first prong test in Missouri

2014To satisfy the first prong of the test, a movant “must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective” by pointing to “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” Smith, 370 S.W.3d at 886 (quotation omitted).

2014To satisfy the first prong of the test, a movant “must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective” by pointing to “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” Smith, 370 S.W.3d at 886 (quotation omitted).

2015“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004); Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2013“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004); Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2015To satisfy the first prong of this test, a mov-ant must “overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2013To satisfy the first prong of this test, a mov-ant must “overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Id. (quoting Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2015“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004); Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2013“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. (citing Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004); Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002)).

2014“To satisfy the first prong of this test, a movant must ‘overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’’” Jamerson v. State, 410 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (quoting Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2014“To satisfy the first prong of this test, a movant must ‘overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Jamerson v. State, 410 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Mo.App.

2014“To satisfy the first prong of this test, a movant must ‘overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’’” Jamerson v. State, 410 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (quoting Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2014E.D. 2013) (quoting Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2005Jameson v. State, 125 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Mo.App.

2005Jameson v. State, 125 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Mo.App.

2003Rule 29.15(i); Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 923 , 113 S.Ct. 343 , 121 L.Ed.2d 259 (1992).

2002Rule 29.15(i); Leisure v. *426 State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992).

2016See Cherco, 309 S.W.3d at 825 ; see also Twenter, 818 S.W.2d at 636-37 .

2016See Cherco, 309 S.W.3d at 825 ; see also Twenter, 818 S.W.2d at 636-37 .

2012This specific statement of Johnson’s expected testimony is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the exception set forth in Frank, 687 S.W.2d at 888-84 ; See also Eltiste, 167 S.W.3d at 749 .

2008The first prong of this claim is that “defense counsel continually violated an Order in limine and continued to make improper references to criminal convictions and drug use of witnesses, while questioning witnesses[.]” 4 Hanson contends that “numerous attempts to interject this highly prejudicial information ultimately resulted in the jury having the belief that at least one witness if not multiple witnesses were drug users and guilty of prior bad acts.” “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial.” Blue v. Harrah’s North Kansas City, L.L.C., 170 S.W.3d 466,

2007See Storey, 40 S.W.3d at 910-12 .

2007Under the first prong of the test, Mr. Coke’s amended Rule 24.035 motion alleged that prior to his plea, his trial counsel told him that he would serve, “at most, seventeen months prior to being paroled.” “As a general proposition, parole eligibility is a collateral circumstance of which a criminal defendant need not be advised to make that defendant’s plea knowing and voluntary.” Shackleford v. State, 51 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Mo.App.

2003Gardner v. State, 96 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Mo.App.

2002See In re Marriage of Phillips, 723 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Mo.App.

1997State v. Vinson, *364 800 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo.banc 1990); Nguyen, 880 S.W.2d at 634 (Mo.App.1994); State v. Bullington, 684 S.W.2d 52,55 (Mo.App.1984).

1997State v. Vinson, *364 800 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo.banc 1990); Nguyen, 880 S.W.2d at 634 (Mo.App.1994); State v. Bullington, 684 S.W.2d 52,55 (Mo.App.1984).

1997State v. Vinson, *364 800 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo.banc 1990); Nguyen, 880 S.W.2d at 634 (Mo.App.1994); State v. Bullington, 684 S.W.2d 52,55 (Mo.App.1984).