first prong test in Indiana

2016Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 , 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1146-1147 (2003)).

2016Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 , 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1146-1147 (2003)).

2015Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 952 . [16] “‘The first prong of this inquiry may be satisfied by a person’s conviction for making unreasonable noise based solely on his loud speaking during a police investigation.’” Id. (quoting Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied).

2009Where a state action restricts a defendant's expressive activity, only if the State correctly determines that a defendant has abused his right to speak may the statute be constitutionally applied. *952 "The first prong of this inquiry may be satisfied by a person's conviction for making unreasonable noise based solely on his loud speaking during a police investigation." Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2001Id. (citing Johnson v. *630 State, 719 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999).

2001See Johnson v. State, 719 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ind. Ct.App.1999) (holding that this prong is satisfied by a person's conviction for making unreasonable noise based solely on his loud speaking during a police investigation).

2020Id. [9] The first prong of the inquiry may be satisfied based solely on the police restricting a claimant’s loud speaking during a police investigation.

2015Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 951 . “‘First, we must determine whether state action has restricted a claimant’s expressive activity; second, if it has, we must decide whether the restricted activity constituted an “abuse” of the right to speak.’” Id. (quoting Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied). [11] “The first prong of this inquiry may be satisfied by a person’s conviction for making unreasonable noise based solely on her loud speaking during a police investigation.” Id. at 952 (quoting anothe

2020The first prong of the test, the declarant’s motive to promote treatment or diagnosis, is equally crucial to a determination of reliability. “[T]he declarant must subjectively believe that he was making the statement for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis or treatment.” With most declarants, this is generally a simple matter: “[o]ften, for example where a patient consults with a physician, the declarant’s desire to seek and receive treatment may be inferred from the circumstances.” Id. at 260-61 (internal citations omitted). [12] Steffey makes no argument regarding the first prong on t

2016“Statements made by victims of sexual assault or molestation about the nature of the assault or abuse—even those identifying the perpetrator— generally satisfy the second prong of the analysis because they assist medical providers in recommending potential treatment for sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy testing, psychological counseling, and discharge instructions.” VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 260 . [21] The first prong of the test, the declarant’s motive to promote treatment or diagnosis is equally crucial to a determination of reliability.

2008Teer v. State, 738 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied; see also Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 78-79 (Ind.1994) (citing long list of cases that summarize the first prong as a requirement that legislative classifications be “just,” “natural,” “reasonable,” “not arbitrary”).

2008In determining whether a statute complies with Article 1, Section 23, “courts must exercise substantial deference to leg *50 islative discretion.” Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80 .

2018As the Sykes panel stated, “we must determine whether the attorney whose change of employment created the disqualification issue was actually privy to any confidential information [her] prior law firm received from Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1250 | December 27, 2018 Page 10 of 15 the party now seeking disqualification of [her] present firm.” Id. at 588 (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)). [19] Citing comment three to Rule 1.9, for the proposition that “[a] conclusion as to whether a lawyer possesses such confidential information ‘may

2015Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 951 . “‘First, we must determine whether state action has restricted a claimant’s expressive activity; second, if it has, we must decide whether the restricted activity constituted an “abuse” of the right to speak.’” Id. (quoting Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied). [11] “The first prong of this inquiry may be satisfied by a person’s conviction for making unreasonable noise based solely on her loud speaking during a police investigation.” Id. at 952 (quoting anothe

2013See Ward, 528 N.E.2d at 54 .

2013See Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713 , 726–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 7 The first prong of the test, the declarant’s motive to promote treatment or diagnosis, is equally crucial to a determination of reliability.

2012See McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind. 1997) (holding “removing the only prospective African-American juror . . . raise[s] an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race”).

2008Teer v. State, 738 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied; see also Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 78-79 (Ind.1994) (citing long list of cases that summarize the first prong as a requirement that legislative classifications be “just,” “natural,” “reasonable,” “not arbitrary”).

2007See N. Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 , 95 S.Ct. 719 , 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975) (prejudgment garnishment of corporation’s accounts implicated due process clause, and “probability of irreparable injury ... is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error”); cf. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 , 111 S.Ct. 2105 (concluding that effects of attachment to real estate are significant even where attachment does not interfere with owner’s use of the property).

2007See N. Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 , 95 S.Ct. 719 , 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975) (prejudgment garnishment of corporation’s accounts implicated due process clause, and “probability of irreparable injury ... is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error”); cf. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 , 111 S.Ct. 2105 (concluding that effects of attachment to real estate are significant even where attachment does not interfere with owner’s use of the property).

2005See, e.g., Saler, 800 N.E.2d at 965-966 .

2001See Monegan, 721 N.E.2d at 248 ; Turner, 682 N.E.2d at 496 .

1997Under the first prong of this analysis, it is not necessary for police to have a warrant to enter a place “when the facts suggest a reasonable belief that a person within the premises is in need of aid.” Geimer v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind.1992).