consideration factors in Ohio

2020Cuyahoga No. 104341, 2017-Ohio-533, ¶14 (internal citations omitted). “‘When a sentence is imposed solely after the consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, appellate courts “may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law”’” only if the appellate court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentence.” Id., quoting Price, supra, at ¶14 , quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio- 1002, ¶23. {¶6} Rutherford does not argue that the court failed to sentence him to a term within the permissible range

2019Cuyahoga No. 104341, 2017-Ohio-533, ¶14 (citations omitted). “‘When a sentence is imposed solely after the consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, appellate courts “may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentence.”’” Id. at ¶18, quoting Price, supra, at ¶14 , quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio- 1002, ¶23. {¶13} Appellant does not argue that the court failed to sentence him to a term that was within the permissible

2012Instead of relying solely on a prescribed formula or script for engaging a juvenile during the consideration of the waiver, see Iowa v. Tovar (2004), 541 U.S. 77, 88 , 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 , the inquisitional approach is more consistent with the juvenile courts’ goals, and is best suited to address the myriad factual scenarios that a juvenile judge may face in addressing the question of waiver.

2012Instead of relying solely on a prescribed formula or script for engaging a juvenile during the consideration of the waiver, see Iowa v. Tovar (2004), 541 U.S. 77, 88 , 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 , the inquisitional approach is more consistent with the juvenile courts’ goals, and is best suited to address the myriad factual scenarios that a juvenile judge may face in addressing the question of waiver.

2011Fisher, supra, at 277 . ¶{24} The second prong, “arising out of,” contemplates a causal connection between the injury and the employment.

2010Fisher, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277 . “‘[I]f the injuries are sustained [off premises], the employee, acting within the scope of his employment, must, at the time of his injury, have been engaged in the promotion of his employer’s business and in the furtherance of his affairs.’” Ruckman, 81 Ohio St.3d at 121 , 689 N.E.2d 917 , quoting Indus.

2024Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275 , 2003-Ohio-3624 , ¶ 5.

2022Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275 , 2003-Ohio-3624 , 791 N.E.2d 434 , ¶ 5. {¶27} In addition to an equitable division of marital property, the court may make a distributive award.

2024“The court’s consideration of the factors is presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.” Id., citing State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

2016State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2011-Ohio-2669 , 951 N.E.2d 381 , ¶ 31; State v. Jones, 8th Dist.

2023Wood No. WD-21-083, 2022-Ohio- 4308, ¶ 4-5. {¶ 19} In challenging the sentence as “contrary to law,” appellant presents no argument contesting the trial court’s consideration of the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶ 20} Even if Aitken did challenge the trial court’s consideration of these factors, in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729 , 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 169 N.E.3d 649 , ¶ 42 and State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397 , 2021-Ohio-3531 , 186 N.E.3d 784 , the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected application of a “contrary to law” review to the trial court’s consideration of factors under R.

2023Wood No. WD-21-083, 2022-Ohio- 4308, ¶ 4-5. {¶ 19} In challenging the sentence as “contrary to law,” appellant presents no argument contesting the trial court’s consideration of the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶ 20} Even if Aitken did challenge the trial court’s consideration of these factors, in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729 , 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 169 N.E.3d 649 , ¶ 42 and State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397 , 2021-Ohio-3531 , 186 N.E.3d 784 , the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected application of a “contrary to law” review to the trial court’s consideration of factors under R.

2023Wood No. WD-21-083, 2022-Ohio- 4308, ¶ 4-5. {¶ 19} In challenging the sentence as “contrary to law,” appellant presents no argument contesting the trial court’s consideration of the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶ 20} Even if Aitken did challenge the trial court’s consideration of these factors, in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729 , 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 169 N.E.3d 649 , ¶ 42 and State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397 , 2021-Ohio-3531 , 186 N.E.3d 784 , the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected application of a “contrary to law” review to the trial court’s consideration of factors under R.

2023Wood No. WD-21-083, 2022-Ohio- 4308, ¶ 4-5. {¶ 19} In challenging the sentence as “contrary to law,” appellant presents no argument contesting the trial court’s consideration of the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶ 20} Even if Aitken did challenge the trial court’s consideration of these factors, in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729 , 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 169 N.E.3d 649 , ¶ 42 and State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397 , 2021-Ohio-3531 , 186 N.E.3d 784 , the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected application of a “contrary to law” review to the trial court’s consideration of factors under R.

2009(Citations omitted.) Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120 , 689 N.E.2d 917 . {¶ 14} An assessment of this prong requires a consideration of factors such as “time, place, and circumstances” of the injury to determine the existence of a nexus between the employment and the activity causing the injury.

2009(Citations omitted.) Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120 , 689 N.E.2d 917 . {¶ 14} An assessment of this prong requires a consideration of factors such as “time, place, and circumstances” of the injury to determine the existence of a nexus between the employment and the activity causing the injury.

2026“The consideration of such factors is presumed, ‘unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.’” State v. Moncrief, 2026-Ohio-1770, ¶ 17 , quoting Spencer at ¶ 22 , citing State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

2026The consideration of such factors is presumed, “unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.” Id., citing id; see also State v. Billips, 2025-Ohio-108, ¶ 73 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Phillips, 2021- Ohio-2772, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).

2024Citing, e.g., State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459 , 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997); State v. Mauldin, 7th Dist.

2024Citing, e.g., State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459 , 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997); State v. Mauldin, 7th Dist.

2020In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2014-Ohio-462 , 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 55 . {¶ 15} The OCC does not question this caselaw; rather, the OCC maintains that those concerns do not apply in this case because the OCC has challenged the PUCO’s subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the rider, urging that Congress has vested FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. {¶ 16} In In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., we indicated that a party appealing from a PUCO order can attack the subject-matter jurisdiction of the PUCO notwithstanding the failure to raise

2020In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2014-Ohio-462 , 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 55 . {¶ 15} The OCC does not question this caselaw; rather, the OCC maintains that those concerns do not apply in this case because the OCC has challenged the PUCO’s subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the rider, urging that Congress has vested FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. {¶ 16} In In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., we indicated that a party appealing from a PUCO order can attack the subject-matter jurisdiction of the PUCO notwithstanding the failure to raise

2020In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2014-Ohio-462 , 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 55 . {¶ 15} The OCC does not question this caselaw; rather, the OCC maintains that those concerns do not apply in this case because the OCC has challenged the PUCO’s subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the rider, urging that Congress has vested FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. {¶ 16} In In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., we indicated that a party appealing from a PUCO order can attack the subject-matter jurisdiction of the PUCO notwithstanding the failure to raise

2020In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2014-Ohio-462 , 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 55 . {¶ 15} The OCC does not question this caselaw; rather, the OCC maintains that those concerns do not apply in this case because the OCC has challenged the PUCO’s subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the rider, urging that Congress has vested FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. {¶ 16} In In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., we indicated that a party appealing from a PUCO order can attack the subject-matter jurisdiction of the PUCO notwithstanding the failure to raise

2018In In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267 , 2007-Ohio-4919 , the court held that an effective "waiver of the right to counsel by a juvenile must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent," and the juvenile court judge should "engage in a meaningful dialogue with the juvenile" instead of "relying solely on a prescribed formula or script for engaging a juvenile during the consideration of the waiver" of counsel.

2017Id.

2017No. 2016-CA-2, 2016-Ohio-7098, ¶ 26 . {¶ 24} In the present case, the trial court discussed each of the above factors in ruling on the motion to withdraw guilty plea.

2016Id.

2012Id. {¶10} In the complaint, C&K raised three grounds supporting its legal malpractice claim.

2012The second part of the Blankenship test requires a consideration of factors specific to an individual’s conduct. {¶ 22} In State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph five of the syllabus, this court held that “[a] rape conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1), and a kidnapping conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(A), and cannot be punished multiply when they are neither committed separately nor with a separate animus as to each within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B).” Despite the state’s

2012The second part of the Blankenship test requires a consideration of factors specific to an individual’s conduct. {¶ 22} In State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph five of the syllabus, this court held that “[a] rape conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1), and a kidnapping conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(A), and cannot be punished multiply when they are neither committed separately nor with a separate animus as to each within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B).” Despite the state’s

2012State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2002-Ohio-2221 , 767 N.E.2d 678 , ¶ 61.