consent defense in New Jersey

2012Notwithstanding, our Court, based upon Article 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, has determined that "[a]s a general rule, after an indictment and before arraignment, prosecutors or their representatives should not initiate a conversation with defendants without the consent of defense counsel." State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277 , 609 A. 2d 400 (1992). [5] *622 In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 289-90 , 645 A. 2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 , 115 S.Ct. 751 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 651 (1995), however, decided two years after Sanchez , the Court rejected defendant's contention

2012Notwithstanding, our Court, based upon Article 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, has determined that "[a]s a general rule, after an indictment and before arraignment, prosecutors or their representatives should not initiate a conversation with defendants without the consent of defense counsel." State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277 , 609 A. 2d 400 (1992). [5] *622 In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 289-90 , 645 A. 2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 , 115 S.Ct. 751 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 651 (1995), however, decided two years after Sanchez , the Court rejected defendant's contention

2012Notwithstanding, our Court, based upon Article 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, has determined that "[a]s a general rule, after an indictment and before arraignment, prosecutors or their representatives should not initiate a conversation with defendants without the consent of defense counsel." State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277 , 609 A. 2d 400 (1992). [5] *622 In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 289-90 , 645 A. 2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 , 115 S.Ct. 751 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 651 (1995), however, decided two years after Sanchez , the Court rejected defendant's contention

2008On the other hand, prior to indictment, “prosecutors or their representatives, including the police, properly may interrogate a suspect without the consent of defense counsel ... after the State has filed or issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant against that suspect.” The Court has chosen not to extend Sanchez to apply to preindictment proceedings concluding, “‘the federal constitution’s safeguards ... are entirely adequate.’ ” A.G.D., supra, 178 N.J. at 65 , 835 A.2d 291 (quoting State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 291 , 645 A.2d 111 (1994) (non-waivable right to counsel not extended to pe

2012Notwithstanding, our Court, based upon Article 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, has determined that "[a]s a general rule, after an indictment and before arraignment, prosecutors or their representatives should not initiate a conversation with defendants without the consent of defense counsel." State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277 , 609 A. 2d 400 (1992). [5] *622 In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 289-90 , 645 A. 2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 , 115 S.Ct. 751 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 651 (1995), however, decided two years after Sanchez , the Court rejected defendant's contention

2008On the other hand, prior to indictment, “prosecutors or their representatives, including the police, properly may interrogate a suspect without the consent of defense counsel ... after the State has filed or issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant against that suspect.” The Court has chosen not to extend Sanchez to apply to preindictment proceedings concluding, “‘the federal constitution’s safeguards ... are entirely adequate.’ ” A.G.D., supra, 178 N.J. at 65 , 835 A.2d 291 (quoting State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 291 , 645 A.2d 111 (1994) (non-waivable right to counsel not extended to pe

2012Notwithstanding, our Court, based upon Article 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, has determined that "[a]s a general rule, after an indictment and before arraignment, prosecutors or their representatives should not initiate a conversation with defendants without the consent of defense counsel." State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277 , 609 A. 2d 400 (1992). [5] *622 In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 289-90 , 645 A. 2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 , 115 S.Ct. 751 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 651 (1995), however, decided two years after Sanchez , the Court rejected defendant's contention

2008On the other hand, prior to indictment, “prosecutors or their representatives, including the police, properly may interrogate a suspect without the consent of defense counsel ... after the State has filed or issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant against that suspect.” The Court has chosen not to extend Sanchez to apply to preindictment proceedings concluding, “‘the federal constitution’s safeguards ... are entirely adequate.’ ” A.G.D., supra, 178 N.J. at 65 , 835 A.2d 291 (quoting State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 291 , 645 A.2d 111 (1994) (non-waivable right to counsel not extended to pe

2008On the other hand, prior to indictment, “prosecutors or their representatives, including the police, properly may interrogate a suspect without the consent of defense counsel ... after the State has filed or issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant against that suspect.” The Court has chosen not to extend Sanchez to apply to preindictment proceedings concluding, “‘the federal constitution’s safeguards ... are entirely adequate.’ ” A.G.D., supra, 178 N.J. at 65 , 835 A.2d 291 (quoting State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 291 , 645 A.2d 111 (1994) (non-waivable right to counsel not extended to pe

2008On the other hand, prior to indictment, “prosecutors or their representatives, including the police, properly may interrogate a suspect without the consent of defense counsel ... after the State has filed or issued a criminal complaint or arrest warrant against that suspect.” The Court has chosen not to extend Sanchez to apply to preindictment proceedings concluding, “‘the federal constitution’s safeguards ... are entirely adequate.’ ” A.G.D., supra, 178 N.J. at 65 , 835 A.2d 291 (quoting State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 291 , 645 A.2d 111 (1994) (non-waivable right to counsel not extended to pe

2025Ibid.

2024Nevertheless, when it decided Pena-Flores, the Court did not expect that the rejection of the automobile exception would lead to police dependency on consent searches. [Witt, 223 N.J. at 442-44 .] Accordingly, in interpreting and applying Witt's location restriction, we must be careful not to inadvertently create practical incentives for police to resort again to the consent doctrine to justify on-the-spot searches.

2020State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 39 (2018). "[U]nder Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution an y consent given by an individual to a police officer to conduct a warrantless search must be given knowingly and voluntarily." State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002), modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002).

2019The A-0898-17T4 10 Court found the State violated the defendant's state law right against self- incrimination because the prosecutor had not just pointed out inconsistencies; the prosecutor "called for the jury to reject the consent defense because defendant remained silent when he had the opportunity to present it to the police." Id. at 566 .

2017Super. 584, 598 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 159 N.J. 584 (1999) (holding, by contrast, that a consent instruction was necessary, given the factual dispute 26 A-1518-14T4 concerning the mental capacity of the alleged victim to engage in the sexual conduct, and where the State did not allege that the defendant had used force or violence).

2017Super. 584, 598 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 159 N.J. 584 (1999) (holding, by contrast, that a consent instruction was necessary, given the factual dispute 26 A-1518-14T4 concerning the mental capacity of the alleged victim to engage in the sexual conduct, and where the State did not allege that the defendant had used force or violence).

2000In such circumstances, the notification requirement becomes, in effect, a consent requirement."); Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F. 2d 1127 , 1132 (7th Cir.1983) ("Although notification requirements do not give parents the legal power to veto their daughter's abortion decision, as a practical matter they may.").

1999The Baird Court disapproved a premise enunciated in Lombardo v. Borsky, 298 N.J.Super. 658 , 690 A. 2d 150 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 150 N.J. 28 , 695 A. 2d 671 (1997), and appeal dismissed, 153 N.J. 44 , 707 A. 2d 149 (1998), "that a medical malpractice claim differs so fundamentally from one based on the failure to obtain a patient's informed consent that the statute of limitations on the consent claim should start running on a date different from that applicable to the medical malpractice claim" and thus the Baird Court overruled Lombardo. 155 N.J. at 70 , 713 A. 2d 1019 . *524 A complai

1999The Baird Court disapproved a premise enunciated in Lombardo v. Borsky, 298 N.J.Super. 658 , 690 A. 2d 150 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 150 N.J. 28 , 695 A. 2d 671 (1997), and appeal dismissed, 153 N.J. 44 , 707 A. 2d 149 (1998), "that a medical malpractice claim differs so fundamentally from one based on the failure to obtain a patient's informed consent that the statute of limitations on the consent claim should start running on a date different from that applicable to the medical malpractice claim" and thus the Baird Court overruled Lombardo. 155 N.J. at 70 , 713 A. 2d 1019 . *524 A complai

1999The Baird Court disapproved a premise enunciated in Lombardo v. Borsky, 298 N.J.Super. 658 , 690 A. 2d 150 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 150 N.J. 28 , 695 A. 2d 671 (1997), and appeal dismissed, 153 N.J. 44 , 707 A. 2d 149 (1998), "that a medical malpractice claim differs so fundamentally from one based on the failure to obtain a patient's informed consent that the statute of limitations on the consent claim should start running on a date different from that applicable to the medical malpractice claim" and thus the Baird Court overruled Lombardo. 155 N.J. at 70 , 713 A. 2d 1019 . *524 A complai

1999The Baird Court disapproved a premise enunciated in Lombardo v. Borsky, 298 N.J.Super. 658 , 690 A. 2d 150 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 150 N.J. 28 , 695 A. 2d 671 (1997), and appeal dismissed, 153 N.J. 44 , 707 A. 2d 149 (1998), "that a medical malpractice claim differs so fundamentally from one based on the failure to obtain a patient's informed consent that the statute of limitations on the consent claim should start running on a date different from that applicable to the medical malpractice claim" and thus the Baird Court overruled Lombardo. 155 N.J. at 70 , 713 A. 2d 1019 . *524 A complai