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32 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1879–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraftgreen2 sentences1989See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). 1989See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 2 | 2 |
John Joe Amador v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divisiongreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding show-up was unnecessary and suggestive where witness viewed defendant through piece of cardboard with holes while he was standing in sheriff’s homicide office because procedure encouraged witness to identify suspect she was viewing and there was no exigency that would have precluded a lineup); People v. Knox, 96 N.Y.S.3d 811 , 812 (2019) (explaining that show-ups “are not presumptively infirm . . . but must be shown to be reasonable under the circumstances—i.e., justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximit | 1 | 1 |
Wabeke v. Wabekegreen1 sentence2018Need and ability to pay are determined based on the court's consideration of the factors listed in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2011), including, inter alia, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living established during the marriage, the financial resources and earning capacity of each party, the tax treatment and consequences to both parties of the award, and "[a]ny other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." "The trial court’s award of alimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, and where the record does not contain substantial, | 1 | 1 |
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscanogreen1 sentence2018Accordingly, we remand for the JCC to make a finding, based on the record as it stands, as to whether Claimant left her employment “for unjustifiable reasons.” Id. at 802 (“[B]ecause competent substantial evidence supports the JCC’s finding that Claimant did not leave her employment as a result of misconduct or for unjustifiable reasons – both valid legal considerations in determining an employee’s entitlement to TPD benefits under the statute – the E/SA fails to demonstrate error based on the JCC’s consideration of these factors.”). | 1 | 1 |
Maye v. Alabama Department of Youth Services & Alabama State Personnel Boardgreen1 sentence2018In the event the JCC concludes the termination was an intervening cause, the JCC will review the record for a “means by which a claimant may establish a causal relationship between a claimant’s compensable injuries and claimant’s temporary partial wage loss,” Thayer v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., 90 So. 3d 766, 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and if none are present in the record, to enter judgment for the E/C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2017See State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1986) (concluding that the issue of prejudice was not an appropriate consideration in a rule 3.850 challenge to a double jeopardy violation). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Committegreen1 sentence2013The Court has specifically held that “[t]here is no requirement for the Bar to connect every alleged item of misconduct to a specific rule violation.” Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So.2d 741, 745 (Fla.2005). | 1 | 1 |
John E. WOLFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence1997Once the determination was made that Ms. Bonner’s impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability was established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to HRS, at step five, to show that there is other work available in the national economy which Ms. Bonner can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f); see Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir.1996); Ortega v. Chater, 933 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (S.D.Fla.1996); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1987); Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Ortega v. Chatergreen1 sentence1997Once the determination was made that Ms. Bonner’s impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability was established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to HRS, at step five, to show that there is other work available in the national economy which Ms. Bonner can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f); see Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir.1996); Ortega v. Chater, 933 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (S.D.Fla.1996); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1987); Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
William J. FRANCIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Resources, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence1997Once the determination was made that Ms. Bonner’s impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability was established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to HRS, at step five, to show that there is other work available in the national economy which Ms. Bonner can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f); see Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir.1996); Ortega v. Chater, 933 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (S.D.Fla.1996); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1987); Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Thelma L. WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence1997Once the determination was made that Ms. Bonner’s impairments prevent her from doing past relevant work, a prima facie case of disability was established and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to HRS, at step five, to show that there is other work available in the national economy which Ms. Bonner can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f); see Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir.1996); Ortega v. Chater, 933 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (S.D.Fla.1996); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1987); Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Webbgreen1 sentence1995Webb v. Webb, 636 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Gipson v. Stategreen1 sentence1989Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Walter v. Waltergreen1 sentence1986Walter v. Walter, 464 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Carlee Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilensky v. Fieldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haucke v. Oxford Development
green
2 sentences1989While a fee order may not always need to expressly address every one of these criteria, cf., Haucke v. Oxford Development, 507 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the order should generally reflect the deputy's consideration of these factors, and must indicate the basis for a fee award which departs from the statutory percentage formula. 1989While a fee order may not always need to expressly address every one of these criteria, cf., Haucke v. Oxford Development, 507 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the order should generally reflect the deputy’s consideration of these factors, and must indicate the basis for a fee award which departs from the statutory percentage formula. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Humana, Inc. v. DEPT. OF HEALTH
green
2 sentences1986The hearing officer’s “well-reasoned” order was recently affirmed in Humana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 469 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). 1986The hearing officer's "well-reasoned" order was recently affirmed in Humana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 469 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Leon Davis, Jr. v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding show-up was unnecessary and suggestive where witness viewed defendant through piece of cardboard with holes while he was standing in sheriff’s homicide office because procedure encouraged witness to identify suspect she was viewing and there was no exigency that would have precluded a lineup); People v. Knox, 96 N.Y.S.3d 811 , 812 (2019) (explaining that show-ups “are not presumptively infirm . . . but must be shown to be reasonable under the circumstances—i.e., justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximit 2021“However, where the procedure used to obtain the out-of-court identification was not unnecessarily suggestive, the likelihood of irreparable misidentification need not be explored.” Id. 7 * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 8 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goddard v. State
green
1 sentence2012However, we find that as Ewing argues in his remaining claim, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present for the court’s consideration the claim that petitioner’s convictions for “dealing in stolen property — organized,” in violation of section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, are fundamentally erroneous in light of Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230 (Fla.1984), and Burrell v. State, 601 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Burrell v. State
green
1 sentence2012However, we find that as Ewing argues in his remaining claim, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present for the court’s consideration the claim that petitioner’s convictions for “dealing in stolen property — organized,” in violation of section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, are fundamentally erroneous in light of Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230 (Fla.1984), and Burrell v. State, 601 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wade v. Hirschman
green
1 sentence2004On the issue of the applicability of the standard enunciated in Gibbs to the modification of rotating custody arrangements, we certify conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Wade v. Hirschman, 872 So.2d 952 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
McLin v. State
green
1 sentence2002Weekly S743 , ___ So.2d ___, 2002 WL 31027106 (Fla. Sept. 12, 2002), set out the legal principles governing the consideration of a rule 3.850 motion containing a claim of newly discovered evidence based upon the recantation of trial testimony. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Gaudin
green
2 sentences1998Ellis contendsand the district court heldthat Florida's perjury statute is invalid because it removes an element of the offense, i.e., materiality, from the jury's consideration in violation of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). 1998Ellis contendsand the district court heldthat Florida's perjury statute is invalid because it removes an element of the offense, i.e., materiality, from the jury's consideration in violation of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
De La Cova v. State
green
1 sentence1996De La Cova v. State, 355 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1978), and cases cited. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Pinder v. State
green
1 sentence1996"Moreover, it is most significant that in the instant litigation the veteran and learned trial judge, who was in the milieu of the court room throughout the trial and who was therefore in a much better position than this court or the District Court to determine whether the alleged prejudicial remarks were actually `in effect' of such character, denied a motion for a new trial." An example of a consideration of a claim of fundamental error that is consistent with supreme court precedent is found in Pinder v. State, 396 So.2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), where the court said: "We are unable to reach | 1 | 1996–1996 |
John SCHNORR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee
green
1 sentence1992A further concern we have with the final order is the minimal consideration the hearing officer gave to Dr. Glider's letter describing Mrs. Fricker as being "totally disabled." In the order, the hearing officer refers to that letter obliquely by recognizing that Mrs. Fricker "was, recently, totally disabled." Although it is true that a hearing officer does not necessarily have to accept a physician's conclusory statement that a patient is totally disabled for purposes of the analysis under the regulations, see Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578 (11th Cir.1987), since Dr. Glider's opinion on this p | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Herold v. Computer Components International, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988In Herold v. Computer Components International, Inc., 252 So.2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), we said: This court is reluctant to disturb an exercise of discretion by a trial judge; however, the sanction of dismissal is a severe one and when it appears that such imposition does not reflect a consideration of those factors which we deem essential, we would be remiss in our duties if we did not set it aside on the basis that the court exceeded its proper discretion. 1988Id. at 580 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Neil
green
1 sentence1985This appeal involves a consideration of the rule announced by the supreme court in State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984), which seeks to preclude racial prejudice in the selection of juries. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse
green
1 sentence1985I find that every time I have three different examiners, they give me three different numbers. [7] The order recites, "I am not persuaded that the extent of Claimant's demonstrated disability comports with his expressions of pain and limitation." [8] Cf. Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse, 411 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [9] E.g., a consideration of the claim for permanent total disability benefits may require some disposition of the question of vocational rehabilitation (proposed by Dr. Taxdal) or a specific finding that claimant rejected such offer. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re Rules of Crim. Proc.(sent. Guidelines)
green
1 sentence1984NOTES [1] Because we find that the deviation from the sentencing guidelines in the present case is permissible based upon the trial court's consideration of factors attending the offenses for which appellants were convicted, we do not address appellee's further assertion that Rule 3.701(d)(11) should not preclude consideration of charges which are dismissed pursuant to plea bargain agreements. [2] See In Re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 439 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1983). [3] See Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 451 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984). [1] The revision to subsection d.11. states: Reasons for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure
green
1 sentence1984NOTES [1] Because we find that the deviation from the sentencing guidelines in the present case is permissible based upon the trial court's consideration of factors attending the offenses for which appellants were convicted, we do not address appellee's further assertion that Rule 3.701(d)(11) should not preclude consideration of charges which are dismissed pursuant to plea bargain agreements. [2] See In Re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 439 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1983). [3] See Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 451 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984). [1] The revision to subsection d.11. states: Reasons for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| LaMarche v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Sherrill v. Mallicote green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Charles Francis Gagnon green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Lee Engineering & Construction Company v. Fellows green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Forehand v. Manly green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The Ozark Corp. v. Pattishall green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| City of Miami Beach v. Cummings neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Witherspoon v. Illinois green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Falnes v. Kaplan green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Gordon v. Cozart green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Bethel Apostolic Temple v. Wiggen green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Burch v. Mayor of Savannah green | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.