consideration defense in Delaware

2018Finally, he contends that his sentence is disproportionate compared to other second degree rape cases. (4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it

2017First, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Loper’s statement to the police because Loper was on drugs at the time he made the statement Second, Loper argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the State did not present any witness who could positively identify him as the man with the gun. (6) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to Withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious

2018Finally, he contends that his sentence is disproportionate compared to other second degree rape cases. (4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it

2017First, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Loper’s statement to the police because Loper was on drugs at the time he made the statement Second, Loper argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the State did not present any witness who could positively identify him as the man with the gun. (6) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to Withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious

2018Finally, he contends that his sentence is disproportionate compared to other second degree rape cases. (4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it

2017First, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Loper’s statement to the police because Loper was on drugs at the time he made the statement Second, Loper argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the State did not present any witness who could positively identify him as the man with the gun. (6) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to Withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious

2018Finally, he contends that his sentence is disproportionate compared to other second degree rape cases. (4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it

2015This appeal followed. (8) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.3 (9) In response to his counse

2017More importantly, Loper admitted 2 Johnson v. State, 962 A.2d 233, 234 (DeI. 2008). 3 Jac'kson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 4 Vincent v. State, 996 A.2d 777, 779 (Del. 2010). 5 McDonaId v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, *2 (Del.

2016Philhower essentially contends that the victim’s testimony was coerced and that the State failed to present any competent evidence, independent of his taped statement, to support his convictions. (5) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to d

2017More importantly, Loper admitted 2 Johnson v. State, 962 A.2d 233, 234 (DeI. 2008). 3 Jac'kson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 4 Vincent v. State, 996 A.2d 777, 779 (Del. 2010). 5 McDonaId v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, *2 (Del.

2017More importantly, Loper admitted 2 Johnson v. State, 962 A.2d 233, 234 (DeI. 2008). 3 Jac'kson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 4 Vincent v. State, 996 A.2d 777, 779 (Del. 2010). 5 McDonaId v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, *2 (Del.

2017More importantly, Loper admitted 2 Johnson v. State, 962 A.2d 233, 234 (DeI. 2008). 3 Jac'kson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 4 Vincent v. State, 996 A.2d 777, 779 (Del. 2010). 5 McDonaId v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, *2 (Del.

2016Sept. 7, 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 3 Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979). 4 Id. 5 Jacobs v. State, 2015 WL 6780786, *2 (Del.

2016Sept. 7, 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 3 Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979). 4 Id. 5 Jacobs v. State, 2015 WL 6780786, *2 (Del.

2016Sept. 7, 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 3 Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979). 4 Id. 5 Jacobs v. State, 2015 WL 6780786, *2 (Del.

1962See duPont v. duPont, 7 Terry 592 , 87 A. 2d 394 , and Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. State ex rel. duPont, 5 Terry 332 , 57 A. 2d 70 .

1962See duPont v. duPont, 7 Terry 592 , 87 A. 2d 394 , and Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. State ex rel. duPont, 5 Terry 332 , 57 A. 2d 70 .