first prong test in Illinois

2018As for the first prong in a claim of ineffectiveness, counsel’s performance “must be evaluated based on the entire record.” 7 Although defendant’s appellate brief states that he seeks reversal for this claim under both prongs, it makes no argument concerning the second prong. - 10 - (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Kirklin, 2015 IL App (1st) 131420, ¶ 114 ; People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 107 (1989) (“[C]ounsel’s performance must be evaluated [based on] the entire record and not on isolated instances of alleged incompetence called into question by defendant.”).

2018People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79 ; Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 24 . - 14 - ¶ 94 As for the first prong in a claim of ineffectiveness, counsel’s performance “must be evaluated based on the entire record.” People v. Kirklin, 2015 IL App (1st) 131420, ¶ 114 ; People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 107 (1989) (“[C]ounsel’s performance must be evaluated on the basis of the entire record, and not upon isolated instances of alleged incompetence called into question by the defendant.”).

2022Id.; see also People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 349 , 633 N.E.2d 654, 670 (1994) (“A court need not decide the first prong of this test, whether counsel’s performance was deficient, before analyzing the prejudice component.”). ¶ 29 Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because, but for counsel’s stipulation to Jefferson Elementary’s being an operating school at the time of the offense, he would not have been convicted of aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing (count II), which carries a sentencing range of 15 to 60 years. 720 ILCS 646/15(b)(1)(H) (West 2016).

2022Id.; see also People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 349 , 633 N.E.2d 654, 670 (1994) (“A court need not decide the first prong of this test, whether counsel’s performance was deficient, before analyzing the prejudice component.”). ¶ 29 Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because, but for counsel’s stipulation to Jefferson Elementary’s being an operating school at the time of the offense, he would not have been convicted of aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing (count II), which carries a sentencing range of 15 to 60 years. 720 ILCS 646/15(b)(1)(H) (West 2016).

2020See id. (negative advertisements about an aldermanic candidate satisfied the first prong of the test for the applicability of the Act). -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190817-U ¶ 29 Turning to the second prong, to establish that plaintiffs’ suit was “solely based on” the defendants’ exercise of their political rights, the defendants must show that the plaintiffs’ suit “ ‘is meritless and was filed in retaliation against [their] protected activities in order to deter [them] from further engaging in those activities.’ ” Id. ¶ 18 , (quoting Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶

2014See Garrido, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 3, 5-6, 17 (negative advertisements about an aldermanic candidate satisfied the first prong of the test for the applicability of the Act). ¶ 37 2.

2003Regarding the first prong of this test, a witness qualifies as an expert if, “because of his skill, training, or experience, he is better able to form a more accurate opinion as to the matter under consideration than is an ordinary person.” People v. Ayala, 208 Ill.

2001Regarding the first prong of this test, a witness qualifies as an expert if, “because of his skill, training, or experience, he is better able to form a more accurate opinion as to the matter under consideration than is an ordinary person.” People v. Ayala, 208 Ill.

2020See id. (negative advertisements about an aldermanic candidate satisfied the first prong of the test for the applicability of the Act). -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190817-U ¶ 29 Turning to the second prong, to establish that plaintiffs’ suit was “solely based on” the defendants’ exercise of their political rights, the defendants must show that the plaintiffs’ suit “ ‘is meritless and was filed in retaliation against [their] protected activities in order to deter [them] from further engaging in those activities.’ ” Id. ¶ 18 , (quoting Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶

2013See Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 21, 30 . ¶ 17 The first prong of the analysis is the most straightforward.

2011The first prong of this test applies “where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178 (2005).

2011Under the first prong of the doctrine, “the defendant must prove ‘prejudicial error.’ That is, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 .

2026Under the first prong of the doctrine, a defendant must establish that “a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against [them], regardless of the seriousness of the error.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

2022People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

2015“Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)).

2015"Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal." People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff'd, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)).

2015“Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)).

2015"Trial before a biased tribunal would deprive defendant of a substantial right and constitute structural error requiring reversal." People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 102 (2009) (citing People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2007), aff'd, 556 U.S. 148 (2009)).

2010Our supreme court provides, under the first prong of the test, the defendant must show trial counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 16 , 794 N.E.2d 314, 325 (2002), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 80 L.

2010Our supreme court provides, under the first prong of the test, the defendant must show trial counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 16 , 794 N.E.2d 314, 325 (2002), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 80 L.

2010See Morr-Fitz, Inc., 231 Ill. 2d at 491-92 , citing Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Federal Election Comm’n, 113 F.3d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Fitness for judicial decision means, most often, that the issue is legal rather than factual”).

2010See Morr-Fitz, Inc., 231 Ill. 2d at 491 -92 (citing Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Federal Election Comm'n, 113 F.3d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Fitness for judicial decision means, most often, that the issue is legal rather than factual")).

2022Under the first prong of that test, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

2020Under the first prong of that test, a 11 defendant must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

2018Defendant does not contend that the error produced a biased jury and argues only that the evidence was closely balanced under the first prong of the doctrine. ¶ 32 "In determining whether the evidence adduced at trial was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445 , ¶ 53, 417 Ill.Dec. 756 , 89 N.E.3d 675 .

2018Defendant does not contend that the error produced a biased jury and argues only that the evidence was closely balanced under the first prong of the doctrine. ¶ 32 "In determining whether the evidence adduced at trial was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445 , ¶ 53, 417 Ill.Dec. 756 , 89 N.E.3d 675 .

2025Id. ¶ 44 If the trial court determines that the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, it proceeds to the second prong of the inquiry.

2023Id. ¶ 33 The standard of review that applies on appeal differs depending on whether the appellate court is reviewing the trial court’s decision as to the first prong of the analysis or the second prong.

2021Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 46-47 (remanded for resentencing “in the interests of judicial economy”).

2020Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 46 .