consideration factors in Colorado

2016DHS adds that even though "CTI and CPR are performed infrequently by" admissions Haisons, the "potential consequences of not requiring Brown to perform [them] are high" because newly admitted patients may be volatile. 127 Even if we were to accept DHS's suggestions that the infrequency of 'a job function is not a significant factor, see Summerville v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir.2000), and that the risks involved in performing a job task "strike at. the heart of another factor used to determine whether a job function is essential," Hennagir, 587 F.3d at 1258-59 ,

2016DHS adds that even though "CTI and CPR are performed infrequently by" admissions liaisons, the "potential consequences of not requiring Brown to perform [them] are high" because newly admitted patients may be volatile. ¶27 Even if we were to accept DHS’s suggestions that the infrequency of a job function is not a significant factor, see Summerville v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 219 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2000), and that the risks involved in performing a job task "strike at the heart of another factor used to determine whether a job function is essential," Hannagir , 587 F.3d at 1258-59

2002"The balancing required by Rule 403 contemplates the consideration of such factors as the importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered, the strength and length of the chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence, the availability of alternative means of proof, whether the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered is being disputed, and, if appropriate, the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the event of admission." Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 .

2002“The balancing required by Rule 403 contemplates the consideration of such factors as the importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered, the strength and length of the chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence, the availability of alternative means of proof, whether the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered is being disputed, and, if appropriate, the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the event of admission.” Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 .

2025A court’s consideration of these factors must be guided by the general rule that motions to set aside default judgments “should be liberally construed in favor of the movant, especially where the motion has been promptly made.” Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982); see also Goodman Assocs., LLC, 222 P.3d at 320 .

2025A court’s consideration of these factors must be guided by the general rule that motions to set aside default judgments “should be liberally construed in favor of the movant, especially where the motion has been promptly made.” Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982); see also Goodman Assocs., LLC, 222 P.3d at 320 .

2025A court’s consideration of these factors must be guided by the general rule that motions to set aside default judgments “should be liberally construed in favor of the movant, especially where the motion has been promptly made.” Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982); see also Goodman Assocs., LLC, 222 P.3d at 320 .

2025A court’s consideration of these factors must be guided by the general rule that motions to set aside default judgments “should be liberally construed in favor of the movant, especially where the motion has been promptly made.” Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982); see also Goodman Assocs., LLC, 222 P.3d at 320 .

2025In other words, in assessing the less drastic alternative criterion, a juvenile court may consider whether the alternative legal disposition — e.g., an APR — is available and in a child’s best interests, even when a specific person has not been identified or the specific terms of a proposed APR are not before the court. ¶ 22 Even though a less drastic alternative to termination is not dependent on a particular out-of-home placement provider, divisions of this court have viewed approvingly a juvenile court’s consideration of factors related to the child’s current or potential placement provider

2025In other words, in assessing the less drastic alternative criterion, a juvenile court may consider whether the alternative legal disposition — e.g., an APR — is available and in a child’s best interests, even when a specific person has not been identified or the specific terms of a proposed APR are not before the court. ¶ 22 Even though a less drastic alternative to termination is not dependent on a particular out-of-home placement provider, divisions of this court have viewed approvingly a juvenile court’s consideration of factors related to the child’s current or potential placement provider

2009Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.Ct.App.1993); see Colo. Accounting Machs., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, 44 Colo.App. 155, 156 , 609 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1980) (legislative intent of Colorado statute disfavors noncompetition agreements).

2009Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.Ct.App.1993); see Colo. Accounting Machs., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, 44 Colo.App. 155, 156 , 609 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1980) (legislative intent of Colorado statute disfavors noncompetition agreements).

2009Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.Ct.App.1993); see Colo. Accounting Machs., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, 44 Colo.App. 155, 156 , 609 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1980) (legislative intent of Colorado statute disfavors noncompetition agreements).

2008"These factors may include, for example, 'the risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the social utility of the [defendant's] conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury or harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the [defendant]'" Id. at 46 (quoting in part Smith v. City & County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo.1986)); accord Univ. of Denver, 744 P.2d at 57.

2003CL People v. Lowery, 642 P.2d 515, 518 (Colo.1982)("it is proper for the judge to consider aggravating or mitigating information, including other charges 'dismissed at the time of the plea"); People v. Campbell, 58 P.3d 1080 (Colo.App.2002)(cert. granted Nov. 25, 2002)(sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in considering that defendant previously failed to seek help for a woman who had died of an obvious drug overdose in his presence).

2003Cf. People v. Lowery, 642 P.2d 515, 518 (Colo.1982)("it is proper for the judge to consider aggravating or mitigating information, including other charges dismissed at the time of the plea"); People v. Campbell, 58 P.3d 1080 (Colo.App.2002)( cert. granted Nov. 25, 2002)(sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in considering that defendant previously failed to seek help for a woman who had died of an obvious drug overdose in his presence).

2000See People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59 (Colo.1988) (where sentencing court finds several factors justifying a sentence, only one of those factors need be legitimate to support court's decision).

1985See People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo.1981); Huguley v. People, 195 Colo. 259 , 577 P.2d 746 (1978); Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419 , 444 P.2d 263 (1968); Bias, 393 So.2d 677 .

1985See People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo.1981); Huguley v. People, 195 Colo. 259 , 577 P.2d 746 (1978); Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419 , 444 P.2d 263 (1968); Bias, 393 So.2d 677 .

1984See In re Marriage of Faulkner, 652 P.2d 572 (Colo.1983).

1890See Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247 ; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt. 494 ; White v. Miller, 22 Vt. 380 ; Belden v. Seymour, 8 Conn. 304 ; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 ; Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Me. 127.