14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Martingreen2 sentences1983While acknowledging that a demonstration of unavailability should be the general rule, in Martin, we stated that “[i]f the analysis shows [that] the utility of confrontation would be insignificant, the statement may be admitted even without a showing of unavailability.” Id. at 480, 679 P.2d at 503 [slip op. at 26]. 1983While acknowledging that a demonstration of unavailability should be the general rule, in Martin, we stated that "[i]f the analysis shows [that] the utility of confrontation would be insignificant, the statement may be admitted even without a showing of unavailability." Id. at 480, 679 P.2d at 503 [slip op. at 26]. | 2 | 2 |
Clark v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2020In 1993, however, our legislature deleted the first prong of the test from the statute’s text, so that now a person is GEI only if a “mental disease or defect” caused the person to “not know the criminal act was wrong.” A.R.S. § 13-502(A); see Clark, 548 U.S. at 742 (upholding changes to Arizona’s moral incapacity-based insanity test as constitutional); cf. Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135, 2020 WL 1325817 , at *5– 6 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2020) (upholding Kansas’s cognitive incapacity-based insanity test as constitutional). ¶16 Though the meaning of “wrong,” as used in M’Naghten, “has been an enigma sin | 1 | 1 |
State v. Malumphygreen1 sentence2020Corley, 108 Ariz. at 243 (citing State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 212 (1969) (McFarland, J., specially concurring)); see also State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467, 472 (1978) (citing Malumphy). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Skaggsgreen1 sentence2020Corley, 108 Ariz. at 243 (citing State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 212 (1969) (McFarland, J., specially concurring)); see also State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467, 472 (1978) (citing Malumphy). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen1 sentence2018Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 554-56 ; see also Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109 (“Merely innocent or negligent mistakes . . . will not satisfy the first prong of the Franks test.”). 5 STATE v. STARKOVICH Decision of the Court ¶18 If the first prong is met, the trial court “must redraft the affidavit by deleting falsehoods and adding the omitted material facts” before determining the existence of probable cause. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beachgreen1 sentence2011Mesa urges us to follow Hold Fast and like cases. ¶ 13 The Colemans ask us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2010), and hold that the act and business of tattooing constitute pure speech under the First Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leegreen2 sentences1989In State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984), the Arizona Supreme Court elaborated on the burden of proof for showing prejudice by defining “reasonable probability” as “less than ‘more likely than not’ but more than a mere possibility.” In sum, a defendant’s burden in general, and appellant’s burden in this case, is more rigorous than a “mere possibility” but less strenuous than the preponderance of the evidence/more likely than not standard applicable to the first prong of the test. 1989In State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984), the Arizona Supreme Court elaborated on the burden of proof for showing prejudice by defining “reasonable probability” as “less than ‘more likely than not’ but more than a mere possibility.” In sum, a defendant’s burden in general, and appellant’s burden in this case, is more rigorous than a “mere possibility” but less strenuous than the preponderance of the evidence/more likely than not standard applicable to the first prong of the test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrigergreen1 sentence1985In Carriger , we stated that counsel displays “incompetent representation” — the first prong of our test — when he fails to “challenge the admission of aggravating evidence where reasonably possible and to present available pertinent mitigating evidence.” State v. Carriger, supra, 132 Ariz. at 304, 645 P.2d at 819 ; State v. Roscoe, supra, 145 Ariz. at 224 , 700 P.2d at 1324 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watsongreen2 sentences1985State v. Watson, 134 Ariz. 1, 4-5 , 653 P.2d 351, 354-55 (1982). 1985State v. Watson, 134 Ariz. 1, 4-5 , 653 P.2d 351, 354-55 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Buccini
green
2 sentences2020Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 554 . 2018Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 554-56 ; see also Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109 (“Merely innocent or negligent mistakes . . . will not satisfy the first prong of the Franks test.”). 5 STATE v. STARKOVICH Decision of the Court ¶18 If the first prong is met, the trial court “must redraft the affidavit by deleting falsehoods and adding the omitted material facts” before determining the existence of probable cause. | 2 | 2018–2020 |
State v. Corley
green
1 sentence2020Corley, 108 Ariz. at 243 (citing State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 212 (1969) (McFarland, J., specially concurring)); see also State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467, 472 (1978) (citing Malumphy). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019The first prong of the test requires a court to consider “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . 2019The second prong asks whether there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Rankovich
green
1 sentence2017Rankovich, 159 Ariz. at 122– 23. 6 STATE v. SMITH Decision of the Court voluntarily called the victim’s cellphone and left the messages. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago
green
1 sentence2011Because the act of tattooing fails the first prong of the test for First Amendment protection, there is no “message” to be understood by viewers and tattooing must also fail the second prong. 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 ; see also Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1254 (stating “there has been no showing that the normal observer or even the recipient would regard the process of injecting dye into a person’s skin through the use of needles as communicative”); White, 560 S.E.2d at 423 (“Appellant has not made any showing that the process of tattooing is communicative enough to automatically fall within First Amen | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Derendal v. Griffith
green
2 sentences2008“Finally, we will consider only those consequences that apply uniformly to all persons convicted of a particular offense.” Id. at 423 ¶ 25, 104 P.3d at 154 . ¶ 12 The parties agree that the first prong of this test is satisfied — the potential consequence of sex offender registration arises directly from Arizona statutes, A.R.S. §§ 13-118 and 13-3821. 2008“Finally, we will consider only those consequences that apply uniformly to all persons convicted of a particular offense.” Id. at 423 ¶ 25, 104 P.3d at 154 . ¶ 12 The parties agree that the first prong of this test is satisfied — the potential consequence of sex offender registration arises directly from Arizona statutes, A.R.S. §§ 13-118 and 13-3821. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise
green
2 sentences2006The legislation need not apply to “every person, place, or thing within the state; however it must apply uniformly to all cases and to all members within the circumstances provided for by the law.” Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 150 , 800 P.2d at 1258 . ¶ 17 In this case, it is undisputed that HB 2145, at this time, only applies to the county islands within Gilbert. 2006The legislation need not apply to “every person, place, or thing within the state; however it must apply uniformly to all cases and to all members within the circumstances provided for by the law.” Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 150 , 800 P.2d at 1258 . ¶ 17 In this case, it is undisputed that HB 2145, at this time, only applies to the county islands within Gilbert. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hull v. Albrecht
green
2 sentences1998Establishment and ensured funding of adequate facilities ¶ 10 The first prong of the test set forth in Hull includes two components: the state must create minimum adequacy standards for capital facilities and must ensure, through state funding, that all districts comply with them. 190 Ariz. at 524 , 950 P.2d at 1145 . 1998Establishment and ensured funding of adequate facilities ¶ 10 The first prong of the test set forth in Hull includes two components: the state must create minimum adequacy standards for capital facilities and must ensure, through state funding, that all districts comply with them. 190 Ariz. at 524 , 950 P.2d at 1145 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences1991Id. at 156 , 98 S.Ct. at 2676 . 1991Id. at 156 , 98 S.Ct. at 2676 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Roscoe
green
2 sentences1985In Carriger , we stated that counsel displays “incompetent representation” — the first prong of our test — when he fails to “challenge the admission of aggravating evidence where reasonably possible and to present available pertinent mitigating evidence.” State v. Carriger, supra, 132 Ariz. at 304, 645 P.2d at 819 ; State v. Roscoe, supra, 145 Ariz. at 224 , 700 P.2d at 1324 . 1985In Carriger , we stated that counsel displays “incompetent representation” — the first prong of our test — when he fails to “challenge the admission of aggravating evidence where reasonably possible and to present available pertinent mitigating evidence.” State v. Carriger, supra, 132 Ariz. at 304, 645 P.2d at 819 ; State v. Roscoe, supra, 145 Ariz. at 224 , 700 P.2d at 1324 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.