consideration factors in Michigan

2017And “a trial court’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines becomes more compelling.” Id., citing People v Williams, 191 Mich App 685, 687-688 ; 479 NW2d 36 (1991).

2017And “a trial court’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines becomes more compelling.” Id., citing People v Williams, 191 Mich App 685, 687-688 ; 479 NW2d 36 (1991).

2017And “a trial court’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines becomes more compelling.” Id., citing People v Williams, 191 Mich App 685, 687-688 ; 479 NW2d 36 (1991).

2017And “a trial court’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines becomes more compelling.” Id., citing People v Williams, 191 Mich App 685, 687-688 ; 479 NW2d 36 (1991).

2017We conclude, as in Walden, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, that the sentence imposed satisfied the requirement that a sentencing departure be “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and the offender,” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 , and that it was therefore reasonable under Lockridge.

2017We conclude, as in Walden, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, that the sentence imposed satisfied the requirement that a sentencing departure be “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and the offender,” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 , and that it was therefore reasonable under Lockridge.

2023In this case, the trial court stated the following after awarding plaintiff $1,250 in attorney fees: The Court finds the award in an amount to be reasonable without the need for in-depth analysis but relies on [plaintiff’s] counsel’s years in practice, reputation in the local legal community, success in defending against the motion, for fact the Court finds the motion baseless, and upon a consideration of the factors as set forth in Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519 (2008), and clarified by Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269 (2016). [Emphasis added.] While the trial court acknowledged it

2023In this case, the trial court stated the following after awarding plaintiff $1,250 in attorney fees: The Court finds the award in an amount to be reasonable without the need for in-depth analysis but relies on [plaintiff’s] counsel’s years in practice, reputation in the local legal community, success in defending against the motion, for fact the Court finds the motion baseless, and upon a consideration of the factors as set forth in Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519 (2008), and clarified by Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269 (2016). [Emphasis added.] While the trial court acknowledged it

2020Further, “[i]n such cases, a trial court’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines becomes more compelling.” Id.

2010However, extrinsic evidence may be used to show that a latent ambiguity exists.55 With respect to a latent ambiguity, we have explained as follows: A latent ambiguity, however, is one “that does not readily appear in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or executed.” Because “the detection of a latent ambiguity requires a consideration of factors outside the instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is obviously admissible to prove the existence of the ambiguity, as well as to resolve any ambiguity proven to exist.”[56] A lat

2010However, extrinsic evidence may be used to show that a latent ambiguity exists.55 With respect to a latent ambiguity, we have explained as follows: A latent ambiguity, however, is one “that does not readily appear in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or executed.” Because “the detection of a latent ambiguity requires a consideration of factors outside the instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is obviously admissible to prove the existence of the ambiguity, as well as to resolve any ambiguity proven to exist.”[56] A lat

2007The court recited the rule now contained in 52 CJS, Landlord and Tenant, § 130, p 200, 3 which provides: “Ordinarily the consideration for the privilege of purchasing is not separate from the consideration for the lease as a whole, and where the lease is sufficiently supported by a consideration the provision for the privilege of purchasing the property is adequately supported.” See Henderson, supra at 414 .

2007Our Supreme Court recognized a similar principle in Wright v Kaynor, 150 Mich *290 7, 11; 113 NW 779 (1907).

1998The failure to give the appropriate measure of consideration to these important concerns and the resulting decision not to accord the Bender rule retroactive effect also violates the "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and the "integrity of judicial review." The majority also fails to give the appropriate consideration to the analysis set forth in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 105 S.Ct. 1065 , 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), would be applied retroactively to cases not y

1998The failure to give the appropriate measure of consideration to these important concerns and the resulting decision not to accord the Bender rule retroactive effect also violates the "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and the "integrity of judicial review." The majority also fails to give the appropriate consideration to the analysis set forth in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 105 S.Ct. 1065 , 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), would be applied retroactively to cases not y

1998For example, in Riethmiller v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 151 Mich App 188, 203 ; 390 NW2d 227 (1986), a case that arose out of the Civil Rights Act, this Court affirmed the trial court’s award of one-half the amount of the plaintiff’s attorney fees, after a consideration of the factors set forth in Wood .

1998For example, in Riethmiller v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 151 Mich App 188, 203 ; 390 NW2d 227 (1986), a case that arose out of the Civil Rights Act, this Court affirmed the trial court’s award of one-half the amount of the plaintiff’s attorney fees, after a consideration of the factors set forth in Wood .

1998In Collister v Sunshine Food Stores, Inc, 166 Mich App 272, 274-275 ; 419 NW2d 781 (1988), another Civil Rights Act case, the Court affirmed an award of $2,000 in attorney fees and $750 in costs, where the prevailing attorney had requested $15,456 in attorney fees and $1,156.89 in costs.

1998In Collister v Sunshine Food Stores, Inc, 166 Mich App 272, 274-275 ; 419 NW2d 781 (1988), another Civil Rights Act case, the Court affirmed an award of $2,000 in attorney fees and $750 in costs, where the prevailing attorney had requested $15,456 in attorney fees and $1,156.89 in costs.

1998The failure to give the appropriate measure of consideration to these important concerns and the resulting decision not to accord the Bender rule retroactive effect also violates the "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and the "integrity of judicial review." The majority also fails to give the appropriate consideration to the analysis set forth in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 105 S.Ct. 1065 , 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), would be applied retroactively to cases not y

1998The failure to give the appropriate measure of consideration to these important concerns and the resulting decision not to accord the Bender rule retroactive effect also violates the "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and the "integrity of judicial review." The majority also fails to give the appropriate consideration to the analysis set forth in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 105 S.Ct. 1065 , 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), would be applied retroactively to cases not y

1996This Court once observed long ago: The rule of stare decisis establishes uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law, but it was never intended to perpetuate error or to prevent the consideration of rule of law to be applied to the ever-changing business, economic, and political life of a community Only in the rare case when it is clearly apparent that an error has been made, or changing conditions result in injustice by the application of an outmoded rale, should we deviate from following the established rale. [Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1, 10 ; 105 NW2d 1 (I960).] This is not the

1996This Court once observed long ago: The rule of stare decisis establishes uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law, but it was never intended to perpetuate error or to prevent the consideration of rule of law to be applied to the ever-changing business, economic, and political life of a community Only in the rare case when it is clearly apparent that an error has been made, or changing conditions result in injustice by the application of an outmoded rale, should we deviate from following the established rale. [Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1, 10 ; 105 NW2d 1 (I960).] This is not the

1995See, generally, Jones v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 202 Mich App 393, 397 ; 509 NW2d 829 (1993). [4] Transport Ins Co v Home Ins Co, 134 Mich App 645 ; 352 NW2d 701 (1984).

1995See, generally, Jones v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 202 Mich App 393, 397 ; 509 NW2d 829 (1993). [4] Transport Ins Co v Home Ins Co, 134 Mich App 645 ; 352 NW2d 701 (1984).

1989Although there is no precise formula for reasonableness, the following guidelines should be considered: "(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” [Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973).] The trial court is not limited to a consideration of these factors, and t

1989Although there is no precise formula for reasonableness, the following guidelines should be considered: "(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” [Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973).] The trial court is not limited to a consideration of these factors, and t

1989Although there is no precise formula for reasonableness, the following guidelines should be considered: "(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” [Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973).] The trial court is not limited to a consideration of these factors, and t

1989Although there is no precise formula for reasonableness, the following guidelines should be considered: "(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” [Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737 ; 211 NW2d 217 (1973).] The trial court is not limited to a consideration of these factors, and t

1988In People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592 ; 194 NW2d 314 (1972), our Supreme Court observed that, in Williams v New York, supra, "certain basic considerations were found to be proper in determining an appropriate sentence: (a) the reformation of the offender, (b) protection of society, (c) the disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” While recognizing the consideration of factors (a), (b), (c) and (d) to be proper, People v Snow, supra, does not limit the trial judge in imposing an appropriate sentence to only consider those factors.

1988In People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592 ; 194 NW2d 314 (1972), our Supreme Court observed that, in Williams v New York, supra, "certain basic considerations were found to be proper in determining an appropriate sentence: (a) the reformation of the offender, (b) protection of society, (c) the disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” While recognizing the consideration of factors (a), (b), (c) and (d) to be proper, People v Snow, supra, does not limit the trial judge in imposing an appropriate sentence to only consider those factors.

1987World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 292. [9] This lack of consensus was noted by Justice MOODY in his dissenting opinion in Hapner, supra, 176. [10] See Asahi Metal Ind Co, Ltd v Superior Court of California, 480 US ___ , ___; 107 S Ct 1026 ; 94 L Ed 2d 92, 103 (1987). [11] In Asahi, supra, 94 L Ed 2d 107 -108, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, disagreed with the plurality's interpretation of the stream-of-commerce theory.

1987Bielski v Wolverine Ins Co, 379 Mich 280 ; 150 NW2d 788 (1967). [7] Neither AAA nor the Automobile Club of Michigan was authorized to take reservations on behalf of the ranch or to perform any other functions which might be construed as establishing a principal-agent relationship. [8] Since we have determined that the purposeful-availment threshold has not been satisfied, it is unnecessary to proceed to a consideration of the factors bearing on the "reasonableness" of exercising jurisdiction.

1987Bielski v Wolverine Ins Co, 379 Mich 280 ; 150 NW2d 788 (1967). [7] Neither AAA nor the Automobile Club of Michigan was authorized to take reservations on behalf of the ranch or to perform any other functions which might be construed as establishing a principal-agent relationship. [8] Since we have determined that the purposeful-availment threshold has not been satisfied, it is unnecessary to proceed to a consideration of the factors bearing on the "reasonableness" of exercising jurisdiction.

1987Emphasis added.] Unlicensed commercial establishments selling food were strictly prohibited from allowing the consumption of alcohol on those premises in response to the situation in Moraco v Wayne Co Prosecutor, supra, where the consideration for the privilege and accommodation of the alcohol consumption was included in the price of the meal.