Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
23 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1909–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roginsky v. Blake-Roginskygreen2 sentences2010As the introductory language of subsection (b) provides, “[i]n making the determination, the court shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including [the twelve listed].” See FL § 11-106(b)(emphasis added); see also Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md.App. 132, 143 , 740 A.2d 125, 130 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 164 , 747 A.2d 645 (2000) (“As the prefatory language in subsection (b) makes plain, the court is not restricted to a consideration of the factors that are expressly listed.”). 2010As the introductory language of subsection (b) provides, “[i]n making the determination, the court shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including [the twelve listed].” See FL § 11-106(b)(emphasis added); see also Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md.App. 132, 143 , 740 A.2d 125, 130 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 164 , 747 A.2d 645 (2000) (“As the prefatory language in subsection (b) makes plain, the court is not restricted to a consideration of the factors that are expressly listed.”). | 1 | 2 |
Caccamise v. Caccamisegreen2 sentences2016App. 505, 521 , 747 A.2d 221, 229 (2000) (“The court, after a consideration of the factors listed in F.L. § 8-205, may decree an unequal division and state the reasons for such an allocation.”); Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. 2016See also Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md.App. 505, 521 , 747 A.2d 221, 229 (2000) (“The court, after a consideration of the factors listed in F.L. § 8-205, may decree an unequal division and state the reasons for such an allocation.”); Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md.App. 577, 588 , 508 A.2d 996, 1001 (1986) (“The statute is designed to achieve equity between the parties; it does not require an equal division of marital property.”) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Randolph v. Randolphgreen2 sentences2016App. 505, 521 , 747 A.2d 221, 229 (2000) (“The court, after a consideration of the factors listed in F.L. § 8-205, may decree an unequal division and state the reasons for such an allocation.”); Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. 2016See also Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md.App. 505, 521 , 747 A.2d 221, 229 (2000) (“The court, after a consideration of the factors listed in F.L. § 8-205, may decree an unequal division and state the reasons for such an allocation.”); Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md.App. 577, 588 , 508 A.2d 996, 1001 (1986) (“The statute is designed to achieve equity between the parties; it does not require an equal division of marital property.”) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Ligreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Collins v. Li, 176 Md.App. 502, 573-77 , 933 A.2d 528 (2007) (“From the foregoing [discussion of Bloom and Matthews ], the concept of passive negligence in an ‘intervening negligent act/superseding cause’ analysis is looked upon with disfavor without a consideration of the factors, relative to foreseeability.”). 2016See, e.g., Collins v. Li, 176 Md.App. 502, 573-77 , 933 A.2d 528 (2007) (“From the foregoing [discussion of Bloom and Matthews ], the concept of passive negligence in an ‘intervening negligent act/superseding cause’ analysis is looked upon with disfavor without a consideration of the factors, relative to foreseeability.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Bigalkgreen1 sentence1995The section provides, in pertinent part: [A] creditor may not act, or commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor____ The term codebtor, although not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, refers to a “signing obligor who did not receive the consideration for the claim held by the creditor, and, therefore, who put forward his creditworthiness and assumed liability on the debt solely for the benefit of the debtor now in bankruptcy.” In re Bigalk, 75 B.R. 561, 565 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Health Services Cost Review Commissiongreen2 sentences1979In explanation we mention that, in the first place and of prime importance, it must be borne in mind that the applicants’ purpose in seeking to intervene at the time their motions were filed was not in any way to change or otherwise influence any proceeding, ruling, or decision that had already been made or taken place in the action, but merely to participate in and urge adoption of their view on the very narrow issue this Court directed be determined on remand: Whether at the time of enactment the statutory words “ ‘total costs of the hospital’ [were] a term ‘of art’ in the health care field 1979In explanation we mention that, in the first place and of prime importance, it must be borne in mind that the applicants’ purpose in seeking to intervene at the time their motions were filed was not in any way to change or otherwise influence any proceeding, ruling, or decision that had already been made or taken place in the action, but merely to participate in and urge adoption of their view on the very narrow issue this Court directed be determined on remand: Whether at the time of enactment the statutory words “ ‘total costs of the hospital’ [were] a term ‘of art’ in the health care field | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010As we noted in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 609 , 495 A.2d 348 (1985), the line between “fact” and “opinion” is often difficult to draw. 2010As we noted in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 609 , 495 A.2d 348 (1985), the line between “fact” and “opinion” is often difficult to draw. | 3 | 1986–2010 |
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1980Subsequently, in Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 378 , 60 S. Ct. 600 , 84 L. 1980Subsequently, in Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 378 , 60 S. Ct. 600 , 84 L. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Pressley v. State
green
2 sentences1975What responsibility, if any, is on the trial court to raise the conflict of interest sua spontel ” Judge Thompson then discussed in detail each of the three critical questions, after stating that in this State: “ . . . [A] conflict of interest begins with a consideration of the requirement that either an actual conflict of interest exists or that a conflict of interest be ‘imminently potential’, Pressley v. State, 220 Md. 558 , 155 A.2d 494 [(1959)]____[T]he more complex a case becomes, either legally or factually, the more opportunity exists for a conflict of interest. ...” (Emphasis supplied 1975What responsibility, if any, is on the trial court to raise the conflict of interest sua spontel ” Judge Thompson then discussed in detail each of the three critical questions, after stating that in this State: “ . . . [A] conflict of interest begins with a consideration of the requirement that either an actual conflict of interest exists or that a conflict of interest be ‘imminently potential’, Pressley v. State, 220 Md. 558 , 155 A.2d 494 [(1959)]____[T]he more complex a case becomes, either legally or factually, the more opportunity exists for a conflict of interest. ...” (Emphasis supplied | 2 | 1970–1975 |
Massey v. Inmate Grievance Office
green
2 sentences2010Further, the State argues that Williams “provided no proof, or even alleged, that delay in the consideration of the issues would prejudice the consideration of the claim.” “By 1997 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 495, the legislature enacted the Prisoner Litigation Act ... to deter frivolous litigation by prisoners.” Massey, supra, 153 Md.App. at 694 , 837 A.2d 1040 (citations omitted). 2010Further, the State argues that Williams “provided no proof, or even alleged, that delay in the consideration of the issues would prejudice the consideration of the claim.” “By 1997 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 495, the legislature enacted the Prisoner Litigation Act ... to deter frivolous litigation by prisoners.” Massey, supra, 153 Md.App. at 694 , 837 A.2d 1040 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System v. Mayor of Baltimore City
green
1 sentence2008Restatement § 78, comment b; Board of Trustees , 317 Md. at 109 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Richardson v. McGriff
green
2 sentences2006McGriff involved the Court’s consideration of a claim of excessive force. 361 Md. at 444-45 , 762 A.2d 48 . 2006McGriff involved the Court’s consideration of a claim of excessive force. 361 Md. at 444-45 , 762 A.2d 48 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lawson v. State
green
1 sentence2005Maj. op. at 604-05, 886 A.2d at 896 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doering v. State
green
1 sentence1991(Citations omitted) Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. 1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hitchcock v. Dugger
green
2 sentences1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. 1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Franklin v. Lynaugh
green
2 sentences1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. 1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Skipper v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. 1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Eddings v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. 1988We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell
green
1 sentence1980Delay in collection had followed upon the taxpayers' request for a consideration of their claim that the tax should be abated, and, in the mistaken belief on the part of the administrative authorities that the statute of limitations did not bar collection...." The Court then discussed Forbes and Heinszen as the cases illustrating the general principles in this area, and it concluded that removing the bar of limitations was within the doctrine of the Heinszen case ( id. at 427-429 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Brogden v. Walker's
neutral
1 sentence1974But a bill of revivor would certainly be preferable to a new suit.” Id. at 289 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Berger v. New York
green
2 sentences1969Tumminello contends the Maryland statute authorizing the recording of certain private conversations does not meet the test of such á statute as set down in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 , 87 S. Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 ; and the trial judge committed error when he failed to suppress the conversations so recorded, or at least the tape thereof. 1969Tumminello contends the Maryland statute authorizing the recording of certain private conversations does not meet the test of such á statute as set down in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 , 87 S. Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 ; and the trial judge committed error when he failed to suppress the conversations so recorded, or at least the tape thereof. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Henry v. Leech
green
1 sentence1931Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 125 , 28 A. 820 ; Henry v. Leech, 123 Md. 439 , 91 A. 694 , and the cases there cited. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Zimmerman v. Bitner
green
1 sentence1931Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 125 , 28 A. 820 ; Henry v. Leech, 123 Md. 439 , 91 A. 694 , and the cases there cited. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Baird v. . Baird
green
2 sentences1909In a note to that case, Lawyer's Edition, where a great number of cases are cited, it is stated that: “The consideration clause in a deed may be contradicted or explained, except for the purpose of defeating the deed.” In the case of Baird v. Baird, 145 N. Y. 659 , a father deeded property to his two sons, and took a mortgage from *605 each of them. 1909In a note to that case, Lawyer's Edition, where a great number of cases are cited, it is stated that: “The consideration clause in a deed may be contradicted or explained, except for the purpose of defeating the deed.” In the case of Baird v. Baird, 145 N. Y. 659 , a father deeded property to his two sons, and took a mortgage from *605 each of them. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.