71 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp.green2 sentences2016Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193(l)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2013), provides in part that a nonresident subjects himself to personal jurisdiction in a Florida court if he “[b]reach[es] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” “It is sufficient for purposes of the first prong of the test that a contract is made with a Florida resident and payment is to be made in this state.” Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp., 949 So.2d 268, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). ‘Where no place of payment is designated in a contract, payment 2009CCC claims that the trial court had personal jurisdiction through Florida's long arm statute by virtue of the contract requiring payments to be made in Florida. *668 This court has found that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of the first prong of the test that a contract is made with a Florida resident and payment is to be made in this state." Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp., 949 So.2d 268, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Company, LLCgreen2 sentences2007See Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Co., 821 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (finding allegation that owner of vessel breached agreement with Florida ship broker by failing to pay commission owed to broker in Florida sufficient to satisfy first prong of jurisdictional inquiry)); see also Tallmadge v. Mortgage Fin. 2004See Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Co., 821 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (allegation that owner of vessel breached agreement with Florida ship broker by failing to pay commission owed to broker in Florida sufficient to satisfy first prong of jurisdictional inquiry); see also Tallmadge v. Mortgage Fin. | 2 | 2 |
BAA v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer's hunch). 1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer’s hunch). | 2 | 2 |
DA v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer's hunch). 1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer’s hunch). | 2 | 2 |
Hewlett v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115-16 (where a chief judge exceeded his authority under both Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6) by issuing an administrative order which attempted to amend the pretrial intervention statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation, such an order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law); Gincley, 267 So. 3d at 446 (“An order based upon the unauthorized portion of an administrative order is a departure from the essential requirements of law and meets the first prong of 2019An order “based upon the unauthorized portion of [an] administrative order” is a departure from the essential requirements of law and “meets the first prong of the test for certiorari jurisdiction . . . .” Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115 . | 1 | 2 |
DG v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97 , 99 1999D.G., 661 So.2d at 76 ; Jay v. State, No. 98-0109, 731 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). | 1 | 2 |
Baze v. Reesgreen2 sentences2025Under the first prong of this test, the question is not merely whether any pain is inflicted, for “the Eighth Amendment ‘does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.’ ” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)). 2025Rather, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not come into play unless the risk of pain associated with the State’s method is ‘substantial when compared to a known and available alternative.’ ” Id. (quoting Glossip, 576 U.S. at 878 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bucklew v. Precythegreen1 sentence2025Under the first prong of this test, the question is not merely whether any pain is inflicted, for “the Eighth Amendment ‘does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.’ ” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
THE BURGESS LAW FIRM, P.A. and FREDERICK BURGESS v. JBJ INVESTMENT OF S. FLORIDA, INC.green1 sentence2021There is no legal requirement for a single formalized document to demonstrate an attorney-client relationship exists; instead, the test for determining that the relationship exists “is a subjective one and hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention is to seek professional legal advice.” JBJ Inv. of S. Fla., Inc. v. S. Title Grp., Inc., 251 So. 3d 173, 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Bartholomew v. Bartholomewgreen1 sentence2021There is no legal requirement for a single formalized document to demonstrate an attorney-client relationship exists; instead, the test for determining that the relationship exists “is a subjective one and hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention is to seek professional legal advice.” JBJ Inv. of S. Fla., Inc. v. S. Title Grp., Inc., 251 So. 3d 173, 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Yang Enterprises, Inc. v. Georgalisgreen1 sentence2021Appellants only dispute the first prong of the test. 4 To satisfy the first prong of the test, the moving party must demonstrate that their perception that an attorney-client relationship existed is “objectively reasonable.” See Yang Enters., Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Fla 1st DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
JAMES EVAN GINCLEY v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen1 sentence2019See Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115-16 (where a chief judge exceeded his authority under both Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6) by issuing an administrative order which attempted to amend the pretrial intervention statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation, such an order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law); Gincley, 267 So. 3d at 446 (“An order based upon the unauthorized portion of an administrative order is a departure from the essential requirements of law and meets the first prong of | 1 | 1 |
Brandful v. Stategreen1 sentence2018The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97 , 99 | 1 | 1 |
VL v. Stategreen1 sentence2018The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97 , 99 | 1 | 1 |
S. G., a child v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2018The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97 , 99 | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Stategreen1 sentence2018The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97 , 99 | 1 | 1 |
Ware v. Polk Countygreen1 sentence2017The resolution of this appeal squarely depends on the first prong of the test because “where the government seeks an injunction in order to enforce its police power, any alternative legal remedy is ignored and irreparable harm is presumed.” Ware v. Polk County, 918 So.2d 977, 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Metro. | 1 | 1 |
| Metropolitan Dade County v. O'BRIENgreen | 1 | 1 |
| William Thompson v. State of Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foster v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sepulvadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corporacion Aero Angeles, S.A. v. Fernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Osterweil v. Bartlettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| The League of Women Voters of Florida, etc. v. Ken Detzner Opiniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Leonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Radcliffe v. Gyvesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. Crosbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fritz v. Courtyard by Marriottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Boca Raton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sperry v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Calderongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sperry v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collie v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pellerito Foods, Inc. v. American Conveyors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2024The Court stated that the first prong of the test is the same deficiency of counsel performance prong established by the Court the preceding year in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2000In further explaining the first prong of the test, the Supreme Court stated that "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" based on "prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 6 | 1986–2024 |
Cruz v. State
green
2 sentences1993In Burch , however, the sting operation passed the first prong of the test enunciated in Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 , 105 S.Ct. 3527 , 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), because it was undertaken in response to a high volume of drug trade near the school. 1988This lack of focus is sufficient for the scenario to fail the first prong of the test. 465 So.2d at 522 . | 5 | 1988–1993 |
Sorrells v. United States
green
2 sentences1992As Justice Roberts wrote in his separate opinion in Sorrells [ v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932)], "Society is at war with the criminal classes," 287 U.S. at 453-54 , 53 S.Ct. at 217 . 1992As Justice Roberts wrote in his separate opinion in Sorrells [ v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932)], "Society is at war with the criminal classes," 287 U.S. at 453-54 , 53 S.Ct. at 217 . | 3 | 1985–1992 |
LC v. State
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 96-97 . 1999Id. at 96-97 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Ingram v. State
neutral
2 sentences1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer's hunch). 1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer’s hunch). | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Vs v. State
neutral
2 sentences1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer's hunch). 1987See D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla.1978); Ingram v. State, 502 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); cf. V.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (delinquency adjudication reversed where juvenile arrested for loitering and prowling based on police officer’s hunch). | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Mark James Asay v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2025Even if Tanzi’s claims satisfied the first prong of the test to which we subject claims like his, he has failed to “identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701 (citing Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Glossip v. Gross
green
2 sentences2025Rather, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not come into play unless the risk of pain associated with the State’s method is ‘substantial when compared to a known and available alternative.’ ” Id. (quoting Glossip, 576 U.S. at 878 ). 2025Even if Tanzi’s claims satisfied the first prong of the test to which we subject claims like his, he has failed to “identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701 (citing Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
1 sentence2024Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Devon Neighborhood Ass'n
green
1 sentence2024In Devon, the court determined the Legislature did not clearly intend a statutory amendment to apply retroactively for two main reasons. 67 So. 3d at 194– 97. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Perez v. State
green
1 sentence2023As mentioned above, although a show-up is inherently suggestive, Perez, 648 So. 2d at 719 , it is not unnecessarily suggestive unless police aggravate the suggestiveness of the procedure. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2023The Menendez Court itself did not acknowledge a preliminary “substantive” inquiry, but rather assumed the first-prong presumption against retroactivity applied, and found it overcome by clear legislative intent. 35 So. 3d at 877 . 2023But the Menendez Court’s ultimate conclusion that the statutory amendment at issue could not be applied retroactively because it worked a “substantive change to the statute,” 35 So. 3d at 875 , indicates the preliminary inquiry would have supported application of the first-prong presumption against retroactivity. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
District of Columbia v. Heller
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 219 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 ). 2017Id. at 219 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Berenson v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Fitzpatrick v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Witt v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Stovall v. Denno green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Munoz v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Little v. Consolidated Publishing Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176 green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Marshall v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Cherry v. State red | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Kearse v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Wade v. Hirschman green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Thornber v. City of Ft. Walton Beach green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Jones v. Jack Maxton Chevrolet, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rolling v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Towery green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Allen v. Hardy green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Arlt v. Buchanan green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Key Largo Restaurant, Inc. v. TH Old Town Associates, Ltd. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Simmons v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| St. Johns County v. NE Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Jay v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Del Duca v. Anthony green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Collins Ex Rel. Burton v. Skinner green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ashley v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Alen green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.