first prong test (West Virginia) · Go Syfert
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first prong test in West Virginia

9 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Mary M.M. Hoffner, M.D.green
ca10 · 1985 · cited in 3 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2015
2 sentences

2015See United States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The perception requirement stems from F.R.E. 602 which requires a lay witness to have first-hand knowledge of the events he is testifying about so as to present only the most accurate information to the finder of fact.”).

2015See United States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir.1985) (“The perception requirement stems from F.R.E. 602 which requires a lay witness to have firsthand knowledge of the events he is testifying about so as to present only the most accurate information to the finder of fact.”).

33
Corley v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018As explained in the body of this decision, there is no error and we need not proceed beyond the first prong in this analysis. 5 Custodial interrogation brings about “inherently compelling pressures” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)), thought to “induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed” (Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 , 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009)).

2018As explained in the body of this decision, there is no error and we need not proceed beyond the first prong in this analysis. 5 Custodial interrogation brings about “inherently compelling pressures” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)), thought to “induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed” (Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 , 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009)).

11
Evans v. Mutual Mininggreen
wva · 1997 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526, 530 , 485 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1997) (lay opinion testimony must be "based on the witness' perception" of events). [10] Indeed, "[i]t is firmly established in this state that the opinion of a witness who is not an expert may be given in evidence if he has some peculiar knowledge concerning the subject of the opinion[.]" [11] Syl. pt. 2, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987).

1999Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526, 530 , 485 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1997) (lay opinion testimony must be "based on the witness' perception" of events). [10] Indeed, "[i]t is firmly established in this state that the opinion of a witness who is not an expert may be given in evidence if he has some peculiar knowledge concerning the subject of the opinion[.]" [11] Syl. pt. 2, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987).

11
William ENGLISH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. Et Al., Defendants-Appelleesgreen
ca5 · 1972 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Only if the court determines that the action should be dismissed is the absent party la-belled “indispensable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b); see English v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 465 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.1972).’ ” We are concerned only with the first prong of this inquiry. 3 In the Syllabus of Wachter v. Dostert, supra, we summarized the guidelines set forth in Rule 19(a) for determining whether a nonparty is a person whose joinder should be compelled: “Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure requires two general inquiries for joinder of a person who is subject to service of pro

1991Only if the court determines that the action should be dismissed is the absent party labelled "indispensable." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b); see English v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 465 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.1972).'" We are concerned only with the first prong of this inquiry. [3] In the Syllabus of Wachter v. Dostert, supra , we summarized the guidelines set forth in Rule 19(a) for determining whether a nonparty is a person whose joinder should be compelled: "Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure requires two general inquiries for joinder of a person who is subject to service of pr

11
Wachter v. Dostertgreen
wva · 1983 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991Only if the court determines that the action should be dismissed is the absent party labelled "indispensable." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b); see English v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 465 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.1972).'" We are concerned only with the first prong of this inquiry. [3] In the Syllabus of Wachter v. Dostert, supra , we summarized the guidelines set forth in Rule 19(a) for determining whether a nonparty is a person whose joinder should be compelled: "Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure requires two general inquiries for joinder of a person who is subject to service of pr

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2002The court then must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assis *36 tance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 .

2002The court then must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assis *36 tance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 .

21999–2002
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2018As explained in the body of this decision, there is no error and we need not proceed beyond the first prong in this analysis. 5 Custodial interrogation brings about “inherently compelling pressures” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)), thought to “induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed” (Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 , 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009)).

2018As explained in the body of this decision, there is no error and we need not proceed beyond the first prong in this analysis. 5 Custodial interrogation brings about “inherently compelling pressures” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)), thought to “induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed” (Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 , 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009)).

12018–2018
State v. Miller green
wva · 1995
2 sentences

2013The plain error doctrine is set forth in Syllabus point 7 of State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), which states: “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” We find that, under the facts of the present ease, the first prong of the test has not been satisfied.

2013The plain error doctrine is set forth in Syllabus point 7 of State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), which states: “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” We find that, under the facts of the present ease, the first prong of the test has not been satisfied.

12013–2013
Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Commission green
wva · 1998
2 sentences

2005In Syllabus Point 1 of Wellsburg, supra, this Court held that "[w]hen a corporation is granted a tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that corporation is deemed to be a charitable organization under 110 C.S.R. § 3-19.1." Therefore, AEMS is deemed to be a charitable organization and meets the first prong of the test set forth in Wellsburg. [8] Next, under the second prong of Wellsburg 's two-prong test, we find that the *317 property at issue is used exclusively for charitable purposes.

2005In Syllabus Point 1 of Wellsburg, supra, this Court held that “[w]hen a corporation is granted a tax exempt status under Section 501(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that corporation is deemed to be a charitable organization under 110 C.S.R. § 3-19.1.” Therefore, AEMS is deemed to be a charitable organization and meets the first prong of the test set forth in Wellsburg. 8 Next, under the second prong of Wellsburg’s two-prong test, we find that the property at issue is used exclusively for charitable proposes.

12005–2005
State v. Haller green
wva · 1987
2 sentences

1999Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526, 530 , 485 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1997) (lay opinion testimony must be "based on the witness' perception" of events). [10] Indeed, "[i]t is firmly established in this state that the opinion of a witness who is not an expert may be given in evidence if he has some peculiar knowledge concerning the subject of the opinion[.]" [11] Syl. pt. 2, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987).

1999Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526, 530 , 485 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1997) (lay opinion testimony must be "based on the witness' perception" of events). [10] Indeed, "[i]t is firmly established in this state that the opinion of a witness who is not an expert may be given in evidence if he has some peculiar knowledge concerning the subject of the opinion[.]" [11] Syl. pt. 2, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987).

11999–1999

Where else courts name it

TX 450 (1982–2026) OH 227 (1980–2026) CA 162 (1982–2026) IL 137 (1983–2026) NY 127 (1969–2026) GA 105 (1975–2026) WA 100 (1982–2026) NJ 95 (1985–2026) CT 93 (1981–2025) PA 91 (1975–2026) FL 71 (1981–2025) IA 65 (1983–2024) MI 57 (1977–2026) TN 49 (1991–2025) NM 48 (1988–2026) AL 46 (1985–2024) MA 41 (1982–2023) IN 41 (1988–2024) MO 38 (1984–2016) RI 36 (1987–2017) NC 35 (1984–2024) NH 35 (1988–2025) UT 35 (1983–2025) MS 31 (1992–2024) WI 31 (1978–2025) KS 30 (1978–2024) MT 29 (1985–2023) KY 28 (1993–2026) VA 26 (1986–2026) VT 26 (1988–2025) CO 25 (1973–2026) HI 23 (1981–2024) LA 21 (1991–2025) MD 18 (1988–2024) SD 18 (1976–2025) MN 16 (1977–2024) OR 16 (1996–2021) AZ 14 (1983–2020) ME 14 (1984–2023) DC 13 (1978–2025) ND 12 (1980–2024) NE 12 (1985–2018) SC 12 (1992–2015) AK 11 (1975–2023) OK 9 (1986–2021) WV 9 (1991–2018) ID 7 (1989–2020) WY 7 (1991–2025) NV 6 (1996–2021) AR 5 (2003–2024) DE 5 (2018–2025) VI 4 (2007–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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