first prong test in Rhode Island

2011See Brennan , 627 A.2d at 845 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2001In considering the first prong of the test for gauging an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has held that “we will not meticulously scrutinize an attorney’s reasoned judgment or strategic maneuver in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 (citing State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842, 851 (R.I.1993)).

2015To demonstrate a deficiency under the first prong of this analysis, the defendant must establish “that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Rodriguez v. State, 941 A.2d 158, 162 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001)).

2014See Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162 .

2004Also, “a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence must satisfy a two-pronged test, and the defendant bears the burden of satisfying each prong.” State v. Brown, 798 A.2d 942, 951 (R.I.2002). 6 The first prong of this test has four elements, and “requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible, (4) of the type which would probably change the verdict at trial. * * * Once this first prong is

1999See Firth, 708 A.2d at 532 .

2014The hearing justice ruled that those claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they had already been resolved in applicant’s direct appeal to this Court or could have been argued “during the trial proceeding or on direct appeal.” The hearing justice further found that, while applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly before the court, applicant had failed to establish that, under the first prong of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), his trial attorney’s “professional decisi

2014The hearing justice ruled that those claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they had already been resolved in applicant’s direct appeal to this Court or could have been argued “during the trial proceeding or on direct appeal.” The hearing justice further found that, while applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly before the court, applicant had failed to establish that, under the first prong of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), his trial attorney’s “professional decisi

1994Id.

1992State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I.1987).

2015To demonstrate a deficiency under the first prong of this analysis, the defendant must establish “that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Rodriguez v. State, 941 A.2d 158, 162 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001)).

2001In considering the first prong of the test for gauging an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has held that “we will not meticulously scrutinize an attorney’s reasoned judgment or strategic maneuver in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 (citing State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842, 851 (R.I.1993)).

1994We now discuss the threshold issue of standing. “[T]he proper inquiry in resolving an issue of standing is whether the party seeking judicial review has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ either economic or otherwise, as a result of the statute or action in dispute.” (Emphasis added.) In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 88 (R.I.1980); see also Burns v. Sundlun, *197 617 A.2d 114 (R.I.1992); Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16 , 317 A.2d 124 (1974) (adopting the first prong of the test in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827

1994We now discuss the threshold issue of standing. “[T]he proper inquiry in resolving an issue of standing is whether the party seeking judicial review has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ either economic or otherwise, as a result of the statute or action in dispute.” (Emphasis added.) In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 88 (R.I.1980); see also Burns v. Sundlun, *197 617 A.2d 114 (R.I.1992); Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16 , 317 A.2d 124 (1974) (adopting the first prong of the test in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827

1994We now discuss the threshold issue of standing. “[T]he proper inquiry in resolving an issue of standing is whether the party seeking judicial review has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ either economic or otherwise, as a result of the statute or action in dispute.” (Emphasis added.) In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 88 (R.I.1980); see also Burns v. Sundlun, *197 617 A.2d 114 (R.I.1992); Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16 , 317 A.2d 124 (1974) (adopting the first prong of the test in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827

1994We now discuss the threshold issue of standing. “[T]he proper inquiry in resolving an issue of standing is whether the party seeking judicial review has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ either economic or otherwise, as a result of the statute or action in dispute.” (Emphasis added.) In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 88 (R.I.1980); see also Burns v. Sundlun, *197 617 A.2d 114 (R.I.1992); Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16 , 317 A.2d 124 (1974) (adopting the first prong of the test in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827

2017Under the first prong of this analysis, “an applicant for postconviction relief first ‘must establish that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; [t]his requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed * * * by the Sixth Amendment.’” Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 654 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 110-11 (R.I. 2012)).

2017“This prong can be satisfied only by a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Lipscomb v. State, 144 A.3d 299, 308 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Bell v. State, 71 A.3d 458, 460 (R.I. 2013)).

2017Under the first prong of this analysis, “an applicant for postconviction relief first ‘must establish that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; [t]his requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed * * * by the Sixth Amendment.’” Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 654 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 110-11 (R.I. 2012)).

2017“This prong can be satisfied only by a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Lipscomb v. State, 144 A.3d 299, 308 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Bell v. State, 71 A.3d 458, 460 (R.I. 2013)).

2015“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Pelletier v. State, 966 A.2d 1237, 1241 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2013B The Defendant’s Due-Process Claim In order to comply with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, the state must “provide a criminal defendant with certain information.” State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 229 (R.I.2008) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 ). “[I]f a prosecutor has suppressed evidence that would be favorable to the accused and the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, the defendant’s due-process rights have been violated and a new trial must be granted.” Id. at 229-30 .

2007See State v. Gatone, 698 A.2d 230, 235 (R.I.1997).