consent requirement in Illinois

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to the warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194 , -7- 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances ex

1991In People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534 , 322 N.E.2d 447 , our supreme court criticized the consent requirement of section 11 — 501 and recognized that police officers may constitutionally seize bodily substances from a defendant when probable cause is present and the evidence may quickly dissipate: “This is an unfortunate result and a cruel anomaly.

1991In People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534 , 322 N.E.2d 447 , our supreme court criticized the consent requirement of section 11 — 501 and recognized that police officers may constitutionally seize bodily substances from a defendant when probable cause is present and the evidence may quickly dissipate: “This is an unfortunate result and a cruel anomaly.

1987The Supreme Court held in Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , that the officers' nonconsensual extraction of the defendant's blood for chemical alcohol analysis did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination. *1051 The Illinois Appellate Court cited Weissinger, Schmerber and the consent requirement of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code in People v. Hoffner (1981), 99 Ill.

1987The Supreme Court held in Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , that the officers' nonconsensual extraction of the defendant's blood for chemical alcohol analysis did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination. *1051 The Illinois Appellate Court cited Weissinger, Schmerber and the consent requirement of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code in People v. Hoffner (1981), 99 Ill.

1982“The consent requirement in section 610(b)(2) is intended to ensure that the custodian acquiesced in the transfer of physical custody (e.g., to discourage non-custodial kidnapping) and the integration into the family of the petitioner, and should be viewed in that narrow context.” In re Custody of Burnett (1979), 75 Ill.

1982"The consent requirement in section 610(b)(2) is intended to ensure that the custodian acquiesced in the transfer of physical custody ( e.g., to discourage non-custodial kidnapping) and the integration into the family of the petitioner, and should be viewed in that narrow context." In re Custody of Burnett (1979), 75 Ill.

2023IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63A stated that the word “consent” meant a “freely given agreement to the act of [(sexual penetration) (sexual conduct)] in question.” The second sentence of the instruction, however, stated that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the defendant [or the victim’s manner of dress] shall not constitute consent.” Id. ¶ 66 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel indicated he was not asking for IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63, explaining that, given the way the case had gone, he did

2023IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63A stated that the word “consent” meant a “freely given agreement to the act of [(sexual penetration) (sexual conduct)] in question.” The second sentence of the instruction, however, stated that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the defendant [or the victim’s manner of dress] shall not constitute consent.” Id. ¶ 66 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel indicated he was not asking for IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63, explaining that, given the way the case had gone, he did

2008The court reasoned the purpose of the consent requirement was to protect the pensioner’s constitutional rights, and if a trial court could order the participant to consent, the requirement “would be rendered meaningless.” Menken, 334 Ill.

2008The court reasoned the purpose of the consent requirement was to protect the pensioner's constitutional rights, and if a trial court could order the participant to consent, the requirement "would be rendered meaningless." Menken, 334 Ill.

2006Krotke, 26 Ill.

2006Krotke, 26 Ill.

2002Cahoon v. Alton Packaging Corp., 148 Ill.

2002Cahoon v. Alton Packaging Corp. , 148 Ill.

2001The several provisions of section 3 of the Act which address the consent requirement would be superfluous if the failure to obtain the husband’s written consent would not affect the legal status of the individuals involved.” Witbeck, 281 Ill.

2001The several provisions of section 3 of the Act which address the consent requirement would be superfluous if the failure to obtain the husband's written consent would not affect the legal status of the individuals involved." Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281 Ill.App.3d at 506 , 217 Ill.Dec. 329 , 667 N.E.2d 122 .

1989If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 ), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” National Discount, 99 Ill.

1989If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 ), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” National Discount, 99 Ill.

1989If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 ), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” National Discount, 99 Ill.

1981If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Firemans Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 ,132 Cal Rptr. 907), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.

1989If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 ), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” National Discount, 99 Ill.

1981If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Firemans Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 ,132 Cal Rptr. 907), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.

1989If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk (Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d 287 ; National American Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1125 ), or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss (University of Judaism v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1976), 61 Cal. App. 3d 937 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 907 ), the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” National Discount, 99 Ill.

1987If in fact the breach of the policy provision does not increase the insurer’s risk [citations], or if the insurer would have routinely approved the assignment had it been presented before loss [citation], the plaintiff may still recover on the policy for its own loss.” 99 Ill.

2026Kline, 2024 IL App (1st) 221595, ¶ 61 . ¶ 68 On appeal, defendant recognizes that trial counsel pursued a consent defense based on M.M.’s testimony that she “agreed” to have sexual intercourse with defendant.

2025Reckers, 251 Ill.

2023App. 3d 881 (2010), People v. Bailey, 374 Ill.