first prong test in Utah

2011Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 29 , 245 P.3d 184 . ¶ 66 The first prong of this test "requires the court to consider `the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.'" ASC Utah, Inc., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 30 , 245 P.3d 184 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 26 , 40 P.3d 599 ).

2011Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 29 , 245 P.3d 184 . ¶ 66 The first prong of this test "requires the court to consider `the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.'" ASC Utah, Inc., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 30 , 245 P.3d 184 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 26 , 40 P.3d 599 ).

2011Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 29 , 245 P.3d 184 . ¶ 66 The first prong of this test "requires the court to consider `the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.'" ASC Utah, Inc., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 30 , 245 P.3d 184 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 26 , 40 P.3d 599 ).

2011Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 29 , 245 P.3d 184 . ¶ 66 The first prong of this test "requires the court to consider `the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.'" ASC Utah, Inc., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 30 , 245 P.3d 184 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 26 , 40 P.3d 599 ).

2008Because Applegate does not challenge the scope of the detention following the initial stop, we only address the first prong of the test. 10 Under the first prong, a routine traffic stop is justified at the inception "if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2007As such, we address only the first prong of the two-part test. 112 Under the first prong of the test, a traffic stop is justified at its inception when "the stop is 'Incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence."" Id. (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct.App.1990)).

2025“In determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal, we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Aguirre-Juarez, 2014 UT App 212, ¶ 6 , 335 P.3d 896 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 341 P.3d 253 (Utah 2014). 20220410-CA 10 2025 UT App 26 State v. Moore ANALYSIS ¶28 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Was

2025“In determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal, we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Aguirre-Juarez, 2014 UT App 212, ¶ 6 , 335 P.3d 896 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 341 P.3d 253 (Utah 2014). 20220410-CA 10 2025 UT App 26 State v. Moore ANALYSIS ¶28 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Was

2025“In determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal, we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Aguirre-Juarez, 2014 UT App 212, ¶ 6 , 335 P.3d 896 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 341 P.3d 253 (Utah 2014). 20220410-CA 10 2025 UT App 26 State v. Moore ANALYSIS ¶28 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Was

2025“Because of the temptation to second-guess trial counsel’s decisions with the benefit of hindsight, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential and courts must acknowledge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 32 , 342 P.3d 182 (quotation simplified); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.

2025“Because of the temptation to second-guess trial counsel’s decisions with the benefit of hindsight, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential and courts must acknowledge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 32 , 342 P.3d 182 (quotation simplified); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.

2023Id. at 1030 . ¶31 While there was ample evidence that Michele’s association with the three companies satisfied the first prong of the test, the court concluded that Michele had failed on the second prong because she could not demonstrate that “observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.” See id. ¶32 Michele had contended that the Appellees would be unjustly enriched by the observance of the corporate form because they would receive the benefit of her paying for taxes and repairs to the properties.

2023Id. at 1030 . ¶31 While there was ample evidence that Michele’s association with the three companies satisfied the first prong of the test, the court concluded that Michele had failed on the second prong because she could not demonstrate that “observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.” See id. ¶32 Michele had contended that the Appellees would be unjustly enriched by the observance of the corporate form because they would receive the benefit of her paying for taxes and repairs to the properties.

2023The first prong of this test “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . “[T]he defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688 . 20220276-CA 14 2023 UT App 77 State v. Hararah ¶28 The second prong “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687.

2023The district court rejected this argument by noting that it was “not enough that a benefit was conferred on the [Appellees], rather, the enrichment to the [Appellees] must be unjust in that [they] received a true windfall or ‘something for nothing.’” (Quoting Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 29 , 222 P.3d 69 , aff’d, 2012 UT 14 , 274 P.3d 911 .) The district court 20210636-CA 17 2023 UT App 135 In re Agusta National Trust #1 explained that money from the mortgages “in no way benefitted” the Agusta Trust because the money was used by Ken to repay debts he incurred “for his benefit.” The co

2023The district court rejected this argument by noting that it was “not enough that a benefit was conferred on the [Appellees], rather, the enrichment to the [Appellees] must be unjust in that [they] received a true windfall or ‘something for nothing.’” (Quoting Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 29 , 222 P.3d 69 , aff’d, 2012 UT 14 , 274 P.3d 911 .) The district court 20210636-CA 17 2023 UT App 135 In re Agusta National Trust #1 explained that money from the mortgages “in no way benefitted” the Agusta Trust because the money was used by Ken to repay debts he incurred “for his benefit.” The co

2023The district court rejected this argument by noting that it was “not enough that a benefit was conferred on the [Appellees], rather, the enrichment to the [Appellees] must be unjust in that [they] received a true windfall or ‘something for nothing.’” (Quoting Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 29 , 222 P.3d 69 , aff’d, 2012 UT 14 , 274 P.3d 911 .) The district court 20210636-CA 17 2023 UT App 135 In re Agusta National Trust #1 explained that money from the mortgages “in no way benefitted” the Agusta Trust because the money was used by Ken to repay debts he incurred “for his benefit.” The co

2023The district court rejected this argument by noting that it was “not enough that a benefit was conferred on the [Appellees], rather, the enrichment to the [Appellees] must be unjust in that [they] received a true windfall or ‘something for nothing.’” (Quoting Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 29 , 222 P.3d 69 , aff’d, 2012 UT 14 , 274 P.3d 911 .) The district court 20210636-CA 17 2023 UT App 135 In re Agusta National Trust #1 explained that money from the mortgages “in no way benefitted” the Agusta Trust because the money was used by Ken to repay debts he incurred “for his benefit.” The co

2023The district court rejected this argument by noting that it was “not enough that a benefit was conferred on the [Appellees], rather, the enrichment to the [Appellees] must be unjust in that [they] received a true windfall or ‘something for nothing.’” (Quoting Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 29 , 222 P.3d 69 , aff’d, 2012 UT 14 , 274 P.3d 911 .) The district court 20210636-CA 17 2023 UT App 135 In re Agusta National Trust #1 explained that money from the mortgages “in no way benefitted” the Agusta Trust because the money was used by Ken to repay debts he incurred “for his benefit.” The co

2021Seach does not appeal his conviction for aggravated assault against Father, acknowledging in his brief that, even if counsel had performed deficiently by failing to object to certain jury instructions, any shortcomings in counsel’s performance did not prejudice him with regard to the count involving Father. 20190457-CA 8 2021 UT App 22 State v. Seach ¶ 35, 462 P.3d 350 , and “requires the defendant to show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,’” State v. Grunwald, 2020 UT 40 , ¶ 19, 478 P.3d 1 (quot

2021Generally, sex-change petitions—just like name-change petitions—should be granted if they are not ―sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose.‖ See In re Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 8 .

2020We agree. ¶19 Under the standard the United States Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington, a court may disturb a criminal conviction based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel only where the criminal defendant shows (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the [criminal defendant’s] defense.”11 The first prong of this analysis requires the defendant to show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”12 And the sec

2020Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 20190235-CA 7 2020 UT App 135 State v. Anderson assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17 , 467 P.3d 912 . ¶19 Under the first prong of the test, “we apply the deficiency standard announced in Strickland and ask whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 41 , 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 (stating that courts “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney performed in an obje

2020Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 20190235-CA 7 2020 UT App 135 State v. Anderson assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17 , 467 P.3d 912 . ¶19 Under the first prong of the test, “we apply the deficiency standard announced in Strickland and ask whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 41 , 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 (stating that courts “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney performed in an obje

2020Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 20190235-CA 7 2020 UT App 135 State v. Anderson assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17 , 467 P.3d 912 . ¶19 Under the first prong of the test, “we apply the deficiency standard announced in Strickland and ask whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 41 , 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 (stating that courts “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney performed in an obje

2020Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 20190235-CA 7 2020 UT App 135 State v. Anderson assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17 , 467 P.3d 912 . ¶19 Under the first prong of the test, “we apply the deficiency standard announced in Strickland and ask whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 41 , 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 (stating that courts “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney performed in an obje

2020Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 20190235-CA 7 2020 UT App 135 State v. Anderson assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17 , 467 P.3d 912 . ¶19 Under the first prong of the test, “we apply the deficiency standard announced in Strickland and ask whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 41 , 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 (stating that courts “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney performed in an obje

2019Eyre fails to meet the first prong in this case. ¶14 “To evaluate whether trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the jury instructions, we must first consider whether those instructions were legally correct.” State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ¶ 12 , 355 P.3d 1078 .

2019Eyre fails to meet the first prong in this case. ¶14 “To evaluate whether trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the jury instructions, we must first consider whether those instructions were legally correct.” State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ¶ 12 , 355 P.3d 1078 .

2019“To prevail on the first prong of the test, a defendant must identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel’s representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quotation simplified).

2018"We do not sit as a second trier of fact: It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Boyd , 2001 UT 30 , ¶ 16, 25 P.3d 985 (emphasis omitted) (quotation simplified); see also State v. Pendergrass , 803 P.2d 1261 , 1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("We defer to the jury because a jury is in the best position to give proper weight to the peripheral nature of any contradictory testimony." (quotation simplified) ). ¶46 Importantly for this case, "[a] conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Ut

2018"We do not sit as a second trier of fact: It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Boyd , 2001 UT 30 , ¶ 16, 25 P.3d 985 (emphasis omitted) (quotation simplified); see also State v. Pendergrass , 803 P.2d 1261 , 1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("We defer to the jury because a jury is in the best position to give proper weight to the peripheral nature of any contradictory testimony." (quotation simplified) ). ¶46 Importantly for this case, "[a] conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Ut

2018Thus, the existence of a "special legal relationship" alone, without a showing that the relationship necessarily implicates a plaintiff's emotional well-being, won't satisfy the first prong of this test. 18 At first blush, it may seem this test is inconsistent with our decision in Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health Care , 1999 UT 102 , 990 P.2d 384 .

2018Thus, the existence of a "special legal relationship" alone, without a showing that the relationship necessarily implicates a plaintiff's emotional well-being, won't satisfy the first prong of this test. 18 At first blush, it may seem this test is inconsistent with our decision in Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health Care , 1999 UT 102 , 990 P.2d 384 .

2018All three prongs must be satisfied for a duty to refrain from causing severe emotional distress to exist. 16 ¶ 81 The first prong of this test ensures that the relationship, activity, or undertaking is one that's "fraught with the risk of emotional harm" to the plaintiff. 17 Vincent v. DeVries , 193 Vt. 574 , 72 A.3d 886 , 893 (2013) (citations omitted).

2018All three prongs must be satisfied for a duty to refrain from causing severe emotional distress to exist. 16 ¶ 81 The first prong of this test ensures that the relationship, activity, or undertaking is one that's "fraught with the risk of emotional harm" to the plaintiff. 17 Vincent v. DeVries , 193 Vt. 574 , 72 A.3d 886 , 893 (2013) (citations omitted).

2018This prong can be met only in those very limited "situations where the emotional well-being of others is at the core of, or is necessarily implicated by, the [relationship, activity, or] undertaking." Hedgepeth , 22 A.3d at 814 .

2018On the first prong of that test, "we give substantial deference to the jury." State v. Ashcraft , 2015 UT 5 , ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 .

2018On the first prong of that test, "we give substantial deference to the jury." State v. Ashcraft , 2015 UT 5 , ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 .