first prong test in Georgia

2022Thus, if the movant fails to satisfy the first prong of the test, a trial court is authorized to deny the motion to withdraw admissions, Turner, 280 Ga. App. at 257 (1), and need not consider the second prong, Fox Run Properties v. Murray, 288 Ga. App. 568, 570 (1) ( 654 SE2d 676 ) (2007).

2017"If the movant fails to make the required showing to satisfy the first prong of the test, then the trial court is authorized to deny the motion to withdraw the admissions." (Citations *899 omitted.) Turner v. Mize , 280 Ga. App. 256 , 257 (1), 633 S.E.2d 641 (2006).

2012Under that test, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Woods must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was-prejudicial to his defense. 2 Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985), citing Strickland, supra. To meet the first prong of that test, he must overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and that counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

2012Under that test, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Woods must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was-prejudicial to his defense. 2 Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985), citing Strickland, supra. To meet the first prong of that test, he must overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and that counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

2009(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of A.H.P., 232 Ga.App. 330, 334 (2), 500 S.E.2d 418 (1998). "[A]ll information helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 15-11-56(a); accord In the Interest of C.N.S., 248 Ga.App. 84, 87 , 545 S.E.2d 633 (2001).

2009(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of A.H.P., 232 Ga.App. 330, 334 (2), 500 S.E.2d 418 (1998). "[A]ll information helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 15-11-56(a); accord In the Interest of C.N.S., 248 Ga.App. 84, 87 , 545 S.E.2d 633 (2001).

2024While the first prong of the test for admissibility involves a binary concept, the second prong is more subjective and whether the State meets its obligations under the second prong depends a great deal on the facts of the case. “[T]here is no mechanical solution for this balancing test.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015).

2024While the first prong of the test for admissibility involves a binary concept, the second prong is more subjective and whether the State meets its obligations under the second prong depends a great deal on the facts of the case. “[T]here is no mechanical solution for this balancing test.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015).

2026Proof of deficiency under the first prong of this test requires a defendant to demonstrate that her trial attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

2026Proof of deficiency under the first prong of this test requires a defendant to demonstrate that her trial attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

2023To properly show motive, “the extrinsic evidence must be logically relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged.” Heard, 309 Ga. at 85 (3) (c).

2022Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 84-85 (3) (b) ( 844 SE2d 791 ) (2020).

2022“This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 201 (VI) ( 811 SE2d 321 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 18 Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 201 (VI) ( 811 SE2d 321 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“Under the first prong of this test, counsel’s performance will be found deficient only if it was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877, 881 (II) ( 808 SE2d 681 ) (2017).

2022“Under the first prong of this test, counsel’s performance will be found deficient only if it was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877, 881 (II) ( 808 SE2d 681 ) (2017).

2015(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 475-476 ( 69 SCt 213 , 93 LE 168) (1948). 6 To satisfy the first prong of the test for admission of another crime, the State must show that evidence of Amey’s prior attempted robbery is relevant to an issue other than his character, such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b).

2015(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 475-476 ( 69 SCt 213 , 93 LE 168) (1948). 6 To satisfy the first prong of the test for admission of another crime, the State must show that evidence of Amey’s prior attempted robbery is relevant to an issue other than his character, such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b).

2013“Therefore, the first prong of the test does not demand a 5 prospective application of the new legal principle established in [Sherman, 321 Ga. App. at 554-555 (1)].” Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 650 (1) (a).

2013“Therefore, the first prong of the test does not demand a prospective application of the new legal principle established in [Sherman, 321 Ga. App. at 554-555 (1)].” Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 650 (1) (a).

2013“Therefore, the first prong of the test does not demand a 5 prospective application of the new legal principle established in [Sherman, 321 Ga. App. at 554-555 (1)].” Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 650 (1) (a).

2013“Therefore, the first prong of the test does not demand a prospective application of the new legal principle established in [Sherman, 321 Ga. App. at 554-555 (1)].” Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 650 (1) (a).

2002Turner v. State, 273 Ga. 340, 342 (2) ( 541 SE2d 641 ) (2001).

2002Turner v. State, 273 Ga. 340, 342 (2) ( 541 SE2d 641 ) (2001).

2012Under that test, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Woods must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was-prejudicial to his defense. 2 Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985), citing Strickland, supra. To meet the first prong of that test, he must overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and that counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

2012Under that test, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Woods must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was-prejudicial to his defense. 2 Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985), citing Strickland, supra. To meet the first prong of that test, he must overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and that counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

2016To satisfy the first prong of the test for admission of extrinsic acts, the State had to show that the evidence of the extrinsic acts was “relevant to an issue other than [Spriggs’s] character.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 158-159 (1); see also Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75 (2) ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016) (“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency’ to prove or disprove a fact[.]”) (quoting OCGA § 24-4-401) (emphasis in original).

2016To satisfy the first prong of the test for admission of extrinsic acts, the State had to show that the evidence of the extrinsic acts was “relevant to an issue other than [Spriggs’s] character.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 158-159 (1); see also Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75 (2) ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016) (“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency’ to prove or disprove a fact[.]”) (quoting OCGA § 24-4-401) (emphasis in original).

2025In other words, Appellants have not satisfied the first prong of the standard set forth in McCoy — that Dr. Umpierrez’s description of the delivery amounted to “gross carelessness” on her part. 167 Ga. App. at 499 (2) (“[I]t must appear that the injuries resulted from such gross carelessness, coupled with a knowledge of the probable physical results, as amounted to wilful and reckless disregard of consequences[.]”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied); see also Bridges, 8 176 Ga. App. at 230 (1) (Regardless of a plaintiff’s particular sensitivity to harm, “major outrage in the language or con

2025In other words, Appellants have not satisfied the first prong of the standard set forth in McCoy — that Dr. Umpierrez’s description of the delivery amounted to “gross carelessness” on her part. 167 Ga. App. at 499 (2) (“[I]t must appear that the injuries resulted from such gross carelessness, coupled with a knowledge of the probable physical results, as amounted to wilful and reckless disregard of consequences[.]”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied); see also Bridges, 8 176 Ga. App. at 230 (1) (Regardless of a plaintiff’s particular sensitivity to harm, “major outrage in the language or con

2024If the movant fails to make the required showing to satisfy the first prong of the test, then the trial court is authorized to deny the motion to withdraw the admissions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fulton County, 343 Ga. App. at 897 (2) (a).

2023With regard to the first prong of the test, OCGA § 24-4-401 defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 3 Burns does not argue that the State failed to show that he committed the act about which his former girlfriend testified. 12 it would be without the evidence.” “The test for relevance is generally a liberal one, and relevance is a binary concept – evidence is relevant or it is not[.]” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 314 Ga.

2022Thus, if the movant fails to satisfy the first prong of the test, a trial court is authorized to deny the motion to withdraw admissions, Turner, 280 Ga. App. at 257 (1), and need not consider the second prong, Fox Run Properties v. Murray, 288 Ga. App. 568, 570 (1) ( 654 SE2d 676 ) (2007).

2022Thus, if the movant fails to satisfy the first prong of the test, a trial court is authorized to deny the motion to withdraw admissions, Turner, 280 Ga. App. at 257 (1), and need not consider the second prong, Fox Run Properties v. Murray, 288 Ga. App. 568, 570 (1) ( 654 SE2d 676 ) (2007).

2021Once again, we disagree. 17 See Weyer, 333 Ga. App. at 715-16 (“[The defendant] has failed to prove that the trial court committed any error in its fashioning of a supplemental instruction to the jury regarding the definition of ‘entice,’ and thus the first prong of the test for plain error has not been satisfied.”); Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 694 (5) ( 586 SE2d 386 ) (2003) (“Our Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in not recharging the jury because if the jury requests a recharge on any issue, it is the court’s duty to do so.

2021Once again, we disagree. 17 See Weyer, 333 Ga. App. at 715-16 (“[The defendant] has failed to prove that the trial court committed any error in its fashioning of a supplemental instruction to the jury regarding the definition of ‘entice,’ and thus the first prong of the test for plain error has not been satisfied.”); Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 694 (5) ( 586 SE2d 386 ) (2003) (“Our Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in not recharging the jury because if the jury requests a recharge on any issue, it is the court’s duty to do so.

2021Once again, we disagree. 17 See Weyer, 333 Ga. App. at 715-16 (“[The defendant] has failed to prove that the trial court committed any error in its fashioning of a supplemental instruction to the jury regarding the definition of ‘entice,’ and thus the first prong of the test for plain error has not been satisfied.”); Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 694 (5) ( 586 SE2d 386 ) (2003) (“Our Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in not recharging the jury because if the jury requests a recharge on any issue, it is the court’s duty to do so.

2020We disagree. (a) The first prong of our analysis requires a showing that the evidence was relevant “to an issue other than defendant’s character[.]” Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 306 (4) ( 797 SE2d 207 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020We disagree. (a) The first prong of our analysis requires a showing that the evidence was relevant “to an issue other than defendant’s character[.]” Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 306 (4) ( 797 SE2d 207 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See Carr, 301 Ga. at 130 (2) (b) (counsel was not deficient for failing to “lock[ ] down the State’s original plea offer” where counsel testified that the appellant would not accept the offer unless it was “whittled down”(punctuation 20 omitted)). (b) Failure to make hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.