35 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of Yocumred2 sentences2012As for the first prong of the test, defendants expressed no concern regarding the reliability of Dr. Wyatt’s “method of proof.” See id. at 459, 460 , 597 S.E.2d at 687 (holding that, in determining reliability, trial court should first look at whether precedent justifies recognition or rejection of “scientific theory or technique” advanced by expert; in absence of precedent, trial court must look at indices of reliability, including expert’s use of established techniques, expert’s professional background in field, use of visual aids before jury, and independent research conducted by expert”). 2011Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2009). 2 As our Supreme Court discussed in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., our case law has established a three-prong inquiry by which a trial court may determine the admissibility of expert testimony: “(1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 , 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (citations omitted). *165 As to the first prong of the inquiry, determining whether an expert | 3 | 3 |
State v. Singletongreen2 sentences2010In order for a hearsay statement to pass the first prong of the test, it must actually subject the declarant to criminal liability, State v. Singleton, 85 N.C.App. 123, 129 , 354 S.E.2d 259, 263 (1987), and it "also must be such that the declarant would understand its damaging potential" (i.e. that a reasonable man in declarant's position would not have said it unless he believed it to be true). 2010In order for a hearsay statement to pass the first prong of the test, it must actually subject the declarant to criminal liability, State v. Singleton, 85 N.C.App. 123, 129 , 354 S.E.2d 259, 263 (1987), and it "also must be such that the declarant would understand its damaging potential" (i.e. that a reasonable man in declarant's position would not have said it unless he believed it to be true). | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2011While raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may entitle defendant to the review of the constitutional question in the context of the first prong of an analysis under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), it does not entitle defendant to raise the claim upon its merits. 2011While raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may entitle defendant to the review of the constitutional question in the context of the first prong of an analysis under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), it does not entitle defendant to raise the claim upon its merits. | 1 | 2 |
Glenn v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2017Glenn, 313 N.C. at 455, 458 , 329 S.E.2d at 330–31. 2017Glenn, 313 N.C. at 455, 458 , 329 S.E.2d at 330–31. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2010State v. Tucker, 331 N.C. 12, 25 , 414 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1992). 2010State v. Tucker, 331 N.C. 12, 25 , 414 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hagemangreen2 sentences2008The second element ensures that the entrapment defense is unavailable "to a defendant who has a predisposition to commit the crime independent of governmental inducement and influence." State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 29 , 296 S.E.2d 433, 449 (1982). 2008The second element ensures that the entrapment defense is unavailable "to a defendant who has a predisposition to commit the crime independent of governmental inducement and influence." State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 29 , 296 S.E.2d 433, 449 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences2005“Generally, when a trial court rules that the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court erred in this respect.” State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 12 , 603 S.E.2d 93, 102 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 161 L. 2005“Generally, when a trial court rules that the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court erred in this respect.” State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 12 , 603 S.E.2d 93, 102 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 161 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wootengreen1 sentence2004App. 481, 482 , 358 S.E.2d 78, 79 (1987) (noting the admission of inadmissible testimony alone does not automatically require a new trial). *121 We address the first prong of the test to determine whether Walker’s letters to the prosecutor constituted a plea discussion. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murvingreen2 sentences2003See Murvin, 304 N.C. at 531-32 , 284 S.E.2d at 294-95 . 2003See Murvin, 304 N.C. at 531-32 , 284 S.E.2d at 294-95 . | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Busbygreen2 sentences2002While in Burgess this Court placed great emphasis on the defendant's status as a member of the medical profession, it ultimately concluded the plaintiffs' claim for unfair and deceptive practices was barred because "this [was] a matter affecting the professional services rendered by members of a learned profession and therefore [fell] within the exception in N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b)." Burgess, 142 N.C.App. at 407 , 544 S.E.2d at 11-12 (emphasis added). 2002While in Burgess this Court placed great emphasis on the defendant's status as a member of the medical profession, it ultimately concluded the plaintiffs' claim for unfair and deceptive practices was barred because "this [was] a matter affecting the professional services rendered by members of a learned profession and therefore [fell] within the exception in N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b)." Burgess, 142 N.C.App. at 407 , 544 S.E.2d at 11-12 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1996Hence, under State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 17 , 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991), we do not need to address the first prong of the test. 1996Hence, under State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 17 , 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991), we do not need to address the first prong of the test. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maready v. City of Winston-Salem
green
2 sentences2017As to the first prong of this test, "whether an activity is within the appropriate scope of governmental involvement and is reasonably related to communal needs may be evaluated by determining how similar the activity is to others which this Court has held to be within the permissible realm of governmental action." Maready , 342 N.C. at 722 , 467 S.E.2d at 624 . 2017As to the first prong of this test, "whether an activity is within the appropriate scope of governmental involvement and is reasonably related to communal needs may be evaluated by determining how similar the activity is to others which this Court has held to be within the permissible realm of governmental action." Maready , 342 N.C. at 722 , 467 S.E.2d at 624 . | 4 | 2005–2017 |
State v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2018Wiggins, 159 N.C. 2018Wiggins , 159 N.C. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Gonzalez Et Vir v. State Bar of California
green
2 sentences2005In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney's actions under the first prong of the test, "the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance." State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73 , 112-113, 558 S.E.2d 463 , 488, certiorari. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. 2004In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney’s actions under the first prong of the test, “the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance.” State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 112-13 , 558 S.E.2d 463, 488 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Cornish v. United States
green
2 sentences2005In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney's actions under the first prong of the test, "the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance." State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73 , 112-113, 558 S.E.2d 463 , 488, certiorari. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. 2004In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney’s actions under the first prong of the test, “the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance.” State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 112-13 , 558 S.E.2d 463, 488 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. | 2 | 2004–2005 |
State v. Gainey
green
2 sentences2005In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney's actions under the first prong of the test, "the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance." State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73 , 112-113, 558 S.E.2d 463 , 488, certiorari. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. 2005In analyzing the reasonableness of the attorney's actions under the first prong of the test, "the material inquiry is whether the actions were reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of performance." State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73 , 112-113, 558 S.E.2d 463 , 488, certiorari. denied, 537 U.S. 896 , 154 L. | 2 | 2004–2005 |
State v. Huey
green
1 sentence2022The basic impropriety of the State’s comment, then, is only the first prong of the analysis, to be followed by a determination of “whether the argument was so grossly improper as to impede the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Huey, 370 N.C. at 179 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Treadway
green
1 sentence2013Nevertheless, defendant argues that this Court’s holding in State v. Treadway, 208 N.C. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Hinnant
green
2 sentences2012As for the second prong of the Hinnant test, defendant has made no argument as to how his statement that he only confessed because an officer told him he would receive the death penalty if he did not confess was “reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289 , 523 S.E.2d at 671 . 2012As for the second prong of the Hinnant test, defendant has made no argument as to how his statement that he only confessed because an officer told him he would receive the death penalty if he did not confess was “reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289 , 523 S.E.2d at 671 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.
red
2 sentences2011Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2009). 2 As our Supreme Court discussed in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., our case law has established a three-prong inquiry by which a trial court may determine the admissibility of expert testimony: “(1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 , 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (citations omitted). *165 As to the first prong of the inquiry, determining whether an expert 2011Howerton, 358 N.C. at 459 , 597 S.E.2d at 686-87 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Tejal Vyas, LLC v. Carriage Park Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2007Id., 166 N.C.App. at 37 , 600 S.E.2d at 885 ; See also N.C. 2007Id., 166 N.C.App. at 37 , 600 S.E.2d at 885 ; See also N.C. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wenying Zhou v. Sun Microsystems, Inc
green
1 sentence2005“Generally, when a trial court rules that the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court erred in this respect.” State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 12 , 603 S.E.2d 93, 102 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 161 L. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 471291
green
1 sentence2004As was stated in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 , 101 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
High v. Zant
green
1 sentence2004As was stated in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 , 101 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Tozer v. LTV Corp.
green
1 sentence2004As was stated in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 , 101 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Raspet v. Buck
green
1 sentence2004App. at 137 , 554 S.E.2d at 678 . *477 The first prong of the analysis is satisfied as the parties clearly have an agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the SOMA employment contract. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2003State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99 , 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991). 2003State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99 , 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
In Re the Appeal of AMP Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 563 , 215 S.E.2d at 762 . 2002Id. at 563 , 215 S.E.2d at 762 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton
green
2 sentences2001Id. (quoting *340 Madison Cablevision, 325 N.C. at 646 , 386 S.E.2d at 207 ). 2001Id. (quoting *340 Madison Cablevision, 325 N.C. at 646 , 386 S.E.2d at 207 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Hannah
green
2 sentences2001When, as here, the first prong of the analysis “is answered in the negative, we need proceed no further.” Hannah, 312 N.C. at 290 , 322 S.E.2d at 151 . 2001When, as here, the first prong of the analysis “is answered in the negative, we need proceed no further.” Hannah, 312 N.C. at 290 , 322 S.E.2d at 151 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Shank green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Benbow green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.