consideration factors in Utah

2025Douglas Horne Family Revocable Trust v. Wardley/McLachlan Dev., LLC, 2013 UT App 129, ¶ 17 , 304 P.3d 99 (quotation simplified); see also Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 326 (“[T]he parties’ surrender of their legal 20230417-CA 9 2025 UT App 8 Mortensen v. Mortensen right to dispute the amount at issue supplies the consideration necessary to support the accord.”). ¶23 That’s essentially what happened here.

2025Douglas Horne Family Revocable Trust v. Wardley/McLachlan Dev., LLC, 2013 UT App 129, ¶ 17 , 304 P.3d 99 (quotation simplified); see also Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 326 (“[T]he parties’ surrender of their legal 20230417-CA 9 2025 UT App 8 Mortensen v. Mortensen right to dispute the amount at issue supplies the consideration necessary to support the accord.”). ¶23 That’s essentially what happened here.

2015Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869-70 .

2015Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869–70.

2024Id. ¶28 Second, there was no indication to the district court that Corry’s failure to obtain treatment “reflect[ed] socio-economic status more than risk” because Corry never connected his lack of treatment to his socioeconomic status before the district court.

2024The State met its burden “to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [Schoenenberger’s confession] was made voluntarily based upon the totality of circumstances,” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 45 , 984 P.2d 1009 (cleaned up), and we therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Schoenenberger’s motion to suppress.

2024The State met its burden “to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [Schoenenberger’s confession] was made voluntarily based upon the totality of circumstances,” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 45 , 984 P.2d 1009 (cleaned up), and we therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Schoenenberger’s motion to suppress.

2024Given these facts, we cannot say that the district court erred in its 20190703-CA 18 2024 UT App 187 State v. Schoenenberger determination that Schoenenberger “was not subjected to a prolonged interrogation that would break down his barriers and compel him to confess when he otherwise would not have done so.” F. Totality of the Circumstances ¶49 After a full consideration of the factors addressed above as well as the other factors specifically elaborated on by the district court (namely, that Schoenenberger understood his right to counsel and understood that “he did not need to speak to the po

2023Although “formation of a contract requires an offer, 20210591-CA 8 2023 UT App 54 Magleby Cataxinos & Greenwood v. Schnibbe an acceptance, and consideration,” in cases of accord and satisfaction “the consideration requirement is satisfied by the settlement of a dispute between the parties,” at least “where there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount due.” Wm.

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2012The consideration of whether a claim was "overlooked in good faith, with no intent to delay or abuse the writ," id. (emphasis added), is a separate analysis to be conducted only after the threshold showing is met.

1948I proceed, therefore, to a consideration of the test of “right of control.” The prevailing opinion relies strongly on Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 423 , 107 P. 2d 1027 , 134 A. L.

1948I proceed, therefore, to a consideration of the test of “right of control.” The prevailing opinion relies strongly on Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 423 , 107 P. 2d 1027 , 134 A. L.

1939In the case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corporation, 7 Cir., 102 F. 2d 383, 385 , the court in the body of the opinion, among other things, said: “The quantum oí proof necessary to sustain a finding by the Board was defined in the recent decision of National Labor Relations Boa/rd, *574 Petitioner, v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., Respondent, [ 306 U. S. 292 ] 59 S. Ct. 501 , 83 L.

1939In the case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corporation, 7 Cir., 102 F. 2d 383, 385 , the court in the body of the opinion, among other things, said: “The quantum oí proof necessary to sustain a finding by the Board was defined in the recent decision of National Labor Relations Boa/rd, *574 Petitioner, v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., Respondent, [ 306 U. S. 292 ] 59 S. Ct. 501 , 83 L.

1939In the case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corporation, 7 Cir., 102 F. 2d 383, 385 , the court in the body of the opinion, among other things, said: “The quantum oí proof necessary to sustain a finding by the Board was defined in the recent decision of National Labor Relations Boa/rd, *574 Petitioner, v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., Respondent, [ 306 U. S. 292 ] 59 S. Ct. 501 , 83 L.

1901For every other purpose it may be varied or explained by parol proof.” Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247 ; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt. 494 ; White v. Miller, 22 Vt. 380 ; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 , 11 Am.

1901For every other purpose it may be varied or explained by parol proof.” Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247 ; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt. 494 ; White v. Miller, 22 Vt. 380 ; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 , 11 Am.

1901For every other purpose it may be varied or explained by parol proof.” Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247 ; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt. 494 ; White v. Miller, 22 Vt. 380 ; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 , 11 Am.

1901For every other purpose it may be varied or explained by parol proof.” Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247 ; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt. 494 ; White v. Miller, 22 Vt. 380 ; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 , 11 Am.