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31 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogers v. Holdergreen2 sentences2021The second alternative prong is met if the disqualified votes make it “impossible to discern the will of the voters.” Rogers v. Holder, 636 So. 2d 645, 647 (Miss. 1994) (citing Stringer v. Lucas, 608 So. 2d 1351 (Miss. 41 1992)). 2008The second alternative prong is met if the disqualified votes make it “impossible to discern the will of the voters.” Rogers v. Holder, 636 So.2d 645, 647 (Miss.1994) (citing Stringer v. Lucas, 608 So.2d 1351 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 8. | 3 | 3 |
Griffin v. Stategreen2 sentences1997"The establishment of a race[-]neutral reason is not a difficult task." Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558 ; Griffin v. State 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss.1992). [A] trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 1997“The establishment of a race[-]neutral reason is not a difficult task.” Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558 ; Griffin v. State 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss.1992). [A] trial judge’s factual findings relative to a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. | 3 | 3 |
Galloway v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Under Rule 702, the first prong of the inquiry for determining whether expert testimony should be admitted is whether the witness is “qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience[,] or education.” Galloway, 122 So. 3d at 632 (¶ 28) (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 35 ). 2017Under Rule 702, the first prong of the inquiry for determining whether expert testimony should be admitted is whether the witness is "qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience[,] or education." Galloway , 122 So.3d at 632 (¶ 28) (quoting McLemore , 863 So.2d at 35 ). | 2 | 2 |
Terminix Intern., Inc. v. Ricegreen2 sentences2009With respect to the first prong of the analysis outlined above, “[t]o determine whether the parties agreed to arbitration, we simply apply contract law.” Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So.2d 1051, 1055 (¶ 9) (Miss.2004). 2008P’ship v. Rice, 904 So.2d 1051, 1055 (¶ 9) (Miss.2004). | 2 | 2 |
Foster v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Havard v. State, 988 So.2d 322, 331 (¶ 25) (Miss.2008) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129-30 (Miss.1996)). 2009Havard v. State, 988 So.2d 322, 331 (¶ 25) (Miss.2008) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129-30 (Miss.1996)). | 2 | 2 |
Havard v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Havard v. State, 988 So.2d 322, 331 (¶ 25) (Miss.2008) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129-30 (Miss.1996)). 2009Havard v. State, 988 So.2d 322, 331 (¶ 25) (Miss.2008) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129-30 (Miss.1996)). | 2 | 2 |
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.green2 sentences2022Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 , 66 S. Ct. 984 , 90 L. 2022Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 , 66 S. Ct. 984 , 90 L. | 1 | 2 |
ONE (1) CHARTER ARMS v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Charter Arms, 721 So. 2d at 623-26 (¶¶14-30); Bobo, 204 So. 3d at 324-26 (¶¶26-36). 13 ¶25. “[U]nder the first prong of our analysis, we determine whether [Taylor’s] seized property possesses a sufficiently close relationship to drug trafficking to justify forfeiture.” See id. at (¶28). ¶26. | 1 | 1 |
One Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($137,325.00) in United States Currency v. State Ex Rel. Pelahatchie Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2022See Charter Arms, 721 So. 2d at 623-26 (¶¶14-30); Bobo, 204 So. 3d at 324-26 (¶¶26-36). 13 ¶25. “[U]nder the first prong of our analysis, we determine whether [Taylor’s] seized property possesses a sufficiently close relationship to drug trafficking to justify forfeiture.” See id. at (¶28). ¶26. 2022See Charter Arms, 721 So. 2d at 623-26 (¶¶14-30); Bobo, 204 So. 3d at 324-26 (¶¶26-36). 13 ¶25. “[U]nder the first prong of our analysis, we determine whether [Taylor’s] seized property possesses a sufficiently close relationship to drug trafficking to justify forfeiture.” See id. at (¶28). ¶26. | 1 | 1 |
Presley v. Stategreen1 sentence2021“While the United States Supreme Court has not precisely defined ‘distinctive group’ under the first prong of the test, it has stated that such may include ‘economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups.’” Presley v. State, 9 So. 3d 442, 444 (¶5) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Moss v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Moss, 977 So. 2d at 1207 (¶5). | 1 | 1 |
Covenant Health & Rehabilitation of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds Ex Rel. Braddockgreen2 sentences2015The court focused its ruling on arbitrator selection alone and did not address the above contractual elements under the first prong of the analysis. ¶ 14: In Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So.3d 695 (Miss.2009), the Court addressed whether an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and a resident was unenforceable when the designated arbitration forum was unavailable. 2015The arbitration agreement in that case “require[d] that the arbitration be administered by the AAA.” Moulds, 14 So.3d at 709 (¶44). | 1 | 1 |
ADAMS COMMUNITY CARE CENTER, LLC v. Reedgreen1 sentence2015Adams Cmty. Care, 37 So.3d at 1158 (¶ 7) (citing Grenada Living Ctr., 961 So.2d at 36-37 (¶ 9)). | 1 | 1 |
Grenada Living Center, LLC v. Colemangreen1 sentence2015Adams Cmty. Care, 37 So.3d at 1158 (¶ 7) (citing Grenada Living Ctr., 961 So.2d at 36-37 (¶ 9)). | 1 | 1 |
East Ford, Inc. v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2009The first prong of this analysis has two subparts: “(1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and (2) whether the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Id. (citing East Ford, Inc., 826 So.2d at 713 (¶ 9)). | 1 | 1 |
Dan Witcher v. C. C. Peyton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiarygreen1 sentence2009Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946); see also Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir.1969) (“a cross-section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with varying economic and social positions.”) ¶ 6. | 1 | 1 |
| Roberson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stringer v. Lucas
green
2 sentences2021The second alternative prong is met if the disqualified votes make it “impossible to discern the will of the voters.” Rogers v. Holder, 636 So. 2d 645, 647 (Miss. 1994) (citing Stringer v. Lucas, 608 So. 2d 1351 (Miss. 41 1992)). 2008The second alternative prong is met if the disqualified votes make it “impossible to discern the will of the voters.” Rogers v. Holder, 636 So.2d 645, 647 (Miss.1994) (citing Stringer v. Lucas, 608 So.2d 1351 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 8. | 3 | 2007–2021 |
Noxubee County Democratic E. Com. v. Russell
green
2 sentences2021Under the first prong of the test, a special election is proper when “enough illegal votes were cast for the contestee to change the result of the election . . . .” Id. at 1197 . 2008Under the first prong of the test, a special election is proper when “enough illegal votes were cast for the contestee to change the result of the election ....” Id. at 1197 . | 3 | 2007–2021 |
Stewart v. State
green
2 sentences1997"The establishment of a race[-]neutral reason is not a difficult task." Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558 ; Griffin v. State 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss.1992). [A] trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 1997“The establishment of a race[-]neutral reason is not a difficult task.” Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558 ; Griffin v. State 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss.1992). [A] trial judge’s factual findings relative to a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. | 3 | 1995–1997 |
Mississippi Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore
green
2 sentences2017Under Rule 702, the first prong of the inquiry for determining whether expert testimony should be admitted is whether the witness is “qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience[,] or education.” Galloway, 122 So. 3d at 632 (¶ 28) (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 35 ). 2017Under Rule 702, the first prong of the inquiry for determining whether expert testimony should be admitted is whether the witness is "qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience[,] or education." Galloway , 122 So.3d at 632 (¶ 28) (quoting McLemore , 863 So.2d at 35 ). | 2 | 2014–2017 |
James Henderson, Trustee for Service Equipment Company v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, a Partnership
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2005Id. | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences2004Notably, we have previously declared with respect to the first prong of the test, "The Constitution does not guarantee a right to errorless counsel." Id. 2004Notably, this Court has declared with respect to the first prong of the test, "The Constitution does not guarantee a right to errorless counsel." Id. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Ward v. State
green
2 sentences2001Id. 1998Id. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
State v. McGrone
green
1 sentence2024The first prong of the test set forth in McGrone is that “the evidence in question must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.” Id. at (¶11). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jones v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp.
green
1 sentence2020As we stated in Wilcher, and even earlier in Jones v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999), the statute’s assignment of authority clearly meets the first prong of the test because it is phrased as a choice or decision. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Gaubert
green
2 sentences2014If the conduct in question meets the first prong of the test, the court must then determine “whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 , 111 S.Ct. 1267 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537 , 108 S.Ct. 1954 ). 2014If the conduct in question meets the first prong of the test, the court must then determine “whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 , 111 S.Ct. 1267 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537 , 108 S.Ct. 1954 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
green
2 sentences2014The purpose of the discretionary-function exemption is to “prevent ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-14 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 . 2014The purpose of the discretionary-function exemption is to “prevent ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-14 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Berkovitz v. United States
green
1 sentence2014If the conduct in question meets the first prong of the test, the court must then determine “whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 , 111 S.Ct. 1267 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537 , 108 S.Ct. 1954 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wakefield v. Puckett
green
1 sentence2005The first prong of the test is "[w]hether the cause of the omission is excusable (e.g., omission due to inadvertence, mistake, etc.?)...." Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Stringer v. State
green
1 sentence2000An "actual conflict" means that "a potential for conflict or hypothetical or speculative conflicts will not suffice for reversal." Stringer, 485 So.2d at 275 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.