Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Salley v. Childsgreen1 sentence2011See Burton v. Merrill, 612 A.2d 862, 865 (Me. 1992); Salley v Childs, 541 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (Me. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. Merrillgreen1 sentence2011See Burton v. Merrill, 612 A.2d 862, 865 (Me. 1992); Salley v Childs, 541 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (Me. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Poulin v. Colby Collegegreen1 sentence1989Since the recreational land use statute limits the common law tort liability landowners have toward licensees, see Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979) (court abolished distinction between licensees and invitees and held that “owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land”), the statute should “be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear." Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 50 | 1 | 1 |
Carolyn L. Ducey v. United States of America, Lois M. Olson v. United States of America, Helen Grugel v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989Since the recreational land use statute limits the common law tort liability landowners have toward licensees, see Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979) (court abolished distinction between licensees and invitees and held that “owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land”), the statute should “be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear." Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 50 | 1 | 1 |
Copeland v. Larsongreen2 sentences1989Since the recreational land use statute limits the common law tort liability landowners have toward licensees, see Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979) (court abolished distinction between licensees and invitees and held that “owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land”), the statute should “be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear." Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 50 1989Since the recreational land use statute limits the common law tort liability landowners have toward licensees, see Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979) (court abolished distinction between licensees and invitees and held that “owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land”), the statute should “be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear." Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 50 | 1 | 1 |
Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Leagreen1 sentence1989Since the recreational land use statute limits the common law tort liability landowners have toward licensees, see Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me.1979) (court abolished distinction between licensees and invitees and held that “owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land”), the statute should “be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear." Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 50 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Betty v. Pace, as Administratrix of the Estate of Floyd J. Pace, Jr., Deceased v. Southern Express Company
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ashley v. State
green
2 sentences1995The hearing officer acknowledged that the consideration of such a defense was beyond his jurisdiction. 2 See Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d 176 (Me.1994) (noting that DHS is without jurisdiction to consider the equitable defense of estoppel). 1995The hearing officer acknowledged that the consideration of such a defense was beyond his jurisdiction. [2] See Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d 176 (Me.1994) (noting that DHS is without jurisdiction to consider the equitable defense of estoppel). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Noel v. Town of Ogunquit
green
2 sentences1989The court's reliance on Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054 (Me.1989), and Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me.1979), to support its narrow interpretation of the consideration exception is misplaced. 1989The court’s reliance on Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054 (Me.1989), and Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me.1979), to support its narrow interpretation of the consideration exception is misplaced. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Moffett v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences1989The court's reliance on Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054 (Me.1989), and Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me.1979), to support its narrow interpretation of the consideration exception is misplaced. 1989The court’s reliance on Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054 (Me.1989), and Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me.1979), to support its narrow interpretation of the consideration exception is misplaced. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences1976Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261 , 84 S.Ct. 401 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 320 (1964). .The only danger presented by the possible dual enforcement of the two rights is possible dual compensation, once from the arbitrator for parity pay due under the pre-MPELRL contracts and again in court under the Charter provision; The Court, however, has the power to shape relief in a manner that would prevent such an unconscionable windfall to the plaintiff. 1976Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261 , 84 S.Ct. 401 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 320 (1964). .The only danger presented by the possible dual enforcement of the two rights is possible dual compensation, once from the arbitrator for parity pay due under the pre-MPELRL contracts and again in court under the Charter provision; The Court, however, has the power to shape relief in a manner that would prevent such an unconscionable windfall to the plaintiff. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Goodspeed v. Fuller
neutral
1 sentence1969Furthermore, our Court has said in Goodspeed v. Fuller, 1858, 46 Me. 141 , at pages 147-148: “The only effect of the consideration clause in a deed, is to estop the grantor from alleging that it was executed without consideration, and to prevent a resulting trust in the grantor. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.