consideration factors in South Carolina

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of

2017Moreover, “[w]hile nervous behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion ... the single element of nervousness [should not be parlayed by law enforcement] into a myriad of factors supporting reasonable suspicion.” Moore, 415 S.C. at 254-55 , 781 S.E.2d at 902 (footnote omitted).

2017“The trial judge’s exercise of discretion must be reviewed in the light of the following factors: ‘... the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it.’ ” “If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important respects, he may permit its introduction in evidence.” 392 S.C. at 94-95 , 708 S.E.2d at 754-55 (citations omitted).

2017“The trial judge’s exercise of discretion must be reviewed in the light of the following factors: ‘... the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it.’ ” “If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important respects, he may permit its introduction in evidence.” 392 S.C. at 94-95 , 708 S.E.2d at 754-55 (citations omitted).

2017“Although never dispositive ... being in a high crime area can be a consideration in our analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Anderson, 415 S.C. at 447 , 783 S.E.2d at 55.

2017See Anderson, 415 S.C. at 447 , 783 S.E.2d at 55 (“Although never dispositive ... being in a high crime area can be a consideration in our analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”).

2016See Sprinkle, 106 F.3d at 617 (“Although being seen in a high crime district carries no weight standing alone, an area’s disposition toward criminal activity is an articulable fact.”) *448 (internal citations omitted); but see United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (“Were we to treat the dangerousness of the neighborhood as an independent corroborating factor, we would be, in effect, holding a suspect accountable for factors wholly outside of his control.”).

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2013PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117-18 , 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (approving the consideration of the factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) by the family court in its decision to waive jurisdiction); State v. Avery, 333 S.C. 284, 292 , 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998) (reviewing a family court's order waiving jurisdiction under the abuse of discretion standard of review); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 65 , 502 S.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1998) ("It is the responsibility of the family court to include

2011As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession of crack cocaine: State v. Rivera , 389 S.C. 399, 404 , 699 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2010) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." (citations omitted)); State v. Fields , 356 S.C. 517, 523 , 589 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] trial judge does not err by refusing to charge a lesser-included offense where there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense." (citations omitted)); see also S.C.

2011As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession of crack cocaine: State v. Rivera , 389 S.C. 399, 404 , 699 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2010) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." (citations omitted)); State v. Fields , 356 S.C. 517, 523 , 589 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] trial judge does not err by refusing to charge a lesser-included offense where there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense." (citations omitted)); see also S.C.

2011“If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important respects, he may permit its introduction in evidence.” Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir.1960).

2011As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession of crack cocaine: State v. Rivera , 389 S.C. 399, 404 , 699 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2010) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." (citations omitted)); State v. Fields , 356 S.C. 517, 523 , 589 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] trial judge does not err by refusing to charge a lesser-included offense where there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense." (citations omitted)); see also S.C.

2011As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession of crack cocaine: State v. Rivera , 389 S.C. 399, 404 , 699 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2010) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." (citations omitted)); State v. Fields , 356 S.C. 517, 523 , 589 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] trial judge does not err by refusing to charge a lesser-included offense where there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense." (citations omitted)); see also S.C.

1993Compare Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So. (2d) 248, 253 (Ala. 1981) (a finding of liability guided by a consideration of the factors outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 will normally be for the jury); Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 264 Ark. 27, 571 S.W. (2d) 74, 76-77 (1978) (jury must determine whether an activity is ultrahazardous).

1993Compare Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So. (2d) 248, 253 (Ala. 1981) (a finding of liability guided by a consideration of the factors outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 will normally be for the jury); Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 264 Ark. 27, 571 S.W. (2d) 74, 76-77 (1978) (jury must determine whether an activity is ultrahazardous).

1993Compare Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So. (2d) 248, 253 (Ala. 1981) (a finding of liability guided by a consideration of the factors outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 will normally be for the jury); Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 264 Ark. 27, 571 S.W. (2d) 74, 76-77 (1978) (jury must determine whether an activity is ultrahazardous).