 A.3d 427 (2018).

2026“Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Citations Bobe v. Commissioner of Correction omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Stephenson, 181 Conn. App. 614 , 629–31, 187 A.3d 528 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 908 , 192 A.3d 427 (2018).

2026“Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.” (Citations Bobe v. Commissioner of Correction omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Stephenson, 181 Conn. App. 614 , 629–31, 187 A.3d 528 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 908 , 192 A.3d 427 (2018).

2021Willow Funding Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates, 63 Conn. App. 832, 845 , 779 A.2d 174 (2001).

2021Willow Funding Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates, 63 Conn. App. 832, 845 , 779 A.2d 174 (2001).

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2021A consideration of these factors enables a court to determine if the informal contract . . . is enforceable or merely an intention to negotiate a contract in the future.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690, 693 , 546 A.2d 321 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 814 , 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). ‘‘Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 223 , 972 A.2d 666 (2009). ‘‘[N]umerous Connecticut cases require definite agreement on the essent

2017(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Willamette Management Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski , supra, 134 Conn. App. at 69 , 38 A.3d 1212 .

2017(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Willamette Management Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski , supra, 134 Conn. App. at 69 , 38 A.3d 1212 .

2016Here, three of the allegedly comparable venirepersons were questioned subsequent to the Batson challenge of D’s dismissal, and the [peti- tioner] did not renew the challenge before the jury was sworn so as to include them in the court’s consideration of the challenge, as required by [State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238 , 245–50, 676 A.2d 384 (1996)] and its progeny.

2016Here, three of the allegedly comparable venirepersons were questioned subsequent to the Batson challenge of D’s dismissal, and the [peti- tioner] did not renew the challenge before the jury was sworn so as to include them in the court’s consideration of the challenge, as required by [State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238 , 245–50, 676 A.2d 384 (1996)] and its progeny.

2016Co., supra, at 601, 922 A.2d 1073 ; our Supreme Court has "observed that whether to apply [res judicata] in any particular case should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2016Co., supra, at 601, 922 A.2d 1073 ; our Supreme Court has "observed that whether to apply [res judicata] in any particular case should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2013The factors include the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the

2013“In the event that the trial court acted unreasonably in denying a continuance, the reviewing court must also engage in harmless error analysis. . . . [I]n order to establish reversible error in nonconstitutional claims, the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion and harm . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 802 , 835 A.2d 977 (2003).

2013“In the event that the trial court acted unreasonably in denying a continuance, the reviewing court must also engage in harmless error analysis. . . . [I]n order to establish reversible error in nonconstitutional claims, the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion and harm . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 802 , 835 A.2d 977 (2003).

2011The factors include the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the

2011The factors include the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the

2011The factors include the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the

2011The factors include the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself .... [A]n appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the

2011These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58-59 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

2011These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58-59 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

2011See Dobozy v. Dobozy, supra, 499 ; Medvey v. Medvey, 83 Conn. App. 567, 575 , 850 A.2d 1092 (2004). 9 The defendant does not challenge the amount of the attorney’s fee award on appeal.

2011See Dobozy v. Dobozy, supra, 499 ; Medvey v. Medvey, 83 Conn. App. 567, 575 , 850 A.2d 1092 (2004). 9 The defendant does not challenge the amount of the attorney’s fee award on appeal.

2011Because we conclude that the defendant was not aggrieved, we do not address any of his claims raised on appeal. 3 In support of his allegation that the original promissory note had been lost, the defendant relied on an affidavit of lost note, which the plaintiff had submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment. 4 “[Our Supreme Court has] consistently held that [our courts should] not render advisory opinions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martino v. Scalzo, 113 Conn. App. 240 , 242 n.2, 966 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904 , 976 A.2d 705 (2009). 5 We note that during or

2011Because we conclude that the defendant was not aggrieved, we do not address any of his claims raised on appeal. 3 In support of his allegation that the original promissory note had been lost, the defendant relied on an affidavit of lost note, which the plaintiff had submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment. 4 “[Our Supreme Court has] consistently held that [our courts should] not render advisory opinions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martino v. Scalzo, 113 Conn. App. 240 , 242 n.2, 966 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904 , 976 A.2d 705 (2009). 5 We note that during or

2011Because we conclude that the defendant was not aggrieved, we do not address any of his claims raised on appeal. 3 In support of his allegation that the original promissory note had been lost, the defendant relied on an affidavit of lost note, which the plaintiff had submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment. 4 “[Our Supreme Court has] consistently held that [our courts should] not render advisory opinions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martino v. Scalzo, 113 Conn. App. 240 , 242 n.2, 966 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904 , 976 A.2d 705 (2009). 5 We note that during or

2011Because we conclude that the defendant was not aggrieved, we do not address any of his claims raised on appeal. 3 In support of his allegation that the original promissory note had been lost, the defendant relied on an affidavit of lost note, which the plaintiff had submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment. 4 “[Our Supreme Court has] consistently held that [our courts should] not render advisory opinions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martino v. Scalzo, 113 Conn. App. 240 , 242 n.2, 966 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904 , 976 A.2d 705 (2009). 5 We note that during or