13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Antoine Mayhand v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025We first ask whether the trial court could reasonably have found that Ms. Austin experienced a “serious occurrence” or “exciting event.” Mayhand, 127 A.3d at 1205-06 (citation modified). | 1 | 1 |
Draude v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen2 sentences2023See Draude, 527 A.2d at 1256 (announcing this test within the analysis of the first prong of the standard variance test). 31 to the second “practical difficulties” prong). 2023See Draude, 527 A.2d at 1256 (announcing this test within the analysis of the first prong of the standard variance test). 31 to the second “practical difficulties” prong). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Meltongreen1 sentence2020See In re Amey, 40 A.3d 902, 911 (D.C. 2012); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 906-07 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczykgreen1 sentence2020He satisfies the second prong because, given the serious 40 See, e.g., Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71-72 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or ‘personal stake,’ in the outcome of the action. . . . | 1 | 1 |
In re Ameygreen1 sentence2020See In re Amey, 40 A.3d 902, 911 (D.C. 2012); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 906-07 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2017See Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 242 (D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) ("[F]irst, there must be an error.”). 2017See Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 242 (D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) ("[F]irst, there must be an error.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017See Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 242 (D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) ("[F]irst, there must be an error.”). | 1 | 1 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animalsred2 sentences2009In this case, by contrast, when the court in Young determined that Officer Young was entitled to qualified immunity, we effectively disposed of the Fourth Amendment excessive force argument upon which Scales’s § 1983 claim is predicated because we held that Scales could not even meet the first prong of the test by “showfing] the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . 2009In this case, by contrast, when the court in Young determined that Officer Young was entitled to qualified immunity, we effectively disposed of the Fourth Amendment excessive force argument upon which Scales’s § 1983 claim is predicated because we held that Scales could not even meet the first prong of the test by “showfing] the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . | 1 | 1 |
O'BRIEN v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995See id. 1995See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monaco v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences2017In light of substantial record evidence showing (1) Hillel considered the feasibility of renovating the existing building, (2) testimony from Rabbi Kaiser-Blueth and GWU students emphasizing the uninviting and fortress-like condition of the existing building, (3) increasing numbers of students and others seeking to participate in Hillel‟s activities and services, (4) the exceptional configuration of the lot, and (5) Hillel‟s institutional mission and needs; and given the Commission‟s correct reading and application of our case law, including Monaco, supra, which clearly stated that the Commiss 2017In light of substantial record evidence showing (1) Hillel considered the feasibility of renovating the existing building, (2) testimony from Rabbi Kaiser-Blueth and GWU students emphasizing the uninviting and fortress-like condition of the existing building, (3) increasing numbers of students and others seeking to participate in Hillel‟s activities and services, (4) the exceptional configuration of the lot, and (5) Hillel‟s institutional mission and needs; and given the Commission‟s correct reading and application of our case law, including Monaco, supra, which clearly stated that the Commiss | 1 | 2017–2017 |
AHMED AIT-GHEZALA v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT, and SB-URBAN, LLC, Intervenor.
green
2 sentences2017In light of substantial record evidence showing (1) Hillel considered the feasibility of renovating the existing building, (2) testimony from Rabbi Kaiser-Blueth and GWU students emphasizing the uninviting and fortress-like condition of the existing building, (3) increasing numbers of students and others seeking to participate in Hillel‟s activities and services, (4) the exceptional configuration of the lot, and (5) Hillel‟s institutional mission and needs; and given the Commission‟s correct reading and application of our case law, including Monaco, supra, which clearly stated that the Commiss 2017In light of substantial record evidence showing (1) Hillel considered the feasibility of renovating the existing building, (2) testimony from Rabbi Kaiser-Blueth and GWU students emphasizing the uninviting and fortress-like condition of the existing building, (3) increasing numbers of students and others seeking to participate in Hillel‟s activities and services, (4) the exceptional configuration of the lot, and (5) Hillel‟s institutional mission and needs; and given the Commission‟s correct reading and application of our case law, including Monaco, supra, which clearly stated that the Commiss | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Laumer v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The Laumer Test for Admitting Statements Against Penal Interest Both appellants contend that the first prong of our test for admitting statements against penal interest, announced in Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190 (D.C.1979) (en banc), has been implicitly invalidated. 2014When applying the first prong of the test to determine “whether the de-clarant in fact made the proffered statement, the trial court’s focus is not on the truth of the declaration, but on the veracity of the witness who repeats the declaration.” Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste of Maryland, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1989Even assuming trial counsel’s conduct at sentencing fell below the norms required under the first prong of the test in Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2063 , counsel’s failure to know of the § 5010(c) recommendation under the Federal Youth Corrections Act would not have changed the result. 1989Even assuming trial counsel’s conduct at sentencing fell below the norms required under the first prong of the test in Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2063 , counsel’s failure to know of the § 5010(c) recommendation under the Federal Youth Corrections Act would not have changed the result. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Jose Gonzalez and Jose Vicente Costano
green
2 sentences1988Therefore, we hold that in determining whether a "substantial risk" exists, the trial court should consider the first-prong of the test enunciated in United States v. Gonzalez, supra , i.e., does the jury have to make a substantial inference that the defendant was the person referred to by neutral references in the redacted statement. 1988Therefore, we hold that in determining whether a “substantial risk” exists, the trial court should consider the first-prong of the test enunciated in United States v. Gonzalez, supra, i.e., does the jury have to make a substantial inference that the defendant was the person referred to by neutral references in the redacted statement. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1978When an informant’s tip is relied upon to establish probable cause, a two-pronged test is to be applied by a reviewing court. [T]he [issuing judge] must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [items to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . was “credible” or his information “reliable.” [Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 , 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (footnote omitted).] Appellant concedes that the first pron 1978When an informant’s tip is relied upon to establish probable cause, a two-pronged test is to be applied by a reviewing court. [T]he [issuing judge] must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [items to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . was “credible” or his information “reliable.” [Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 , 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (footnote omitted).] Appellant concedes that the first pron | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.