first prong test in Maine

2023"Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is ‘highly deferential.'... '[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Watson v. State, 2020 ME 51 , P20, 230 A.3d 6, 12 (Quoting, Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164 , { 13, 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 US. at 689)).

2023"Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is ‘highly deferential.'... '[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Watson v. State, 2020 ME 51 , P20, 230 A.3d 6, 12 (Quoting, Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164 , { 13, 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 US. at 689)).

2022"Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is 'highly deferential.' ... '[A] 2 court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."' Watson v. State, 2020 ME 51 , P20, 230 A.3d 6, 12 (Quoting, Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164, 113 , 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 )).

2022"Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is 'highly deferential.' ... 1[AJ court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 2 professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.u' Watson v. State, 2020 ME 51 , P20, 230 A.3d 6, 12 (Quoting, Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164 , if 13, 129 A.3d 962 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 )).

2022Discussion When the Law Court considered personal jurisdiction ansmg from the sale of non­ commercial boat in Murphy v. Keenan, it held that the state must have "interest beyond mere citizenry. . . such as the protection of its industries, the safety of its workers, or the location of witnesses and creditors within its border" to satisfy the first prong of the test. 667 A.2d at 594-95 .

2013For example, “private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.” Id. 16 discussed, candidacy for office is subject to some measure of First Amendment protection. [¶25] The employees having satisfied their burden on the first prong of the test, the burden then shifts to the City to demonstrate that “its interest, as an employer, in providing efficient public services outweighs the employee[s’] interest[s].” Moen, 1998 ME 135, ¶ 14 , 71

2013For example, “private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.” Id. 16 discussed, candidacy for office is subject to some measure of First Amendment protection. [¶25] The employees having satisfied their burden on the first prong of the test, the burden then shifts to the City to demonstrate that “its interest, as an employer, in providing efficient public services outweighs the employee[s’] interest[s].” Moen, 1998 ME 135, ¶ 14 , 71

2013For example, “private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.” Id. 16 discussed, candidacy for office is subject to some measure of First Amendment protection. [¶25] The employees having satisfied their burden on the first prong of the test, the burden then shifts to the City to demonstrate that “its interest, as an employer, in providing efficient public services outweighs the employee[s’] interest[s].” Moen, 1998 ME 135, ¶ 14 , 71

2005Id.

2002Id. at (72 Stowell argues that the * The twelve factors cited by the Law Court are (1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling of business activity[,] assets, or management; (4) thin capitalization; (5) nonobservance of corporate formalities; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) no payment of dividends; insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; (9) siphoning away of corporate assets by the dominant shareholders; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and directors; (11) use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders; [and] (12) use of the

2000The first prong of that test focuses on whether “counsel’s performance falls below the performance that might be expected of an ordinary, fallible attorney.” State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, 17 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 ; Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169 , ¥ 6, 697 A.2d 1301, 1304 .

2000The first prong of that test focuses on whether “counsel’s performance falls below the performance that might be expected of an ordinary, fallible attorney.” State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, 17 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 ; Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169 , ¥ 6, 697 A.2d 1301, 1304 .

2000The first prong of that test focuses on whether “counsel’s performance falls below the performance that might be expected of an ordinary, fallible attorney.” State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, 17 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 ; Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169 , ¥ 6, 697 A.2d 1301, 1304 .

2000The first prong of that test focuses on whether “counsel’s performance falls below the performance that might be expected of an ordinary, fallible attorney.” State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, 17 , 699 A.2d 1139, 1144 ; Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169 , ¥ 6, 697 A.2d 1301, 1304 .

2000The first prong of the inquiry called for by MacDonald, supra, must be answered in the affirmative.

1997Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass’n, 404 A.2d 204, 207-08 (Me.1979). [¶4] The substantive arbitrability, of this dispute fails on the first prong of the test stated above because Roosa never agreed to arbitrate any disputes with Tillotson. “[P]arties ‘cannot be compelled to sub *1198 mit their controversy to arbitration unless they have manifested in 'writing a contractual intent to be bound to do so.’ ” State of the Arts, Inc. v. Congress Property Management Carp., 1997 ME 18, § 4 , 688 A.2d 926 (Me. 1997) (quoting Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 782 (Me.1981)); see also Maine Cent.

1997Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass’n, 404 A.2d 204, 207-08 (Me.1979). [¶4] The substantive arbitrability, of this dispute fails on the first prong of the test stated above because Roosa never agreed to arbitrate any disputes with Tillotson. “[P]arties ‘cannot be compelled to sub *1198 mit their controversy to arbitration unless they have manifested in 'writing a contractual intent to be bound to do so.’ ” State of the Arts, Inc. v. Congress Property Management Carp., 1997 ME 18, § 4 , 688 A.2d 926 (Me. 1997) (quoting Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 782 (Me.1981)); see also Maine Cent.

1984Id.