consideration factors in District of Columbia

2008As appellants point out, in Packheiser v. Miller, 875 A.2d 645, 648 (D.C.2005), this court vacated the trial court's order refusing to vacate a dismissal under Rule 41(b), and remanded for a consideration of the factors described in Wagshal , even though the plaintiff, on the sixtieth day of the service period, filed only a praecipe in which she provided no information about future plans for service, and informed the court only that she had mailed the defendant a copy of the complaint via U.S. Postal Service certified mail and “had failed to receive confirmation of its delivery.” Packheiser, 8

2008As appellants point out, in Packheiser v. Miller, 875 A.2d 645, 648 (D.C.2005), this court vacated the trial court's order refusing to vacate a dismissal under Rule 41(b), and remanded for a consideration of the factors described in Wagshal , even though the plaintiff, on the sixtieth day of the service period, filed only a praecipe in which she provided no information about future plans for service, and informed the court only that she had mailed the defendant a copy of the complaint via U.S. Postal Service certified mail and “had failed to receive confirmation of its delivery.” Packheiser, 8

2001The Board of Parole is therefore obliged to make its parole decisions in light of the youthful offender’s potential or actual progress, or lack thereof, in his program of treatment. 11 We hasten to add that although treatment and rehabilitation are the cornerstones of the YRA, see Veney v. United States, 681 A.2d 428, 432 (D.C.1996) (en banc), the YRA “was not intended to make the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation a dispositive sentencing criterion which trumps all others.” Id. at 434 .

2001The Board of Parole is therefore obliged to make its parole decisions in light of the youthful offender’s potential or actual progress, or lack thereof, in his program of treatment. 11 We hasten to add that although treatment and rehabilitation are the cornerstones of the YRA, see Veney v. United States, 681 A.2d 428, 432 (D.C.1996) (en banc), the YRA “was not intended to make the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation a dispositive sentencing criterion which trumps all others.” Id. at 434 .

1995See also State v. Hamilton, 636 A.2d 760, 762-4 (Conn.1994), holding that a trial court did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of possibly retaining new counsel; the court held that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of its ruling on the motion... .

1995The judge then followed up on the concerns appellant articulated at that point, and then concluded the inquiry. [17] See also State v. Hamilton, 636 A.2d 760, 762-4 (Conn.1994), holding that a trial court did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of possibly retaining new counsel; the court held that an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to a consideration of those factors, on the record, that were presented to the trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the time of it

1989The court’s withdrawal of the paraphernalia charge from the jury’s consideration was error because, under our recent decision in Simmons v. United States, 554 A.2d 1167, 1171 (D.C.1989), only the jury — and not the court — could find appellant guilty of the lesser included offense.

1989Nursing Home v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 527 A.2d 282, 287 (D.C.1987), no such limitation exists with respect to the Commission’s consideration of a hearing examiner’s proposed decision.