first prong test in New Hampshire

2022To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

2016“To meet the first prong of this test, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Thompson , 161 N.H. at 528 (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . ‘We judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct based upon the facts and circumstances of that particular case, viewed from the time of that conduct.” Hall, 160 N.H. at 584 ; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 .

2010To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms).

2010To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“[T]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (quotation omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2010To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms).

2010To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768 (2009) (quotation omitted); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“[T]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (quotation omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2025See State v. Belonga, 163 N.H. 343, 360 (2012).

2020See MacElman, 149 N.H. at 798 .

2019See Oakes , 161 N.H. at 278 -79 , 13 A.3d 293 .

2019See Oakes , 161 N.H. at 278 -79 , 13 A.3d 293 .

2016“To meet the first prong of this test, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Thompson , 161 N.H. at 528 (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . ‘We judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct based upon the facts and circumstances of that particular case, viewed from the time of that conduct.” Hall, 160 N.H. at 584 ; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 .

2016“To meet the first prong of this test, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Thompson , 161 N.H. at 528 (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . ‘We judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct based upon the facts and circumstances of that particular case, viewed from the time of that conduct.” Hall, 160 N.H. at 584 ; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 .

2015“To satisfy the first prong of the test, the performance prong, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 412 (quotation omitted); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

2011In order to have a “rational understanding” under the second prong, a defendant must have “sufficient contact with reality.” Haycock, 146 N.H. at 6 (quotation omitted).

2011The first prong of the test requires that the defendant be capable of communicating “meaningfully with his attorney so as to be able to make informed choices regarding trial strategy.” Gourlay, 148 N.H. at 77 (quotation omitted).

2010Inducement is something more than “merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense.” RSA 626:5; see Larose, 157 N.H. at 35 .

2007State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 29 (1998).

2004See id.

2003See id. at 844 .

1998Under the first prong of the analysis, an individual’s right to work within one’s profession is a “privilege of fundamental significance.” Plantier, 126 N.H. at 507 , 494 A.2d at 273 ; cf. Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 378-79 , 513 A.2d 956, 958-59 (1986) (recognizing a hierarchy of protected interests in habeas corpus proceedings).

1998Under the first prong of the analysis, an individual’s right to work within one’s profession is a “privilege of fundamental significance.” Plantier, 126 N.H. at 507 , 494 A.2d at 273 ; cf. Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 378-79 , 513 A.2d 956, 958-59 (1986) (recognizing a hierarchy of protected interests in habeas corpus proceedings).

1998The petitioner’s interest in continuing his employment with the school and his work at Better Buddies is substantial, see Lee TT. v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1250 (N.Y. 1996), so we turn to the last two prongs of our analysis.

1991Here, “the damages do not appear to us to be so far incapable of accurate estimation,” Langlois v. Maloney, 95 N.H. 408, 414 , 64 A.2d 697, 702 (1949), to pass the first prong of the test for liquidated damages.

1991Here, “the damages do not appear to us to be so far incapable of accurate estimation,” Langlois v. Maloney, 95 N.H. 408, 414 , 64 A.2d 697, 702 (1949), to pass the first prong of the test for liquidated damages.

1989See Trainor, 130 N.H. at 374 , 540 A.2d at 1238 .

1989See Trainor, 130 N.H. at 374 , 540 A.2d at 1238 .