consideration factors in Texas

2025Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.

2025Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.

2022TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 46 (Tex. 2016) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2022TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 46 (citing World– Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2022TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 46 (Tex. 2016) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2022TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 46 (citing World– Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2015“The perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene is a consideration in the analysis of the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion.” Pace v. State, 318 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (citing Rhodes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995), aff’d, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim.

2010Rhodes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995), aff'd, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2011See Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (“However, when appellant’s conduct, as here, falls so clearly within the proscribed activity, he cannot complain of the law’s vagueness as applied to others.”); Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (“A person who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”).

2011See Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (“However, when appellant‟s conduct, as here, falls so clearly within the proscribed activity, he cannot complain of the law‟s vagueness as applied to others.”); Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref‟d) (“A person who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”).

2011See Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (“However, when appellant’s conduct, as here, falls so clearly within the proscribed activity, he cannot complain of the law’s vagueness as applied to others.”); Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (“A person who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”).

2011See Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (“However, when appellant‟s conduct, as here, falls so clearly within the proscribed activity, he cannot complain of the law‟s vagueness as applied to others.”); Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref‟d) (“A person who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”).

2003Stewart v. U.S. Leasing Corp. , 702 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).

2003Stewart v. U.S. Leasing Corp., 702 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).

2000See Roark, 813 S.W.2d at 496 ; Texas Gas Utilities, 460 S.W.2d at 412 (when no other consideration is shown, mutual obligations by the parties to the agreement will furnish sufficient consideration to constitute a binding contract).

1997See Roark, 813 S.W.2d at 496 .

2022TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 46 (Tex. 2016) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2022TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 46 (citing World– Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).

2019Co., 742 S.W.2d 863 , 867–68 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied))).

1994McCurry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 742 S.W.2d 863, 867-68 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).

2025Turnbull is also “unable to show that the consideration of his bar grievance ‘produce[d] erroneous or unreliable results [that] imperil[ed] a protected liberty or property interest.’” Martinez v. State Bar of Texas, 797 F. App’x. at 168 (citing Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997)).

2025Id. (“From a consideration of the record as a whole, we are not satisfied that the case has been fully developed with respect to the title to the two-thirds interest.”); In re E.W., 494 S.W.3d 287 , 301–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (“[I]t is apparent here that the parties and the trial court were confused as to what evidence had been submitted for the trial court’s consideration.”).

2023See Columbia Gas Transm’n Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996). 17 EIS also argues the purpose of the restrictions must be taken into account in the consideration of a waiver/abandonment defense, but it cites no authority on point.

2021And, as noted by the Firm in its response to Skeels’s motion for further rehearing, Skeels’s consideration argument “was never really intended to be a focus of Skeels’[s] appeal,” having “received the attention of two sentences in Skeels’[s] opening brief, a footnote in [the Firm’s] 25 Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (“Texas follows a ‘fair notice’ standard for pleading, which looks to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant.”).

2019See Shaw v. Trinity Highway Prods., LLC, 329 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also Weisberg v. London, No. 13-02-659-CV, 2004 WL 1932748 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When considering a summary-judgment motion, the trial court may judicially notice documents that are part of its record in the case at issue, since they are already on file and available for the court’s consideration.”); Jones v. Jones, 888 S.W.2d 849 , –5– 852–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“[I]n a summary judgment case, the trial court may judi

2019In contrast to the consideration of whether rule 172 was properly followed, cases involving sanctions by their very nature implicate due process concerns: “[t]he imposition of very severe sanctions is limited, not only by [rule 215], but by constitutional due process.” Powell, 811 S.W.2d at 917 ; see id. at 918 (noting that there are constitutional limitations upon court’s power to dismiss action without affording opportunity for hearing on merits and that “[w]hen a trial court strikes a party’s pleadings and dismisses its action or renders a default judgment against it for abuse of the discov

2019In contrast to the consideration of whether rule 172 was properly followed, cases involving sanctions by their very nature implicate due process concerns: “[t]he imposition of very severe sanctions is limited, not only by [rule 215], but by constitutional due process.” Powell, 811 S.W.2d at 917 ; see id. at 918 (noting that there are constitutional limitations upon court’s power to dismiss action without affording opportunity for hearing on merits and that “[w]hen a trial court strikes a party’s pleadings and dismisses its action or renders a default judgment against it for abuse of the discov

2016See Hutchings, 174 S.W.2d at 489 .

2015“The perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene is a consideration in the analysis of the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion.” Pace v. State, 318 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (citing Rhodes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995), aff’d, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim.

2015Additionally, as we previously concluded that appellant was entitled to an application paragraph on concurrent causation, this evidence of Torres’s blood alcohol concentration would be relevant to the jury’s consideration of that defense. 12 Because the evidence was relevant, the trial court was directed under the Texas Rules of Evidence to admit such evidence “unless the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice_” See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389 (emphasis in original); see also Tex. R.